TNAG-0010-FCO40-46-Kowloon-disturbances-1986 — Page 204

CC..

SECRET

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

22 May, 1967.

Cypher

D.

#

R. 22

FLASH SECRET

No. 662.

11002

9

2.3

MAY

2

114

RECEIVED IN

ARCHIVES No. 63

2 3 Ark 190/

HWAY/17

Addressed to Commonwealth office. Repeated " POLAD Singapore No. 115.

" Peking No. 248.

"Washington No. 129. (S. of S.

please pass FLASH to Singapore and Peking and PRIORITY to Washington).

My telegram No. 641.

Hong Kong Disturbances.

77B

Over the past two days the situation has deteriorated. There has been an increase in the number of violent incidents, particularly in the central area of Hong Kong; and known pro-communist elements have been involved in many of these. An important feature has been the continuous broadcasting from the Bank of China (which has not opened for business today) of incitements to violence against Government and Europeans generally, including such slogans as "kill Trench", "police turn your weapons (i.e. against your Officers)". The pro-Communist press is giving full and approving accounts of violent action by demonstrators and calling for their extension. There have been token strikes today by the bus companies and taxis,

2. The key to the situation here is the maintenance of public confidence and especially police morale. The police have stood up very well to the harassments of the last few days, but there are two adverse factors in the situation: (a) fatigue which is now beginning to tell on them; and (b) the constant barrage of Communist propaganda directed specifically to the subversion and intimidation of the rank and file. We believe that Communist tactics over the next few days will be to create incidents in several places at once, so as to extend the police while maintaining the propaganda barrage. Public morale is still holding surprising well, but there is increasing interference with daily life; and there are signs that unless we are seen to take effective action to control the situation, instead of simply acting to block individual communist initiatives, public confidence will slip. A landslide could quickly follow.

13.

R..

27A

SECRET

RE:

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