[ { "id": 328248, "series_id": 27, "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine", "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "CO129-221 - Governor Sir Bowen - 1885 [4-6]", "page_number": 23, "title": "CO129-221 - Governor Sir Bowen - 1885 [4-6]", "content_text": "# Enclosure \n8th April, 1885.\n\n## QUESTIONS--The Honourable T. JACKSON\nPursuant to notice, asked the following questions:\n\n1st. Has the Blockade of Pakhoi been legally notified? \n2nd. Is it an effective blockade? \n3rd. Can your Excellency suggest any remedies for the existing evils under which the trade of this Colony with Pakhoi, and the surrounding district is at present suffering, in consequence of the reported blockade?\n\nHis Excellency the Governor addressed the Council as follows:\n\n**HONOURABLE MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL**\n-My Honourable friend who represents the Chamber of Commerce has, in the exercise of his undoubted privilege as a Member of this Council, put questions to the Government on a subject of the gravest importance to the interests of this community. I am very glad indeed that my Honourable friend has taken this course, because it enables me to lay before the Council a Minute giving the fullest information which I have been able to collect on all the subjects connected with the matter to which he refers. Before reading that minute, I will, with the permission of the Council, inform you of a telegram which I have during the last half hour received from Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Peking:\n\n## H.B.M. CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES AT PEKING TO THE GOVERNOR OF HONGKONG\n(Received 8th April at 3.30 p.m.)\n\nProtocol restoring peace between France and China has been signed in Paris, and would probably be submitted to the French Legislative Chambers on the 7th April. Armistice with prohibition of contraband of war continues till definitive signature of Treaty. Please communicate to Admiral in command.\n\nThis, of course, I at once did. Favourable as is the prospect of peace, still as the present state of affairs seems likely to continue for a short time, I think it better that I should read to the Council the Minute to which I have referred:\n\nWhen the French Consul announced to me the blockade of Pakhoi and of the neighbouring Coast, I immediately (on the 6th March ultimo), telegraphed this intelligence to Her Majesty's Government, and on the following day (March 7th), I addressed to Lord DERBY the subjoined despatch:\n\n### GOVERNMENT HOUSE, HONGKONG, 7th March, 1885.\n\n\"MY LORD,---I have the honour to report that I yesterday telegraphed to your Lordship in the following terms: 'The French Consul informs me that a blockade will be established from March the 7th on Pakhoi and the neighbouring coast of China, from the frontier of Tonquin to the 107th meridian of longitude.' \n\n2. This blockade was announced to the French Consul at Hongkong by a telegram from Captain DE BEAUMONT, commanding the French Naval Forces in Tonquin, dated at Haiphong on the 5th instant. It was added that no notice of the blockade could be given to the Foreign Consuls at Pakhoi, as no communications were possible between the French Naval Forces and that port. Consequently, I telegraphed to the above effect to the British Consul at Pakhoi (Mr. ALLEN).\n\n3. It appears that the longitude referred to is reckoned by the French from Paris; and therefore, the blockade would seem to extend from the Frontier of Tonquin to a short distance to the East of the Treaty Port of Pakhoi, which contains about 25,000 inhabitants and is the outlet of a large district. Public Notice (By Proclamation in the Hongkong Government Gazette of March 7th, 1885) of the blockade has been given at Hongkong, which carries on a considerable trade with Pakhoi; and Admiral Sir W. DOWELL has despatched thither the British Gun-boat Espoir.\n\n4. It will be understood that the French are now blockading parts of the coast of China both to the North and to the South of Hongkong.\"\n\nAs is mentioned in this despatch, I lost no time in causing public notice of the blockade to be given in the Hongkong Government Gazette of March 7th, and there was a further notice in the Gazette of March 28th, when the British Consul at Pakhoi had sent me, under flying seal, a letter addressed to Her Majesty's Minister at Peking, to the effect that the blockade was then in active operation, being carried on by two French Men-of-war. This is all that I know concerning the blockade of Pakhoi.", "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-221 - Governor Sir Bowen - 1885 [4-6].txt", "external_url": "", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 328322, "series_id": 27, "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine", "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "CO129-221 - Governor Sir Bowen - 1885 [4-6]", "page_number": 97, "title": "CO129-221 - Governor Sir Bowen - 1885 [4-6]", "content_text": "## \npeace has caused general satisfaction at Hongkong, the centre of that vast trade which has suffered severely from the protracted Franco-Chinese hostilities. At the same \ntime, there is a general feeling that the fact of France having consented to an armistice and to negotiations for peace immediately after the serious reverse which her arms have recently suffered in Tonquin, is calculated to inflate the national pride of the Chinese, and to render them difficult of management by all European States. Assuredly, the last phase of the historical drama which has been played in the Far East during the last two years, is not the least grotesque. The protocol of peace is signed at Paris by a person employed in the Chinese Customs Department, and by a Clerk in the French Foreign Office, and is approved by Mr Freycinet, who was not at that time the Minister for Foreign Affairs. This transaction is communicated to the British Legation at Peking, and thence telegraphed", "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-221 - Governor Sir Bowen - 1885 [4-6].txt", "external_url": "", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 330006, "series_id": 27, "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine", "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "CO129-224 - Foreign Office - 1885", "page_number": 329, "title": "CO129-224 - Foreign Office - 1885", "content_text": "# No. 53.\n## Mr. O'Conor to Earl Granville.-(Received May 19.)\n### (No. 133. **Secret and Confidential.**)\nMy Lord,\n\nI HAVE recorded the telegram which I had the honour to send your Lordship this day, giving, as far as I have been able, the substance of the Preliminary Agreement now under the immediate consideration of the Governments of France and China in the view of peace.\n\nI believe the Protocol was drawn up on the Chinese side entirely. The first Article, \"China re-ratifies the Treaty of Tientsin, France engages not to demand more,\" was, I understand, agreed to by M. Ferry in the sense it was framed, though the wording was amended. Article II ran, as telegraphed to your Lordship, \"Blockade to be raised, hostilities to cease on signature.\"\n\nI believe this Article to mean that the blockade of Formosa will cease from the date of signature of the Protocol, and that active hostilities will likewise come to an end; but whether it also means that ships will be allowed to come north laden with rice I have not succeeded in finding out.\n\nThe third Article, \"Definitive Treaty of Peace to be negotiated forthwith,\" means, no doubt, that as soon as the Protocol is signed, fresh negotiations will be opened for a definitive Treaty by the French Minister, still residing at Shanghae, coming north, or though less likely, by the Marquis Tsêng in Paris.\n\nConsiderable importance must be attached to the fact of an Imperial Decree having been recorded approving the above terms, and an earnest desire for a settlement is shown by the Chinese Government departing so far from precedent as to authorize by a Decree from the Throne an outside agent in Paris to sign so important a document.\n\nM. Ferry appears to have agreed in substance to the three Articles, subject to approval, however, by the Chinese of some secondary, yet by no means unimportant, explanations, which he proposes shortly to furnish.\n\nKelung is to remain in French possession, at any rate, till the regular Treaty of Peace is signed, and China contends for the status quo in Tonquin.\n\nAs regards the frontier commercial advantages asked for by France, I understand that China has intimated her willingness to accord very liberal privileges, provided they are limited by two stipulations—first, that she is not asked for anything injurious to herself; and, second, that the privileges demanded are not incompatible with the most-favoured-nation clauses of her Treaties with foreign Powers.\n\nI have, &c.\n(Signed) **N. R. O'CONOR**.\n\nPage 327", "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-224 - Foreign Office - 1885.txt", "external_url": "", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 330007, "series_id": 27, "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine", "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "CO129-224 - Foreign Office - 1885", "page_number": 330, "title": "CO129-224 - Foreign Office - 1885", "content_text": "# No. 54.\n## Mr. O'Conor to Earl Granville.—(Received May 19.)\n\n**C. O. 13437**\n**REC?**\n**REGO 30 JUL 85**\n\n**(No. 134. Secret and Confidential.)**\nMy Lord,\n\nPeking, March 29, 1885.\n\nWITH reference to my despatch No. 133 of yesterday's date, marked **Secret and Confidential**, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that the main difference now existing between France and China appears to be whether, as the Chinese contend, the status quo shall continue in Tonquin until the Definitive Treaty of Peace, or, as the French require, the whole of that country shall be given up to them as soon as the Preliminary Agreement or Protocol is signed.\n\nThe question of the stoppage of rice coming northwards is also, I believe, a much disputed point. The French argue that by allowing Peking and the northern provinces to re-victual, they not only lose all the advantages of the last six weeks, but afford China the means of continuing the war with greater ease should the present negotiations unhappily break down. The period intervening between the acceptance by both sides of the Protocol and the signature of the Definitive Treaty of Peace must be looked upon as a time of armistice, in which neither party should gain any advantage.\n\nI think it not improbable that the Chinese will give way on this point, as they attach great importance to the somewhat similar understanding respecting the Island of Formosa.\n\nOn the whole, the prospects of a speedy termination of the Franco-Chinese war seem very good at this moment.\n\nI cannot, however, wholly dismiss from my mind the fear that in the detailed negotiations France will seek some compensation for the lost indemnity in special commercial privileges likely to be injurious to England in proportion as they are exclusive and exceptional. There is reason to believe that after the Langson affair in August 1884 China was inclined to entertain proposals coming from the side of France by which the right of building railways throughout the country should be conceded exclusively to Frenchmen for a number of years, and that it was seriously offered and entertained as a basis of peace.\n\nWhat may be the nature of the special frontier commercial advantages claimed by France at the present moment I have failed to discover, though I gather from a Chinese source that, whatever they are, the Chinese Government has declared they must be limited by what they can afford to give to other nations who have the most-favoured-nation clause in their Treaties.\n\nI have also reason to think that certain definite commercial proposals of France are at this moment under the consideration of the Yamên, and I therefore thought it advisable in conversation with the Ministers this day to allude to the subject.\n\nI said that I had heard reports of negotiations for peace between France and China, and that I was sure Her Majesty's Government would hear with extreme satisfaction of the termination of a long and painful war, which they had viewed with so much concern. I then went on to observe that, while wishing every success to the pending negotiations for peace, I felt it my duty to express most earnestly the hope that, whatever might be the final terms, there would be found no commercial stipulations opposed to the rights or the legitimate interests of England.\n\nIt was, I understood, the duty of the British Representative to cement by every means in his power the growing friendship between the two countries, and I felt sure their Excellencies would agree with me in thinking that nothing should be done likely to check the further development of the good understanding now happily existing between them.\n\nIn reply, the Ministers of the Yamên assured me I might feel quite easy on this point, but that, nevertheless, they would not fail to communicate the observations I had confidentially made to them on this subject to the other Ministers of the Tsung-li Yamên.\n\nI have, &c.\n(Signed) **N. R. O'CONOR**.\n\nPage 330 \nPage 331", "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-224 - Foreign Office - 1885.txt", "external_url": "", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 338264, "series_id": 27, "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine", "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "CO129-240 - Public Offices & Others - 1888", "page_number": 192, "title": "CO129-240 - Public Offices & Others - 1888", "content_text": "# N. 131-11 DE JUNHO DE 1888\n\nSousa, facultativo de 2.o classe do quadro de saude da província de S. Thomé e Principe, habilitado pela escola médica cirúrgica de Nova Goa; hei por bem transferi-lo para idêntico logar do quadro de saude da província de Cabo Verde.\n\nO ministro e secretário d'estado dos negócios da marinha e ultramar assim o tenha entendido e faça executar. Paço, em 5 de junho de 1888.\n\n**REI**\n\nO ministro e secretário d'estado dos negócios da marinha e ultramar...\n\nDe Mormugão, no estado da Índia, o capitão de fragata Henrique de João Carlos Adrião.\n\nHei por bem nomear para o lugar de capitão do porto...\n\nO ministro e secretário d'estado dos negócios da marinha e ultramar assim o tenha entendido e faça executar. Paço, aos 2 de junho de 1888. — **REI** — Henrique de Macedo.\n\n## MINISTERIO DOS NEGOCIOS ESTRANGEIROS\n### Direcção política\n\nThe Government of His Most Faithful Majesty the King of Portugal and the Algarves and that of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of China, having decided to regulate the friendly relations existing for more than three centuries between the two countries, have agreed for this purpose to a preliminary protocol. To this effect the undersigned, Henrique de Barros Gomes, of His Majesty's Council, His Minister and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Knight Grand Cross of the orders of Our Lord Jesus Christ, of the Legion of Honour, of Pius IX, of the Saints Maurice and Lazarus, of Charles the III, and Leopold of Belgium, etc.; and James Duncan Campbell, commissioner and non-resident secretary of the Inspectorate General of Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs, of second class Chinese civil rank, with Double Dragon decoration 2nd division 2nd class, Commander of the Legion of Honour and Companion of the most distinguished order of St Michael and St George, duly empowered by their respective Governments have concluded the following Protocol.\n\n### Protocolo\n\n| Artigo | Português | English |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| 1 | Um tratado de comércio e de amizade com a cláusula da nação mais favorecida será concluído e assinado em Pekin. | A Treaty of friendship and commerce with most favoured nation clause will be concluded and signed at Pekin. |\n| 2 | A China confirma a perpétua ocupação e governo de Macau e suas dependências por Portugal como qualquer outra possessão portuguesa. | China confirms perpetual occupation and government of Macau and its dependencies by Portugal, as any other Portuguese possession. |\n| 3 | Portugal obriga-se a nunca alienar Macau e suas dependências sem acordo com a China. | Portugal engages never to alienate Macau and dependencies without agreement with China. |\n| 4 | Portugal obriga-se a cooperar com a China na cobrança do rendimento de ópio em Macau, do mesmo modo que a Inglaterra em Hong-Kong. | Portugal engages to cooperate in opium revenue work at Macau in same way as England at Hong Kong. |\n\nFeito em Lisboa, em 26 de março de 1887.\n\nHenrique de Barros Gomes. James Duncan Campbell.\n\nEstá conforme. — Secretaria d'estado dos negócios estrangeiros, em 28 de março de 1887. — A. de Ornellas.\n\nEste protocolo já havia sido publicado no `Diario do governo` n. 76, de 30 de março de 1887.\n\n## DOM LUIZ, por graça de Deus, Rei de Portugal e dos Algarves...\n\nFaço saber aos que a presente carta de confirmação e ratificação virem que, em 1 de dezembro de 1887, se concluiu e assinou entre mim e Sua Magestade Imperial o Imperador da China, pelos respectivos plenipotenciários, munidos dos competentes plenos poderes, um tratado de amizade e comércio para regular as relações entre os dois estados, e uma convenção apensa ao referido tratado, relativa à cooperação na cobrança do rendimento do ópio, ambos estes actos ajustados nos termos, que constam dos próprios originais que seguem:\n\n### Tratado de amizade e comércio entre Portugal e a China\n\n| Artigo | Português | English |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| I | Continuará a existir constante paz e amizade entre Sua Magestade Fidelíssima El-Rei de Portugal e dos Algarves e Sua Magestade Imperial o Imperador da China, e os seus respectivos súbditos gozarão igualmente nos domínios das duas altas partes contratantes de uma plena e inteira protecção para suas pessoas e propriedades. | There shall continue to exist constant peace and amity between His Most Faithful Majesty the King of Portugal and Algarves and His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of China, whose respective subjects shall equally enjoy, in the dominions of the High Contracting Parties, the most complete and decided protection for their persons and property. |\n| II | A China confirma, na sua íntegra, o artigo 2.o do protocolo de Lisboa que trata da perpétua ocupação e governo de Macau por Portugal. Fica estipulado que comissários dos dois governos procederão à respectiva delimitação, que será fixada por uma convenção especial... | China confirms, in its entirety, the second article of the Protocol of Lisbon relating to the perpetual occupation and government of Macau by Portugal. It is stipulated that commissioners appointed by both governments shall proceed to the delimitation of the boundaries... |\n| III | Portugal confirma, na sua íntegra, o artigo 3.o do protocolo de Lisboa sobre o compromisso de nunca alienar Macau sem prévio acordo com a China. | Portugal confirms, in its entirety, the third article of the Protocol of Lisbon relating to the engagement never to alienate Macau without previous agreement with China. |\n| IV | Portugal concorda em cooperar com a China na cobrança dos direitos sobre o ópio exportado de Macau para os portos chineses... | Portugal agrees to cooperate with China in the collection of duties on opium exported from Macau into Chinese ports... |\n| V | Sua Magestade Fidelíssima El-Rei de Portugal e dos Algarves poderá acreditar um embaixador, ministro ou outro qualquer agente diplomático junto de Sua Magestade Imperial o Imperador da China... | His Most Faithful Majesty the King of Portugal and Algarves may appoint an Ambassador, Minister or other Diplomatic Agent to the court of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of China... |\n| VI | Os agentes diplomáticos de Portugal e da China gozarão, reciprocamente, no lugar... | The diplomatic agents of Portugal and China shall reciprocally enjoy in the place... |", "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-240 - Public Offices & Others - 1888.txt", "external_url": "", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 367511, "series_id": 27, "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine", "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "CO129-284 - Acting Governor Major Gen Black - 1898 [7-8]", "page_number": 399, "title": "CO129-284 - Acting Governor Major Gen Black - 1898 [7-8]", "content_text": "# DESPATCH\n## No. 18694\n### 18 AUG 20\n\n**(Subject.)** War between U States and Spain\n\nFurther to previous Paper. No. 1898\n\nas follows whether American ships will be permitted to be docked and cleaned and put into a named port for repairs at Hong Kong\n\n## (Minutes.)\nW. Lucas \nI. Wingfield \n18/8\n\nWe wish I suppose to refer this to Attorney General on the signing of a peace protocol altering the existing state of war between international litigations of the mine.\n\nThe question is a good one. I have sent an enquiry to the Admiralty as to whether the state of war between the US & Spain early answer the question no longer exists?\n\nI have seen M. Villers & have drafted a telegram to be sent at once.\n\n147/8 CPL 18 \nM'Veinboeid's device", "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-284 - Acting Governor Major Gen Black - 1898 [7-8].txt", "external_url": "", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 369143, "series_id": 27, "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine", "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "CO129-287 - Public Offices & Others - 1898", "page_number": 319, "title": "CO129-287 - Public Offices & Others - 1898", "content_text": "the outbreak of hostilities between Spain and the United States were made to the Governor of Hong Kong for the docking and repairs of the American ships there.\n\nIt may be granted without substantial infringement of our obligations of neutrality assumed by the terms of the Protocol signed at Washington on the 12th instant that there is no intention of resuming hostile operations and it may however safely be assumed that the request made to the Governor of Hong Kong for the docking and repairs of the American ships there is to be formally withdrawn before the actual conclusion of peace.\n\nThe Balfour is of opinion that in these circumstances the application made on behalf of the Spanish Government either at Hong Kong or elsewhere here is unnecessary and any similar request may be refused.", "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-287 - Public Offices & Others - 1898.txt", "external_url": "", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 391069, "series_id": 27, "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine", "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "CO129-321 - Public Offices & Others - 1903", "page_number": 30, "title": "CO129-321 - Public Offices & Others - 1903", "content_text": "[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]\n\nCHINA TRADE.\n\nCONFIDENTIAL.\n\nNo. 1.\n\n27\n\n[January 15.]\n\nSECTION 1.\n\nMemorandum by Mr. Somers Cocks respecting Movement of Grain and the Ratification of the New Commercial Treaty.\n\nSIR E. SATOW reports, in his despatch No. 351 of the 19th October, that in view of the frequent violations by the Chinese authorities of the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 5 attached to the Treaty of Tieu-tsin, and to prevent their continuance, he suggested to the Chinese the immediate putting into force of Article XIV of the New Commercial Treaty regulating the procedure to be observed in cases where it might be wished to prohibit the movement of grain from one port to another in China.\n\nPrince Ching in replying, said: \"The Board (i.e., of Foreign Affairs) beg leave to observe that although this Treaty has been signed by the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain and China, it has not yet received the assent of other Treaty Powers, and it is not possible therefore to put it into operation in advance. As soon as negotiations with the various Powers have been concluded and Treaties signed, action will, of course, be taken in accordance with their provisions.\"\n\nThis observation appears to have been left unanswered.\n\nPrince Ching may have meant---\n\n(1.) All the Treaty Powers.\n\n(2.) All the Signatory Powers of the Peace Protocol.\n\n(The Chinese language probably does not admit of distinguishing between the two ideas, and the Chinese character happens in the present case to have been translated \"Treaty.\")\n\n1. In Article XIV of the Treaty no mention is made of the assent of other Treaty Powers, which is only necessary in the case of the li-kin and morphia Articles (Nos. VIII and XI), because there sacrifices are required from the Powers to make the provisions feasible. Therefore, should the Treaty be ratified, we shall be entitled to claim that all its Articles, with those two exceptions, should come into force at once.\n\nA certain doubt may have arisen in consequence of Sir J. Mackay's note to the Chinese Commissioners of the 19th August, 1902; but the words used therein, are: \"His Majesty's Government when they come to ratify it (i.e., the Treaty) shall either ratify it as a whole or reject it entirely.\" This was only meant to mean, and only does mean, that His Majesty's Government will not accept only the parts of the Treaty they like, while keeping the Chinese Government bound to those parts and themselves rejecting the provisions less favourable to British interest.\n\nThe idea of securing what at first sight seems an unnecessary engagement from Great Britain, occurred to the Chinese in consequence of the partial ratification of the Chefoo Convention of 1876, which was due to a subsequent Agreement made in 1885. This partial ratification has been a source of endless trouble to Chinese officials, as they have in the past in their local disputes with foreigners constantly based (in all innocence) their contention on the original text of Treaty, only to find subsequently that the part they have appealed to is unratified and, therefore, invalid.\n\nIt is possible the Chinese may now say that the whole Treaty is now a bargain, and that until they get their increased import duties, they are not morally bound to the other parts of the Treaty. But it was most clearly understood at the time that though the li-kin and import duty arrangement was a bargain, the other parts were concessions from China made in pursuance of Article XI of the Peace Protocol, and therefore part of the conditions on which the Chinese had been granted peace.\n\n2. It might perhaps be contended that, as the Treaty was made in pursuance of Article XI of the Protocol all the Powers who signed that Protocol, are entitled to a say in our Treaty. The paragraph dealing with the matter runs as follows:-\n\n\"Le Gouvernement Chinois s'est engagé à négocier les amendements jugés utiles par les Gouvernements étrangers aux Traités de Commerce et de Navigation, et les autres sujets touchant aux relations commerciales dans le but de les faciliter.\"\n\nIt will be seen that no mention is made of simultaneous action on the part of the Powers, or that the validity of the Treaty made by one Power is dependent on the consent of all the other signatory Powers.\n\n[1817 p-1]\n\nPage 30\nPage 31", "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-321 - Public Offices & Others - 1903.txt", "external_url": "", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 391120, "series_id": 27, "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine", "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "CO129-321 - Public Offices & Others - 1903", "page_number": 81, "title": "CO129-321 - Public Offices & Others - 1903", "content_text": "This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government)\n\n2\n\nInclosure 2 in No. 1\n\nJoint Note addressed by the Diplomatic Body to Prince Ching.\n\nMonseigneur,\n\nPékin, le 9 Février, 1903. LA Chambre de Commerce de Shanghai a récemment attiré l'attention du Corps Diplomatique sur l'état dans lequel se trouve actuellement la barre extérieure du Wang Pu.\n\nL'ensablement oblige les navires de forme étrangère à effectuer leurs opérations de chargement et de déchargement en dehors de Woosung: il en résulte des difficultés et des délais considérables, ainsi que des dépenses additionnelles très lourdes pour les armateurs et affréteurs. La situation présente du chenal est même si mauvaise qu'on peut craindre qu'il devienne absolument impossible aux navires à destination de Shanghaï d'entrer en rivière.\n\nDans ces conditions, nous croyons devoir attirer à nouveau la sérieuse attention de votre Altesse sur les conséquences que pourraient entraîner de plus longs retards mis à la constitution de la Commission du Wang Pu, telle qu'elle est prévue par l'Annexe 17 du Protocole Final du 7 Septembre, 1901.\n\nNous avons l'honneur, en conséquence, de la prier très instamment d'intervenir auprès du Gouvernement Impérial pour que le Vice-Roi de Nankin reçoive pour instructions de désigner sans désemparer le fonctionnaire qui devra représenter la Chine dans la Commission du Wang Pu.\n\nVu et approuvé.\n\nVeuillez, &c.\n\n(Signé)\n\nWALTER TOWNLEY. JOOSTENS.\n\nE. H. CONGER.\n\nW. J. OUDENDYK.\n\nP. ROUDANOVSKY.\n\nCARCER.\n\nK. MATSUI.\n\nVON DER GOLTZ.\n\nG. DUBAIL.\n\nv. ROSTHORN.\n\nG. GALLINA.\n\nInclosure 3 in No. 1.\n\nSOUTH-WEST CHINA.\n\nCONFIDENTIAL.\n\nNo. 1.\n\n77\n\n[March 30.]\n\nSECTION 1.\n\nConsul Little to the Marquess of Lansdowne.