1917-04-05 — Page 7

DARDANELLES FAILURE. APPORTIONING THE BLAME,

CHURCHILL, KITCHENER, AND FISHER.

The following is a full report of the Commissioners appointed by the Govern- mont to inquire into the operations in

the Dardanelles Straits and Gallipoli Peninsula. The first part appeared in Our cable columns on March 10th,

WAS

THE HONGKUNG DAILY PRESS, THURSDAY, APRIL 6TH. 1917.

This council's decisions.

what happened over the naval and military oporations in the Dardanelles Soms members of the Cabinet did not wish to be informed of what was going on. Mr. Churchill, during examination, said, "I often heard Cabinet say it did not wish to be told of this gearet matter, as the fewer knowing about it the better."

THE REAL RESPONSIBILITY.

the operation was diffealt, and would require a large force Lord Kitchener agreed that it might be necessary to make diversion by attacking the Turkish com munications, but the moment had not arrived.

navy through and on February 16th an informal meeting of Ministers decided to despatch the 29th Divison.

BITCHRNER'S RESPONSIBILITY. Acute discussions took place at the War Council between February 16th and 10th.. and Lord Kitchener's views underwent & RUSSIA'S REQUEST, -- On January 2nd, 1015, the Russians change. There was now no chance of were somewhat hard pressed in the breaking off the Dardenelles attack. A The report adds that these members Caucasus, and Russia asked for a demon sharp difference occurred on February Churchill owing to the decision not to send very rightly were content to dolegate stration against the Türke, in order to 20th between Lord Kitchener and Mr. the full powers of Cabinet to their col-relieve the pressure The Foreign Office the 29th Division, Lord Kitchener held sent a telegram drafted by the War that the naval division with the Austra- Office, stating that demonstration woud

lians and New Zealanders from Egypt" leagues on the War Council,

be made, though it was feared that any would be adequate. Lord Kitchener still action would not seriously affect thought that the fleet would get through. withdrawal of enemy troops from the Lieutenant-General Birdwood, on March

telegraphed to Lord Kitchener: NA chill did not see the telegram, though the latter thought that Lord Kitchener's reply was the outcome of to conversation he had with him. Lord Kitchener, writ Eng to Mr. Churchill, said he had not the troops to land anywhere, and that the only place for a demonstration was the Dardanelles. But we will not be ready for anything big for somo months, he added. The Commissioners are of opinion that, although Lord Kitcheper was pressed for a demonstration, it did not necessarily involve an attempt to foros the passage,

Commissioner for Australis), Sir Thomas this delegation of power. Distinction Caucasus. Mr. Asquitu and Mr. Churos Very doubtful the Navy can force

Mr. M'Kenue (then Chancellor of the Exchequer), in bis evidente, confirmed has to be made between the real respon- sibility devolving upon several Ministers who wore members of the War Council, Mr. Lloyd George, Viscount Grey, and Lord Crewe exercised undoubted and very legitimate influence, but the main responsibility rested with Mr. Asquith, Lord Kitchener, and Mr. Churchill. The latter, in his evidence, said:-- In the early stages the war was carried on by Mr. Asquith, Lord Kitchener, and me but I was on rather a different plane. I had not the same authority as Mr. Asquith or Lord Kitchener. If they said

the passage unassisted. In any case it will take a considerable

miral's forecast too sanguime

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The Commissioners consisted of Earl Cromer, chairman (since dood), Field. Marshal Lord Nicholson, Lord Justice Piciord, Mr. Andrew Fisher (High Mackenzie (High Commissioner for New Zealand), Admiral Sir W. H May, Sir Frederick Cawley, M.P., Mr. J. Avon Clyde, K.C., M., Mr. Stephen Gwynn M.P., and Mr. W. T. Roch, M.P

The majority ands that Mr. Winston Crutobill, thon First Lord of the Admiralty, initiated the proposal for attacking the Dardanelles, as laid before the War Council on November 24th, 1914, as an ideal method of defending Egypt. Bussis re-opened discussion of the sub- ject, and on January 2nd, 1918, Lord Kitchener (Secretary for War) declared that troops were unavailable. The War this or that should be done that settled FOUCING THE STRAW Dardanelles, or buldy face the risk which Council's acceptance of the plan, the Commissioners report, was unfortunate because investigation would have reveal ed otherwise Thus, on January 13th the question of whether thore should be à naval action or not had to be decide t

