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5.
The alternative policy, of taking a firm but reasonable line in resistance to the demands, of course carries major risks i.e. of renewed violence, probably on an increased scale, which in the long run we might find ourselves unable to control; and finally of physical intervention by the G.P.G. on the other hand, there is just a chance that if we took a very firm line, offering no provocation but explaining our policy clearly to the C.P.G. there might be some prospect of inducing a change of Chinese attitude. It remains hard to believe that at the present time the C.P.G. could really welcome the prospect of a military clash in Hong Kong or indeed of having to take Hong Kong over, thus losing its economic and other advantages.
6.
A possible line of action might now be to explain our position clearly and in forthright terms to the C.P.G., preferably in London. Our reply might start by stating our refusal to accept the Chinese allegations of atrocities" (there is plenty of evidence that the police acted with great restraint throughout) and saying that the action that was taken in no way aimed either at the workers or the left-wing whose activities in Hong Kong have always been permitted provided that they remained within the law. The intention of the Hong Kong Government is, and remains, solely to uphold the law, which is published and accessible to all and equally applicable to all members of the community. The C.P.G. must realise that unless the law is upheld and public order maintained the interests of all the population of Hong Kong will suffer. H.M.G. are therefore unable to understand the arguments in the statements of the M.F.A.
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A reply in these reasonable, though firm, terms would for the moment preclude drastic action against the left-wing of the sort suggested in paragraph 4 of my telegram No.600, since this would be going further than the maintenance of the existing law. But at the moment it seems that a seizure by us of the initiative along those lines would in the immediate future destroy any slim chances there may be of reaching a reasonable solution; and though preparations for such action are being made they should not in my view be put into operation except as a last resort in the event of a further breach of the law by the left.
8.
It now seems essential that I should know as soon as possible whether Ministers would wish me to seek a compromise along the lines of the four demands; or whether they would favour a firmer line as in paragraph 6. In any case, there is no longer any possibility of treating this as a labour dispute, and hence a visit by Foggon would not in my view serve a useful purpose. On the other hand, 30 soon as Ministers have reached a decision on the point in paragraph 7 above, it would be most helpful if a senior official could come out here immediately to give me the fullest possible picture of what is in their minds,
(Passed as requested)
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