-(Received March 30.) (No. 4.) My Lord,\n\nPakhoi, February 23, 1903, IN accordance with the request of His Majesty's Consul-General at Canton, I have the honour to forward herewith copy of two Reports which I recently sent to His Majesty's Minister at Peking.\n\nI have, &c.\n\nPolitical\n\n(Signed) H. A. LITTLE.\n\nInclosure 1 in No. 1.\n\nIntelligence Report for December Quarter, 1902.\n\nState of the country Smuggling of arms.. Missionaries\n\nActivity of French Chinese Postal Service Commercial-\n\nOpium tax..\n\nDecrease of trade\n\nArmy and Navy\n\nMovements of officials..\n\nINDEX.\n\nSir,\n\nMr. Goodnow to Mr. Conger.\n\nShanghae, January 26, 1903.\n\nI AM instructed by my colleagues to notify you that the Acting Consul-General for Sweden and Norway has notified us that his nation is entitled to a seat on the Whangpoo Conservancy Board under paragraph (h) of section 4 of the Peace Protocol.\n\nIn this matter I am further instructed to say that the Board is still unorganized, although sixteen months have elapsed since the signing of the Protocol. This is due to the fact that the Representative of the Chinese Government has not been appointed. As the Whangpoo River is constantly silting up, and the work of harbour improvement becomes greater and more expensive the longer it is delayed, we venture to hope that the Diplomatic Body will do all that seems to it fit towards inducing the Chinese Government to make its appointment without further delay.\n\nI have, &c.\n\n(Signed)\n\nJ. GOODNOW.\n\nThere has of late been some increase of lawlessness in the surrounding country, but Political.\n\nit does not appear to be of a serious character, and is probably nothing more than what State of the usually happens on the approach of the China new year, which is, so to speak, the country.\n\nseason \" for robbers and thieves. Beyond a few cases of gang robbery here and at Lienchow, and an unsuccessful attempt by a band of pirates (who were subsequently captured) to seize a junk in the harbour, which they intended to use for piratical purposes, nothing has occurred to disturb the peace of the district. The neighbouring district of Lingshan, however, is reported to be in an unquiet state, and there has also been a recrudescence of trouble around Nanning. Information has just reached me that a Commandant (ying-kuan) and another officer have been killed in an engagement in that neighbourhood, and that the bandits there are displaying great activity. A short time ago a body of troops from Chinchou numbering about 200 men was worsted in a fight with brigands on the Kuanghsi border, and now General Pan has been ordered to proceed into that province with the whole of his command, consisting of four ying (nominally 2,000 men, but in reality only half that number). In his absence Li Chia Cho, who was recently on special duty in connection with the suppression of piracy in the Canton district, will have charge of military affairs in the Chinchou district, and will also be Acting Magistrate. The force under his command will be of about the same strength as that which General P'an is taking into Kuanghsi, and the greater part of it has already passed through this port on the way to Chinchou, 700 men having arrived with him a few days ago, and 500 having been brought shortly before in a steamer specially chartered for the purpose. They are armed with repeating rifles, mostly Mausers, and have also several quick-firing guns. This force will be further strengthened by a few hundred men raised locally,", "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-321 - Public Offices & Others - 1903.txt", "external_url": "", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 391225, "series_id": 27, "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine", "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "CO129-321 - Public Offices & Others - 1903", "page_number": 186, "title": "CO129-321 - Public Offices & Others - 1903", "content_text": "This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.\n\nCHINA TRADE.\n\nCONFIDENTIAL.\n\nNo. 1.\n\n182\n\n[June 8.]\n\nSECTION 2.\n\n(No. 14.) My Lord,\n\nConsul-General Scott to the Marquess of Lansdowne.--(Received June 8.)\n\nCanton, May 8, 1903. WITH reference to my despatch No. 71 of the 13th August last, I have the honour to inclose herewith copy of my despatch No. 14 of the 5th instant to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Peking, with respect to the transference of the native customs to the Imperial Maritime Customs Department, in terms of the Final Peace Protocol of the 7th September, 1901, from which it will be seen that, with the exception of Canton itself, the native customs stations throughout the Delta still remain under the control of the Hoppo.\n\nI have, &c. (Signed)\n\nJAMES SCOTT.\n\nInclosure in No. 1.\n\nConsul-General Scott to Mr. Townley.\n\n(No. 14.)\n\nCanton, May 5, 1903. Sir,\n\nI BEG to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram No. 2 of the 2nd instant, having reference to the native customs and my despatch No. 68 of the 12th August last.\n\nFully a year has now elapsed since the transfer by the Hoppo of the native customs at Canton to the Imperial Maritime Customs Department in terms of the Final Peace Protocol of the 7th September, 1901, and the result of the past year's operations, in respect to the amount of duty collected, may well be considered disappointing. As you are no doubt aware, it was only after considerable pressure from Peking that the Hoppo consented to surrender his control of the Chang Kuan in Canton itself; the other stations in the Delta, some twelve in number, remaining under his control.\n\nIn my despatch No. 68 of last year, I ventured to point out that the Hoppo would not fail to so organize arrangements at the different out-stations as to minimize the effect of the transfer of the Chang Kuan to the Imperial Maritime Customs. I beg to report that my forecast in this respect has been fulfilled, more especially in regard to the two native customs stations at Ch'ên Ts'un and Fatshan. I learn from reliable and confidential sources that formerly, in ordinary years, some 600,000 taels were annually collected by the native customs at Canton, while at Fatshan and Ch'ên Ts'un combined some 2,000 taels per month covered the total revenue collected. On the other hand, under the Imperial Maritime Customs' control, the revenue received at the Ch'ang Kuan in Canton during the first year's management amounted to 320,000 taels, while at Chên Ts'un and Fatshan trustworthy evidence places the amount now being collected at fully 10,000 taels per month. Further, I learn that the Hoppo is so organizing his system, by granting reduced duty and other facilities to the native merchants, as to induce them to make Ch'ên Ts'un their head-quarters. It is well known that many articles which were formerly dispatched from Canton now find their way to Ch'ên Ts'un from the producing districts direct, and are thence exported to Hong Kong, paying duty to the Hoppo.\n\nAs reported in my despatch No. 68 above referred to, all native customs stations within a radius of 50 li (17 miles) should have been handed over to the control of the Imperial Maritime Customs Department. Ch'ên Ts'un and Fatshan are only 10 miles from Canton, but the Hoppo, on the ground that a detour by water is necessary to reach them, has been successful in resisting all attempts to withdraw them from his control.\n\nI have, &c. (Signed)\n\nJAMES SCOTT.\n\nPage 183\n\n[illegible characters]\n\n \n督", "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-321 - Public Offices & Others - 1903.txt", "external_url": "", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 391412, "series_id": 27, "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine", "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "CO129-321 - Public Offices & Others - 1903", "page_number": 373, "title": "CO129-321 - Public Offices & Others - 1903", "content_text": "entirely the restrictions on the purchase of cattle\n\nin Kuangsi by British subjects.\n\nWith regard to the question of the importation\n\nof arms from Hong Kong into China, His Majesty's\n\nConsul-General informed the Viceroy that His Majesty's\n\nGovernment had, at their own instance, taken\n\nmeasures to restrict the trade in arms in Hong Kong,\n\nalthough the term of two years during which, under\n\nthe Peace Protocol, no arms could be imported into\n\nChina, has now expired. The Viceroy, in his telegram\n\nannouncing the withdrawal of all restrictions\n\non the purchase of cattle in Kuangsi, expressed\n\nthe hope that the Hong Kong Government would take\n\nstrict measures to detect the smuggling of arms.\n\nI am to suggest for Mr. Secretary Lyttelton's\n\nconsideration, that the attention of the Governor\n\nof Hong Kong may be called to the last paragraph\n\nof a despatch which has been addressed to His Majesty's\n\nMinister at Peking, and a copy of which is\n\ninclosed, instructing him that Mr. Scott should\n\ninform the Viceroy that the Governor of Hong Kong\n\nwill use every endeavour to prevent the illicit importation\n\nof arms into China.\n\nI am,\n\nSir,\n\nYour most obedient,\n\nhumble Servant,\n\nHb Merepbell,\n\n369", "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-321 - Public Offices & Others - 1903.txt", "external_url": "", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 391415, "series_id": 27, "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine", "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "CO129-321 - Public Offices & Others - 1903", "page_number": 376, "title": "CO129-321 - Public Offices & Others - 1903", "content_text": "372\n\nThis Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.\n\nKacichou, are not prevented from reaching the markets; and this understanding is the crux of the whole question.\n\nIn regard hereto I beg to point out that the area from which cattle may now be drawn under the Viceroy's new arrangement amounts to barely one-fourth of that of the whole province, and excludes the important centres of Nanning, Tai Ping, near Lungehou, Ssn An and Po-Se on the borders of Yunnan, all large trading districts where at present there are no disturbances whatever.\n\nIn view of the action of the Viceroy in peremptorily upsetting the arrangement made by His Majesty's Minister in Peking with the Chinese Government, I am satisfied that every obstacle will be thrown by the present Viceroy to trade in cattle, and that no measure will be wanting on his part to prevent supplies from outlying districts from reaching local markets—his attitude in the past has been hostile, and will certainly remain so.\n\nThe one argument adduced by the Viceroy in support of his action, viz., assisting the rebels by furnishing them with money obtained for cattle, is untenable. This was advanced by the late Governor and fully discussed. The fact is, there is no communication by the rebels with cattle dealers; and neither passports nor transit passes are ever issued for the disturbed districts. At the present moment the position in Kuang-si is far less serious than during the time of Governor Wang; and where that High Officer agreed to an unrestricted withdrawal of his prohibition, the Viceroy at the present moment has no valid grounds whatever for his action, either in prohibiting the export, or restricting it to four districts.\n\nI have, &c.\n\n(Signed)\n\nJAMES SCOTT.\n\nCHINA TRADE.\n\nCONFIDENTIAL.\n\nNo. 1.\n\n39485 [October 12.\n\nBECH SECTION 8 OCT 031\n\nConsul-General Scott to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received October 12.)\n\n(No. 32.) My Lord,\n\nCanton, August 29, 1903.\n\nI HAVE the honour to inclose herewith copy of a despatch No. 34 to His Majesty's Minister at Peking with inclosure, from which it will be seen that the Viceroy has withdrawn all his restrictions in respect to the purchase and export of cattle from Kuang-si.\n\nI have, &c.\n\n(Signed)\n\nJAMES SCOTT,\n\nInclosure 1 in No. 1.\n\nConsul-General Scott to Sir H. Satow.\n\n(No. 34.) Sir,\n\nCanton, August 29, 1903.\n\nIN continuation of my despatch No. 33, Confidential, of the 28th instant, I beg to report that yesterday afternoon the Viceroy's Secretary called and handed me a copy of a telegram which he had just received from the Viceroy, announcing the withdrawal of all restrictions on the purchase of cattle in Kuang-si by British subjects, and that the necessary instructions had accordingly been given to the Customs Department at Wuchow.\n\nI desired the Secretary to convey to his Excellency my thanks for this satisfactory settlement, which, I added, I should at once report to my Minister in Peking by telegram.\n\nIn regard to the question of the import of arms, I beg to state that during my previous interview with the Viceroy's Secretary, I desired him to remind his Excellency that the term of two years during which, under the Peace Protocol, no arms could be imported into China, would soon expire. Was his Excellency, I inquired, aware of what the effect of this withdrawal would be in respect to the unrestricted sale of arms to Chinese and others in Hong Kong if sanctioned by His Majesty's Government? The Secretary, on behalf of the Viceroy, deprecated any such unrestricted sale, which would only add to the difficulties of the Chinese authorities in dealing with the pirates in the Canton Delta and the rebels in Kuang-si. In reply, I explained to him that His Majesty's Government fully realized the situation in the Liang Kuang provinces, and had, at their own instance, already taken measures to restrict the trade in arms in Hong Kong; and that his Excellency the Governor of Hong Kong would only permit the sale and export of arms to accredited officials of the Chinese Government, or to contrast the friendly action of the British authorities with the recent attitude of the Viceroy, in several matters, and especially as regards the prohibition of the export of cattle from Kuang-si. I urged the Secretary to lay the whole position before the Viceroy, and to press him to mark his appreciation of the friendly action of His Majesty's Government in respect to arms by removing all hindrance to and interference with the export of cattle from Kuang-si.\n\nI have, &c.\n\n(Signed)\n\nJAMES SCOTT.\n\nInclosure 2 in No. 1.\n\n(Translation.) (Telegraphic.)\n\nViceroy of Canton to Kao Weiyuan.\n\n[Undated.]\n\nHAVE received your telegram informing me that the term during which arms could not be imported has now expired, and that the Hong Kong Government has issued a special Proclamation strictly prohibiting the sale of arms to private individuals.\n\nYou\n\n[2180 m-1]", "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-321 - Public Offices & Others - 1903.txt", "external_url": "", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 391420, "series_id": 27, "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine", "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "CO129-321 - Public Offices & Others - 1903", "page_number": 381, "title": "CO129-321 - Public Offices & Others - 1903", "content_text": "4\n\nKueichou, are not prevented from reaching the markets; and this understanding is the crux of the whole question,\n\nIn regard hereto I beg to point out that the area from which cattle may now be drawn under the Viceroy's new arrangement amounts to barely one-fourth of that of the whole province, and excludes the important centres of Nanning, Tai Ping, near Lungehou, Ssn An and Po-Se on the borders of Yunnan, all large trading districts where at present there are no disturbances whatever.\n\nIn view of the action of the Viceroy in peremptorily upsetting the arrangement made by His Majesty's Minister in Peking with the Chinese Government, I am satisfied that every obstacle will be thrown by the present Viceroy to trade in cattle, and that no measure will be wanting on his part to prevent supplies from outlying districts from reaching local markets-his attitude in the past has been hostile, and will certainly remain so.\n\nThe one argument adduced by the Viceroy in support of his action, viz., assisting the rebels by furnishing them with money obtained for cattle, is untenable. This was advanced by the late Governor and fully discussed. The fact is, there is no communication by the rebels with cattle dealers; and neither passports nor transit passes are ever issued for the disturbed districts. At the present moment the position in Kuang-hsi is far less serious than during the time of Governor Wang; and where that High Officer agreed to an unrestricted withdrawal of his prohibition, the Viceroy at the present moment has no valid grounds whatever for his action, either in prohibiting the export, or restricting it to four districts.\n\nI have, &c.\n\n(Signed) JAMES SCOTT.\n\nThis Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.\n\nO.\n\n59435\n\nCHINA TRADE.\n\n[October 12.]\n\nCONFIDENTIAL.\n\nSECTION\n\n3-CT 03)\n\n377\n\nNo. 1.\n\nConsul-General Scott to the Marquess of Lansdowne.~(Received October 12.)\n\nCanton, August 29, 1903.\n\n(No. 32.) My Lord,\n\nI HAVE the honour to inclose herewith copy of a despatch No. 34 to His Majesty's Minister at Peking with inclosure, from which it will be seen that the Viceroy has withdrawn all his restrictions in respect to the purchase and export of cattle from Kuang-si.\n\nI have, &c.\n\n(Signed)\n\nInclosure 1 in No. 1.\n\nConsul-General Scott to Sir E. Satow.\n\nJAMES SCOTT,\n\n(No. 34.) Sir,\n\nCanton, August 29, 1903. IN continuation of my despatch No. 33, Confidential, of the 28th instant, I beg to report that yesterday afternoon the Viceroy's Secretary called and handed me a copy of a telegram which he had just received from the Viceroy, announcing the withdrawal of all restrictions on the purchase of cattle in Kuang-si by British subjects, and that the necessary instructions had accordingly been given to the Customs Department at Wuchow.\n\nI desired the Secretary to convey to his Excellency my thanks for this satisfactory settlement, which, I added, I should at once report to my Minister in Peking by telegram.\n\nIn regard to the question of the import of arms, I beg to state that during my previous interview with the Viceroy's Secretary, I desired him to remind his Excellency that the term of two years during which, under the Peace Protocol, no arms could be imported into China, would soon expire. Was his Excellency, I inquired, aware of what the effect of this withdrawal would be in respect to the unrestricted sale of arms to Chinese and others in Hong Kong if sanctioned by His Majesty's Government? The Secretary, on behalf of the Viceroy, deprecated any such unrestricted sale, which would only add to the difficulties of the Chinese authorities in dealing with the pirates in the Canton Delta and the rebels in Kuang-si. In reply, I explained to him that His Majesty's Government fully realized the situation in the Liang Kuang provinces, and had, at their own instance, already taken measures to restrict the trade in arms in Hong Kong; and that his Excellency the Governor of Hong Kong would only permit the sale and export of arms to accredited officials of the Chinese Government. I went on to contrast the friendly action of the British authorities with the recent attitude of the Viceroy, in several matters, and especially as regards the prohibition of the export of cattle from Kuang-si. I urged the Secretary to lay the whole position before the Viceroy, and to press him to mark his appreciation of the friendly action of His Majesty's Government in respect to arms by removing all hindrance to and interference with the export of cattle from Kuang-si,\n\nI have, &c.\n\n(Signed)\n\nInclosure 2 in No. 1.\n\nJAMES SCOTT.\n\n(Translation.) (Telegraphic.)\n\nViceroy of Canton to Kuo Weiyuan.\n\n[Undated.]\n\nHAVE received your telegram informing me that the term during which arms could not be imported has now expired, and that the Hong Kong Government has issued a special Proclamation strictly prohibiting the sale of arms to private individuals.\n\nYou\n\n0", "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-321 - Public Offices & Others - 1903.txt", "external_url": "", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 394680, "series_id": 27, "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine", "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "CO129-326 - Foreign Office - 1904", "page_number": 17, "title": "CO129-326 - Foreign Office - 1904", "content_text": "and south of Moukden, but at some distance off, would not therefore be of much service to merchants unless they were granted shipping facilities to and at the goods stations.\n\nRailway Freights.--He was struck by the absolute ignorance of the Russian officials as to the rudimentary principles of railway freighting (long haul, short haul, three rates, return freights, and the like). It would be necessary to have American freight agents to teach them; otherwise the Railway could never pay. There was a state of absolute chaos in this respect, the rates seeming to depend on the will of the official.\n\nDifferential Railway Rates.--This subject is as much discussed in Manchuria as elsewhere. Some officials think it desirable to discriminate against foreigners; others maintain that the Railway cannot pay unless foreign trade is granted and encouraged. His own opinion is that the Railway cannot pay without foreign merchandise.\n\nAt the same time, the question of differential Tariff treatment at the ports is more important than the question of differential freights, which no Treaty can prevent. It exists in spite of the most stringent regulations in America. The Railway is essential to the development of trade, and if the Russian authorities chose to discriminate against foreigners on their Railway, the question of the Tariff at the ports is of minor importance.\n\nSt. Petersburgh, December 9, 1903.\n\n\"This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.\"\n\nCHINA TRADE,\n\nCONFIDENTIAL.\n\nNo. 1.\n\n15\n\n[November 19.]\n\nSECTION 2.\n\nMr. Jamieson to the Marquess of Lansdowne.(Received November 19.)\n\n(No. 14.)\n\nShanghae, October 13, 1903.\n\nMy Lord,\n\nI HAVE the honour to inclose herewith copies of two despatches I have addressed to Sir Ernest Satow, with reference to the Treaty recently negotiated between China and Japan in terms of the Peace Protocol of 1901.\n\nI have, &c.\n\n(Signed) J. W. JAMIESON,\n\nCommercial Attaché.\n\nInclosure 1 in No. 1.\n\nMr. Jamieson to Sir E. Satow.\n\n(No. 14.) Sir,\n\nShanghae, October 12, 1903.\n\nThe Treaties which, in terms of the Protocol of 1901, the Plenipotentiaries of the United States and Japan have been negotiating with the Special Commissioners appointed by the Chinese Government, were signed here on the 8th instant.\n\nThe North China \"Daily News\" has published as a supplement the full text of the United States' Treaty, but it is understood that the English text of the Japanese Treaty will not for the present be made public. The Chinese text appeared in one of the native papers (the \"Hsin-wen Pao\") the day before yesterday, and the following is a précis of the various Articles extracted therefrom:-\n\nArticle 1. As regards import surtaxes to compensate for the loss of revenue likely to arise out of the proposed abolition of li-kin dues, the Japanese Government will accept, and be bound by, any arrangements made by China with other Treaty Powers. They are also prepared to recognize the legality of imposing such growers', consumption, and excise taxes, or duties on salt and opium, as may receive the assent of other Powers, but in neither case must there be any differential treatment of Japanese goods.\n\nArt. II. The Chinese Government permit private Japanese enterprise to establish, at its own expense, and after the consent of the Imperial Maritime Customs has been obtained, appliances for facilitating the passage of vessels between Ich'ang and Chungking.\n\nArt. III. Steam navigation on inland waters may be carried on under special Regulations. (These Regulations are given in an Annex, and are identical with those attached to the British Treaty.)\n\nArt. IV. Chinese and Japanese Courts will reciprocate in the matter of causing the terms of any partnership Agreement between the subjects of the two countries to be faithfully carried out.\n\nArt. V. The Chinese Government agree to draw up Regulations to prevent the infringement of trade-marks or copyright.\n\nArt. VI. The Chinese Government will, as soon as possible, introduce a uniform system of national coinage. Duties, however, shall be calculated in terms of the Haikuan tael.\n\nArt. VII. The Chinese Government will take steps to reform, on a uniform basis, weights and measures throughout the Empire—the new system to be inaugurated at the Treaty ports and thence gradually extended into the interior.\n\nArt. VIII. This Article appears to be supplementary to Article III, as it simply reiterates the right to navigate the inland waters under special Regulations.\n\nArt. IX. Previous Treaty stipulations, not modified nor cancelled by the present Instrument, shall remain in full force, and most-favoured-nation treatment is secured for Japanese subjects at the hands of the Chinese Government—Imperial or provincial.\n\nArt. X. When the foreign garrisons in Chihli shall have been withdrawn, China will open Peking to international trade.\n\n[2217 t-2]", "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-326 - Foreign Office - 1904.txt", "external_url": "", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 395097, "series_id": 27, "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine", "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "CO129-326 - Foreign Office - 1904", "page_number": 434, "title": "CO129-326 - Foreign Office - 1904", "content_text": "2\n\nGouvernement Chinois, le Taotai et le Commissaire des Douanes à Shanghai, font partie par suite de leurs offices.\n\nIl me semble que le Doyen du Corps Diplomatique devrait répondre dans ce sens au Doyen du Corps Consulaire, en le chargeant en même temps de notifier au Taotai et aux autres membres du Conseil de procéder incessamment à la constitution du Conseil Fluvial.\n\nSi, après la constitution de ce Conseil, le Gouvernement Chinois juge à propos de soumettre aux Puissances intéressées des amendements changeant les stipulations du Protocole Final, rien ne s'oppose à ce que le Wai Wu-pou fasse des ouvertures dans ce sens aux Représentants des Puissances Signataires du Protocole Final, et que ceux-ci en saisissent leurs Gouvernements respectifs. Mais on ne doit pas perdre de vue que jusqu'à ce qu'un nouvel accord ait été conclu avec le consentement unanime de toutes les Puissances Signataires du Protocole Final, les stipulations de ce Protocole tiennent bon.\n\nMUMM.\n\n(Signé)\n\nJe partage entièrement l'avis de son Excellence le Ministre d'Allemagne au sujet de la communication faite par le Viceroi de Nankin aux membres du Corps Consulaire de Shanghai. Mon Gouvernement tient à ce que le Gouvernement Chinois exécute les stipulations du Protocole touchant l'amélioration du Huangpu, et m'a donné des instructions m'autorisant à appuyer toute proposition tendant à la réunion du Conseil, même dans le cas où le Gouvernement Chinois continuerait à ne pas nommer un Représentant pour ses intérêts maritimes. Il me paraît, du reste, peu désirable de prendre en considération des propositions présentées d'une manière tellement irrégulière.\n\nERNEST SATOW.\n\nLe 27 Mai, 1904.\n\n(Signé)\n\nI wholly agree with opinions expressed by their Excellencies Baron von Mumm and Sir Ernest Satow.\n\nE. H. CONGER.\n\n(Signed)\n\nJe partage l'avis de son Excellence le Ministre d'Allemagne.\n\n(Signé)\n\nP. LESSAR\n\nIdem.\n\n(Signé)\n\nM. CZIKANN.\n\nGAIFFIER.\n\nJ. UCHIDA.\n\nVAN CITTERS.\n\nGALLINA.\n\nVu:\n\n(Signé)\n\nCARCER.\n\nALMEIDA.\n\nExcellency,\n\n3\n\nInclosure 2 in No. 1.\n\nMr. J. Goodnow to Baron Czikann.\n\nConsular Service, U.S.A., Shanghae, May 11, 1904.\n\nI AM directed by my colleagues to inform you that his Excellency Wei, Viceroy at Nanking, has requested us to lay before you his proposals to substitute the hereto attached five rules for Annex 17 to the Final Protocol.\n\nThe following motion is now before the Consular Body :-\n\n\"The Consular Body of Shanghae decides in accordance with (1), paragraph b, Article 2, of the Peace Protocol, signed in Peking on the 7th September, 1901, and (2), Annex 17 of the same Protocol, to give notice to his Excellency the Viceroy at Nanking that the first meeting of the Huang-pu River Conservancy Board will take place on next.\"\n\nWe respectfully ask instructions of the Diplomatic Body on the above.\n\nI have, &c. (Signed) JOHN GOODNOW, Consul-General, U.S.A., and Senior Consul,\n\nInclosure 3 in No. 1.\n\nProjet de Règlement en Cinq Articles relativement aux Travaux d'Amélioration du Huang-Pou, soumis à l'Approbation du Corps Consulaire pour le prompt Commencement de ces Travaux.\n\nLES bateaux des Grandes Puissances ont déjà des droits à payer; la Chine sera confuse de réclamer encore des contributions pour les dépenses des travaux du Huang-Pou aux étrangers qui viennent faire le commerce chez elle. Aussi le Gouvernement Chinois prélèvera sur les recettes de la Douane une somme de 230,000 taels pour son compte et prendra aussi à sa charge les 230,000 taels que les commerçants étrangers avaient consenti à fournir; cela fera en tout une somme de 460,000 Haikwan taels, qui sera versée annuellement jusqu'à l'achèvement des travaux.\n\n2. Les travaux du Huang-Pou seront sous la direction du Taotai de Shanghaï et de la Douane; ce sera également la Douane qui aura la haute main sur la police et les phares.\n\n3. Trois mois après l'acceptation de ce projet de Règlement, le Gouvernement Chinois invitera le concert des Puissances à nommer un ou deux ingénieurs spécialistes pour les travaux des fleuves, qui dirigeront cette entreprise.