The Commissioners are of opinion that Admirals Fisher and Wilson, both of whom did not express their dissent to the proposed naval action alone, should have expressed their view if they thought that the project was impracticable from s naval point of view. They did not ob ject, however, because they regarded the operation as experimental only. The Commissioners think that it was an ob ligation, first on Mr. Churchill's part, next on Mr. Asquith's, and next on the other mombers of the War Council, to

it." EXPERTS DISCARDED

Then Lord Kitchener decided to despatch the 20th Division, but three weeks valu- able time had been lost. Lord Kitchener was mainly responsible for the decisions, strange that although, if he were alive, he might throw new light upon them. It the actualities of the situation should not have been more fully realised by Lord alternatives, either to face the Kitchener and his colleagues. There were of prestige by abandoning the would have been involved elsewhere by a determined effort to force the Dardanelles by a rapid combined attack in great strength. Unfortunately the Government adopted neither. For three weeks the Government vacillated, the moment for action lapsed, and the Turks were enabled to formidably strengthen their position. Mr. Churchill was justified in attaching importance to the delays in despatching the

9th Division.

insist upon a clear expression of expert cil. We are," he said, "experts who tiveness would revolutionise naval war the War Office stoff, No scheme had been

could pot itself secure the desired by a hasty, purely naval attack, which objects.

TROOPS DELAYED,

fare.

tele

Admiral

The proper conclusion seems to be, the The Commission Ends this description Commissioners say, that when a demon of the working of the machine substan- stration appeared to be necessary Mr tially correct, save that Mr. Churchill Churchill thought it possible to convert it into an attempt to force & passage. probably assigned to himself a more un- obtrusive part than he actually played. As Lord Kitchener's new army was not There was a distinction between the War ready, and he had to provide for home Office and Admiralty. Lout. Col. Wolfe- defence, he was unwilling to withdraw a Murray stated that Lord Kitchener acted angle man from Frano Mr. Chur- very much as his own Chief of Staff. He chill's views as to the success of a pure (Lieut. Col. Wolfe-Murray) was never naval operation were more optimistic

Even when General Sir Ian Hamilton, naked to express any opinion. With the than warranted by experts' opinion.

TOO MUCH UNCERTAINTY. Admiralty it was different. Mr. Chur Therefore Lord Kitabener grasped too chill was not an expert, and Admirals eagerly at the proposal to use the fleet on the eve of his departure from London, The latter alleged abundantly clear that the scope of the Fisher and Wilson acted as experts, Ad. alone, but the responsibility rested rather conversed with Lord Kitchener, it was dwelt miral Fisher explained that neither he, on Mr. Churchill, Admiral Wilson, nor Lieut. Col. Wolfe the marvellous potentialities of the operations had not been fully decided. strongly on the absence of information by Murray were members of the War Coun- Queen Elizabeth, whose astounding effee General Hamilton, in his evidenco,

map drawn up, there were no water supply Admiral Carden, replying to be arrangements, and there was a great want opinion on the naval action alone, he only opened our mouths when told." They Cause the chances of surprise in an attack were never asked anything about tho.

to force the Dardanelles by ships alone clung to getting through without by land and sex offered such great mili. Dardanelles, Admiral. Wilson confirmed igram asking whether it was practicable of staff preparation. Lord Kitchener still military tory and political advantages that it was Lord Fisher's statement

said he did not think the Straita could

impression, He took Lord Kitchener's mistaken and ill-advised to sacrifice them

extended operations with a large number gram that the passage of the Dardanelles be rushed, but they might be forced by aid, General Hamilton went out with that of ships. Mr. Churchill replied must be forced as peremptory.

High authorities concur in your opin de Robeck, in his evidence, said that he Admiral Carden supposed that realised that it would only be possible for ion, the high authorities meant Lord Fisher the fleet to stay in the Sea of Marmora

1. It would have been difficult any and Admiral Jackson. The former did if a revolution broke out in Constantin not see the reply, and the latter could ople: otherwise it would have to come out not remember whether he was consulted. again. Admiral Carden suggested the metho-way for the transports to follow up the dical destruction of the Dardanelles and Straits The Commission thought that it The Narrows defences. An advance into was clear that Admiral de Tobeck's the Sea of Marmora, he estimated, opinion had been greatly influenced by would take a month to carry out Ad political considerations and the loss of miral Jackson agreed to attack the outer prestige if the attack were abandoned. Am reluctantly convinced that bai- forta, but considered it not feasible for General Hamilton on the fleet to get through the Dardanelles Phed to Lord Kitchener --- sone. Admiral Oliver thought that by

tleships are unlikely to force the pass- the time the fleet had overcome the

nge If the army is to participate the operations will not assume the subsidi initial difficulties the military force. would have been ready. Generally speak

