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PART IV THE MEASURES TAKEN TO DEAL WITH THE DISTURBANCES
249. Of the total, 18 rounds were fired in connection with the very serious incident in Shaw's Building where there was substantial danger to life and prop- erty and a further 17 shots were fired when small bodies of police were confronted with large bodies of hostile rioters.
250. In nearly all other cases, apart from the category next mentioned, fire arms were used only after warnings, when other measures had failed and deter mined crowds were damaging property, lighting fires and/or stoning the police.
251. A total of 20 rounds of carbine, two sterling and two revolver were fired in Yau Ma Tei and Tsim Sha Tsui districts by Yau Ma Tei company between 1.45 and 3.00 a.m. on April 6/7th to stop bombardments with flower-pots, litter-bins etc. from the roofs and upper floors of multi-storey buildings. These missiles were very dangerous and, in explaining why he thought that the use of firearms was the most effective way of dealing with the bombardments, the Company Commander said:
'The only other steps would have been to have gone up to the rooftop. I know that each of these buildings have a minimum of 17 storeys, huge buildings, many many stairways up and down, several lifts, of course, but you couldn't put a platoon in a lift for instance, so it would have meant climbing up-I considered it was the only way to stop this satisfactorily; in fact, once I had fired, it did stop'. 252. We readily accept the fact that these missiles could have caused serious or fatal injury to anyone being hit from a height of 120 ft. or more and that it would often be impracticable to detach a squad of policemen from the company to go into the building and deal with the offenders. It is to be noted that, in seek- ing to arrest this barrage from the rooftops, the Police would be protecting not only themselves but others in the streets who could also have been seriously injured by so indiscriminate a barrage. We see no reason to question the justifica. tion for the measures adopted.
Conclusion
253. To sum up, the confidence and skill shown by the Police Force in sup- pressing these disturbances with a remarkably small number of casualties is a tribute to the organization and training of the Force. This was the first occasion on which the present emergency organization, evolved from experience in the 1956 riots, had been tested in action and it appears to have done well.
CHAPTER 2.
THE CURFEW
254. It is obvious that in Hong Kong's overcrowded urban areas, the imposi tion of a curfew is a vital weapon in the hands of the security forces charged with preventing and quelling disturbances. Experience in 1956 and again in 1966 has shown how effectively a curfew can aid in the suppression of riots in Hong Kong by clearing the streets of the less determined onlookers, thus enabling the security forces to deal with the actual rioters.
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