\n\n4. Tous les trois mois il sera dressé un état des dépenses faites pour les travaux, qui sera soumis au Corps Consulaire.\n\n5. Le Gouvernement Chinois s'engage à ne réclamer pour les travaux du Huang-Pou aucun impôt, soit à Shanghai soit aux endroits environnants, sur les bateaux, sur les marchandises ou sur les propriétés.\n\nJe dois demander des instructions de mon Gouvernement.\n\n(Signé)\n\nG. DUBAIL\n\n431", "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-326 - Foreign Office - 1904.txt", "external_url": "", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 395133, "series_id": 27, "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine", "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "CO129-326 - Foreign Office - 1904", "page_number": 470, "title": "CO129-326 - Foreign Office - 1904", "content_text": "[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]\n\nCHINA TRADE.\n\nCONFIDENTIAL.\n\nNo. 1.\n\n[August 15.]\n\nSECTION 1.\n\n:\n\n:\n\nSir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne.-(Received August 15.)\n\n(No. 229.)\n\nPeking, June 27, 1904.\n\nMy Lord,\n\nWITH reference to my despatch No. 219 of the 16th instant, transmitting translation of a note from the Chinese Government in which they make new proposals for the Hwangpoo River Conservancy, I have the honour to report that after consultation with my German and United States' colleagues as to the answer which it was advisable to return, I addressed the inclosed reply to Prince Ching on the 22nd instant.\n\nIt may perhaps seem that I have in some measure anticipated the instructions of His Majesty's Government in this note, but I venture to point out that a mere acknowledgment of receipt, coupled with an undertaking to transmit the Chinese proposals to His Majesty's Government, would probably be interpreted as a virtual acceptance, and it was necessary, therefore, to frame my answer in such a way as to reserve full liberty for any future decision.\n\nI beg also to inclose copy of the reply returned by my United States' colleague to the Chinese note. My German colleague, to whom I communicated a copy of my note before it was sent in, informed me that he would write to Prince Ch'ing in the same sense.\n\nThe Japanese Minister has also informed me that he agrees with the views expressed in my note, and that he will return a similar reply to the Chinese proposals.\n\nI have, &c. (Signed) ERNEST SATOW.\n\nP.S.-Since writing the above I have been informed by the United States' Minister that his Government are willing to accept the Chinese proposal, provided that guarantees for the immediate commencement and satisfactory completion of the works are given. (See my telegram No. 144 of the 30th June.) This was communicated to the Chinese Government on the 27th June.\n\nE. S.\n\nInclosure 1 in No. 1.\n\nSir E. Satow to Prince Ch'ing,\n\nPeking, June 22, 1904.\n\nYour Highness,\n\nI HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Highness' note of the 9th June, containing a scheme for the improvement of the Huangpu River which the Chinese Government desire to substitute for the arrangement contained in Annex 17 of the Peace Protocol of 1901.\n\nDuring the past three years the Chinese Government have been repeatedly urged by the Diplomatic Body and by various foreign Representatives to appoint a Chinese member of the Conservancy Board under Article IV (h) of Annex 17, and on the 23rd March, 1903, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires again addressed your Highness on the subject. But his note has remained unanswered. Your Highness will also remember that at our interview of the 3rd February last, I again pressed this question on your notice, but without effect.\n\nIt must be obvious to your Highness that the acceptance of any new scheme by the Powers must be unanimous. In their present form it appears to me unlikely that the proposals of the Chinese Government will meet with approval. In the first place, the Chinese Government ask His Majesty's Government to consent to the appropriation of a portion of the Customs revenue for this purpose. Now these funds are already pledged for the payment of the foreign loans and for the indemnity due to the Powers, so that there is nothing over.\n\n[2103 p]\n\n467", "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-326 - Foreign Office - 1904.txt", "external_url": "", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 404790, "series_id": 27, "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine", "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "CO129-333 - Governor Nathan - 1906 [1-4]", "page_number": 528, "title": "CO129-333 - Governor Nathan - 1906 [1-4]", "content_text": "# XII-MILITARY FORCES AND EXPENDITURE\n\n## (a) REGULAR FORCES\n\nThe following return shows the number and composition of the Forces employed in the Colony during 1905 :-\n\n| CORPS | Officers | EUROPEANS | INDIANS | CHINESE | N. C. O.'s & Men | TOTALS |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| General Staff | 4 | | | | | 4 |\n| Garrison Staff | 2 | 2 | | | | 4 |\n| Royal Garrison Artillery | 16 | 615 | | | 631 | 631 |\n| Hongkong-Singapore Bn. R. G. A. | 9 | 379 | | | 404 | 404 |\n| Royal Engineers | 11 | 194 | | | 205 | 205 |\n| Chinese S. M. M. Co., R. E. | | | | 69 | 69 | 69 |\n| 119th Infantry | | 646 | | | 664 | 664 |\n| 129th (D.C.O.) Baluchis | | 535 | | | 554 | 554 |\n| | 31 | 43 | 52 | 31 | | 157 |\n| | | 38 | 8 | 11 | | 57 |\n| 110th Mahratta L. I. | | 壬... | 282 | | 291 | 291 |\n| 93rd Burma Infantry | 4 | | 276 | | 285 | 285 |\n| 114th Mahrattas | | 102 | | | 105 | 105 |\n| 2nd Royal West Kent Regiment | 11 | 441 | | | 452 | 452 |\n| Totals | 98 | 1,370 | 41 | 2,220 | 69 | 3,798 |\n| Army Service Corps | | | | | | |\n| Royal Army Medical Corps | | | | | | |\n| A. O. Department and Corps | | | | | | |\n| A. P. Department and Corps | | | | | | |\n\n## (b) Colonial CONTRIBUTION\n\nThe Colony contributed $1,562,650.27 (being the statutory contribution of 20 per cent. of the Estimated revenue including arrears on account of 1904) towards the cost of the maintenance of the Regular Forces in the Colony and Barrack Service.\n\n## (c) VOLUNTEER CORPS\n\nThe total establishment of the Corps is 431 of all ranks. The strength on the 31st December, 1905, was 276, made up as follows:- Staff, 7; two Garrison Artillery Companies, 205; one Engineer Company, 35; Troop 29.\n\nThe members of the Corps are now all armed with the new M.L.E. Short rifle and the latest pattern equipment.\n\nThe period for the annual Camp of Instruction was extended from 10 days to 16, it was held in October, 1905, and was very well attended.\n\nThe Hongkong Volunteer Reserve Association numbered two hundred and thirteen members at the close of the year, an increase of 113 members, as compared with 1904.\n\nMembers of this Association, who must be over 35 years of age, are required to make themselves proficient in rifle shooting, and undertake to enrol themselves under the Volunteer Ordinance in the event of hostilities.\n\nThe expenditure on the Volunteers, which is entirely borne by the Colony, was $58,311.12.\n\n- 13 -\n\n# XII-GENERAL OBSERVATIONS\n\nThe war between Russia and Japan continued during the first half of the year to affect disadvantageously the trade of the Colony and to be productive of incidents involving important questions of law. Early in January a breach of a Colonial Ordinance required the forfeiture of a cargo of ammunition destined for a belligerent but carried by a British steamer that had put into the port for coal. The position of one of the belligerent fleets from the middle of April to the middle of May within three days' steam of Hongkong necessitated stringent measures being taken to prevent any use of the port not in accordance with British neutrality laws and in several instances the severe penalties involved by the despatch of any ship with reasonable cause to believe that the same would be employed on the naval service of a foreign state at war with a friendly state had to be brought to the special notice of shipping agents. The departure northwards of that fleet relieved anxiety in this matter but was followed by the capture, on the grounds of carrying contraband of war, of two British ships - the `Oldhamia` in the Bashee Channel on May 18th and the `St. Kilda` a few hours out of Hongkong on June 4th. The latter capture was the last incident of the naval operations which directly affected Hongkong though it was not till nearly three months later that the armistice protocol was signed on September 1st. The opportunity was taken of the first visit to the port after the conclusion of peace of a Russian war vessel - the `Almaz` - to embark on her on November 30th for repatriation the 2 officers and 53 men of the former Russian torpedo boat destroyer `Burni` who had arrived in the Colony from Wei-Hai-Wei on the 22nd August, 1904. 2 officers and 8 men who had formed part of the same crew had previously been sent to Europe on grounds of ill-health.\n\nThe result of the disappearance of Russian naval power from Far Eastern waters was the immediate withdrawal of all the battleships from the British fleet on the China Station and a reduction in the number of cruisers. The lessening of imperial expenditure in the Colony resulting from this has necessarily been disadvantageous to its trade.\n\nThis was more seriously affected by the organized attempt of the Chinese in the last half of the year to boycott American goods as a protest against the administration of the United States law excluding Chinese labourers from that country. The attempt to extend the organization of the movement to this Colony was not supported by the principal Chinese merchants here, but its strength in Canton adversely affected the business in American goods which passes through Hongkong and further tended to the development of anti-foreign feeling and consequent unrest in that part of China with which Hongkong does most trade. Advantage was taken of the visit in September of Mr. WILLIAM H. TAFT, United States Secretary for War, to give that gentleman an opportunity of hearing the views of some of the leading Chinese of the Colony as to the Chinese objections to the provisions and administration of the exclusion law.\n\nUncertainty of exchange is always a factor adverse to trade and the year under review was not exceptional in this respect, the range of variation being slightly greater than in 1904. The year started with the dollar at 1s. 11d. It fell to 1s. 10d. at the end of March, rose irregularly to 2s. 1d. at the end of November and stood at 2s. 0.25d. in the last days of December. The maximum of the year was the highest value that had been attained since early in 1897.\n\nProbably the most important factor in making the year a bad one for trade was the loss of confidence in Hongkong Chinese dealers owing to the speculation of 1904 which had the natural result of making it difficult for these dealers to get money with which to carry on their business in 1905. As regards imports, trade was particularly slack in fancy cotton and woollen goods and metals while but a limited business was done in Manchester piece goods. Yarns did fairly well, especially for importers. Australian flour entered into serious competition with American of which the importation fell off largely; American kerosine also suffered from the boycott. As regards exports, trade in silk was adversely affected by various causes and in other articles, especially ginger and soy, compared unfavourably with that of preceding years.\n\nIn spite of indifferent trade several local stocks stood higher at the end than at the commencement of the year. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation shares advanced $150 against an advance of $50 in 1904. Local shipping companies retrograded. Marine insurance shares generally improved. Of the local land and building companies the shares of one operating at Kowloon slightly appreciated; the others declined and the decision of holders of marine lots on the East Praya not to undertake for the present the reclamation of the sea bed in front of their properties was probably a wise one. The Dock companies did...", "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-333 - Governor Nathan - 1906 [1-4].txt", "external_url": "", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 412745, "series_id": 27, "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine", "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "CO129-345 - Public Offices & Foreign Office - 1907", "page_number": 505, "title": "CO129-345 - Public Offices & Foreign Office - 1907", "content_text": "# AFFAIRS OF CHINA\n## CONFIDENTIAL\n\n440 \n502 \nNovember 17 DEC 07 \n## SECTION 1.\n\n[36641] \n\nSir, \n\n### No. 1. Chinese Engineering and Mining Company to Foreign Office.-(Received November 6.)\n\n22, Austin Friars, London, November 5, 1907. REFERRING to your letter of the 18th July last, on the subject of the occupation of land by the French at Chin Wang Tao, and inclosing a copy of a letter of the 4th July from M. Pichon, the French Foreign Minister, and a Memorandum on the subject. My Directors have been in communication with the Company's representative in China, and I am instructed to reply as follows:- \n\nM. Pichon's letter might give the impression that this Company has adopted an unconciliatory attitude in dealing with the question of the French occupation. I am therefore desired to point out that, so far from this being the case, the Company has throughout expressed its willingness to concede to the French Government exactly the same advantages which have been accepted by the German and Japanese Governments. The Company, in fact, expressed its willingness to meet the demands made by the French Minister for land for naval, military, and Government purposes, although these demands exceeded those of either the Japanese or the German Governments. Moreover, the Company's proposals were accepted as satisfactory by M. Dubail, the former Minister at Peking, who concluded an Agreement accordingly on the 5th October, 1904. It was only after a lapse of eighteen months that the Company received information that this Agreement was rejected by the French Foreign Office.\n\nM. Pichon's letter proposes as an equitable compromise the very conditions which from the first have been rejected as unacceptable to this Company.\n\nThe French Memorandum may be divided into four sections :--\n1. The justification of the French action and position.\n2. The alleged history of the port and the Company, and a discussion of its rights.\n3. A threat to take action with the Chinese Government hostile to the Company.\n4. A reiteration of proposals for a settlement which from the first have been rejected by this Company.\n\nThe French Government are at present in occupation--\n* (a.) Of certain lands near the railway station.\nThese lands were occupied by the French Government at the end of 1900 or the beginning of 1901, simultaneously with the temporary occupation of land at Chin Wang Tao effected by other Powers. This area of ground in the occupation of the French authorities is far greater than that occupied by the other Powers, and only a small portion of it is actually required for their naval and military depôts. The Company has always expressed its willingness to the retention of this extended area by the French Government for Government purposes.\n\nThe only issue with respect to these lands, therefore, is their assignment by the French Government to their nationals for private or trading purposes. This is dealt with later, where it is shown that the Protocol of the 7th September, 1901, Article 9, on which the French Government's claim is based, expressly recognizes \"le droit d'occuper certains points pour maintenir les communications libres entre la capitale et la mer,\" but only for that special purpose.\n\n* (b) Of certain lands on the bluff at Chin Wang Tao.\nThese lands were forcibly seized by the French Government in October 1901, at a time when they were indisputably in the possession of this Company, and some time subsequent to the signing of the Peace Protocol of the 7th September, 1901. It is surprising that the French Memorandum makes no reference to this, nor affords any justification of their action.\n\nCompletely independent and reliable evidence of this seizure and its date is to be found in the Report of Captain H. W. Cruddas, Officer Commanding Chin Wang Tao, addressed on the 20th October, 1901, to the Chief Staff Officer of the British China Field Force in Tien-tsin.\n\n[2732 f-1]", "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-345 - Public Offices & Foreign Office - 1907.txt", "external_url": "", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 412746, "series_id": 27, "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine", "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "CO129-345 - Public Offices & Foreign Office - 1907", "page_number": 506, "title": "CO129-345 - Public Offices & Foreign Office - 1907", "content_text": "# 503\n\n2\n\nCorroborating this is the protest addressed by the then Manager of the Company, Mr. Dugan, to the French Admiral dated the 27th October, 1901, and his reply dated the 1st December, 1901, expressing himself unable to deal with the matter and referring the former to the French Minister in Peking.\n\nM. Dubail, the French Minister, withdrew all claim to these lands and caused the French boundary posts to be removed and the lands returned to the Company. After a period of eighteen months' undisturbed occupation by the Company of the same, the land was again forcibly seized by the French Government. The justification advanced in the French Memorandum is to be found on pp. 11 and 12, and reads as follows:\n\n\"En fait, la situation de la France à Ts'in-ouang-tao est nette et son droit sur les terrains qu'elle occupe fort bien établi; d'accord avec les autres Puissances, elle détient en vertu du droit de guerre et en exécution de l'Article 9 du Protocole de 1901 relatif à l'occupation des points nécessaires pour assurer les libres communications entre Pékin et la mer en toute saison, une partie des terrains de Ts'in-ouang-tao, au même titre que divers autres emplacements situés sur les lignes d'étapes entre Pékin et la mer, et nul ne peut légalement l'en déposséder.\"\n\nThe \"droit de guerre\" could give no right to the French Government to seize the private property of the subjects of a friendly Power six weeks after the Final Peace Protocol with the Chinese Government has been signed.\n\nArticle 9 of the Protocol confirms to the use of the Powers certain lands the occupation of which had been ceded by the previous Protocol of the 16th February, 1901, for the purpose of maintaining free communication between the capital and the sea. It affords no justification for the subsequent seizure of private property.\n\nExcept for the alleged \"droit de guerre,\" no justification is offered by the French Memorandum beyond occasional references to the Tien-tsin Treaty of 1858, and an argument that the possession by this Company of its land constitutes a breach of that Treaty.\n\n31\n\nMy Directors cannot understand how clause 14 of the Treaty of 1858 forbidding \"toute coalition organisée dans le but d'exercer un monopole sur le commerce\" have any bearing on the case, or how, if a right were accorded to the French Government to lease a small portion of land at Chin Wang Tao to private individuals for commercial or industrial purposes, it could remedy a breach of this clause. The ownership of the land by this Company gives no monopoly of commerce, nor does the Company claim any. What gives this Company a special position at Chin Wang Tao (apart from its legal title) is the fact that the port has been created by the Company, that no natural port whatsoever existed there, but an artificial harbour has been created as the result of the expenditure of large sums of money by this Company in the construction of a pier and breakwater, &c. But for this expenditure the land would be worthless, as it was when first acquired by the Company.\n\nNo commercial monopoly is sought or exercised by this Company at Chin Wang Tao. The Agreement made with M. Dubail accorded to French nationals and shippers the same facilities at moderate rates as to those of any other Power, the same Agreement having been entered into with the German and Japanese Governments. In proof of this we need only mention that half-a-dozen different shipping lines, including the French \"Chargeurs Réunis,\" are running to the port. The Company is, moreover, quite prepared to sell to French nationals as much land as they may require on exactly the same terms as are accorded to any others.\n\nAs regards the rights of this Company to its property at Chin Wang Tao under the Agreement of Purchase with the old Chinese Engineering and Mining Company my Directors do not consider that they are called upon to enter into any discussion, but I am to point out that Chang Yen Mao, in entering into the Agreement, acted not only as Director-General of the old Chinese Engineering and Mining Company, but also as Director-General of Mines of the Province of Chili, in which capacity he was second only to the Viceroy in rank and power.\n\nOn pp. 6 and 7, however, a definite pretext is assigned for taking the view that the Company's rights are open to question. It runs as follows:\n\n\"La date seule du 30 Juillet, 1900, fait d'ailleurs tomber le contrat sous le coup d'une décision du Corps Diplomatique de Pékin (procès-verbal de la quatrième séance, le 5 Novembre, 1900), d'après laquelle aucun achat de terrains aux Chinois depuis le commencement de siège ne saurait être valable sans l'assentiment des Ministres étrangers. Cette mesure, qui visait spécialement les spéculations dolosives dans l'enceinte du quartier des Légations de Pékin, répondait à la préoccupation générale d'empêcher les ventes fictives ou léonines. Ainsi le contrat provisoire du 30 Juillet, 1900, conclu sans titres suffisants, est des plus contestables en raison de sa date, qui le rend légalement sans valeur.\"\n\nIn reply, it is only necessary to point out that this decision of the Diplomatic Corps referred exclusively to land at Peking, as is well known to all concerned.\n\nThe fact remains that this British Company has twice been forcibly dispossessed, while in actual possession and occupation of certain lands, by the French Government without any warrant or justification, and that no satisfactory explanation is as yet advanced.\n\nThe French Government, in trying to prove that the position of this Company is not correct, is taking up a question which it is not in its province to adjudicate upon. This Company's contentions as to its rights are incontestable from the point of view of international law, and the action of the French Government can only be considered as an act of aggression against British-owned property.\n\nIt is not, however, only because of the very material loss which acceptance of the French proposals would entail that the Company finds itself unable to accede to the French demands; it is because this Company is pledged to the British, Japanese, and German Governments to equality of treatment in all respects for their respective nationals, and is therefore unable to come to an agreement with the French Government by which French citizens would be placed at an advantage over those of any other Power.\n\nThat is the reason why this Company cannot consent to the transfer of further lands to the French Government beyond those near the railway station of which it already has the use, nor to the use of those lands for private and commercial purposes.\n\nMy Directors therefore beg to request that His Majesty's Government should urge upon the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs the acceptance of a similar arrangement to that made with the Governments of Japan and Germany.\n\nI have, &c.\n\nThe Chinese Engineering and Mining Company (Limited),\n\n**(Signed) ALFRED W. BERRY, Secretary**", "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-345 - Public Offices & Foreign Office - 1907.txt", "external_url": "", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 412775, "series_id": 27, "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine", "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "CO129-345 - Public Offices & Foreign Office - 1907", "page_number": 535, "title": "CO129-345 - Public Offices & Foreign Office - 1907", "content_text": "## Inclosure 2 in No. 1.\n\n## Statement by Chinese Engineering and Mining Company.\n\nM. Pichon's letter might give the impression that this Company has adopted an unconciliatory attitude in dealing with the question of the French occupation. So far from this being the case, the Company has throughout expressed its willingness to concede to the French Government exactly the same advantages which have been accepted by the German and Japanese Governments. The Company, in fact, expressed its willingness to meet the demands made by the French Minister for land for naval, military, and Government purposes, although these demands exceeded those of either the Japanese or the German Governments. Moreover, the Company's proposals were accepted as satisfactory by M. Dubail, the former Minister at Peking, who concluded an Agreement accordingly on the 5th October, 1904. It was only after a lapse of eighteen months that the Company received information that this Agreement was rejected by the French Foreign Office.\n\nM. Pichon's letter proposes as an equitable compromise the very conditions which from the first have been rejected as unacceptable to this Company.\n\nThe French Memorandum may be divided into four sections:--\n\n1. The justification of the French action and position.\n2. The alleged history of the port and the Company, and a discussion of its rights.\n3. An announcement of possible action with the Chinese Government hostile to the Company.\n4. A reiteration of proposals for a settlement, which from the first have been rejected by this Company.\n\nThe French Government are at present in occupation--\n\n(a) Of certain lands near the railway station.\n\nThese lands were occupied by the French Government at the end of 1900 or the beginning of 1901, simultaneously with the temporary occupation of land at Chin Wang Tao, effected by the other Powers. This area of ground, in the occupation of the French authorities, is far greater than that occupied by the other Power, and only a small portion of it is actually required for their naval and military depôts. The Company has always expressed its willingness to its retention of this extended area by the French Government for Government purposes.\n\nThe only issue with respect to these lands, therefore, is their assignment by the French Government to their nationals for private or trading purposes. This is dealt with later, where it is shown that the Protocol of the 7th September, 1901, Article IX, on which the French Government's claim is based, expressly recognizes \"le droit d'occuper certains points pour maintenir les communications libres entre la capitale et la mer,\" but only for that special purpose.\n\n(b) Of certain lands on the Bluff, at Chin Wang Tao.\n\nThese lands were forcibly seized by the French Government in October 1901, at a time when they were indisputably in the possession of this Company, and some time subsequent to the signing of the Peace Protocol of the 7th September, 1901. It is surprising that the French Memorandum makes no reference to this nor affords any justification of their action.\n\nCompletely independent and reliable evidence of this seizure and its date is to be found in the Report of Captain H. W. Cruddas, Officer Commanding Chin Wang Tao, addressed on the 20th October, 1901, to the Chief Staff Officer of the British China field force in Tien-tsin.\n\nCorroborating this is the protest addressed by the then Manager of the Company, Mr. Dugan, to the French Admiral, dated the 27th October, 1901, and his reply dated the 1st December, 1901, expressing himself unable to deal with the matter, and referring the former to the French Minister in Peking.\n\nM. Dubail, the French Minister, withdrew all claim to these lands, and caused the French boundary-posts to be removed and the lands returned to the Company. After a period of eighteen months' undisturbed occupation by the Company of the same, the land was again forcibly seized by the French Government. The justification advanced in the French Memorandum is to be found on pp. 11 and 12, and reads as follows:-\n\n\"En fait, la situation de la France à Ts'in-ouang-tao est nette et son droit sur les terrains qu'elle occupe fort bien établi; d'accord avec les autres Puissances, elle détient, en vertu du droit de guerre et en exécution de l'Article IX du Protocole de 1901 relatif à l'occupation des points nécessaires pour assurer les libres communications entre Pekin et la mer en toute saison, une partie des terrains de Ts'in-ouang-tao, au même titre que divers autres emplacements situés sur les lignes d'étapes entre Pekin et la mer, et nul ne peut légalement l'en déposséder.”\n\nThe \"droit de guerre\" could give no right to the French Government to seize the private property of the subjects of a friendly Power six weeks after the final Peace Protocol with the Chinese Government has been signed.\n\nArticle IX of the Protocol confirms to the use of the Powers certain lands, the occupation of which had been ceded by the previous Protocol of the 16th February, 1901, for the purpose of maintaining free communication between the capital and the sea. It affords no justification for the subsequent seizure of private property.