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2. The other main Treasury argument against agreeing to a refit is that Ark Royal will be available to cover our withdrawals only for
1971 and part of 1970, say 21 months in all. The Defence Secretary's answer (paragraph 2(a) in his minute of 23 February) is that this is
the very period in which a threat to our with-
drawal is most likely. The risk is perhaps not all that great but it is impossible to
Eart of sung
forecast developments in South East Asia in three or four years' time and the Secretary of
State may agree that it is one which we cannot discount without good evidence.
Carriers
played a large part in the Aden withdrawals
and in service opinion might be equally
important in the Far East, particularly in the later stages of our withdrawals when we could
no longer rely on land based air craft.
The Foreign Secretary's minute of 21 February supporting the Defince scenetang, no doubt reflects our Aden experience.
3. Zhe A mismanaged withdrawal would of
course have adverse repercussions on Commonwealth policies not only in Malaysia,
Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand, but
also in Həɔng Kent. The Australians πm)
all of whiny
New Sealanters would be aware of the
risks we were running if we abandoned the
Ark Royal refit. We would require far more
powerful forces than Ark Royal to meet any
direct Chinese threat but the indirect
repercussions on our position in Hong Kong
of a mismanaged withdrawal could be serious,
both in terms of confidence inside the Colony and China's attitude to our presenten there.
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