TNAG-0003-FCO40-39-Commission-of-Enquiry-into-the-Kowloon-disturbances-addition-1968 — Page 93

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PART IV

THE MEASURES TAKEN TO DEAL WITH THE DISTURBANCES

73

271. However, we did examine a detailed written statement summarizing the assistance given by the Army and in reply to our questions we received further information in regard to this from counsel for the Armed Forces, Major A. C. RILEY, DAD/ALS. In addition, both the Commissioner of Police and Mr. SUTCLIFFE answered a number of questions relating to the general principles governing the use of military forces for internal security and the circumstances in which military assistance was called for and given on this occasion.

272. From the information thus made available to us it would appear that the police procedure for obtaining military aid is adequately defined and well under- stood by commanders in the field and that, under the circumstances which prevailed at the time, the decision to ask for military aid was amply justified. Liaison between the police and the military was very effective and the transition to com- bined operations appears to have taken place without interruption in efficiency.

General role in relation to Internal Security

273. The military forces in Hong Kong, both regular and volunteer, are charged with an internal security role together with their other functions, and the manner in which this role is carried out appears to have been thoroughly tested in practice. The basis of the working arrangement between the Police and the Military is laid down in a joint directive on the command of security forces and amplified in the Emergency Manual of the Police Force, both of which documents were supplied to us.

274. The principles on which joint action is based and the steps usually follow- ed may be summarized as follows:

(a) H.Q. Land Forces are informed as soon as a threat to internal security

has arisen.

(b) Arrangements may then be made between Police and Military commanders for joint Pol./Mil. operations rooms to be established and for troops to be prepositioned in readiness. This is a mutual arrangement between the police and military commanders and does not require higher authority. (c) When, in the opinion of the Commissioner of Police, the threat to internal security occasioned by a disturbance renders military aid advisable, he requests the Governor to call on H.M. Forces to aid the civil power, as their deployment is ensured by his authority, though their actual inter- vention in individual instances must be justified by law and dependent on circumstances.

(d) When H.M. Forces have been called in by the Governor, the Police and Military forces work in liaison under a joint H.Q. command. The Police remain primarily responsible for the maintenance of law and order unless

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