\n\nExcept for the alleged \"droit de guerre\" no justification is offered by the French Memorandum beyond occasional references to the Tien-tsin Treaty of 1858, and an argument that the possession by this Company of its land constitutes a breach of that Treaty.\n\nThe Directors of the Company cannot understand how Clause No. XIV of the Treaty of 1858 forbidding \"toute coalition organisée dans le but d'exercer un monopole sur le commerce\" can have any bearing on the case, or how, if a right were accorded to the French Government to lease a small portion of land at Chin Wang Tao to private individuals for commercial or industrial purposes, it could remedy a breach of this clause. The ownership of the land by this Company gives no monopoly of commerce, nor does the Company claim any. What gives this Company a special position at Chin Wang Tao (apart from its legal title) is the fact that the port has been created by the Company, that no natural port whatsoever existed there, but an artificial harbour has been created as the result of the expenditure of large sums of money by this Company in the construction of a pier and breakwater, &c. But for this expenditure the land would be worthless, as it was when first acquired by the Company.\n\nNo commercial monopoly is sought or exercised by this Company at Chin Wang Tao. The Agreement made with M. Dubail accorded to French nationals and shippers the same facilities at moderate rates as to those of any other Power, the same Agreement having been entered into with the German and Japanese Governments. In proof of this we need only mention that half-a-dozen different shipping lines, including the French \"Chargeurs Réunis,\" are now running to the port. The Company is, moreover, quite prepared to sell to French nationals as much land as they may require on exactly the same terms as are accorded to any others.\n\nAs regards the rights of this Company to its property at Chin Wang Tao under the Agreement of Purchase with the old Chinese Engineering and Mining Company, the Directors of the Company do not consider that they are called upon to enter into any discussion, but I am to point out that Chang Yen Mao, in entering into the Agreement, acted, not only as Director-General of the old Chinese Engineering and Mining Company, but also as Director-General of Mines of the Province of Chili, in which capacity he was second only to the Viceroy in rank and power.\n\nOn pp. 6 and 7, however, a definite pretext is assigned for taking the view that the Company's rights are open to question. It runs as follows:-\n\n\"La date seule du 30 Juillet, 1900, fait d'ailleurs tomber le contrat sous le coup d'une décision du Corps Diplomatique de Pékin (procès-verbal de la quatrième séance, le 5 Novembre, 1900), d'après laquelle aucun achat de terrains aux Chinois depuis le commencement du siège ne saurait être valable sans l'assentiment des Ministres étrangers. Cette mesure, qui visait spécialement les spéculations dolosives dans l'enceinte du quartier des Légations de Pékin, répondait à la préoccupation générale d'empêcher les ventes fictives ou léonines. Ainsi le contrat provisoire du 30 Juillet, 1900, conclu sans titres suffisants, est des plus contestables, en raison de sa date, qui le rend légalement sans valeur.\"\n\nIn reply, it is only necessary to point out that this decision of the Diplomatic Corps referred exclusively to land at Peking, as is well known to all concerned.\n\nThe fact remains that this British Company has twice been forcibly dispossessed, while in actual possession and occupation, of certain lands, by the French Government, and that no satisfactory explanation is as yet advanced.\n\nPage 531", "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-345 - Public Offices & Foreign Office - 1907.txt", "external_url": "", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 415715, "series_id": 27, "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine", "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "CO129-350 - Public Offices - 1908", "page_number": 410, "title": "CO129-350 - Public Offices - 1908", "content_text": "63. The Russians took advantage of Hei-lung Chiang being the first place pacified after the Boxer trouble to encroach on Manchuria. The Tartar General Tseng-chi sent Chou-mien, whom the Russians forced to conclude a new Treaty, practically giving Russia full powers in Kuan-tung. The Plenipotentiary Li had also agreed, but Chang and Liu jointly made a vigorous protest, urging the Court not to ratify. After a score of telegrams and Memorials the Russians set the 25th April (1901) as the latest date for signing, after which they would break off relations. They used every possible threat, but he persisted in vigorous protest, and succeeded in preventing ratification, thus saving the three eastern provinces.\n\n64. In 1909, when peace was about to be made after the western tour, and the Court was discussing their Majesties' return, foreigners started saying that, though all the guilty had been punished, there was still an important matter undealt with. If positions remained unaltered after the return to Peking, the Powers would certainly not stop asking till their demand was granted. Thereon he telegraphed secretly to the Government urging oral representation that advantage should be taken of the Court not having returned to vindicate the State by issuing the order as by their Majesties' own will. This proposal was thereafter settled while the Court was still at K'aifong.\n\n74. The 1901 Allied Forces' Peace Protocol, on the Powers' plea that the deepening of the Huangpu would benefit merchant-ships, and with the assent of the Plenipotentiaries, forced China to send officers to set about it in concert with them. Viceroy Liu put off doing so, and in the spring of 1903 Chang took charge. In the face of repeated Imperial urgings, he protested and vigorously argued and never sent anyone. He also engaged other Powers' Consuls to help and then took the lead in proposing that China should finance and execute the dredging without financial aid or interference by other nations—a policy that won.\n\n75. In the summer of 1902 he shared in negotiating the British Commercial Treaty. Of many rectifications and recoveries, the most important was getting them, whose strong demand was for the abolition of li-kin and native customs dues, to agree to the levy of consumption duty. Another still more important clause agreed to surrender extra-territoriality, a subject none had touched on during fifty years of trade.\n\n76. He points out how he had the Wai-wu Pu's idea of not discussing mining overruled as the only safeguard against illicit partnership in mining between Chinese and foreigners. A law was necessary to afford control and prevent the loss of rights, reform old and limit new mining enterprises. The Throne approved and bade him, with Liu, arrange regulations. Lin's death threw the task on his shoulders alone. From the laws and prohibitions of all nations, he selected what was good, his general idea being to safeguard rights, benefit the people's livelihood, and make taxation light. He compiled them in a volume of seventy-four regulations and seventy-two supplementary rules.\n\n80. In view of the awkward and dangerous position of the Shanghae Arsenal, he advocated its removal to Ping-hsiang, a remote site close to coal. Funds were provided; the annual reserve of the old arsenal of 700,000 and the copper mint's yearly profit of 500,000 would have enabled it to be done in five years, but the Board of Revenue's annexation of the funds stopped the scheme for the time. Still, in a crisis, it will be remembered.\n\n82. When he was in Peking in 1903, giving an account of his stewardship, the Russo-Japanese war was imminent, and the Government bade him go and dissuade Japan from the war. He refused and reported the remark of a western envoy that the war would be a good thing for China. The idea was dropped on his view being laid before the Throne. Again, in the spring of 1904, the Southern Trade Superintendent Wei tried to get the high provincial authorities to combine in moving the Northern Trade Superintendent to memorialize that Japan be dissuaded from war. On his way through Tien-tsin, he was asked about the idea and vigorously opposed it. The same winter, when, despite defeats, Russia would not evacuate Manchuria, the new Southern Trade Superintendent suggested mediating along with the Northern Trade Superintendent and Hupei, but his strong disapproval prevented action.\n\n83. It records how Arnhold Karberg and Co.'s proposal to farm the sale of opium throughout China, negotiated through Ching-wei Hsing, had taken form after Peking intriguing, but he refused to help, in spite of the offer of heavy bribes. Twice he telegraphed strong protests, and at last, the Grand Secretary Jung-lu understood the danger and rejected the scheme.\n\n84. It mentions Melchers and Co.'s attempt to follow the Japanese example of using the native city frontage at Nankow and the threat to place a hulk under man-of-war protection. The people were afraid lest their ferry-boats be endangered forever. After he went to Peking in the winter of 1903, he sent an officer to negotiate with the German Envoy Mumm and got the project dropped on the condition that the Osaka Shoshen Kaisha should also move to the Japanese Concession within a certain time. The Envoy had notified the Wai-wu Pu that on the 1st January next, he would have a serious matter to tell them, and they were panic-struck until the receipt of this correspondence filled them with joy.\n\nPage 5\n\n85. The Inspector-General Hart started a scheme to increase the land taxation and abolish all trade levies. The Government did not approve but could not stop it, so called for provincial views. He was the only one who strongly refuted it, and got it dropped.\n\n86. The American Jenks' design to control the great matter of China's silver currency could not be refuted by the Court Ministers, and the idea was assented to before Jenks came to Hupei, where, at an interview, Chang silenced him with awkward questions, and then memorialized strongly on his blunders and showed up the danger. The matter was happily successfully blocked.\n\n87. Among the many foreign cases dealt with, whenever there was a question of capital punishment, he tried to save the people's lives, and constantly, in identical mission cases where other provinces executed several, Hupei men went scatheless, and capital penalties agreed to by his predecessors were lightened. From appreciation of his justice, foreigners even do not object.\n\n88. When the Hankow-Canton Railway was sold by the Americans to the Belgian-China Development Company, he was the first to show up the scandal of the Empire. In steadfast isolation, he fought the battle of resumption for ourselves, despite the combined resistance of the two Powers, until the American State Secretary, from respect for his austerity, ended by giving the line back to us.\n\n120. He once told his retainers: \"During my twenty-five years as a Provincial Governor, the only comparatively easy time was the two years in Shansi. For the rest, not a day but I am among thorns and brambles. Speaking generally, what I have done has never been what the Government wanted me to do; what I spent was never money the province surely had; whom I employed never served me with joy and real heartiness.\"", "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-350 - Public Offices - 1908.txt", "external_url": "", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 415994, "series_id": 27, "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine", "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "CO129-351 - Public Offices - 1908", "page_number": 159, "title": "CO129-351 - Public Offices - 1908", "content_text": "This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.\n\n10573\n\n156\n\nCHINA RAILWAYS.\n\nCONFIDENTIAL.\n\n[5360]\n\nNo. 1.\n\n[February 10.]\n\n08\n\nSECTION 1.\n\nMessrs. Pauling and Co. to Foreign Office.-(Received February 15.)\n\n26, Victoria Street, Westminster, London, February 14, 1908.\n\nSir,\n\nWE have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 12th February, and note with great regret the decision that His Majesty's Government have come to with regard to the extension of the Chinese Imperial Railway from Hsinmintun to Fakumen.\n\nThe construction of this 50 mile extension could only increase the existing volume of traffic and trade that passes by road to Hsinmintun, the present railway terminus, and thence confessedly an increased traffic, and not a lessened one, must pass also to Mukden and to the Japanese South Manchurian system to its benefit.\n\nThe construction of this extension cannot be therefore possibly deemed as prejudicial to the South Manchurian system, nor consequently constitute a breach of the Protocol referred to in your letter under reply. We therefore deeply regret that, notwithstanding these facts, His Majesty's Government refuse to assist us in the matter.\n\nWe venture respectfully to say that, were it a case of a British Concession being injured by competition, His Majesty's Government would decide the question, and rightly so decide it, on the actual railway facts applicable to the case; and as we have so far not heard of a single reason advanced by the Japanese Government why the extension now proposed could prejudicially affect their South Manchurian Railway traffic, we trusted naturally that, in the absence of all such reasons, His Majesty's Government would assist us in the dispute that has occurred between China and Japan.\n\nIt has caused us the greatest surprise to learn that His Majesty's Government consider the Japanese decision on the question is alone to be taken into account by it. Surely, although China may be the less important of the two Powers involved in this dispute, that should not, in our humble opinion, preclude it from being heard in the matter, nor prevent His Majesty's Government giving due consideration to any representations which China may make to His Majesty's Government.\n\nThat the Japanese Plenipotentiary, in the informal Agreement signed, we believe, some months after the conclusion of the actual Treaty, really had this particular extension of 50 miles in mind appears to us very surprising, because such an admittedly able statesman as Yuan-Shi-Kai is the Plenipotentiary concerned, both in the Treaty and in the subsequent informal Agreement, and is now the advocate of the construction of this extension on behalf of his Government, and therefore presumably may be quite as correct in his interpretation of the Protocol as the Japanese Plenipotentiary alleges that he is.\n\nWe must repeat once more most respectfully that we consider the Japanese action in this matter to be entirely at variance with the Protocol referred to in your letter, and with Article IV of the Portsmouth Treaty of Peace, and with paragraph B of the Preamble of the Japanese Treaty of 1905.\n\nWe have communicated with Lord ffrench in the sense indicated in your letter, and we beg to acknowledge, with an assurance of our sincere thanks, the promises His Majesty's Government has been good enough to give us, reiterating its desire to continue its assistance to Lord ffrench whenever possible.\n\nIn conclusion, we must beg most respectfully to say, from information cabled to us by Lord ffrench, that when it becomes known that His Majesty's Government have decided against taking up this case, in which British commercial interests of great importance are involved, that decision will be found to so prejudicially affect English enterprises in China as to invite a considerable measure of public and adverse comment there.\n\nWe beg, &c. Pauling and Co. (Limited),\n\n(Signed)\n\nJ. M. SCOTT, Secretary.\n\n[2856 p-1]", "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-351 - Public Offices - 1908.txt", "external_url": "", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 417170, "series_id": 27, "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine", "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "CO129-352 - Public Offices - 1908", "page_number": 496, "title": "CO129-352 - Public Offices - 1908", "content_text": "Minister will doubtless have reported to them the fact of your having mentioned the matter to him yourself.\n\nFrance has received into her army for a long period of military training thirty Chinese cadets to whom she grants special facilities, and if we required the quid pro quo suggested by the Admiralty a contrast might be drawn to our disadvantage. Admiral Sali, whom I met two months ago at Shanghae, expressed his high appreciation of the Admiralty's courtesy in training young Chinese officers, and the Central Government are aware of their obligations to us in the matter.\n\nThe Japanese Government, I may mention in conclusion, presented the Empress Dowager a few days ago with a steam-yacht, appropriately named \"Everlasting Peace,\" and they are evidently aiming at having a share in the reconstruction of the navy they destroyed in 1894.\n\nI have, &c.\n\n(Signed) J. N. JORDAN.\n\nC.0.\n\n33035 493\n\nThis Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.\n\nPage 9\n\n06\n\n[August 24.]\n\nSECTION 5.\n\nAFFAIRS OF CHINA.\n\nCONFIDENTIAL.\n\n[29338]\n\nNo. 1.\n\nSir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.-(Received August 24.)\n\n(No. 309. Confidential.) Sir,\n\nPeking, July 7, 1908. I am informed on good authority that when Mr. Rockhill, the American Minister here, recommended to the President the remission of a portion of the Boxer indemnity of 1900, he did so relying on the assurance of Tong Shoa-yi that the money would be expended upon the education of Chinese students in the United States.\n\nSome time afterwards Tong became Governor of Manchuria, and while there he entered into negotiations with Mr. Straight, the American Consul at Mukden, with the view of raising a loan in America on the strength of the sum to be returned by the Government at Washington. The proceeds were to be applied to the development of Manchuria, and Mr. Straight, who was apparently ignorant of Tong's understanding with Mr. Rockhill, claims that the project had the approval of Mr. Taft, who passed through Manchuria on his way to Russia in December last.\n\nThe Chinese Government are now reported to have some intention of sending Tsai Chen, Prince Ch'ing's dissolute son, and Tong Shoa-yi on a mission to Washington to convey their thanks to President Roosevelt, and it is believed that Tong will take advantage of the opportunity to urge his loan proposal.\n\nMr. Rockhill is strongly opposed to the money being diverted to loan-mongering purposes, and will do all he can to block the project.\n\nStrictly speaking, I believe China does not become entitled to the money until some eight years hence, when the United States shall have been recouped by the annual payments under the protocol for the actual outlay incurred in connection with the Boxer outbreak.\n\nI have, &c. (Signed) J. N. JORDAN,\n\n[1905 aa-5\n\n-51", "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-352 - Public Offices - 1908.txt", "external_url": "", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 422114, "series_id": 27, "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine", "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "CO129-361 - Public Offices - 1909", "page_number": 143, "title": "CO129-361 - Public Offices - 1909", "content_text": "# C.O.\n\n**This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government** 17950 \n\n141 Rece \n\n[B] \n\n## AFFAIRS OF CHINA.\n\n**CONFIDENTIAL.**\n\n(12775) \n\n### No. 1.\n\nREGP 24 APR 09 \n\n[April 5.] \n\n#### SECTION 1.\n\n**(No. 123.)** Sir, \n\nSir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.-(Received April 5.) \n\nBerlin, April 2, 1909. \n\nI HAVE the honour to report that a Chinese Special Mission arrived in Berlin on the 31st March, under the Minister, Tong Shao-yi, and the Director of Chinese Railways, Mun-yen-Chung. \n\nIn connection with the arrival of the Mission an article has appeared in the \"Berliner Tageblatt\" of to-day, entitled \"The Great Powers and China,\" of which I have the honour to inclose a translation by Mr. Sampson. \n\nAn editorial note explains that this article furnishes the key to the customs negotiations pending between China and the Great Powers, which will probably form the subject of discussion between the Chinese Special Envoy and the Berlin officials.\n\nI have, &c. (Signed) **W. E. GOSCHEN**, \n\n### Inclosure in No. 2.\n\nArticle extracted from the \"Berliner Tageblatt\" of April 2, by Adolph von Flöckher, entitled, \"The Great Powers and China.\" \n\n**(Translation.)** \n\nENGLAND was the first Power to take advantage of the right granted by the Peking Protocol of 1901 to demand a revision of the old Treaties; and this was due to the pressure of her merchants in the Far East, who demanded that the Chinese market, which had been greatly endangered by Japanese competition, should be secured by new Agreements. The British Government did not charge their Diplomatic or Consular Representatives with these negotiations, but put them in the hands of a merchant, who also concluded the Treaty with the Chinese Government. \n\nSir James Lyle Mackay, who for many years had been a merchant in India and a member of the Indian Council, was sent to Shanghae in 1902 to negotiate for a Treaty. He arrived in great state with the rank of Envoy Extraordinary, and was soon able to conclude negotiations for a Treaty, which was signed on the 5th September, 1902. It may be observed by the way that the Treaty is for the present not valid, and will not come into force until all the Signatory Powers of the peace of Peking have adhered to it, and that in Germany great misgivings are felt concerning it, as it does not sufficiently protect our interests. \n\nThe increase of the import duties from 5 to 12 per cent. and of the export duties from 5 to 7 per cent. ad valorem appears justified; but, on the other hand, the promise of the Chinese Government to abolish the interior duties, known as li-kin, does not appear to be sufficiently guaranteed to make it certain that they will actually be abolished. The railways have indeed made a great breach in the system of levying li-kin, as the goods are by this means forwarded in through trains, thus avoiding the pernicious system, whereas under the ordinary means of transport the goods are taxed as many as eighty times before arriving at their destination. \n\nGermany, in virtue of Article 24 of the Commercial Treaty of 1861, is able to avoid the payment of li-kin on all goods imported into a Chinese town by rail; and merchandize, after paying the import duty, is only subject to a further transit tax of 2 1/4 per cent., so that, for instance, goods sent to Hankow via Shanghae pay a total duty of 7 per cent. ad valorem. \n\nIt would therefore appear at first sight that Germany has no very great interest in the abolition of li-kin. But it must be considered that the railways are of comparatively small extent, and that also above all the Chinese exports suffer from ...", "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-361 - Public Offices - 1909.txt", "external_url": "", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 422530, "series_id": 27, "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine", "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "CO129-361 - Public Offices - 1909", "page_number": 559, "title": "CO129-361 - Public Offices - 1909", "content_text": "# 557 \n\n## 30 \n\nIf a local official in the transaction of international matters exceed the limit of his powers, then his actions shall not be upheld.” \n\nInasmuch as Treaties are mutually agreed to by two Governments, the officers of the two Powers should observe their provisions, and cannot on their own authority alter or cancel them. \n\nAt the present time, according to the Treaties as well as the Shanghae Mixed Court Rules, these criminals should all be handed over to the Chinese authorities for trial and punishment by them, and therefore, of course, they should be immediately handed over according to Treaty regulation. Moreover, the intent of these criminals was to throw the whole Empire into disorder, and China in punishing these offenders not only punishes criminals guilty of seditious practices, but also gives peace to the country and protection to trade. \n\nI make this communication to you, as senior Consul-General, with the request that you may in concert with your colleagues consider this matter, and that you will with all despatch hand over the criminals in accordance with the Treaty, and to the promotion of friendly relations. \n\nI hope you will take prompt action in all these matters. \n\n## No. 36. \n\nI am, &c. \n\nSir C. MacDonald to the Marquess of Lansdowne.--(Received November 9.) \n\n## (No. 115.) \n\n(Telegraphic.) P. \n\nTokió, November 9, 1903. \n\nIn February 1898, His Majesty's Government proclaimed its position as regards the Valley of the Yang-tsze, and the Japanese Government used almost identical terms in a despatch, dated the 21st April, dealing with Fuhkion. \n\nBut the Foreign Minister says that the idea had never occurred to him to bring up, in the present negotiations, the question of advantages in that province, as Mr. Hay imagines according to your Lordship's telegram No. 115. \n\n## 31 \n\nThere is no question that events reported as having happened at Moukden regarding the reoccupation of that town are not looked upon with friendly eyes by officials here, but so long as the United States' Government secures and retains trade in Manchuria it will not be drawn into the political complications of the present situation. \n\nImmediately after his visit to the State Department, Sir Liang cabled to Peking the answer of Secretary Hay to China's appeal for assistance in checking Russia in Manchuria. The Peking authorities are aware by this time that until the ratification of the American-Chinese Treaty, which was signed on the 8th October, pledging to the world the opening of Moukden and Antung, it will be impossible for this Government, in view of its traditional policy of steering clear of foreign alliances, to protest against Russia's continued occupation of Manchuria, \n\nIt has been pointed out to China that, although the sympathy of the United States is with her, the time for American interference has not yet come. It is expected that the Commercial Treaty, which should arrive at Washington this week, will be ratified at the extra session of Congress, when the United States will be in a position to insist on a strict regard for her Treaty rights throughout China. The Peking Government has been told that infringement by Russia of American Treaty rights in Manchuria will furnish to the Washington Government the opportunity for at least a reiteration of its desire for the preservation of the integrity of China. \n\nJapan, it was learned to-night, has instituted a vigorous investigation regarding the extent and character of Russia's reoccupation of Moukden. Mr. Takahira, the Japanese Minister, when asked to-night whether Russia and Japan contemplated an understanding by which the one would obtain a free hand in Manchuria and the other important concessions in Corea, replied by calling attention to a recent official announcement from Tokio that the negotiations at the Japanese capital between Russia and Japanese officials were, so far as Japan is concerned, strictly in accord with the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Mr. Takahira has not been advised of any appeal from Russia to Japan, and he said to-night that his conference with Secretary Hay to-day concerned another matter. \n\nWashington, November 3, 1903. \n\n## No. 38. \n\n## (No. 304.) My Lord, \n\n## No.37. \n\nMr. Raikes to the Marquess of Lansdowne.--(Received November 13.) \n\nWashington, November 3, 1903. \nWith reference to my despatch `No. 287`, marked **very Confidential**, of the 8th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit an extract from the \"New York Tribune,\" of to-day's date, respecting an interview between the Secretary of State and the Chinese Minister at this capital. \n\nIf the extract gives a correct account of what took place, Mr. Hay would seem to have repeated to Sir Chentung Liang what he said to me last month, viz., that as soon as the American Commercial Treaty was ratified the United States' Government would have a better *locus standi* for remonstrating with Russia if American interests were interfered with by that Power. \n\nI have, &c. \n(Signed) \n**ARTHUR S. RAIKES**. \n\n## Inclosure in No. 37. \n\nExtract from the \"New York Tribune\" of November 3, 1903. \n\nSIR CHENTUNG LIANG CHENG, the Chinese Minister here, acting under instructions from his Government, has been particularly active recently in the effort to interest the United States' Government in China's behalf in her Manchurian troubles. He was at the State Department to-day in pursuit of that object, the direct purpose being to see if any way can be found by which the United States' Government may be able to serve China in this emergency. \n\nIt appears, however, that Secretary Hay has not been able to hit upon any plan of action that would promise to serve China in this manner. There is no question that events reported as having happened at Moukden regarding the reoccupation of that town are not looked upon with friendly eyes by officials here, but so long as the United States' Government secures and retains trade in Manchuria it will not be drawn into the political complications of the present situation. \n\nSir, \n**British and Chinese Corporation** to Foreign Office.