TNAG-0005-FCO40-41-Departmental-briefs-about-Hong-Kong-1968 — Page 33

CONFIDENTIAL

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success in, India. Sino-Pakistan relations flourished in direct contrast. Russia is courting Pakistan sufficiently to make India apprehensive. Both India and Pakistan have been very wary of taking Russia too much to task over Czechoslovakia. Can Russia, by supplanting Chinese influence in Pakistan, achieve a position of dominant influence in both countries of the sub-continent? Would they accept this position or do they feel the need for support from whichever of China or Russia is not supporting the other? Is Russia interested in the sub- continent only to the extent that she thinks it necessary to attempt to limit Chinese expansion; or is she also interested in seeking to extend her influence over at least India in the hope of encouraging the eventual establishment of an Indian socialist state?

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In South East Asia, Russia will feel obliged to combat Chinese influence, so long as her relations with China remain bad. She will certainly not be content to see a Chinese hegemony established in the wake of any withdrawal of the Western military presence. She will probably seek to bolster the various nationalisms against Chinese penetration. To that negative extent, how far are her aims the same as those of the West? And is there any scope for discreet cooperation with her?

22. It is early yet to gauge the effect of recent events in Czechoslovakia on Russia's Asian policies. Will she become so preoccupied with maintaining her hold on Eastern Europe, by military and economic means, that she will be compelled to pull in her horns in Asia, even if her rivalry with China continues? For the moment, the Czech crisis seems unlikely to affect Soviet aid to North Vietnam or Hanoi's attitude to the Paris peace talks or its conduct of the war.

Japan

23. How is China likely to view Japan in the 70s? As the only Asian power which could be the mainstay of a grouping of non-communist states, a hostile containing ring?

As too politically timid to do other than conciliate China's ambitions? As interested primarily in China's enormous potential as a market and a source, therefore, of financial and technical aid when China is again confident enough to allow such intrusion.

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24. In which of these roles indeed do the Japanese see themselves? Most probably in the last. To some extent lulled by their cultural affinity with China, the latter's economic backwardness and the American nuclear guarantee, the Japanese do not regard China as basically aggressive and think that her intransigence will gradually be broken down by the soft response of economically strong neighbours. To that end Japan will probably pursue a more active role, a rather "higher posture" in promoting Asian economic groupings, which have their beginnings now in an organisation like the Asian Development Bank; she is the only Asian country with the economic strength and experience to take such a lead, though her neighbours would have to be convinced that she was not seeking simply to manipulate their economies for her own ends. The Japanese economy will get stronger and unless there is a world trade recession, she is unlikely to find herself in serious economic difficulties.

25. The West, and especially the United States, may well expect more of Japan in Asia than she is ready to contribute. A Japanese Conservative Government will probably wish to continue the Security Treaty with the United States in 1970 and the American market will continue to provide the fastest growing outlet for Japanese goods. It would not be surprising if, in these circumstances, there was American pressure on Japan to adopt in the 70s a more positive role in Asia, including the defence sphere. How is Japan likely to react to such pressure? Could the strong pacifist feelings of the Japanese and their reluctance to "confront"China lead to a lurch to the Left and a growing friendship with Peking? This seems hardly likely - unless the Japanese were prepared to leave themselves undefended. On the other hand, if Japan could be persuaded to play more than her accepted "Self-Defence"

CONFIDENTIAL