}
being able physically to deport them. We are
advised that they might well not be accepted at
the border, and that therefore we might lose face.
But we must rely upon your judgment to weigh up the
various factors here. As you say this weapon
should not be used lightly and I assume that you
would begin with only two or three key leaders at
a time. You have authority to go ahead if the
situation deteriorates but please keep me informed
of any action you take.
4. We also agree that if the Communist press
continues to carry out or step up the campaign of
sedition and intimidation you should use your
emergency regulations to close down the printing
presses. I would, however, wish to be consulted
before any action is actually taken.
5. With reference to paragraph 1 of your
telegram 691, it is appreciated that any decisions
on action against the N.C.N.A. must fully take
into account the position in Hong Kong.
6.
I agree with views expressed in paragraphs 2
and 3. We had already thought of taking up with
the Americans a reduction of their use of Hong
Kong on the lines you suggest and this will be
pursued.
7. It was not in any case intended to make any
announcement about the decision to withdraw a major
unit (your paragraph 7) till later in the year and,
prior to your present troubles, the position was
to have been reviewed in June in the light of the
situation
(8430) Dd,033246 600m 9/66 G.W.B.Ltd. Gp.963
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