--(Received November 13.) \n\n3, Lombard Street, E.C., November 11, 1903. \nWe beg leave to refer to your letter of the 21st ultimo, in which the Marquess of Lansdowne was so good as to inquire whether we have any observations to make respecting the representation made by the German Minister in Peking to Sir E. Satow that the German group desire to separate their interests in the Tien-tsin-Yang-tsze Railway from those of the British financiers. \n\nWe replied provisionally on the 23rd ultimo (copy annexed), and since then we have been in communication with our Berlin friends. The reply we have received is of a somewhat ambiguous and qualified nature. They state that there is no question of a separation of German interests from those of the English group, and that this suggestion of a dissolution of the partnership must be due to some misunderstanding, the seat and reason of which they are not in a position to judge of, although they attribute it to a wrong interpretation of telegrams which they will do their best to clear up. \n\nThey go on in their letter to express a wish, however, for separate contracts for the German and British sections of the line, but, nevertheless, preserving the unity of interests, which seems to us to be a contradiction. \n\nSome time ago when the Germans wished for separate contracts and to break the partnership, we expressed our willingness to meet their wish subject to the condition that they declared their adherence to the Protocol of September 1898 and to the Chinese Government undertaking to give us a contract for the British section of the line on terms equally as good as they might have granted to the Germans. \n\nThe Chinese Imperial authorities have positively refused: \n| Refusal | Description |\n| --- | --- |\n| 1. | To grant separate agreements. |\n| 2. | To fix the amount of the loan or to consider the question of the change of southern terminus pending the completion of the survey. |\n| 3. | To give the Government guarantee to the loan. |", "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-361 - Public Offices - 1909.txt", "external_url": "", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 423241, "series_id": 27, "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine", "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "CO129-362 - Public Offices - 1909", "page_number": 644, "title": "CO129-362 - Public Offices - 1909", "content_text": "**(This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government)**\n\n## AFFAIRS OF CHINA\n\n**CONFIDENTIAL**\n\n[35407]\n\n### No. 1\n\n#### [September 16]\n\n## SECTION 3\n\nQuestion asked in the House of Commons, September 16, 1909.\n\nMr. Ginnell,-To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what British force was specified by the protocol, signed by the Powers after the Boxer outbreak in 1900, to remain in North China for the preservation of order, and for how long; what is the entire strength of the British forces maintained there now; whether they are maintained there at China's expense; how many of those troops are white men, and how many are men of colour; and whether he is aware that the maintenance of troops of an inferior race in this country is resented by the Chinese.\n\n### Answer\n\nThe Final Peace Protocol of 1901 provided that each Power had the right to maintain a permanent guard in its legation quarter and to occupy certain points between Peking and the sea. Under this agreement a total of about 8,000 troops was maintained in North China for several years, about 2,000 of whom were British. These troops are maintained at the expense of the country to which they belong, and not of China.\n\nNo time-limit was specified in the protocol of 1901, but the question of their reduction has been, and still is, under consideration. The latest information I have shows that there are 64 British officers and 1,025 European British troops, 17 Indian officers and 805 Indian troops in North China. I have no reason to suppose that the presence of the latter is in any way resented by the Chinese, nor are they of inferior race, and I repudiate entirely the description of them given in the question.\n\n[2418--3]", "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-362 - Public Offices - 1909.txt", "external_url": "", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 423389, "series_id": 27, "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine", "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "CO129-362 - Public Offices - 1909", "page_number": 792, "title": "CO129-362 - Public Offices - 1909", "content_text": "# Arrangement for the Joint Working of the Kirin-Changchun Railway\n\narrangement for the joint working of the Kirin-Changchun Railway were not sufficient to ensure the loss of Kirin every demand of the Japanese has now been conceded and it is impossible to foresee what the consequences will be. As regards their demand for the opening of five places to trade, some of these places as, for instance, Liu Tao Kou and Kuang Chi Yu, although important positions are still situated within the disputed territory and the demand that they should be opened to trade might perhaps be acceded to, but Pai Ts'ao Kou, which is rich in minerals, is a most important place, and is almost 100 li north of Yen-chi and there are few Coreans there.\n\nTou Tao Kou and Chi Pi Kou are important places on the route to Fongtien and are about 90 li from Yen-chi. All these places have nothing whatever to do with the boundary, and serious disadvantages will follow if they have really been opened to trade. As regards the question of judicial courts in Yen-chi, we have never hitherto, in the course of our difficulties with the Japanese, admitted in any way their right to judicial authority, and it is impossible to understand why we have now agreed to the establishment of Mixed Courts. In agreeing to the appointment of consuls we merely admit consular jurisdiction, but by consenting to the establishment of Mixed Courts we openly recognise Yen-chi to be leased territory, and this is entirely different from the opening of places of trade. Tien Pao-shan, which is famous for its silver mines, is about 50 li north of Yen-chi and has nothing to do with the boundary question. Since I have arrived in Fengtien I have done my best to preserve these mines for China, and to oppose the efforts of the Japanese, and in the case of other natural resources such as mines and forests I have during the past two years succeeded in the face of enormous difficulties in resisting the Japanese claims, pending the settlement of the boundary question. Now, however, the question of the boundary has been decided, the rights which I have striven to protect are at once surrendered. It is enough to cause one to despair.\n\nEven if it be argued that the above concessions have some concern with Yen-chi, the construction of a line to Ying-k'ou, which can be extended west of the Liao River, and our undertaking that no parallel line shall be built west of the Liao mean that we have definitely precluded ourselves from any further development of Manchuria. When we allowed Russia to build the Chinese Eastern Railway, we lost the opportunity of doing anything for Manchuria as a whole, and although, after the reorganisation of the three provinces, we endeavoured to extend railway communications, it was beyond our power to help the regions to the north-east. For this reason the construction of the Taonan-Fakumen and Chinchow-Tsitsihar Railways was planned, with a view to protecting the Mongolian frontiers and uniting the three provinces of Manchuria, but now these rights have been abandoned, and not merely have our rights in Manchuria been thrown away, but it is to be feared that it will even be impossible for us to undertake any railway construction in Inner or Outer Mongolia.\n\nThe consideration of all these points cannot but excite the deepest regret, and I would point out, with regard to these negotiations, that it is not a case of a conquered country suing for peace and unable to offer any resistance to the victor's demands. The first intention of the Japanese was merely to take advantage of the unsettled position of the Corean boundary question, in order to obtain some special advantages upon our frontiers, but, in face of the conclusive evidence in our favour, and in spite of all their specious arguments, they could only succeed in making some confusion by claiming that the Pu-erh-ba-t'ung and Hai-lan Rivers were parts of the Tiumen, the piece of land in dispute only measuring some 100 li from north to south, and it would really be as well to surrender this land to them altogether if our rights over all the country north of Yen-chi could thereby be preserved unimpaired.\n\nThese boundary negotiations have now been proceeding for nearly two years, and have cost the State almost 1,000,000 taels, and the only result is that, in return for a nominal recovery of our territory we have opened all the important places north of Yen-chi, have lost all our rights there so that it will be impossible for us to keep anything for ourselves in the southern part of Kirin, and have agreed to borrow money from them for the construction of the Kirin-Huining Railway, whereby the power of the South Manchurian Railway will be extended throughout the two provinces of Fengtien and Kirin. The Japanese have not only supreme authority in Corea, their power is now extended as far as the capital of Kirin. We have also precluded ourselves from constructing any parallel line west of the Liao and have thereby put a stop to the gradual development of communications in Manchuria. In fact, on account of a dispute about the boundaries of one piece of land, we have lost all our rights in Manchuria, and it would have been incomparably better to surrender the land to them at once without any attempt at negotiation.\n\nFurthermore, the Russian military forces in the Far East have been enormously increased in recent years, munitions of war have been constantly sent out by the Siberian Railway, and they are eagerly watching for an opportunity of avenging their defeat. When they see how Japan has been able, merely through a dispute about boundaries, to secure these great concessions their resentment will naturally be extreme. Other countries too, seeing how easy it is to get the better of us, will put forward claims to equal privileges, and when I consider what difficult international questions and what terrible wars are impending I cannot but feel the utmost apprehension. I feel, however, that although the Wai-wu Pu have complete authority in international questions it is still the duty of the provincial authorities to defend their country, and as your Excellency's telegram to Na-tung proved of no avail I addressed a long telegram to the Wai-wu Pu, but the fact that I have received no reply is sufficient evidence that the Board's view is unfavourable. If I delay any longer the agreement will be signed, and then not only will our remonstrances be unavailing, but even the Imperial Power will be unable to help us. After long consideration the only course that appears open to me is to entreat your Excellency to memorialise the Throne by telegraph, setting forth all the aspects of the situation and asking that the Wai-wu Pu be instructed to lose no time in arranging some other solution which will recover some small portion of our rights.\n\nEven if the current rumours are false, my responsibility remains the same, and in the present critical position of affairs I am quite prepared to run the risk of censure, but I am confident that your Excellency, whose patriotism is known to all, will not regard my representations as mere blind ravings. Furthermore, in view of the pressing importance of the matter, this telegram has been prepared in consultation with the Commissioners and Taotais, including Shih Taotai, from Harbin, who is at present here. They were unanimous in holding that the situation admitted of no delay, and unite with me in requesting your Excellency to submit a memorial by telegraph in order to save our country.\n\n## Inclosure 2 in No. 1\n\n### Newspaper Extract\n\n#### THE MANCHURIAN CONVENTION: EXPLANATION OF THE MURDEN \"SECRET\" AGREEMENT\n\n**Official Communiqué**\n\nSince the consummation of the recent negotiations and the publication (by the \"Peking and Tien-tsin Times\") of the two agreements between China and Japan, relating to Chientao and some of the Manchurian questions, it seems as if some quarters have been exercised by some misapprehension and misgivings. There seems to be involved misunderstandings on two points in regard to the import of article 4 of the Manchurian agreement. The first is that the clause reading \"in conformity with the general principles agreed to by the governor-general of the three eastern provinces and the governor of the province of Mukden with the Japanese consul-general in the 40th year of Meiji (1907), &c.\" is looked upon as referring to a secret agreement of some sort which had been entered into between the authorities of the two countries on some prior occasion. The second is that the above article gives to Japan exclusive rights of exploiting the mining properties along the Antung-Mukden Railway and the main line of the South Manchurian Railway, which is incompatible with the principle of the \"open door and equal opportunities\"; while some seem to see in it a violation of the treaty rights of other Powers. If only for the sake of laying correct information before the public a reasonable statement seems to be called for at this moment.\n\nIn the first place the negotiations between the Chinese authorities and the Japanese consul-general at Mukden in 1907 were merely a necessary and natural sequel to the Peking protocol of December 1905. As Japan succeeded, by the treaty", "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-362 - Public Offices - 1909.txt", "external_url": "", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 429661, "series_id": 27, "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine", "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "CO129-373 - Public Offices - 1910", "page_number": 398, "title": "CO129-373 - Public Offices - 1910", "content_text": "6\n\ntides, the range of tides being about 5 feet. At Shanghai the rise of springs is neap about 9 feet, and at neap 6 ft. 6 in. above low-water ordinary spring tides the range of the neap tides being 4 feet. It would appear from levellings and observations recently made for M. de Rijke that low-water ordinary spring tide at Shanghai is 1 foot higher than low-water ordinary spring tide at Woosung.\n\nDatum.\n\n13. It will be noticed that we have referred the tidal particulars given above to low water of ordinary springs, this being the datum which has been adopted by the We should, Whangpoo Conservancy, and is the result of many years of observation. however, point out that there also exists the \"Customs datum,\" which is adopted by the harbour-master, and is used in signalling to vessels the depth of water which is available. This last-named datum is the lowest recorded low-water level, and is 2 feet below the \"Conservancy datum\" just referred to. It is desirable that the harbour officials and the Conservancy Board should endeavour to agree upon a common datum, the existence of two zeros being liable to give rise to confusion.\n\nCharacter of Bed of River.\n\n14. The Whangpoo runs throughout its length, across a flat alluvial country, of which extensive areas are liable to flooding, especially at high tides, for notwithstanding that dykes or bunds have been constructed over considerable lengths, they have not been maintained in proper and efficient state of repair. The bed of the river is in places of soft and, from the point of view of engineering works, a treacherous character, especially in the neighbourhood of Gough Island. The right bank through Ship Channel, previous to the construction of the new works, had been subject to very rapid erosion, a comparison of old charts showing that between 1877 and the date of the commencement of the works the channel has shifted to the eastward to an extent fully equal to its width.\n\n15. The Whangpoo is, naturally, a clear-running river. The Yang-tsze, on the other hand, is heavily charged with silt, especially during the floods in the summer months, when it is reported to rise normally 45 feet above its low-water level at Hankow and about 2 feet at Woosung. Its waters carry into the Whangpoo, on a rising tide, large quantities of matter in suspension, which are deposited during slack water, thus forming banks and shoals in the bed of the river. It therefore happens that the Whangpoo, although rising to a higher level, is not in so good a condition for navigation at this season of the year, as it is after the Yang-tsze floods are over.\n\nPort of Shanghai.\n\n16. The port of Shanghai is situated on the left bank of the river, about 14 miles above Woosung. On arrival there almost all vessels are berthed at a wharf, but some lie in the stream, made fast to buoys, and swing with the tide. In a few cases they moor head and stern and do not swing. The cargo from steamers lying in the stream is loaded into native boats, by which it is either conveyed up the creeks, or landed at one of the numerous pontoon piers or wharves, and thence taken to the merchants' godowns.\n\n17. The river is crowded with all kinds of native craft, running from large five-masted ocean-going junks down to sampans. We gathered from the witnesses, whom we examined, that vessels drawing upwards of, say 24 or 25 feet, and some of the mail-steamers, do not as a rule come up the river to Shanghai, but remain at anchor at Woosung, either in the Whangpoo abreast the fort railway station, or in the Yang-tsze off the end of the jetty. Other vessels, of heavy draught, not infrequently lighten at Woosung before going up the river to Shanghai.\n\nApproaches to Whangpoo River.\n\n18. It is important here to explain the general practice observed in the navigation of vessels proceeding to and from Shanghai. There exist in the Yang-tsze River, about 25 miles below Woosung, patches of shoal water named the Fairy Flats, on which, as shown on the Admiralty charts, the depth is from 2 to 3 fathoms, but, according to the local pilots, a minimum depth of about 18 feet at low-water ordinary spring tides may usually be found there.\n\n7\n\n19. Captain Gregor and Captain Evans (before referred to) informed us that it is the usual practice for vessels approaching Shanghai to leave the fair-way bell-buoy, off the Yang-tsze Cape, and 20 miles south-east of the Fairy Flats, at one hour after low water, and thence to proceed up the river. Fairy Flats are passed at about one-third flood, the vessel carrying the tide with her past Woosung—which is reached at about high water—and then up the river to Shanghai, where she arrives about an hour after high water, using the last of the flood current to swing head downstream prior to coming alongside a wharf. When outward bound from Shanghai the time for departure is not quite so important, as vessels are almost always then of lighter draught; but the practice is to leave a little before high water, so as to pass through the Astræa Channel about the top of the tide.\n\nNavigable Depth required.\n\n20. The improvement works in progress under the direction of M. de Rijke, for the Whangpoo Conservancy, are designed to give a minimum depth of 15 feet at low-water ordinary spring tides in the new or Astræa Channel. We have already mentioned, in paragraph 12, that at Woosung neap tides rise 8 feet above low-water ordinary spring tides thus giving an available depth at high-water neap tides of 25 feet, which may be taken as limiting the draught of vessels which could reach Shanghai during such tides to, say about 24 feet. From the foregoing it will be seen that the depth provided by the improvement works, about corresponds with that which is available over the Fairy Flats.\n\n21. It would thus appear, for the reasons given, that if a minimum depth of 18 feet at low-water ordinary spring tides is provided and maintained throughout the Whangpoo River to Shanghai, such depth would be sufficient to pass any vessel which could come up the Yang-tsze to Woosung. A vessel, however, of unusually heavy draught, which could not pass over Fairy Flats until a later period of the flood tide than above described would have either to anchor at Woosung and lighten, or wait there during a tide, in order to pass through the Astræa Channel during the following high water.\n\nII. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE WHANGPOO CONSERVANCY.\n\n22. For many years the deteriorating condition of the Whangpoo has been a menace to the existence of Shanghai as a sea-port, consequently efforts have been made by the Chamber of Commerce to obtain the appointment of a board charged with the improvement and proper conservation of the river. In putting forward these efforts the chamber were strongly supported by the consular body at Shanghai, as well as by the foreign Ministers at Peking; but it was not until almost thirty years had elapsed that definite provision was made for the above purpose in the peace protocol following the Boxer rising of 1900,\n\nOriginal Conservancy Board.\n\n23. At that date a Conservancy Board was appointed which comprised representatives of China and of all the foreign Powers interested in Shanghai. It was agreed that the necessary works should be carried out, and that half the cost should be defrayed by the Chinese Government and half by the foreign nationalities.\n\nModified Conservancy Board.\n\n24. This board, however, never actually met. Difficulties due to the number of its members and the complicated nature of its constitution proved to be so great that it was unanimously agreed by the Chinese Government and the foreign Powers that China should herself undertake the works, subject to the provision that, if they were not carried out satisfactorily, the Powers might revert to the original board, for which stipulation was made in the protocol.\n\n25. Thus, in 1905, a convention was signed under which, instead of the board provided by the peace protocol, a Conservancy Board was created consisting only of the taotai of the native city and the local commissioner of customs, China agreeing at the same time to pay the entire cost of the works, and to forthwith provide 9,200,000 Haikwan taels in twenty annual instalments of 460,000 each. Provision was likewise made that in the event of the money being required at an earlier period,\n\n397", "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-373 - Public Offices - 1910.txt", "external_url": "", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 445815, "series_id": 27, "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine", "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "CO129-406 - Public Offices - 1913", "page_number": 286, "title": "CO129-406 - Public Offices - 1913", "content_text": "20\n\nHis Exe. Mr. Marcellin Pellet proposed that instead of discussing the proposed resolution which had just been deposited and with which the members of the Conference were familiar, this proposition be put immediately to vote. The members who had objections might advance them while voting.\n\nThe proposed resolution was put to vote and unanimously adopted.\n\nHis Exe. Mr. Ferreira justified his affirmative vote in the following words: Mr. President! I am in accord with the proposition presented by His Excellency the First Delegate of Germany on behalf of the Delegations of Germany, the United States of America, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Russia, because it is conceived in the same spirit that prompted the observations made at the third meeting of the First Opium Conference on December 7, 1911, which were made because so few nations were represented at a Conference whose aim was generally humanitarian.\n\nThese observations have borne fruit, for a new Article 22 was inserted in the Convention by which an invitation was addressed to the nations which were not represented at the First Conference, with the object of inducing them to lend their support and I note with pleasure that this resolution is only an amplification, so to speak, of the article to which I have just referred.\n\nNow the statements to which I have just alluded were made in the First Conference by the Delegations of Persia, France, and the one of which I had the honor to form part. This is why I not only support the proposition which has been submitted to you, but do so with the greatest enthusiasm and pleasure.\n\nThe President considered that unanimous adoption of the resolution would contribute considerably to the efficacy of the proposals which the Government of the Netherlands, under this resolution, would make to the Powers who have not yet signed the Convention. He believed that he voiced the sentiment of the entire Conference in expressing his sincere thanks to the Delegates who, in formulating this resolution, had notably facilitated the humanitarian work of the Conference.\n\nThe PRESIDENT believed that, upon the adoption of this resolution, the principal task of the Conference appeared to have been accomplished: the Government of the Netherlands now knew in what manner it should proceed. Nevertheless, the question arises: what should be done if, as a result of the measures which the Government of the Netherlands should take, only a part of the Powers who had not yet signed the Convention should decide to do so. Would it be necessary again to convoke a Conference of the Signatory Powers, in accordance with the provisions of Article 23, in order to examine the possibility of depositing ratifications? Article 23 of the Convention deals only with the action that the Government of the Netherlands has taken in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 22 of said Convention. Is it the wish of the Conference that Article 23 should be considered applicable to the steps that the Government of the Netherlands proposes to take? Shall the same apply to the last paragraphs of Articles 22 and 23, prescribing that the Government of the Netherlands shall each month inform the Signatory Powers of each additional signature and of each ratification that it may receive, or shall this Government, while informing the Signatory Powers of the new adherents, request ratification through diplomatic channels? These are the questions that present themselves and which should be determined in order that the Government of the Queen may determine its procedure in case there should remain some nations who refuse to sign the Convention in spite of its efforts in this direction. The speaker proposed that the Editing Committee undertake to examine these questions with the assistance, should the Committee deem it advisable, of those Delegates who might be willing to cooperate, and formulate a resolution which should be discussed and, upon its adoption by the Conference, embodied in the \"Protocol de Clôture\".\n\n21\n\nHis Exe. Mr. Swétchine believed it inadvisable at present to determine upon a plan of procedure in a situation which did not yet exist.\n\nIn case the procedure of the Government of the Netherlands did not meet with complete success and should it prove impossible to induce certain of the Powers to adhere, the time would then be opportune to decide the question. At this moment the Netherlands Government should ask the Signatory Powers whether they wished to ratify notwithstanding the abstentions, or whether they considered it necessary to call another Conference. Such a decision seemed to him to be premature at this moment.\n\nThe President: It is for this reason that I would like to open the discussion of this question. The Editing Committee will profit by the discussion and formulate a well-prepared proposition in accord with the Delegates who will kindly assist them.\n\nHis Exc. Mr. Yen said: Mr. President. I have the honor to call your attention to our interpretation of the 2nd paragraph of Art. 23 of the Opium Convention; the last part of this paragraph defines the duties of Delegates to this Conference. They are to come to The Hague to examine into the possibility of nevertheless depositing their ratifications.\n\nWe beg to submit that if we scatter now or next week without providing a way whereby we may reassemble and make a final decision, we should be acting against the letter and spirit of the foregoing paragraph. The paragraph in question predicates or assumes a possibility of the deposit of ratifications, but the possibility is one requiring examination. Hence the Conference. But possible or impossible, the question, it seems to us, must be fully examined and decided at this, the second, Conference. The Convention does not provide for a 3rd or 4th or 5th Conference.\n\nWe beg to submit that, individually, the nations here represented have declared their ability or inability to ratify, and it is most gratifying that a very large majority voted in the affirmative when the question was put. But collectively and as a Conference, with all due deference, we beg to submit that we have not yet completely discharged our duty outlined in Art. 23. The excellent resolution proposed by the German, the American, the British, the Dutch, the French, and the Russian Delegations is a long step taken to increase the possibility of ratification, for which we all are exceedingly grateful, but after the replies are received from the countries, the possibility of ratification must again be examined according to Art. 23. To put it bluntly, it is to be decided at this Conference whether the solemn compact, originally signed by 12 Powers, and subsequently signed by 22 more, whose number is now to be still further increased, is to be enforced as the will of the civilised Powers, or is to be shelved or thrown into the waste basket.