TNAG-0009-FCO40-45-Kowloon-disturbances-1967 — Page 68

may try to instigate, but at the same time to avoid so far as possible action which could be regarded as unnecessarily provocative. While I realise that in their present mood they will castigate any measures you take as provocative, I think it would probably be wise

Pro-Communist to avoid prosecutions against the Left Wing press for e.g. sedition, which is usually difficult to prove and generally provides considerable opportunities for

propaganda. The actual measures to be taken to deal with the situation at any given time must continue to

be a matter of most careful judgment. I know that you will remain in the closest touch with us, and continue

to consult with us about the actual choice of measures.

4. While continuing to show firmness in maintaining

law and order, we must obviously continue with our efforts to maintain contact with the Left Wing, with a

view to making clear to them that we are not prepared to face a Macau-type compromise. I agree with you (paragraph 5 of your telegram No. 609) that there is just a chance that by taking a very firm line, avoiding any unnecessary provocation but explaining our policy clearly to the C. P.G., there may be some prospect of inducing a change of Chinese attitude which would enable both sides to disengage without loss of authority on our part. I feel that, however difficult the outlook may be right now, we must keep to this course for so long as there is any chance of success. We do not altogether rule out that we may have to start a dxxx dialogue on these lines with the Chinese in Peking, (because of the calibre of Chinese

representation here there would be no point in our attempting this in London). But, as you know, such a dialogue would introduce several large complications, and for the time being at any rate we still think that the best hope of getting the message through to the Chinese lies in your using your local channels.

5.

It would be very helpful to me to have your assessment of the ability of Hong Kong to cope with an all-out confrontation by the C.P.G. short of armed intervention, i.e. widespread disorders in the Colony coupled with the cutting off of Hong Kong's water and food supplies from the mainland, and your assessment

of the effect on the morale of the Hong Kong Chinese

if this situation lasted for some time.

Could you

organise