TNAG-0003-FCO40-39-Commission-of-Enquiry-into-the-Kowloon-disturbances-addition-1968 — Page 86

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PART IV THE MEASURES TAKEN TO DEAL WITH THE DISTURBANCES

they were widespread or symptomatic of the operation as a whole. Many police units were accompanied by reporters who gave evidence before us and no such impression emerged from that evidence. Even the reporter who made the allega- tion just mentioned stated that the police had, in his opinion, been very restrained and reasonable with the crowds on the first night and that it was only on the second night of the riots that they seemed to be 'more rash and short of patience'. It would not be surprising if the police on the second night tended to take stronger action against those who, having seen what the effect of riots could be on the first night, chose to come back for more, but, looking on the evidence before us as a whole, we find no justification for the suggestion that police brutality caused the riots or that the police were brutal in the measures which they took to contain and suppress the rioting. On the contrary, the evidence indicates that, in general, the police action was characterized by reason and restraint and fully consonant with the principle that no more force should be used than is necessary to attain the objective.

The Emergency Structure

242. Having considered the evidence given concerning the equipping, the organization and the deployment of the police emergency companies, we formed the impression that the present procedure works effectively and we have only one or two points to make. The control and co-ordination of all the companies engaged would have been easier and their use more effective, had the companies from Hong Kong Island and the P.T.C. company from the New Territories been equipped to establish wireless communication with the field commander and the other companies immediately on their arrival in Kowloon. The evidence would also seem to raise a question as to the value of the field commander when the combined Pol./Mil. Headquarters is equipped to co-ordinate the movements of companies in the field and is in receipt of all incoming information on crowd movements and reports of incidents.

243. We note that plans to make available to company commanders addi- tional personnel in small groups are already being drawn up; we endorse this proposal since it appears that on a number of occasions unnecessarily large bodies of police had to be moved to deal with small incidents or with false reports. This was inevitable under the allocation and distribution of police man- power in force at the time of the riots. There is, of course, an obvious danger in fragmenting parent units too freely and too indiscriminately, as the attack made on one motor-cyclist and three mobile patrols on 6th April so clearly demon strated, but we feel that this danger is outweighed by the value of the small units in preventing the formation of large riot crowds and in breaking up the small groups which evade the larger bodies of police.

244. One further advantage in the use of smaller forces would be to provide a police 'presence' in more of the streets peripheral to the troubled areas, thus

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