\n\nWe venture to submit that the second alternative is unthinkable. We must, therefore, devise measures to make the possibility of ratification a fact.\n\nPersonally, we are as anxious as any other Delegation to resume our normal duties, and we beg to suggest that the Conference do take a recess. In the meantime, the resolutions will have been forwarded to the Governments concerned and very likely definite replies will soon be received.\n\nNow I believe that near the end of next month, the formal dedication of the Peace Palace will take place. The majority of us present will no doubt be invited to come, and it seems to us that the recess may very well end at that date. We feel assured that at that time the Conference will as a body be in a position to say conscientiously that we have fully examined the question and found it possible to ratify. We can think of no happier combination of events than the opening of the Peace Palace and the unanimous ratification of the International Opium Convention.\n\nHis Exc. Mr. Jorge Huneeus did not believe it wise to fix a date at present. It did not seem possible for the Netherlands Government to conclude...\n\n285", "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-406 - Public Offices - 1913.txt", "external_url": "", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 445963, "series_id": 27, "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine", "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "CO129-406 - Public Offices - 1913", "page_number": 434, "title": "CO129-406 - Public Offices - 1913", "content_text": "6\n\ndiscussion of its terms. As a matter of fact, at the next session, on the consideration of the report of the Editing Committee, which incorporated the resolution in the protocol, the Haytian delegate proposed certain alterations of form to which no exception could be taken, but it was ruled that, as the resolution had been unanimously accepted and had been included, unaltered, in the protocol, it was impossible to reopen discussion upon it. There was, indeed, throughout the sittings of the Conference a tendency on the part of certain delegates, whose Governments were only interested in a secondary degree in the subjects we were met together to discuss, unduly to hasten the proceedings and to sacrifice thorough consideration of the questions before us to a speedy termination of our labours. On the other hand, certain other delegations desired to protract the duration of the Conference until replies had been received from the non-signatory Powers to the new representations which were about to be made. We are not aware, however, that the results attained by the Conference were in any way prejudiced either by too little discussion or by the expedition of the procedure.\n\nWe desire to draw attention to a speech made by Dr. Wu Lien-Téh, one of the Chinese delegates, at the commencement of the third session (l. c., p. 16). Dr. Wu urged the necessity of speedy ratification by all the signatory Powers, and insisted on the efficacy of the measures adopted by the Chinese Government since the signature of the convention and the importance of the results thus obtained. He pointed out that China was especially interested in an early ratification of the convention as it contains articles specially applying to China. He quoted article 18, which deals with the reduction, pari passu with the adoption of corresponding measures by the Chinese Government, of the number of shops for the sale of raw or prepared opium existing in the leased territories, foreign settlements, and concessions in China, and the restriction and control of the retail trade in opium in the leased territories, settlements, and concessions. He gave instances of the state of affairs in this respect at present prevailing in the International Settlement of Shanghai and the French Concession at Tien-tsin. We were not in a position either to confirm or contest the accuracy of Dr. Wu's figures though we reasserted (l. c., p. 18) the belief of His Majesty's Government in the sincerity of the Chinese Government in their opium policy; our object in referring to this particular point is merely to express our opinion that this is one of the matters where action on the part of the signatory Governments need not wait on ratification and enforcement of the convention.\n\nWith the adoption of the resolution prescribing the steps to be taken with the object of inducing the hitherto abstaining Governments to sign, it was felt that the Conference had accomplished its principal task and that little remained to be done. However, as the president pointed out, it was necessary to decide what should be the next step on the part of the signatory Powers if the fresh representations contemplated failed to produce the desired effect and certain Governments still refused to sign. In the course of the ensuing discussion the Chinese delegate explained (l. c., p. 21) that according to his interpretation of article 23 of the Opium Convention, under which we had been summoned, we were bound to decide before separating, either in the affirmative or the negative, the question of the possibility of ratifying the convention. He contended that, though the delegations had individually declared the ability or inability of their Governments to ratify, no decision on this point had been come to by the Conference as a whole, so that we had not as yet discharged the duty imposed on us by article 23. He suggested that the new representations contemplated by the resolution just adopted be made at once, and that, pending receipt of replies, the Conference do adjourn. He was optimistic enough to believe that the replies would be received by the end of August, and he proposed that the delegates should reassemble by that date, which would coincide with the opening of the Peace Palace, and expressed his firm belief that the Conference would by that time be in a position to decide as a body on the ratification of the Opium Convention.\n\nDr. Hamilton Wright, the first delegate of the United States, seconded the proposal of the Chinese delegate, and expressed his wish that the Conference should not dissolve until the result of the fresh representations had been ascertained. The opinion of the majority of the delegates was against such a proposal. It was felt that the question of the possibility of ratification had already been fully examined into, and it was quite evident, though the minutes do not clearly indicate this, that few, if any, of the delegates shared the optimistic views of their Chinese and American colleagues as to the time necessary to obtain the replies of those Governments which had hitherto failed to sign, several of which were at the time actively engaged in war.\n\nOur opinion was that the event contemplated by article 23 had taken place; the Powers which had signed had met together, and had examined the possibility of depositing their ratifications notwithstanding the absence of certain signatures. That mandate was exhausted, and it therefore seemed necessary to amend or extend article 23. We accordingly proposed (l. c., p. 22) the following resolution:—\n\n“That it be referred to the Editing Committee to prepare and present to the next meeting of the Conference a protocol de clôture, setting out the resolution which has been passed unanimously by the Conference, and also suggesting an amendment of article 23 with a view to meet the situation which has arisen from the signature of the convention by a large number of Powers and the abstention of a certain number.”\n\nAfter some further discussion our resolution was adopted, and the Conference adjourned in order to allow the Editing Committee to accomplish the duties thus imposed on them.\n\n7\n\nThe reasons which guided the Editing Committee in drafting the final protocol are fully described in the explanatory statement made by their chairman, M. van Deventer, at the fourth session of the Conference (l. c., p. 31). For the moment it is sufficient to say that their draft protocol was printed and distributed to the delegates in time to permit of its consideration before it came up for discussion at the fourth session. At this same session the Chinese delegation submitted a resolution in the following terms:-\n\n“That the delegates to the Second International Opium Conference advise their Governments to deposit forthwith their ratifications.”\n\nThis resolution had been previously circulated, and we took an early opportunity of pointing out privately to the Chinese delegates that such a resolution could not be accepted by certain of the delegations; that it was superfluous as far as concerned the Governments which had already declared their readiness to deposit their ratifications; while, as regarded the other Governments, their delegates had, under instructions, stated the reasons for which their Governments were for the present unable to proceed to ratification, and nothing had meanwhile occurred which would justify those delegates in advising their Governments to alter their attitude and deposit their ratifications forthwith. Dr. Yen therefore withdrew this resolution, and agreed to move in its place the resolution to which reference has already been made, and which had been drafted by the Editing Committee, thus providing the Netherland Government with the necessary authority to receive the instruments of ratification from those Governments which were prepared to ratify. This resolution appears in the final protocol in these words: “a décidé que le dépôt des ratifications peut avoir lieu dès maintenant.” TRANSLATION——“Has decided that the deposit of ratifications may now take place.”\n\nM. van Deventer, chairman of the Editing Committee, in submitting for the approval of the Conference the draft final protocol, referred to the assistance afforded to the Committee by the honorary president of the Conference, M. van Swinderen, who had attended their last meeting and was in full accord with the proposals now submitted. M. van Deventer explained that the Committee had, at the outset of their labours, noticed the omission on the part of the Conference, already referred to by us, to give a direct reply to the question submitted to it under article 23 of the convention, whether, in spite of the fact that certain signatures had not yet been obtained, the deposit of ratifications could nevertheless take place. This omission, M. van Deventer explained, had now been remedied by the resolution just unanimously adopted. The Committee had next dealt with the British resolution adopted at the third session. They had had no difficulty in deciding on the bodily incorporation of the resolution dealing with the steps to be taken to secure the signatures of further Powers, but they had found that the suggestion of a modification of article 23 of the Convention of the 23rd January, 1912, presented difficulties. It had appeared to the Committee that to modify in any way the text of the convention was open to exception, especially in view of the fact that one of the original signatory Powers to the convention was not represented at the second Conference; moreover, the chairman of the Committee explained that it was scarcely logical to eliminate a provision which had already been acted upon and to which practical consequences attached. In place of a formal amendment of article 23, the Committee accordingly proposed that the Conference should pass the following vœu, which would then be inserted in the final protocol:-\n\n“Que dans le cas où la signature de toutes les Puissances invitées en vertu du paragraphe 1 de l'article 23 n'aurait pas été obtenue à la date du 31 décembre, 1913, le\n\nD\n\n432", "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-406 - Public Offices - 1913.txt", "external_url": "", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 450766, "series_id": 27, "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine", "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "CO129-416 - Public Offices - 1914", "page_number": 348, "title": "CO129-416 - Public Offices - 1914", "content_text": "## 7 G\n\nof the report of the Editing Committee, which incorporated the resolution in the protocol, the Haitian delegate proposed certain alterations of form to which no exception could be taken, but it was ruled that, as the resolution had been unanimously accepted and had been included, unaltered, in the protocol, it was impossible to reopen discussion upon it. There was, indeed, throughout the sittings of the Conference a tendency on the part of certain delegates, whose Governments were only interested in a secondary degree in the subjects we were met together to discuss, unduly to hasten the proceedings and to sacrifice thorough consideration of the questions before us to a speedy termination of our labours. On the other hand, certain other delegations desired to prolong the duration of the Conference until replies had been received from the non-signatory Powers to the new representations which were about to be made. We are not aware, however, that the results attained by the Conference were in any way prejudiced either by too little discussion or by the expedition of the procedure.\n\nWe desire to draw attention to a speech made by Dr. Wu Lien-Teh, one of the Chinese delegates, at the commencement of the third session (4, c., p. 16). Dr. Wu urged the necessity of speedy ratification by all the signatory Powers, and insisted on the efficacy of the measures adopted by the Chinese Government since the signature of the convention and the importance of the results thus obtained. He pointed out that China was especially interested in an early ratification of the convention, as it contains articles specially applying to China. He quoted article 18, which deals with the reduction, pari passu with the adoption of corresponding measures by the Chinese Government, of the number of shops for the sale of raw or prepared opium existing in the leased territories, foreign settlements, and concessions in China, and the restriction and control of the retail trade in opium in the leased territories, settlements, and concessions. He gave instances of the state of affairs in this respect at present prevailing in the international settlement of Shanghai and the French concession at Tien-tsin. We were not in a position either to confirm or contest the accuracy of Dr. Wu's figures, though we reasserted (l. c., p. 18) the belief of His Majesty's Government in the sincerity of the Chinese Government in their opium policy; our object in referring to this particular point is merely to express our opinion that this is one of the matters where action on the part of the signatory Governments need not wait on ratification and enforcement of the convention.\n\nWith the adoption of the resolution prescribing the steps to be taken with the object of inducing the hitherto abstaining Governments to sign, it was felt that the Conference had accomplished its principal task, and that little remained to be done. However, as the President pointed out, it was necessary to decide what should be the next step on the part of the signatory Powers if the fresh representations contemplated failed to produce the desired effect and certain Governments still refused to sign. In the course of the ensuing discussion the Chinese delegate explained (7, c., p. 21) that according to his interpretation of article 23 of the Opium Convention, under which we had been summoned, we were bound to decide before separating, either in the affirmative or the negative, the question of the possibility of ratifying the convention. He contended that, though the delegations had individually declared the ability or inability of their Governments to ratify, no decision on this point had been come to by the Conference as a whole, so that we had not as yet discharged the duty imposed on us by article 23. He suggested that the new representations contemplated by the resolution just adopted be made at once, and that, pending receipt of replies, the Conference do adjourn. He was optimistic enough to believe that the replies would be received by the end of August, and he proposed that the delegates should reassemble by that date, which would coincide with the opening of the Peace Palace, and expressed his firm belief that the Conference would by that time be in a position to decide as a body on the ratification of the Opium Convention.\n\nDr. Hamilton Wright, the first delegate of the United States, seconded the proposal of the Chinese delegate, and expressed his wish that the Conference should not dissolve until the result of the fresh representations had been ascertained. The opinion of the majority of the delegates was against such a proposal. It was felt that the question of the possibility of ratification had already been fully examined into, and it was quite evident, though the minutes do not clearly indicate this, that few, if any, of the delegates shared the optimistic views of their Chinese and American colleagues as to the time necessary to obtain the replies of those Governments which had hitherto failed to sign, several of which were at the time actively engaged in war.\n\nOur opinion was that the event contemplated by article 23 had taken place; the Powers which had signed had met together, and had examined the possibility of depositing their ratifications notwithstanding the absence of certain signatures.\n\nThat mandate was exhausted, and it therefore seemed necessary to amend or extend article 23. We accordingly proposed (l. c., p. 22) the following resolution:-\n\n\"That it be referred to the Editing Committee to prepare and present to the next meeting of the Conference a protocol de clôture, setting out the resolution which has been passed unanimously by the Conference, and also suggesting an amendment of article 23 with a view to meet the situation which has arisen from the signature of the convention by a large number of Powers and the abstention of a certain number.\"\n\nAfter some further discussion our resolution was adopted, and the Conference adjourned in order to allow the Editing Committee to accomplish the duties thus imposed on them.\n\nThe reasons which guided the Editing Committee in drafting the final protocol are fully described in the explanatory statement made by their chairman, M. van Deventer, at the fourth session of the Conference (L. c., p. 31). For the moment it is sufficient to say that their draft protocol was printed and distributed to the delegates in time to permit of its consideration before it came up for discussion at the fourth session.\n\nAt this same session the Chinese delegation submitted a resolution in the following terms:-\n\n\"That the delegates to the Second International Opium Conference advise their Governments to deposit forthwith their ratifications.\"\n\nThis resolution had been previously circulated, and we took an early opportunity of pointing out privately to the Chinese delegates that such a resolution could not be accepted by certain of the delegations; that it was superfluous as far as concerned the Governments which had already declared their readiness to deposit their ratifications; while, as regarded the other Governments, their delegates had, under instructions, stated the reasons for which their Governments were for the present unable to proceed to ratification, and nothing had meanwhile occurred which would justify those delegates in advising their Governments to alter their attitude and deposit their ratifications forthwith. Dr. Yen therefore withdrew this resolution, and agreed to move in its place the resolution to which reference has already been made, and which had been drafted by the Editing Committee, thus providing the Netherland Government with the necessary authority to receive the instruments of ratification from those Governments which were prepared to ratify. This resolution appears in the final protocol in these words: “a décidé que le dépôt des ratifications peut avoir lieu dès maintenant.\"* The resolution was, as already stated, unanimously adopted.\n\nM. van Deventer, chairman of the Editing Committee, in submitting for the approval of the Conference the draft final protocol, referred to the assistance afforded to the Committee by the honorary president of the Conference, M. van Swinderen, who had attended their last meeting and was in full accord with the proposals now submitted. M. van Deventer explained that the Committee had, at the outset of their labours, noticed the omission on the part of the Conference, already referred to by us, to give a direct reply to the question submitted to it under article 23 of the convention, whether, in spite of the fact that certain signatures had not yet been obtained, the deposit of ratifications could nevertheless take place. This omission, M. van Deventer explained, had now been remedied by the resolution just unanimously adopted. The Committee had next dealt with the British resolution adopted at the third session. They had had no difficulty in deciding on the bodily incorporation of the resolution dealing with the steps to be taken to secure the signatures of further Powers, but they had found that the suggestion of a modification of article 23 of the convention of the 23rd January, 1912, presented difficulties. It had appeared to the Committee that to modify in any way the text of the convention was open to exception, especially in view of the fact that one of the original signatory Powers to the convention was not represented at the second Conference; moreover, the chairman of the Committee explained that it was scarcely logical to eliminate a provision which had already been acted upon and to which practical consequences attached. In place of a formal amendment of article 23, the Committee accordingly proposed that the Conference should pass the following resolution, which would then be inserted in the final protocol :—\n\n\"Que dans le cas où la signature de toutes les Puissances invitées en vertu du paragraphe 1 de l'article 23 n'aurait pas été obtenue à la date du 31 décembre, 1913, le ...\n\n* TRANSLATION.—\"Has decided that the deposit of ratifications may now take place.\" \n\n## Page 344", "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-416 - Public Offices - 1914.txt", "external_url": "", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 478323, "series_id": 27, "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine", "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "CO129-451 - Public Offices - 1918", "page_number": 560, "title": "CO129-451 - Public Offices - 1918", "content_text": "# Majesty's Government\n\nIt have definitely adopted measures limiting the export of certain drugs with a view to the ultimate traffic. The export of these drugs is authorized only when a certificate is issued stating that the drugs are for medicinal purposes only.\n\nIt is true that these measures have been taken under emergency powers, but it seems that they will continue. Majesty's Government have restricted the sale and use of these drugs, which were previously exported freely to countries that were not restricted, and Majesty's Government have been considering the question of continuing these restrictions.\n\nI would point out that the medical authorities have been thinking along the same lines, and the British Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that the signatories of the Convention should sign the Protocol. It was further stated that the signatories of the Protocol should put the Convention into effect.\n\nThe Convention does not provide for the actual principles, but only for the necessary legislative measures, and Majesty's Government hold that legislative measures should be given formal sanction unless the necessary measures are imposed. Further, it is objected that the cooperation of all the administrative Powers is essential to make the Convention effective, and it is still found that the cooperation of all the principal countries is vital to the success of the Convention.\n\nIn the opinion of Majesty's Government, it is essential to secure the general ratification of the Powers, or at least of all the Great Powers, whose participation is considered essential to its proper working. And it has been suggested that a favourable opportunity for such an effort is afforded by the Peace Conference, which is about to meet.\n\nViewed in this manner, the resolution binating all the signatory Powers to take immediate steps to ratify the legislation contemplated in the Convention would ensure the effective cooperation of the more important countries, including those that have hitherto resisted the Convention, such as Germany and Turkey, and would be likely to secure the adherence of all the neutral states, such as Denmark, Holland, etc.\n\n## Page 14 \n\n1. Page further stated that the signatories of the Convention should sign the Protocol.\n2. The Convention should be put into effect.\n3. The cooperation of all the administrative Powers is essential to make the Convention effective.\n \n## THE CONVENTION\n\nIt was effective among the signatory Powers, but it did not provide for the actual principles, but only for the necessary legislative measures... \n556 \nMajesty's Government hold that legislative measures should be given formal sanction unless the necessary measures are imposed.", "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-451 - Public Offices - 1918.txt", "external_url": "", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 482352, "series_id": 27, "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine", "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "CO129-458 - Public Offices & Others - 1919", "page_number": 400, "title": "CO129-458 - Public Offices & Others - 1919", "content_text": "THE KOREAN REVOLUTION.\n\n16. The protest and opposition of the Korean People to Japanese annexation of their country and to the process of political extermination applied to them by the Mikado's agents, has now expressed itself in the Korean Revolution. On the First of March at p.m., the Korean People and Nation declared their independence. This act of independence was formally done by the National Independence Union, composed of three million Koreans representing and expressing the desire and will of 18,700,000 Koreans in Korea proper, in China, in Siberia, in Hawaii and in the United States.\n\nThe declaration states: \"It is our solemn duty to secure the right of free and perpetual development of our own national character, adapting ourselves to the principles of the reconstruction of the world—to secure our independence, to wipe out injuries, get rid of our present sufferings, and leave our children eternal freedom instead of a bitter and shameful inheritance.\"\n\nPROGRESS OF THE REVOLUTION.\n\n17. The Korean Delegation—appointed by the New Korean Young Men's Society to which are affiliated the Korean National Independence Union and other Bodies organised in the cause of Korean independence—is in receipt of several cable despatches, reporting the progress of the revolution and the national movement for independence.\n\nA despatch from the Korean National Independence Union received in Paris, via Shanghai, on April 7 instant, reads in part as follows: \"On March 26 we held grand demonstrations at Seoul. Our national flags were flown on the city hills. The Japanese Authorities arrested two hundred of those who participated in the demonstrations. There were casualties on both sides. Samnam (i.e., all provinces south of Seoul) are uprising every day. Korean demonstrations are taking place in Eastern Siberia and Manchuria.\"\n\nTHE KOREAN REPUBLIC.\n\n18. The same despatch reports the organisation of a Provisional Republican Government of Korea, consisting of a President, Vice-President, Secretary of State, Minister for Home Affairs, Minister of Finance, Minister of Justice and Minister of War.\n\nAmong those included in the Provisional Government are Prince Pak Yung-hio and Messrs. Rhee Syngman, Ahn Chang Ho and Li Tong Whi. Prince Pak Yung-hio is one of the five great leaders who inaugurated what is known in Korean history as the movement of the Progressive Party in 1884. He was the chief figure among the Progressives who, in 1891, compelled the introduction of modern reforms into Korea. He was at one time Minister for Home Affairs before the annexation. Rhee Syngman is an M.A. of Harvard, U.S.A. and Ph.D. of Princeton, B.S.A. Since 1894 he has been one of the leaders of the old Korean Independence Club. As a political worker, he has suffered imprisonment and he has also been tortured. Ahn Chang Ho is the founder of the Sin Min Huch of People's Society and, since 1905, has been a leader of young Korean nationalists. He is the President of the Korean National Association. Li Tong Whi is a former major in the old Korean Army and a recognised leader of Korean nationalists in Siberia and Manchuria. He has been imprisoned and tortured by the Japanese Authorities.\n\nJAPANESE REPRESSION.\n\n19. Another despatch received by the Korean Delegation on April 10 instant, states that \"from first March up to date, active demonstrations of the Independence movement have been very well conducted all over Korea. Representatives prefer passive revolution, including lecturing and distribution of manifestoes. Girls more active. Strikes have occurred in enemy (Japanese) factories, stores, etc. Our churches, schools and 32,000 men and women are in prison. About 100,000 have been injured, including stores closed everywhere, old people, girls and children. Interior traffic communications severed. Terrible outrages committed by enemy (Japanese). Missionaries are sending truth to world.