Directory_and_Chronicle_1850 — Page 688

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Defense of an Essay, &c.

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so; he thought of strength invincible, and power irresistible: and God was pleased to convince him of his fully and vanity, not by telling him how scanty his dominion was, or how low his office; but how weak, frail, and perishing his nature was; that he was man only, and 'not God,' ver 2, 9, and should surely find so by the event. When the Lycaonians, upon the sight of a miracle wrought by St. Paul (Acts xiv, 11 ), took him and Barnabas for gods, they did not think so much of dominion, as of power and ability beyond human: and when the apostles answered them, they did not tell them that their dominion was only human, or that their office was not Divine, but that they had not a Divine nature; they were weak, frail, and feeble men, of like infirmities with the rest of their species, and therefore no Gods.

If we trace the Scripture notion of one who is truly and properly God, we shall find it made up of these several ideas; infinite wisdom, power invincible, all-sufficiency, and the like. These are the ground and foundation of dominion, which is but a secondary notion, a consequence of the power: and it must be supreme dominion, and none else, which will suit with the Scripture notion of God. It is not that of a governor, a ruler, a protector, a lord, or the like; but a sovereign Ruler, an almighty Protector, an omniscient and omnipresent Go- vernor, an eternal, iminutable, all sufficient Creator, Preserver, and Protector. Whatever falls short of this is not properly, in the Scripture notion, Ged; but is only called so by way of figure; as has before been explained. Now, if you ask me why the relative terms may properly be applied to the word God, the reason is plain; because there is something relative in the whole idea of God; namely, the notion of Governor, Protector, &c. If you ask why they can not be so properly applied to the word God in the metaphysical sense, beside the reason before given, there is another as plain; because metaphysics take in only part of the idea, consider the nature abstracted from the relation, leaving the relative part out." Waterland's Works, Vol. I. p. 33–35.

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The word God, as I intimated in the first part of this Essay, does not stand for a single idea, but for an assemblage of ideas, some of which relate to the nature of the Being so called, and some to the relations he sustains. When used metaphorically, any one of these may form the basis of the metaphor; if, however, we desire to give a full definition of the word when used propriè, we should mention both classes; those which refer to nature (such as neces- sary existence, wisdom, power, &c., &c.), being however "the ground or foundation" of the relative, the mention of them is indispensable in all defini- tions of the word, as I have observed above; the mention of the relative is not indispensable as we have seen, because we may conteinplate God as existing from eternity, before there were any beings to stand in any relation to him.

Dr. Legge, when he insists that God is a mere relative term, which tells us nothing of the nature of the Being indicated, discards the whole class of fundamental ideas, and gives us a word which can not be used to express the doctrine of the Trinity as the word God is used in the Creeds of the Catholic Church; which can not be used as the word God is in the documents I have quoted, to teach the Divine nature of Christ; in short, a word which differs from the fog used in St. John's Gospel, and by orthodox Christian writers from the beginning. He must therefore be wrong in his view of the word.

This note has already extended to great length, but I must say a word to Dr. L.'s statement that we can not with the word Shin express the doctrine of the Trinity. He asks, "Does the word God standing absolutely, without definitive of any kind, denote a Being who is possessed of a Divine nature; or the Being who sustains the relation of supreme dominion? If the former