TNAG-0010-FCO40-46-Kowloon-disturbances-1986 — Page 110

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PRIORITY WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NO.1751

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TO FOREIGN OFFICE

24 MAY 1967

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO.1751 OF 24 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION (PRIORITY) TO HONG KONG AND ROUTINE TO PEKING AND POLAD SINGAPORE.

(10MY TELEGRAM NO.1697: DISTURBANCES IN HONG KONG.

IN FURTHER GENERAL DISCUSSION TODAY THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR CONCERNED (DON AL D) SAID THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD MORE OR LESS REACHED THE CONCLUSION THAT, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE NO (NO) SIGNS OF ANY DECISION TO DAMP DOWN THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER IN HONG KONG ITSELF, PERHAPS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT FEATURE OF RECENT DAYS, AND A HOPEFUL ONE, HAD BEEN THE REMARKABLE ABSENCE OF PUBLIC SUPPORT FROM PEKING. THE AMERICANS HAD NOT (NOT) AT THAT STAGE HEARD OF THE NCNA ARTICLES REPORTED IN PEKING TELEGRAM NO.563, AND DONALD AGREED THAT THE DECISION TO PUBLISH SUCH INFLAMMATORY FALSEHOODS WAS DISTINCTLY OMINOUS. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT HE WOULD NOT (NOT) ATTACH TOO MUCH SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ARTICLES IN ISOLATION: THEY DID NOT INCLUDE ANY PUBLIC REITERATION OF THE DEMANDS: AND THE IMPORTANT QUESTION WOULD BE WHETHER THE CHINESE NOW SUSTAINED SUCH A TONE.

2. OTHER STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS HAVE SINCE TENDED TO WRITE DOWN RATHER FURTHER THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE PARTICULAR REPORTS, POINTING OUT THAT THEY ECHO SCURRILITY IN SOME PROVINCIAL PAPERS ALSO, BUT NEED NOT (NOT) NECESSARILY IN THEMSELVES LEAD TO ANY PARTICULAR ACTION BY THE CHINESE.

3. DONALD, LIKE THE GOVERNOR, EXPECTED LEFT WING EXPREMISTS IN HONG KONG TO PURSUE FURTHER EFFORTS AT DISRUPTION THROUGH UNIONS AND INDUSTRY: HE FEARED THAT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT INDEED FOR THEM TO ACCEPT THE BAN ON MEETINGS.

4. DONALD AGREED WITH A SUGGESTION THAT THE EXTREME CHINESE MEASURES IN SHANGHAI MIGHT TIE IN WITH ACCUMULATING INDICATIONS OF GREAT DIFFICULTIES FOR THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION IN THE PROVINCES,

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RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 63;

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