\"\n\nIn a further despatch which reached the Korean Delegation on April 11 instant, Japanese atrocities are reported: \"Japan has begun massacring in Korea. On March 28, over 1,000 unarmed people were killed during a three-hour demonstration held in Seoul. The shooting, beating and bayonetting of people are in merciless progress throughout Korea. Churches, schools and homes of leaders have been destroyed. Women are being stripped naked and beaten before crowds, especially female members of leaders' families. The imprisoned are being tortured. Doctors are forbidden to attend to the wounded. Foreign Red Cross. We have decided to fight for freedom until last Korean falls. We ask urgently aid from ... We solicit help in the name of God.\n\nOf the many news despatches on the subject appearing in the American and the European Press, it must suffice here to quote the latest from the Tokio correspondent of the London \"Times\". It appeared in the issue of the London paper on April 17 instant, under the caption \"Korea's Rights\". \"While it is recognized that there can be only one outcome of the disturbances in Korea, the Government's decision to reinforce the military establishment in the peninsula evokes universal Press comment, the feature of which is the recognition that it will be inevitable, when opportunity occurs, to replace the Military Governor by a civilian Governor. The Nichi-Nichi attributes the disturbances chiefly to a mistaken conception of the principle of self-determination, also to the inimical influence of missionaries. The 'Jiji' says it is evident that many reforms are necessary in Korea. Another journal dwells on the fact that the Koreans are not an inferior people…\"\n\nABROGATION OF THE TREATY OF ANNEXATION.\n\n20. The Korean People submit that the Treaty of Annexation of August 22, 1910, should be declared Null and Void or otherwise abrogated by the Peace Conference for the reasons set forth in this Petition and further elaborated in the Memorandum hereto attached and more especially for the reasons following:-\n\nI. The said Treaty of Annexation was concluded in circumstances of Fraud and Force which vitiated its validity as a legal and international document, even assuming that the then Emperor of Korea had the right to hand over to His Majesty the Emperor of Japan Fifteen Million Koreans and a country that had existed as a separate and sovereign state for more than 4,200 years.\n\nII. The Korean People and Nation have consistently denied the right of the then \"puppet\" Emperor of Korea to deal with them in terms of the said Treaty of Annexation. Being men and not cattle they hold that their consent is and has been an essential condition to the validity of the said Treaty. This consent has never been given.\n\nIII. The said Treaty of Annexation was and is a direct violation by Japan of the International guarantees entered into by the Japanese Government with Korea and other Powers regarding Korean independence and integrity.\n\nIV. In the several Treaties concluded between Korea and Japan and other Powers, and by Japan with China, with Russia and with Great Britain, regarding Korea, the existence of the latter as a separate and sovereign state is—as to all these Treaties—explicitly recognised and its political independence and territorial integrity...\n\nThe Japan-Korean Treaty of February 26 or 27, 1876, states in the first article \"Chosen being an independent state enjoys the same sovereign rights as does Japan\".\n\nIn the Japan-Russian Protocol of April 25, 1898, it is stipulated in Article I that the \"Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia definitively recognise the sovereignty and entire independence of Korea, and mutually engage to refrain from all direct interference in the internal affairs of that country.\"\n\nThe Japan-Korean Protocol of February 13, 1904, provides (art. 3) that the Government of Japan definitively guarantees the independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire.\n\nPage 386", "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-458 - Public Offices & Others - 1919.txt", "external_url": "", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 485430, "series_id": 27, "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine", "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "CO129-464 - Public Offices - 1920", "page_number": 372, "title": "CO129-464 - Public Offices - 1920", "content_text": "Page 361\n\nForeign Office,\n\nMarch 22, 1920.\n\nSir,\n\nIT is provided by Article 295 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany that \"those of the High Contracting Parties who have not yet signed, or who have signed but not yet ratified, the Opium Convention signed at The Hague on the 23rd January, 1912, agree to bring the said Convention into force, and for this purpose to enact the necessary legislation without delay, and in any case within a period of twelve months from the coming into force of the present Treaty. Furthermore, that ratification of the present Treaty should, in the case of Powers that have not yet ratified the Opium Convention, be deemed in all respects equivalent to the ratification of that Convention and to the signature of the Special Protocol for bringing the said Convention into force.\"\n\nThere is reason to believe that, in spite of the efforts of His Majesty's Government and of the other Governments concerned, morphia produced in the United Kingdom is at present reaching the Far East in quantities largely in excess of the amount required for legitimate purposes, and His Majesty's Government are therefore of opinion that it is desirable that steps should be taken forthwith to regulate the export to all countries, whether their Governments are parties to the Opium Convention or not, of the drugs specified in Chapter III of the Convention and mentioned below.\n\nAn arrangement has already been made by His Majesty's Government with the United States, French and Japanese Governments whereby no consignment of morphia or kindred drugs is allowed to be exported from the United Kingdom to any of the countries in question except on production of a certificate from the Government concerned.\n\nPage 362\n\n \n(The original text ends abruptly. The rest of the content is not available.)\n\nTAS#156), AMA\n\nHis Majesty's Representative\n\n2615", "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-464 - Public Offices - 1920.txt", "external_url": "", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 485632, "series_id": 27, "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine", "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "CO129-464 - Public Offices - 1920", "page_number": 574, "title": "CO129-464 - Public Offices - 1920", "content_text": "1469/17/10.\n\nFOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.\n\nJuly 26th, 1920,\n\n562\n\nSir,\n\nIn reply to your note No.1295 of the 12th instant, I have the honour to state that His Majesty's Government consider that they will become bound by the provisions of the Opium Convention of 1912, as from the date when, the French Government, having made to the Netherlands Government the communication provided for in the third paragraph of Article 295 of the Treaty of Versailles, the Netherlands Government shall have expressed their readiness to accept the certified copy of the Protocols of the deposit of ratifications of the Peace Treaty as if it were a deposit of ratifications of the Opium Convention and a signature of the additional Protocol of 1914.\n\nHis Majesty's Government are enquiring of the French Government as to the steps which they are taking in order to give effect to the third paragraph of Article 295 of the Peace Treaty.\n\nI have the honour to be\n\nwith high consideration,\n\nSir,\n\nYour most obedient,\n\nhumble Servant,\n\n(For the Secretary of State),\n\n(Signed) VICTOR WELLESLEY\n\nJonkheer F. M. Hichiels van Verduynen,\n\netc.,\n\netc.,\n\netc.", "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-464 - Public Offices - 1920.txt", "external_url": "", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 485759, "series_id": 27, "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine", "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "CO129-465 - Public Offices & Others - 1920", "page_number": 113, "title": "CO129-465 - Public Offices & Others - 1920", "content_text": "4. That all countries represented having strict laws against smuggling of imported opium, similar strictness should be shown in the regulation of opium exports.\n\n5. That the sale and distribution of morphine already constituted a grave danger, and each Government should take drastic measures to control the manufacture, sale and distribution of this drug and of other deleterious derivatives of opium.\n\nOther recommendations urged the suppression of opium divans and the application of strict pharmacy laws in foreign concessions and settlements in China, and the prohibition of the trade in deleterious anti-opium remedies.\n\n1911. Anglo-Chinese Agreement.\n\nOn the 6th May, 1911, an agreement was signed between His Majesty's Government and the Chinese Government, which embodied Great Britain's effort to show a practical appreciation of the recommendations of the 1909 Commission. By this agreement the work of an earlier agreement (1907) was hastened so as to bring the import trade of opium from India to an end pari passu with the progress of the Chinese Government in stopping the production of opium in China. As a result of this agreement, the legitimate foreign opium trade in China came entirely to an end on the 31st December, 1917.\n\n1912. International Opium Convention.\n\nMeanwhile, on the 1st December, 1911, the International Opium Conference met at The Hague, again on the initiative of the Government of the United States. The aim of this conference, as stated in the preamble to the convention, was to advance a step further on the road opened by the International Commission of 1909, and to bring about the gradual suppression of the abuse of opium, morphine, cocaine, as also of the drugs prepared or derived therefrom which give rise to similar abuses. This Conference was more formal in character than the 1909 Commission, whose functions had been merely advisory. The delegates at The Hague Conference were empowered to sign a convention, which was to have the force of a treaty. The following Powers were represented: United States of America, China, France, Germany, Great Britain, Netherlands, Italy, Japan, Persia, Portugal, Siam and Russia. On the 23rd January, 1912, the International Opium Convention was signed. The principal articles in the convention were as follows:\n\n1. Raw Opium.-The contracting Powers undertook to enact laws for the control of the production and distribution of raw opium and to limit the number of ports through which export and import would be permitted.\n\n2. Prepared Opium.-The contracting Powers would take measures for the gradual and effective suppression of the manufacture of, internal trade in, and use of prepared opium. They would prohibit the import and export of prepared opium, except those Powers which were not yet ready to prohibit it immediately; and even they undertook strictly to regulate the traffic and to prohibit it as soon as possible.\n\n3. Medicinal Opium, Morphine, Cocaine, Heroin, &c.--The contracting Powers would enact pharmacy laws to confine the manufacture, sale and use of such drugs to medicinal and legitimate purposes. They would co-operate with one another to prevent the use of those drugs for any other purposes. Every effort would be taken to regulate import and export, and to prevent those drugs coming into the possession of unauthorised persons; and they would not be exported from the territories of one contracting Power to those of another, except when consigned to persons furnished with the licences or permits provided for by the laws or regulations of the importing countries.\n\nA special chapter was devoted to the trade with China, in which the contracting Powers undertook to reduce pari passu with China the opium shops and dens in foreign territories, concessions and settlements in China; and to prevent smuggling and illegal use of postal facilities in that country. The contracting Powers were to examine the possibility of making it a penal offence to be found in possession of opium and kindred drugs.\n\nThey were to communicate with one another, through the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands the text of existing laws and statistical information bearing on the subject. Any Power not represented at the Conference was to be invited by the Dutch Government to sign the convention.\n\nPage 3\n\nFinally, the Dutch Government were to invite all the Powers to ratify the convention with its protocol. As soon as the ratifications had been deposited, the Dutch Government were to notify all the Powers, and the convention was to come into force three months after the date upon which the last ratification had been deposited. Laws, regulations, and other measures arising out of the convention were to be prepared not later than six months after the entry into force of the convention; and the date on which these laws, regulations, &c., were to come into force was to be arranged by the Powers concerned, at the instance of the Dutch Government.\n\nBy the protocol to this convention, the Conference expressed its wish (1) to direct the attention of the Universal Postal Union to the urgency of regulating the transmission through the post of raw opium, morphine, cocaine, &c., and of prohibiting the transmission of prepared opium; and (2) to study the question of Indian hemp, with the object of regulating its abuses.\n\n1913 and 1914. International Opium Conferences.\n\nThe Second Opium Conference met in 1913, and decided that, although certain Powers who had been invited to sign the convention had not then done so, the deposit of ratifications might nevertheless take place. The Third Opium Conference was held at The Hague the 15th-25th June, 1914. By that time 44 out of 46 Powers had decided to sign the convention; 11 of the former had already ratified, 14 more were disposed to do so, while not one of the remaining 19 signatories had expressed any intention of not proceeding to put the convention into force. The non-signatories were Turkey (for economic reasons) and Serbia (because she had been unable to study it sufficiently).\n\nThe points secured by the Third Conference were as follows:-\n\n1. An all but unanimous expression of opinion on the part of the signatory Powers represented in favour of the convention coming into force without awaiting signature by the remaining two invited Powers. Germany alone opposed this resolution. That is to say, an affirmative reply was recorded to the question propounded to the third Conference by the second, with only one negative voice.\n\n2. An absolutely unanimous request to the Dutch Government to press for early ratification by all the signatory Powers which had not yet ratified in order that the convention might come into force as soon as possible. Germany, which had declined to assent to the enforcement of the convention without securing the signature of all the invited Powers, acquiesced in this proposal, as did also the representatives of several signatory Powers, which had, for one reason or another, not yet ratified.\n\n3. A recognition by the Conference, although with several abstentions, of the feasibility of enforcement by a group of the Powers who might be ready to co-operate for that purpose without awaiting the automatic enforcement of the convention provided for in article 24 after ratification by all the signatory Powers. The date as from which such group enforcement might take place was fixed as the 31st December, 1914, and a special protocol was to be provided for Powers desiring to co-operate to this end for signature by them.\n\nThe Dutch Ministry for Foreign Affairs was unanimously requested to make urgent representations to all signatory Powers to complete their ratifications in order that the convention might come into force as soon as possible.\n\nAt the time of the Third Conference Great Britain had not yet ratified the convention owing to technical difficulties concerning signature and ratification on behalf of the various dominions and colonies; these difficulties, however, had ceased to exist, and the British delegates were instructed to inform the Conference that His Majesty's Government would deposit the instruments of ratification as soon as the necessary formalities had been carried out.\n\nUnfortunately, the outbreak of the war suspended progress in this promising experiment in international legislation.\n\n1919. The Opium Convention and the Versailles Treaty.\n\nBy article 295 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany it is provided that \"those of the high contracting parties who have not yet signed or who have signed, but not yet ratified, the Opium Convention, signed at The Hague on the 23rd January, 1912, agree\n\n[4807]\n\nPage 112", "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-465 - Public Offices & Others - 1920.txt", "external_url": "", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 485819, "series_id": 27, "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine", "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "CO129-465 - Public Offices & Others - 1920", "page_number": 173, "title": "CO129-465 - Public Offices & Others - 1920", "content_text": "4. That all countries represented having strict laws against smuggling of imported opium, similar strictness should be shown in the regulation of opium exports.\n\n5. That the sale and distribution of morphine already constituted a grave danger, and each Government should take drastic measures to control the manufacture, sale and distribution of this drug and of other deleterious derivatives of opium.\n\nOther recommendations urged the suppression of opium divans and the application of strict pharmacy laws in foreign concessions and settlements in China, and the prohibition of the trade in deleterious anti-opium remedies.\n\n1911. Anglo-Chinese Agreement.\n\nOn the 6th May, 1911, an agreement was signed between His Majesty's Government and the Chinese Government, which embodied Great Britain's effort to show a practical appreciation of the recommendations of the 1909 Commission. By this agreement the work of an earlier agreement (1907) was hastened so as to bring the import trade of opium from India to an end pari passu with the progress of the Chinese Government in stopping the production of opium in China. As a result of this agreement, the legitimate foreign opium trade in China came entirely to an end on the 31st December, 1917.\n\n1912. International Opium Convention.\n\nMeanwhile, on the 1st December, 1911, the International Opium Conference met at The Hague, again on the initiative of the Government of the United States. The aim of this conference, as stated in the preamble to the convention, was to advance a step further on the road opened by the International Commission of 1909, and to bring about the gradual suppression of the abuse of opium, morphine, cocaine, as also of the drugs prepared or derived therefrom which give rise to similar abuses. This Conference was more formal in character than the 1909 Commission, whose functions had been merely advisory. The delegates at The Hague Conference were empowered to sign a convention, which was to have the force of a treaty. The following Powers were represented: United States of America, China, France, Germany, Great Britain, Netherlands, Italy, Japan, Persia, Portugal, Siam and Russia. On the 23rd January, 1912, the International Opium Convention was signed. The principal articles in the convention were as follows:-\n\n·\n\n1. Raw Opium.-The contracting Powers undertook to enact laws for the control of the production and distribution of raw opium and to limit the number of ports through which export and import would be permitted.\n\n2. Prepared Opium.--The contracting Powers would take measures for the gradual and effective suppression of the manufacture of, internal trade in, and use of prepared opium. They would prohibit the import and export of prepared opium, except those Powers which were not yet ready to prohibit it immediately; and even they undertook strictly to regulate the traffic and to prohibit it as soon as possible.\n\n3. Medicinal Opium, Morphine, Cocaine, Heroin, &c.—The contracting Powers would enact pharmacy laws to confine the manufacture, sale and use of such drugs to medicinal and legitimate purposes. They would co-operate with one another to prevent the use of those drugs for any other purposes. Every effort would be taken to regulate import and export, and to prevent those drugs coming into the possession of unauthorised persons; and they would not be exported from the territories of one contracting Power to those of another, except when consigned to persons furnished with the licences or permits provided for by the laws or regulations of the importing countries.\n\nA special chapter was devoted to the trade with China, in which the contracting Powers undertook to reduce pari passu with China the opium shops and dens in foreign territories, concessions and settlements in China; and to prevent smuggling and illegal use of postal facilities in that country. The contracting Powers were to examine the possibility of making it a penal offence to be found in possession of opium and kindred drugs.\n\nThey were to communicate with one another, through the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands the text of existing laws and statistical information bearing on the subject. Any Power not represented at the Conference was to be invited by the Dutch Government to sign the convention.\n\nFinally, the Dutch Government were to invite all the Powers to ratify the convention with its protocol. As soon as the ratifications had been deposited, the Dutch Government were to notify all the Powers, and the convention was to come into force three months after the date upon which the last ratification had been deposited. Laws, regulations, and other measures arising out of the convention were to be prepared not later than six months after the entry into force of the convention; and the date on which these laws, regulations, &c., were to come into force was to be arranged by the Powers concerned, at the instance of the Dutch Government.\n\nBy the protocol to this convention, the Conference expressed its wish (1) to direct the attention of the Universal Postal Union to the urgency of regulating the transmission through the post of raw opium, morphine, cocaine, &c., and of prohibiting the transmission of prepared opium; and (2) to study the question of Indian hemp, with the object of regulating its abuses,\n\n1913 and 1914. International Opium Conferences,\n\nThe Second Opium Conference met in 1913, and decided that, although certain Powers who had been invited to sign the convention had not then done so, the deposit of ratifications might nevertheless take place. The Third Opium Conference was held at The Hague the 15th-25th June, 1914, By that time 44 out of 46 Powers had decided to sign the convention; 11 of the former had already ratified, 14 more were disposed to do so, while not one of the remaining 19 signatories had expressed any intention of not proceeding to put the convention into force. The non-signatories were Turkey (for economic reasons) and Serbia (because she had been unable to study it sufficiently).\n\nThe points secured by the Third Conference were as follows:-\n\n1. An all but unanimous expression of opinion on the part of the signatory Powers represented in favour of the convention coming into force without awaiting signature by the remaining two invited Powers. Germany alone opposed this resolution. That is to say, an affirmative reply was recorded to the question propounded to the third Conference by the second, with only one negative voice.\n\n2. An absolutely unanimous request to the Dutch Government to press for early ratification by all the signatory Powers which had not yet ratified in order that the convention might come into force as soon as possible. Germany, which had declined to assent to the enforcement of the convention without securing the signature of all the invited Powers, acquiesced in this proposal, as did also the representatives of several signatory Powers, which had, for one reason or another, not yet ratified.\n\n3. A recognition by the Conference, although with several abstentions, of the feasibility of enforcement by a group of the Powers who might be ready to co-operate for that purpose without awaiting the automatic enforcement of the convention provided for in article 24 after ratification by all the signatory Powers. The date as from which such group enforcement might take place was fixed as the 31st December, 1914, and a special protocol was to be provided for Powers desiring to co-operate to this end for signature by them.\n\nThe Dutch Ministry for Foreign Affairs was unanimously requested to make urgent representations to all signatory Powers to complete their ratifications in order that the convention might come into force as soon as possible.\n\nAt the time of the Third Conference Great Britain had not yet ratified the convention owing to technical difficulties concerning signature and ratification on behalf of the various dominions and colonies; these difficulties, however, had ceased to exist, and the British delegates were instructed to inform the Conference that His Majesty's Government would deposit the instruments of ratification as soon as the necessary formalities had been carried out.\n\nUnfortunately, the outbreak of the war suspended progress in this promising experiment in international legislation,\n\n1919. The Opium Convention and the Versailles Treaty.\n\nBy article 295 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany it is provided that \"those of the high contracting parties who have not yet signed or who have signed, but not yet ratified, the Opium Convention, signed at The Hague on the 23rd January, 1912, agree\n\n[4807]\n\nB.\n\n172\n\n...", "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-465 - Public Offices & Others - 1920.txt", "external_url": "", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 489237, "series_id": 27, "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine", "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "CO129-470 - Public Offices - 1921", "page_number": 385, "title": "CO129-470 - Public Offices - 1921", "content_text": "## 1911. Anglo-Chinese Agreement\n\nOn the 6th May, 1911, an agreement was signed between His Majesty's Government and the Chinese Government, which embodied Great Britain's effort to show a practical appreciation of the recommendations of the 1909 Commission. By this agreement, the work of an earlier agreement (1907) was hastened so as to bring the import trade of opium from India to an end pari passu with the progress of the Chinese Government in stopping the production of opium in China. As a result of this agreement, the legitimate foreign opium trade in China came entirely to an end on the 31st December, 1917.\n\n## 1912. International Opium Convention\n\nMeanwhile, on the 1st December, 1911, the International Opium Conference met at The Hague, again on the initiative of the Government of the United States. The aim of this conference, as stated in the preamble to the convention, was to advance a step further on the road opened by the International Commission of 1909, and to bring about the gradual suppression of the abuse of opium, morphine, cocaine, as also of the drugs prepared or derived therefrom which give rise to similar abuses. This Conference was more formal in character than the 1909 Commission, whose functions had been merely advisory. The delegates at The Hague Conference were empowered to sign a convention, which was to have the force of a treaty. The following Powers were represented: United States of America, China, France, Germany, Great Britain, Netherlands, Italy, Japan, Persia, Portugal, Siam, and Russia. On the 23rd January, 1912, the International Opium Convention was signed. The principal articles in the convention were as follows:\n\n1. **Raw Opium**. The contracting Powers undertook to enact laws for the control of the production and distribution of raw opium and to limit the number of ports through which export and import would be permitted.\n2. **Prepared Opium**. The contracting Powers would take measures for the gradual and effective suppression of the manufacture of, internal trade in, and use of prepared opium. They would prohibit the import and export of prepared opium, except those Powers which were not yet ready to prohibit it immediately; and even they undertook strictly to regulate the traffic and to prohibit it as soon as possible.\n3. **Medicinal Opium, Morphine, Cocaine, Heroin, &c**. The contracting Powers would enact pharmacy laws to confine the manufacture, sale, and use of such drugs to medicinal and legitimate purposes. They would co-operate with one another to prevent the use of those drugs for any other purposes. Every effort would be taken to regulate import and export, and to prevent those drugs coming into the possession of unauthorised persons; and they would not be exported from the territories of one contracting Power to those of another, except when consigned to persons furnished with the licences or permits provided for by the laws or regulations of the importing countries.\n\nA special chapter was devoted to the trade with China, in which the contracting Powers undertook to reduce pari passu with China the opium shops and dens in foreign territories, concessions, and settlements in China; and to prevent smuggling and illegal use of postal facilities in that country. The contracting Powers were to examine the possibility of making it a penal offence to be found in possession of opium and kindred drugs.