Cypher
SECRET
OUTWARD TELEGRAM
FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
TO HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
Sent 17 May, 1967. 1950Z
IMMEDIATE SECRET
No. 944.
Draj V Below
기
11
Following from Commonwealth Secretary.
Kowloon disturbances.
I shall shortly be asking my colleagues to consider the issues raised in paragraph 4 of your telegram No. 600. 20 But I should like to give you my own thoughts at this stage, and there are certain points on which I need your assessment.
-
20
I am sure our intention must be to remain in Hong Kong as long as it is physically possible for us to retain control of the situation. I wholeheartedly endorse your own conclusion that we should not accept a Macao-type compromise.
3. While we must obviously avoid an all-out confrontation with the C.P.G. if this can possibly be avoided, I recognise that this is unfortunately a risk in herent in the situation. I think therefore that our policy must be to continue to deal firmly with any disorders which the Communists may try to instigate, but at the same time to avoid so far as possible action which could be regarded as unnecessarily provocative. While I realise that in their present mood they will castigate any measures you take as provocative, I think it would probably be wise to avoid prosecutions against the pro- Communist press for e.g. sedition, which is usually difficult to prove and generally provides considerable opportunities for propaganda. The actual measures to be taken to deal with the situation at any given time must continue to be a matter of most careful judgment. I know that you will remain in the closest touch with us, and continue to consult with us about the actual choice of measures.
40 While continuing to show firmness in maintaining law and order, we must obviously continue with our efforts to maintain contact with the Left Wing, with a view to making clear to them that we are not prepared to face a Macao-type compromise. I agree with you (paragraph 5 of your telegram 35 No. 609) that there is just a chance that by taking a very
firm line, avoiding any unnecessary provocation but explaining our policy clearly to the C.P.G., there may be some prospect of inducing a change of Chinese attitude which would enable both sides to disengage without loss of authority on our part. I feel that, however difficult the outlook may be right now, we must keep to this course for so long as there is any chance of success. We do not altogether rule out that we may have to start a dialogue on these lines with the Chinese in
/Peking
20
8283
SECRET
AQ
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.