Hamilton's and Ad-

the operations were postponed operation. The Commission thinks that mital de Robeck's representations of the War Council, in is actiun, was prob- March 23rd thly governed excessively by the fact that until

The Commission, finds that although the would have a profound effect on the EFFECTS OF CAMPAIGN course of the war, and it therefore neg lected to ascertain whether it was advis attempt to force the Dardanelles was a fail: able to undertake a purely naval enter ure, it was fairly successful in relieving priso. It is highly probable that if Lord the pressure on Russin, while it delayed Kitchener or Admiral Fisher had ob the earlier entry of Bulgaria into the war iccted upon technical grounds the project and kept a large force of Turks & long would have been abandoned Mr. Asquith while immobilised. stated that Admiral Fisher's main ob jection was not based on the naval merits or demerits of the Dardanelles operation

The decision on February 16th, 1815, to mass troops in the noigbourhood of the Dardanelles marked a critical stage while In operation, The Commissioners con sider that, inasmuch as time was all important, no compromise was then possible between taking immediate and vigorous effort to ensure success by joint naval and military occupation or by falling back on the original intention of desisting from naval attack, if the ex- periences gained during the bombard mcat were unsatisfactory

Lord Kitchener decided on February 20th that the 29th. Division. part of the

Mr. Winston Churchill, in his evidence, the right and power to correct him or declared that his naval colleague, had dissent from his views, and were fully cognisant of their rights. Viscount Grey stated that the War Council went en tirely in naval and miltary matters by the opinions expressed by the two Minis tors. Mr. Balfour expressed the opinion that if the experts did not express their views it would be inferred that they as sonted He did not think they should remain silent if they dit not agree to the propositions. Te military experts stood on a different footing, because Lord Kitchener was an export. He, however, thought the Cabinet President should have facilitated the exports to assent or dissent by asking them.

CONFLICT OF AUTEDRITY.

Lord Haldano said he would expect Admiral Fisher, if he had objections; to

3 on March 19th telegra-

should not be seat thon, and Colonel bave stated them. He did not concur in ing, the Admiralty staff preferred a joint anticipated.

troops which, by the decision of February 16th, were to have been sent eastward Fingerald, by Lord Kitchoner's order, Admiral Fisher's view of the War instructed, the Director of Naval Trans Council. Lord Crewe thought the poli- ports that the transports for that, division tical members of the council did too much and the rest of the expeditionary force talking and the experts too little. Mr. the entry to the Dardanelios operations assembled wry forces had been would not be required. This was done Lloyd George also disagreed with Ad- without informing Mr. Winston Chur-mira Fisher's view. None of the Junior chill. Consequently, there was a delay Sen Lords were consulted about the Dar of three weeks in the despatch of troops, danoiles. Commodore Lambert expressed which gravely compromised the prob- the opinion that the Dardanelles was a ability of the success of the original proper subject for the Admiralty Board's attack by the land forces and materially discussion On November 2nd, 1915, the Sucrossed the difficulties of the inal Junior Sea Lords submitted a minute to Mr. Balfour, that the principle that the supremacy of the First Lord is com plete and unassailable had been pushed national safety.

attack.

DILATORY WAR COUNCIL.

The Commissioners consider that, in

FISHER 5 MINUTE,

Mr. Andrew Fisher, Australian repre-

prasages 1 in the report. He. sentative, attacked a minute dissenting

view of the opinions of naval and maili- too far and would tend to imperil the but upon the fact that, he preferred an from cere disagrees with the view that

AND COORDINATION.

other objective,

LORD FISHER'S RESIGNATION,

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the naval advisers should have expressed tary authorities on the spot, the decision to abandon the naval attack after the

Council's project unpracticable from a fait, whereupon Mr Asquith wrote to bombardment of March 18th was inevit able. They point out that there was no had the naval members of the board been evidence confirms the accuracy of Mr. were asked or not, if they considered the and that he did not like this Dardanelles, moeing of the War Council between regularly and collectively consulted on Asquith's statement Lord sane les naval aspect. He disagres, also with the Lord Fisher, stating that he thought it March 10th and May 14th, while import large questions of war policy during the luctantly noquiesced in the Dardanelesssion's inability to concur with imperative that Lord Fisher should attend present naval campaign, some at least of operation as long as he thought it would Lord Fisher's view that he should maintain hour before the meeting on Jan- and land operations were undertaken. They think that, before such operations the events which the Empire is bitterly not seriously interfere with his plane silence of resign. Mr. Fisher expresses uary 28th for discussion. Mr. Asquith,

cussed the proposal. were commenced, the War Council should deploring would not have happened that elsewhere. It may be conceived that the the opinion that it would real the fate of Mr Churchill, and Lord Fisher fully dis-