\n\nThey were to communicate with one another, through the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, the text of existing laws and statistical information bearing on the subject. Any Power not represented at the Conference was to be invited by the Dutch Government to sign the convention.\n\nFinally, the Dutch Government were to invite all the Powers to ratify the convention with its protocol. As soon as the ratifications had been deposited, the Dutch Government were to notify all the Powers, and the convention was to come into force three months after the date upon which the last ratification had been deposited. Laws, regulations, and other measures arising out of the convention were to be prepared not later than six months after the entry into force of the convention; and the date on which these laws, regulations, &c., were to come into force was to be arranged by the Powers concerned, at the instance of the Dutch Government.\n\nBy the protocol to this convention, the Conference expressed its wish (1) to direct the attention of the Universal Postal Union to the urgency of regulating the transmission through the post of raw opium, morphine, cocaine, &c., and of prohibiting the transmission of prepared opium; and (2) to study the question of Indian hemp, with the object of regulating its abuses.\n\n## 1913 and 1914. International Opium Conferences\n\nThe Second Opium Conference met in 1913, and decided that, although certain Powers who had been invited to sign the convention had not then done so, the deposit of ratifications might nevertheless take place. The Third Opium Conference was held at The Hague from the 15th-25th June, 1914. By that time, 44 out of 46 Powers had decided to sign the convention; 11 of the former had already ratified, 14 more were disposed to do so, while not one of the remaining 19 signatories had expressed any intention of not proceeding to put the convention into force. The non-signatories were Turkey (for economic reasons) and Serbia (because she had been unable to study it sufficiently).\n\nThe points secured by the Third Conference were as follows:\n\n1. An all but unanimous expression of opinion on the part of the signatory Powers represented in favour of the convention coming into force without awaiting signature by the remaining two invited Powers. Germany alone opposed this resolution. That is to say, an affirmative reply was recorded to the question propounded to the third Conference by the second, with only one negative voice.\n2. An absolutely unanimous request to the Dutch Government to press for early ratification by all the signatory Powers which had not yet ratified in order that the convention might come into force as soon as possible. Germany, which had declined to assent to the enforcement of the convention without securing the signature of all the invited Powers, acquiesced in this proposal, as did also the representatives of several signatory Powers, which had, for one reason or another, not yet ratified.\n3. A recognition by the Conference, although with several abstentions, of the feasibility of enforcement by a group of the Powers who might be ready to co-operate for that purpose without awaiting the automatic enforcement of the convention provided for in article 24 after ratification by all the signatory Powers. The date as from which such group enforcement might take place was fixed as the 31st December, 1914, and a special protocol was to be provided for Powers desiring to co-operate to this end for signature by them.\n\nThe Dutch Ministry for Foreign Affairs was unanimously requested to make urgent representations to all signatory Powers to complete their ratifications in order that the convention might come into force as soon as possible.\n\nAt the time of the Third Conference, Great Britain had not yet ratified the convention owing to technical difficulties concerning signature and ratification on behalf of the various dominions and colonies; these difficulties, however, had ceased to exist, and the British delegates were instructed to inform the Conference that His Majesty's Government would deposit the instruments of ratification as soon as the necessary formalities had been carried out.\n\nUnfortunately, the outbreak of the war suspended progress in this promising experiment in international legislation.\n\n## 1919. The Opium Convention and the Versailles Treaty\n\nBy article 295 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, it is provided that \"those of the high contracting parties who have not yet signed or who have signed, but not yet ratified, the Opium Convention, signed at The Hague on the 23rd January, 1912, agree...\n\nPage 383", "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-470 - Public Offices - 1921.txt", "external_url": "", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 489879, "series_id": 27, "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine", "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "CO129-471 - Public Offices - 1921", "page_number": 370, "title": "CO129-471 - Public Offices - 1921", "content_text": "# 369 \n\nThis Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]\n\n## CHINA.\n\n**CONFIDENTIAL.**\n\n`[F 2910/96/10]`\n\nNo. 1.\n\n[August 9.]\n\n### SECTION 5.\n\nSir B. Alston to Earl Curzon.-(Received August 9.)\n\n**(No. 337.)**\nMy Lord,\n\nPeking, June 21, 1921.\n\nWITH reference to my telegram of the 25th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of the Chinese text of the new Sino-German Agreement and accompanying exchange of notes, a copy of which has been procured through private channels.\n\nI would draw attention to the last paragraph of the letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to Herr von Borch stating that a separate arrangement would be concerted for dealing with the Deutsche-Asiatische Bank and the Ching Hsing mines, but that the bank premises at Peking and Hankow, not having been subjected to liquidation, \"may be restored to the original owners.\" As your Lordship is aware, the status of the German bank in the Legation quarter has never been exactly determined, and the premises are at the present time in the custody of the Netherlands Minister, as representative of German interests during the war. Should an attempt be made to give effect to the promise given in Dr. Yen's letter, the question of the right of the Chinese Government to dispose of property within the Legation quarter will have to be settled.\n\nThe German drill ground referred to in Herr von Borch's letter signifies presumably the German portion of the extra-mural glacis. It is obvious that the German renunciation of rights over the glacis can only take practical effect if and when a similar renunciation has been made by the remaining protocol Powers.\n\n(Copies to Shanghai, Canton, Tien-tsin and Hankow.)\n\n### Enclosure 1 in No. 1.\n\nHerr von Borch to Dr. Yen.\n\nI have, &c.\n\nB. ALSTON.\n\nSir,\n\nMay 20, 1921.\n\nI HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that I have been formally delegated to make to your Excellency in the name of my Government the following declaration:-\n\nThe Government of the German Republic desires to renew relations of amity and commercial intercourse between China and Germany. Now whereas it is right that such relations should be founded upon the principle of perfect equality and strict reciprocity, as in conformity with the provisions of general international law, and whereas on the 15th September, 1919, a mandate was promulgated by his Excellency the President of the Republic of China restoring peace with Germany, and whereas Germany has accepted the obligations towards China created by articles 128 to 134 of the Versailles Treaty of the 28th June, 1919, which came into operation on the 10th January, 1920, it is hereby stated that Germany has in consequence of her military situation and the Versailles Treaty been compelled to renounce all interests, property rights and concessions obtained by her under the treaty with China of the 6th March, 1898, and the various other documents relating to the province of Shantung, and that she has thereby ceased to have it in her power to restore to China the said interests, property rights and concessions.\n\nIt is further formally declared as follows:-\n\nGermany agrees to the abolition of her right to consular jurisdiction in China. She also renounces in entirety in China's favour all rights possessed by the German Government over the German drill ground belonging to the German Legation at Peking, acknowledging the expression \"public property\" mentioned in clause 1, article 130, of the Versailles Treaty as including in its denotation the drill ground in question.\n\n`[6735 i---5]`", "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-471 - Public Offices - 1921.txt", "external_url": "", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 493942, "series_id": 27, "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine", "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "CO129-478 - Public Offices & Others - 1922", "page_number": 333, "title": "CO129-478 - Public Offices & Others - 1922", "content_text": "[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]\n\nCONFIDENTIAL.\n\n(11724.) (AMENDED.)\n\n328\n\nC. U\n\n7\n\n9085\n\nREC :\n\nREG25 FB22\n\nRemission of the Boxer Indemnity.\n\nAFTER the Boxer rising of 1900 the Chinese Government were called upon to pay an indemnity to the Powers concerned for damage sustained or military expenditure incurred.* By article 6 of the Final Protocol of 1901 the amount was fixed at 450,000,000 Haikwan taels. This sum constituted a gold debt calculated for the different currencies at rates of exchange fixed in the protocol (e.g., in calculating the amount of the gold debt the tael is to be taken as representing 3s. 71⁄2d gold dollars, 3.750 fr., 1.407 yen, &c.).\n\nThe gold debt was to bear interest at the rate of 4 per cent., and was to be redeemed in annual instalments spread over thirty-nine years, terminating at the end of 1940. A proportionate amount was to be paid monthly to a commission of bankers representing the interested Powers, and certain revenues were assigned as security.\n\nThe indemnity was made up between the different Powers as follows:--\n\n \n Taels\n Per cent of Total\n \n \n Russia\n 180,371,120\n 29.0\n \n \n Germany\n 90,070,515\n 20.0\n \n \n France..\n 70,878,240\n 15.75\n \n \n Great Britain\n 50,620,545\n 11.23\n \n \n Japan\n 94,793,100\n 7.7 (?)\n \n \n United States\n 32,939,055\n 7.8 (?)\n \n \n Italy\n 26,617,005\n 5.8\n \n \n Belgium..\n 8,484,345\n 1.8\n \n \n Austria..\n 4,008,920\n 0.9\n \n \n Netherlands\n 782,100\n 0.2\n \n \n Spain\n 185,315\n \n \n \n Portugal\n 92,250\n \n \n \n Sweden..\n 62,820\n \n \n \n Other claims\n 149,670\n \n \n \n Total\n 450,000,000\n 100.0\n \n\nIn 1908 the United States Government had the amount of their indemnity claim reviewed by a special claim's court, and according to a statement prepared by Mr. Morse, the author of the standard work, \"The International Relations of the Chinese Empire,\" for the China Association, it was decided to demand from China not the entire cost of the expeditionary force, but a sum to cover the difference between the war cost in the field and the peace cost in garrison. This difference added to the private claims amounted to about 2,800,000l., as compared with the estimate of about 5,000,000l. provisionally made in 1901. The balance of 2,200,000l. was remitted by proportionate deductions from future payments. This was done without any conditions being imposed.\n\nThe United States Minister at Peking, Mr. Rockhill, a persona gratissima with the Chinese Government, induced them to continue voluntarily to issue the American quota of the indemnity without deduction and to pay that portion which was renounced by the United States Government to a Commission of Education for the purpose of sending Chinese students to American Universities. The net result, therefore, was that the Chinese Government devoted the amount by which the original American claim was over-estimated to the education of Chinese students in America.\n\n* For fuller details and for some account of the machinery for the payment of the indemnity instalments, see Appendix I.\n\nTo nearest decimal.\n\n477.6 [6823]\n\nB", "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-478 - Public Offices & Others - 1922.txt", "external_url": "", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 509243, "series_id": 27, "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine", "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "CO129-502-6 China- general situation 7-1-1927 - 3-3-1927", "page_number": 168, "title": "CO129-502-6 China- general situation 7-1-1927 - 3-3-1927", "content_text": "## 5. In our previous Report (C.I.D. Paper No. 756-B) we have already set out the strength of the force which we consider is necessary for the defence of Shanghai, viz. :- \n\"To protect the Concessions at Shanghai by military means against Nationalist troops that might be brought against it in the near future, a force of at least 1 Division and one squadron of aeroplanes would be necessary, and would have to be despatched without delay. This should be an international force with a preponderance of Japanese, and commanded by a Japanese officer, in view of the fact that Japan alone can provide large forces at short notice. In the present circumstances we must, in fact, rely primarily on Japan to protect our interests in Shanghai. Owing to the magnitude of British interests, British participation on the scale of a mixed brigade, with a proportion of naval aircraft, although it may be late, is essential. These forces should be additional to those required to control the population.\"\n\nIt will be seen, therefore, that our estimate of one Division corresponds to the estimate of the Naval Commander-in-Chief in his telegram of the 12th January.\n\n## 6. \nWe emphasised in our last Report the importance of securing international co-operation in the defence of Shanghai, and we understand that conversations have been proceeding with the Japanese Staff in this connection, the results of which, however, are not yet available.\n\n## 7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.\n\nOur Conclusions and Recommendations in regard to the defence of Shanghai in the present circumstances may be summarised as follows:-\n\n(a) If Shanghai is to be secured, it is of the first importance that the troops for this purpose should be despatched at once, otherwise they may arrive on the scene too late. Any delay in this connection is dangerous.\n\n(b) The following British troops should be despatched to Shanghai at once:-\n| Item | Troops |\n| --- | --- |\n| (i) | One mixed Brigade from India. |\n| (ii) | 1,000 Marines. |\n| (iii) | The First Cruiser Squadron (which can supply a landing-party of 1,000 rifles). |\n\n(e) That recommendation (b) is on the understanding that the remainder of the units required to complete the Division which is necessary for the defence of Shanghai will be provided by other nationalities. If other nationalities are not prepared to provide the remainder of the Division we shall have to provide a complete Division ourselves.\n\n## 8. \nWe understand that arrangements are being made for the supply of such necessities as barbed wire, ammunition, &c.\n\n## 9. \nProvided that authority is given to-day to carry out the moves recommended in paragraph 7 above, it is estimated that the troops concerned will be available for action at Shanghai in 30 to 32 days from this date. Our latest information is to the effect that the earliest date on which the Chinese Nationalist Forces can arrive at Shanghai is 30 days from to-day. It will be seen, therefore, that in order to ensure effective intervention on our part the necessary orders for the move of our troops must be given to-day.\n\n## USE OF TEAR GAS IN CHINA.\n\n## 10. \nIn addition to the matters dealt with above we also considered the Memorandum by the Naval Staff on the possible use of Tear Gas in China (C.I.D. Paper No. 760-B). In his Memorandum dated the 20th December, 1926 (C.I.D. Paper No. 754-B), the Secretary of State for War described the widespread activities of Soviet Russia in connection with the production of war gases. In view of the close connection known to exist between the Chinese Nationalists and Soviet Russia, the use of gas by the former in any conflict that may arise between them and ourselves would therefore be a contingency that must be regarded as probable. It also appears unlikely that any decision by us to refrain from using gas would be taken into consideration by the Chinese if they had stocks of gas available for use.\n\nThe question for more immediate consideration, however, is whether the use of tear gas should be permitted against mobs. We are definitely of opinion that it is more humane and, under most circumstances, just as effective as the use of lethal weapons.\n\nIn the Washington Agreement and the recent Geneva Protocol on the subject gas it is laid down that gas is not to be used in war; tear gas is included in this prohibition. That this prohibition does not apply in peace time is, however, apparently the view of certain nations as authentic information of its use by France and the United States in quelling civil disturbances has been received.\n\nWe recognise, nevertheless, that a distinction must be drawn between the use by a Government of gas against its own nationals and against those of another Power.\n\nTear gas of a suitable kind could be obtained either at home or in the open market in America without undue delay, and, if its use were sanctioned, we are informed that arrangements could be made without difficulty for sending a special gas unit to China.\n\nAfter taking into consideration the many factors affecting its use, we unanimously recommend that authority should be given for gas to be used in China against the mob, subject to the issue of very definite instructions as to the circumstances under which it may be employed.\n\n2. Whitehall Gardens, S.W, 1, \nJanuary 17, 1927.\n\n(Signed) \n**BEATTY.** \n**H. TRENCHARD.** \n**G. F. MILNE.**\n\n## APPENDIX.\n\nDecypher Telegram from Commander-in-Chief, China, to Admiralty, No. 728, dated January 12, 1927, \n`H.M.S. Hawkins.`\n\n**ADRESSED** Admiralty (No. 728); repeated to `H.M.S. Hawkins` repeat message to Governor, Hong Kong.\n\nMy appreciation of position in Shanghai, by which mean the foreign occupied areas and the harbour from Shanghai to Wusung, is as follows: The conditions since fall of Hankow and Kiukiang, referred to in my No. 725, have materially altered all previous appreciations. At the present time there is nothing to stop an advance in force of the Cantonese army. I look on their reverse in Chekiang in the last two days merely as incidents and their ultimate advance on Shanghai as an absolute certainty. The volunteer force of Shanghai is entirely inadequate for defence purposes, and unless it is very materially increased the corrupt group of Shanghai is inevitable and will take place in practically the same manner as that of Hankow and Kiukiang. I consider a fully-equipped division, repeat division, is urgently required for the defence of Shanghai, and that, moreover, it should be despatched with the least possible delay. Urgency of situation calls for immediate action, and delay disastrous. Under the present conditions the Cantonese army can arrive in the vicinity of Shanghai within thirty days. The defence of Shanghai will be purely a military operation; the naval landing parties and volunteer corps will be used for maintaining order inside the settlement. I would point out that should this division be forthcoming, in addition to disposing of present menace to Shanghai, it would lead to eventual restoration of concessions at Hankow and Kiukiang and, above all, to the re-establishment of British prestige. Moreover, the presence of a strong British force in Shanghai would without doubt encourage our wavering allies to follow suit and thus afford them the opportunity to join with us in dealing with situation, which at present they are inclined to avoid as being mess of our own making. The alternatives to this proposal are: (i) peaceful evacuation of concession at an early date; (ii) evacuation under similar or worse conditions than existed at Hankow and possibly under fire. I have consulted Consul-General, Shanghai, in this matter, and he is in entire agreement, though he adheres to his previously expressed opinion that evacuation would prove physically impossible in practice. In the meantime, I concur that the battalion now in readiness at Hong Kong should be sent forthwith and accommodated ashore.\n\nMinister at Peking is being similarly informed.\n\nPage 185", "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-502-6 China- general situation 7-1-1927 - 3-3-1927.txt", "external_url": "", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 509494, "series_id": 27, "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine", "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "CO129-502-7 China- general situation 4-3-1927 - 26-4-1927", "page_number": 185, "title": "CO129-502-7 China- general situation 4-3-1927 - 26-4-1927", "content_text": "# \n## \n\nSIR MAURICE HANKEY reminded the Committee of Imperial Defence that one of the reasons that had led the Committee to recommend the rejection of the Geneva Protocol (notwithstanding that Representatives of the late Government had taken an important part in drawing it up at Geneva) had been its provision for working out plans for economic coercion and for ascertaining in advance the amount of force to be placed at the disposal of the League \"for sanctions\" (`C.I.D. Paper 559-B`, paragraph 109 (1)). The Committee of Imperial Defence had seen in these provisions (Articles 12 and 13 of the Geneva Protocol) a furtherance of the scheme, desired by the French Government ever since the Peace Conference, for a League General Staff to draw up plans for its forces (ibid., paragraph 58), a scheme which the British Government had always opposed. If the Committee of Imperial Defence still held this view, they ought to be on their guard against any step which might lead by successive stages to the same end—first, the sending of information on armament expenditure to the League; then a demand for a Commission to examine and report on the information, and, finally, for its development into something resembling a General Staff.\n\nLORD BEATTY pointed out that paragraph 2 of Article 3 provided for a statement of expenditure on Naval Armaments. A difficulty arose in this connection, viz., that, though the Navy was one Imperial unit, the expenditure on the Navy was in part borne by the Governments of the various Dominions.\n\nSIR SAMUEL HOARE expressed the view that, whatever reservations we might make, there would always be a dangerous tendency for a Commission, analogous to the Mandates Commission, to be set up at Geneva to examine the statement of expenditure.\n\nTHE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that the Committee of Imperial Defence had agreed at its 138th meeting held on the 12th May, 1921, that the information as to scales of armaments and programmes of construction to be given to the League of Nations should be the same as is given to Parliament (viz., estimates and returns laid on the Table), and that, so long as some of the principal Naval and Military Powers remain outside the League of Nations, the difficulties of giving more information than this are manifest. He felt convinced that paragraph 2 of Article 3 should be struck out of the draft Treaty.\n\n## \n\nLORD CECIL asked that he should be allowed a certain amount of liberty on this point. It was not true to say that other Powers broke their agreements without concern. What the Representatives of these Powers stated quite openly was that they were only bound by the exact terms of the Agreement which they had accepted, and that they did not understand such phrases as \"the intention of the Treaty\" or \"the spirit of the Treaty.\" He still thought that the provisions contained in paragraph 2 of Article 3 were desirable, especially with regard to foreign countries, as it would force them to show what steps they were taking in regard to armaments, and would thus give the opposition parties in these countries an opportunity of keeping their Governments to their pledges.\n\nSIR AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN pointed out that so long as coercive measures were in force his experience had been that the Opposition Parties remained silent. For example, so long as the Inter-Allied Commission of Control was in Berlin the Opposition in Germany had been silent in regard to military matters, but once the Control Commission had been removed, the Opposition showed itself keen to ensure that the Reichswehr was not allowed to exceed its proper limitations, and, for the first time, an open Inquiry was conducted into scandals in connection with the Reichswehr. He thought, therefore, that paragraph 2 of Article 3 could be dropped as the first paragraph of that Article gave all the powers that were necessary.\n\n## \n\nLORD BEATTY drew attention to the wording of Articles 2, 3, and 4, which contained such phrases as \"with the concurrence of the Council of the League of Nations,\" \"communicate to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations.\" He suggested that these references to the League of Nations might be changed to \"High Contracting Parties,\" since the United States of America might object to them.\n\nLORD CECIL suggested that, if the Americans raised any objection, suitable alterations in wording could be effected later on.\n\nSIR LAMING WORTHINGTON-EVANS drew attention to Article 7, which provided for a limitation of the aggregate expenditure on land armaments. He suggested that the tendency would be to put the figure so high as to defeat the object of this provision.\n\nLORD CECIL pointed out that this Article had been included on the suggestion of the representative of the War Office on his Committee. He did not attach any great importance to it and was quite willing for the Article to be deleted.\n\nSIR LAMING WORTHINGTON-EVANS pointed out that if Article 7 was deleted a consequential alteration would have to be made in Article 13, involving the deletion of the words \"or is incurring expenditure on land armaments in excess of the figures set out in Table 1 of Annex I.\"\n\nMR. BRIDGEMAN suggested that the words \"at once\" in the sixth line of Article 13 should be deleted, and enquired whether the provision at the end of the second paragraph of Article 13, namely, that it will join in such action as may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations,\" required a unanimous decision before being put into effect.\n\nLORD CECIL pointed out that we were bound to take action of this kind under Article 11 of the Covenant, whereas the United States of America was not so bound. If this provision remained in the Convention, the United States would also be undertaking the obligations which already rested on us. He was of opinion that unanimity was implied in the wording of the Convention.\n\n## CONCLUSION\n\n**THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE agreed**—\n\nTo approve the draft Convention for the limitation of Naval, Military, and Air Armaments (`C.I.D. Paper No. 776-B`) as the basis for the instructions of the British representatives at the forthcoming meetings of the Preparatory Commission at Geneva, subject to the following amendments:\n\n| Amendment | Description |\n| --- | --- |\n| (a) | Paragraph 3 (2) to be omitted. |\n| (b) | Paragraph 7 to be excluded. |\n| (c) | Paragraph 13, Lines 4 and 5, omit the words \"or is incurring expenditure on land armaments in excess of the figures set out in Table 1 of Annex 1.\" |\n| (d) | Line 6, omit the words \"at once.\" |\n\nAnd subject to the understanding that the British Delegates will oppose any proposal for the creation of a special League Commission or Staff for the purpose of examining, analysing, or reporting on the information to be furnished under the provisions of the Draft Convention.\n\n## (B) Convention for the Control of Private Manufacture of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War\n\n(`C.I.D. Paper No. 774-B`)\n\n(Previous Reference: `C.I.D. Minutes` of the 218th Meeting, Minute 1.)\n\nLORD CECIL explained that he did not realise that this matter would be brought up for consideration at the forthcoming meeting at Geneva. A draft Convention prepared by the Service Departments had been considered at the last meeting of his Sub-Committee. From this draft Convention, however, had been omitted the provisions in the draft prepared by the League Committee, which were really the whole substance of the Convention. The Board of Trade and Home Office representatives on his Sub-Committee had made certain suggestions which appeared to give prospects of a solution of this question. At the present moment, therefore, he had no definite proposal to put forward. He suggested that the Cabinet might delegate authority in regard to this Convention to the Sub-Committee which had been dealing with the matter, since not much time was available before he would have to leave for Geneva.\n\nTHE PRIME MINISTER considered that the Convention ought to be examined by the Committee of Imperial Defence before being put forward at Geneva.\n\nLORD CECIL suggested that it would be advisable, if such a course were possible, for consideration of the Convention at Geneva to be postponed until an... \n\n## \n5 \n13 \nB 3 [15855]", "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-502-7 China- general situation 4-3-1927 - 26-4-1927.txt", "external_url": "", "rank": 0 } ]