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of peace and, tranquillity if China is to break out of the vicious circle whereby capital investment for industry can only be adequately provided following good harvests and good harvests depend to some extent at least on industry providing the tools and equipment for agriculture.
7.
Whatever strides they make (and nuclear strides will impede those in other directions), the Chinese are likely to find themselves still frustratingly far behind Western achievements and attempts to close that gap will entail the holding down of the standard of living. There will be scope for Western aid and investment (potentially on a vast scale) if the Chinese can bring themselves to accept it and if (which is probably very unlikely) the Western nations, the United States in particular, can be convinced that they will not simply be building up a nation still actively antagonistic to their interests.
8.
As her nuclear power increases, will China be content with its basic deterrent value, bearing in mind that it will always be inferior in this respect to the United States and Russia? Will the current campaign to reform Chinese education by drafting workers and peasants to "take over" universities and schools affect China's advanced technology, including nuclear development. If this section is isolated from the reforms and, as is widely assumed, China acquires ICBMs by the late '70s will these pose a real threat to AB M-protected American and Russian cities or, indeed, to unprotected Western European and Australasian cities? Will it be feasible to protect all those cities? Or will the Chinese ICBM be no more than China's passport into the major league of super-powers?
9. In the decade we are looking at, will we see China emerge into the inter- national comity, for good or ill? Can this be assisted by Western countries, which at present have many common problems in trading and maintaining diplomatic relations with China? In the short term at any rate, such relations seem to bring little benefit; the British experience is, of course, coloured by the existence of Hong Kong but Germany and Japan do substantial trade with China without diplomatic representation. Do we want to assist Chinese emergence or is it best postponed until 'revisionism' has set in? If China joined the United Nations in the next few years, her influence would probably be disruptive but to what extent would her membership reduce her isolation and change her attitudes and eventually her policies?
10. In or out of the U.N., China will continue to exert some influence throughout the world. There are indications that her early efforts in Africa have largely failed as far as influencing the established governments are concerned. But she is likely to go on attracting the adherence of revolutionary intellectuals in the Third World.
11. As far as Asia is concerned, China (unless wholly pre-occupied with civil war) cannot fail to react on her neighbours, among which for the purposes of this paper is included the United States. The possible shape of such reactions is reviewed in the succeeding sections.
United States
12. At the moment, China is contained largely by the conventional and nuclear power of the United States, which is very heavily committed in Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam and Thailand. While having to avoid a direct confrontation with the Americans, the Chinese must aim to eliminate their presence in Asia.
13. To what extent will the Americans wish to remain committed on the mainland, the islands or the horizon of Asia? The domestic political and economic pressures to reduce the commitment will probably remain strong in the long run, even if temporarily diminished they may be by recent Russian action in Czechoslovakia.
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