TNAG-0011-FCO40-47-Kowloon-disturbances-1967 — Page 111

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

CONFIDENTIAL

Ministry of Defence.

The main argument for offering an apology or an explanation

to the Chinese was that it was our present policy to do our utmost

to avoid provoking Peking into taking any tougher action against

Hong Kong and we could best achieve this by making it clear to

Peking that the two shallow overflights had been wholly accidental

and in no way provocative.

This would demonstrate that we

intended to act strictly in accordance with the rules, which was

the message we would like to get over to the more sensible elements

in the Chinese leadership. To admit an infringement of foreign

territory would, I understand, also be in accordance with our

normal practice in such cases.

5.

6.

Against this were the arguments that:-

(a) British public opinion would find it difficult to

understand that when we made a small and accidental

navigational error we rushed in to apologise to

Peking, whereas the Chinese having committed gross

indignities against our representatives in Chine

and abused our authorities in London and Hong Kong,

rejected our protests and justified their completely

unacceptable behaviour.

(b) Peking would publicise our apology as an attempt

to cover up a deliberate provocation.

(c) Peking would also publicise any apology as an

abject surrender. This would not help to maintain

public morale in Hong Kong.

On balance we considered that we should not take any initiativ

in raising this matter with Peking. If, however, Peking protested

to Mr. Hopson or publicised the incident, we thought we should

CONFIDENTIAL

/authoris

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