Later, at the War Conseil, a certainly have reconsidered the whole ant the authority and responsibility of demands made upon the ficet for the responsible government if State servante Although Sir Thomas Mackenzie (New Zealand) position. They are of opinion that the the Sea Lords is enlarged and definite, Dardanelles prejudiced his alternative shared the responsibility of Ministers. Premier ought to have summoned & met them can be no adequate assurance that schemes, and he resigned.

Lord Fisher in his evidence said that he in a minute declares that it is premature incident occurred. After Mr. Churchill Ang of the War Council for that purpose, similar disasters will not recur. Mr

Sufficient evidence Lord Tisher left the table. Lord Kitche and if not summoned, other members of Churchill agreed that the four Sea Lord was dead against a naval operation for the report to expresa an opinion as to had explained the scheme on the map, the War Counc? should have pressed for should be fully consulted, but Prince alone, he did not at the time express any the general results. such a meeting. They think that this Louis of Battenberg and Admiral Fisher such decided opinions. The actual do had not been taken to enable a decision to her followed him and asked Lord Fisher did not favour the suggestion The Comcision was arrived at by the War Council be made on the objects attained. It was what he intended to do. Lord Fisher re- was serious omission.

Sea Lord. Lord Kitchener urged Lord KITCHENER UNDERWICK TOO MUCH. mission found that Mr. Asquith was ill-on January 13th after hearing Lord necessary that there should be a complete plied that he would not return to the table,

vorare a true perspective. He agrees with The Commissioners are of opinion that informed of the way in which Admiralty Kitchener and Mr. Churchill, while Lord inquiry into aubsidiary operations to and that he intended to resign as First and as Mr. Asquith had decided upon the ging their views without being asked. Lord Kitchener did not sufficiently avail business was being conducted when he Fisher. Admiral Wilson, and Lieut. himself of the services of his General told the Commission that the War Colonel Wolfe-Murray remained silent, Andrew Fisher regarding experts Fruber that, as he was the only dissentient, The report was signed by all the mem-venture, it was Lord Fisher's duty to Naval expedition. February Take Staff, with the result that ho undertook Council was entitled to asume that any It was couched as follows:-

with Constantinople as the hers of the Commission, except Mr remain at the Admiralty. Lord Fisher, after further conversation, reluctantly more work than it was possible for one view submitted by the First Lord was

gave in to Ford Kitcher's treaty, and Cobjective. man to do, causing confusion and want the considered opinion of the Admiralty

resumed his seat. On May 14th, when the with the dey They are unable to concur Board. WANT OF FELVISION.

War Council decided to persevere Regarding War Offer administration The Commissioners add that it is impos

scheme, Lord Fisher thought that his great. in Lord Fisher'a view that it was his duy, if he differed from Mr. Churchill, the Commissioners think it regrettable

without being struck with the atmosphere

In a lengthy minority renort Mr. Roch, alternative scheme, which had been his to maintain silence at the Council or that the devolution of authority and resible to rend all the evidence and papers res go, but think that the adoption of spanaibility on which the War Office of vagueness and want of precision which than the torring of the main pre-occupation during this period any such principle generally would im based was ignored by Lord Kitchener, characterised the War Council's precsed- pair the efficiency of the public services. All the evidence points to Lord Kitebener ings. It is almost inconceivable that any Dardanelles had been considered when and to which his mind and energies had schemes of Fleet, and later, when Lord Fisher became ed. He said: "I was faced by progres- tained, certain important political ad- and having given orders over the chiefs could have imagined that Constantinople rift Sen Lord in the latter part of 1914, sive frustration of my main Although the main object was not at not having consulted his subordinates, vne, whether military, naval or civilian, Ford Fisher commanded the Mediterranean been almost exclusively devoted, was dodin- vantages were secured by the expedition, of departments. Ho centralised the whole could be cantured without military help the General Staff Lord Fisher derided naval stratgy

Meanwhile, but whether those advantages were worth admin fetration in his own hands. When on a somewhat large scale. In the case it would be mightify hazardous if the On the following day he resigned his

post

nominated to the com the loss of life and treasure involved must an Order-in-Conncil at a later stage of of the Dardanelles the reduction of the

mand of the Dardanelles forces, leaving On December 28th-1914 Täcut-Col Chief of the General Staff, Sir Reginald than at Port Arthur and Wei-hai-rei military action... UNWIELDY CABINET CONTROL From the commencement of war until Brade (Assistent, Secretary to the War while the narrow waters leat themselves Vaurice Hankey Secretary to the Com for the Dardanelles next day. He we mites of Imperial Defence, circalated assisted by no staff preparation, and no November 25th, 1014, ho change was made Occ) was of the opinion that this was to he defended, he mines and torpedoes..

CHURCHILE TO SANATINE in the machinery for the superior conduct due to Lord Kitchener's, not making, or

Referring to Mr Churchill's present memorandum to the War Council suggest preliminary scheme of operations of any The War Council would force passage. of the naval and military operation.dsregarding, the advice of the General

authorised Mr. Churchill This machinery consisted of a Cabinet Staff Lord Kitchener pushed centrali ment of the enterprise in the War Copning that Germany could be struck most kind. It was still assumed that the navy

sisted by the Committee of Imperisation to extremes. Though, it had proved cil, the Commissioners, without impugning effectively through Turkev Defence, with the War Office and Ad eminently successful in the Soudar, it his good faith, say it overs clear what he In January, 1815, ME Lloyd George, in on March 19th miralty acting as executive agents. It was unsuitable to large scale operations, was carried away by his sanguine tempera a memorandum, outlined a far-reaching to inform Admiral de Robeck to continue The attention must have been obvious from the first and threw work on the hands of one man, ment and firm belief in the undertaking policy against Austria in co-operation the Dardanelles operations as he thought

forces from France. that it was a far too numerous control with which no individual could success. The evidence shows that be obtained the with the Greeks, Roumanians, and Ser fit. The War Council did not meet

imagined. It is also clear that Carden greatly under-estimated mira

Admiral Jackson presented to Mr too much on the political ends to be gained grettably Chiri direntary In a car fully copes are exporty support to a less extent than herinns, plan the withdrawal of substantial My War Council concentrated

this was. not recognised immediately after the out Dealing with the narrative of Dar Card break of war. Thus for four months, danelles events: the Commissioners occur opposition: Lord Kitchener held the Churchill & memorandum against the Des by an Eastern cffensive. The War Coun the position at Gallipoli would cease to ing the losses that would be involved in men, munitions, material, or definite plans when events of the utmost importance with Admiral Jackson that the bombard minion that once the ships got through ibility of rushing the Dardanellee, show-cil never had detailed staff estimates of were occurring, the machinery for the ment on November 3rd was a mistake and he important. Moreover, he and others, even reaching the Straite Admirals showing what military operations were higher operations was both clumsy and de'oulated to place the Turks on the alert. including Tiscount Grey, confidently anti Fisher, Wilson, and Oliver (Chief of the possible. The War Council fully to the War Council the opinions of The War Council rejected without sulf Mr. Roch decides that important politi inefficient. Eventually an improvement The order emanated solely from the Ad cipated a revolution in Constantinople Admiralty War Staff) expressed objections estimated, without any real investigation bis naval advicers, and Mr. Churchill miralty, and the War Council was no when the fleet entered the Sea of Marmorata maval attack, but after the War Coun the strength of the Turkish opposition failed to consult the Board of Admiralty." meeting on January 1st they concient consideration all the previous expert cal advantages more gained by the first consulted. On November 25th Mr Chur Then the idea of a purely naval oneration manped working ont details for the eve

forte Mr. Churchill failed to present urges that similar operations in the future should be thoroughly considered by the jojut naval and military staff. which gave control to the Dandanelles, hig military attack. Lord Kitchener on enerally informed of say important | chil: suggested an attack on Gallipoliradusily dropped, and we drifted intomatic reduction of the forts by naval opinions against a navel, attack on the access of the naval attack, and strongly

(Continued at foot of nest Column.)

remain a matter of opinion, the war fud restored the power of the forts presented difimties mori hazardons | Grupral Staff decided agajustav Ian Hamilton, March 12th Birl

wes effected

To Cabinet appears to have been

BOMBARDMENT A MISTAKE,

B

decisions taken by the War Council, but

not until Executive stops had been taken

and would enable them to dictate terms fay 14th said he realised that if the feet

to give who's or partial effect to the

bombardment

at Constantinople. He admitted that failed, the army would need to help the (Continued at foot of next column.)

Sir

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