[
    {
        "id": 352378,
        "series_id": 27,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine",
        "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "CO129-259 - Governor Sir Robinson - 1893 [5-8]",
        "page_number": 543,
        "title": "CO129-259 - Governor Sir Robinson - 1893 [5-8]",
        "content_text": "PREFACE.\n\n[From the HONGKONG DAILY PRESS of 29th August, 1893.]\n\nThe Government has succeeded in staving off the much talked-of Retrenchment Commission. The whole history of the affair will be found in the correspondence published in another column, and very interesting reading it will be found to be. The Secretary of State directed an enquiry, and the Governor, in pursuance of this direction, expressed his intention to appoint a Committee. The composition of this Committee, however, was such that the Hon. T. H. WHITEHEAD felt himself compelled to decline to serve. The matter will now go on before the Secretary of State again, and if the unofficial members of the Legislative Council remain quiescent, no doubt his Lordship will be very willing to let it rest, but if they persevere in their demand for an independent enquiry there can be little doubt that it will be granted. However this may be, it would certainly be better to have no enquiry at all than a mere whitewashing Commission, and the Hon. T. H. WHITEHEAD has taken the proper course in declining to serve on the Committee the Governor proposed to appoint. At first His Excellency proposed rather a large Committee with a very decided preponderance of officials, but after much correspondence the number of members was reduced to four--- two officials (of whom one was to be Chairman) and two unofficials. Mr. WHITEHEAD rightly declined to serve unless the unofficials were in a majority, and as the Governor declined to accede to this, and the enquiry could not well go on without Mr. WHITEHEAD's assistance, the present dead-lock has come to pass.\n\nThe Colonial Secretary in his last letter to Mr. WHITEHEAD endeavours to show that the constitution of the Committee ought to be a matter of indifference to that gentleman, because it would have no power to decide anything; its functions would be strictly limited to enquiring and recommending, and any recommendations which the Committee or any of its members might make would by no means necessarily derive weight in proportion to the number of the members making the several recommendations, but solely from the amount of reason and good sense which the recommendations might severally contain. \"Will you walk into my parlour, said the spider to the fly.\" Mr. O'BRIEN must have thought Mr. WHITEHEAD a peculiarly foolish fly if he imagined that gentleman was likely to be taken in by such sophistry as this. Or was it the public that was looked upon as the fly to be taken in and done for? Mr. WHITEHEAD's refusal to serve on the Committee was already final, so that the argument could have no effect upon his course of action, but Mr. O'BRIEN perhaps thought that it might serve to make the gullible public think Mr. WHITEHEAD was in the wrong.\n\nWhenever an important Commission is appointed its constitution is always narrowly watched, especially when the matter is one as to which public opinion is strongly divided. The appointment of the delegates to the Monetary Conference and the more recent appointment of a Royal Commission on the opium question are instances in point. Although the functions of such Commissions are confined to enquiry and recommendation their constitution is never looked upon as a matter of indifference, because the fact that force of argument avails little against preponderance of numbers has unfortunately to be taken into consideration. In the present instance, between the Chief Justice and the Colonial Secretary, the Governor has been placed in a hopelessly untenable position. The Chief Justice writes to His Excellency that \"he must decline to accept a position by which he would be bereft of all influence,\" meaning a position as Chairman of a Commission in which there was any fear of the side to which His Honour belongs being outvoted, for, as he says in subsequent letter, \"it is impossible to escape the conclusion that there are sides.\" So we have the officials on the one side and the public on the other, and the officials want to have a trained lawyer like the Chief Justice to conduct their case for them as Chairman of the proposed Committee, backed up by another official. These two would be able to hold the fort against two unofficials, who, being unacquainted in detail with the routine of the various offices, would have to grope about blindly for information while their supposed colleagues looked on with amused contempt. The arrangement was naturally one which could not be accepted on the unofficial side. If, as Mr. O'BRIEN says, the recommendations of the Committee would not derive weight in proportion to the number of the members making the several recommendations, but solely from the amount of reason and good sense which the recommendations might severally contain, why should the Government have exhibited such fear of an independent enquiry? The confession that \"there are sides\" explains the whole thing; the officials are on one side, the public on the other, and the Government wants the official side to have a preponderance of strength on the Retrenchment Committee. By insisting on this unfair arrangement they have managed to stave off the unwelcome enquiry altogether for the time being.\n\nPage 538",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-259 - Governor Sir Robinson - 1893 [5-8].txt",
        "external_url": "",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 388437,
        "series_id": 27,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine",
        "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "CO129-316 - Governor Sir Blake - 1903 [1-4]",
        "page_number": 613,
        "title": "CO129-316 - Governor Sir Blake - 1903 [1-4]",
        "content_text": "# Hong Kong No. \n## Gov. Sir H.Blake \n### 18024/11.Kong \n#### 305 \n\nSir, \n\n2) Aug.1900. \n\n590 \n\n599 \n\nMr. Collins \n\nMr. Lucas \n\n4185 \n\nCry 4, 16574 (346. \n\nformation t \n\n`ALC` \n\nPrint \n\n03 \n\n29/42203 \n\nPrint \n\nCopy Treas 22 \n\nAugas \n\nAnodi \n\nI have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 174 of the 2nd Apr., with its enclosures, on the subject of the currency of Hong Kong.\n\nI regret that I have not returned an earlier reply to your despatch, which has however been receiving my careful attention. I transmit to you herewith a copy of resolutions agreed to at a recent conference between Delegations from the United States, China and Mexico, and Representatives of this country, regarding the monetary systems of silver-using countries and the establishment of a national currency in the Chinese Empire, together with a copy of a Message from the President of the U.S.A which led up to the Conference. The Delegations are now discussing the silver question with Representatives of different Governments in Europe.\n\nIt does not appear expedient to discuss further at the present stage the question of establishing a gold standard in H.K., the difficulties of which are clearly stated in your despatch. It appears to me out of the question...",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-316 - Governor Sir Blake - 1903 [1-4].txt",
        "external_url": "",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 421937,
        "series_id": 27,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine",
        "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "CO129-360 - Public Offices - 1909",
        "page_number": 726,
        "title": "CO129-360 - Public Offices - 1909",
        "content_text": "## weight of merchandize is ascertained directly by the tonnage booked in and out of the joint station, plus that interchanged between the two lines. As regards the coaching traffic, the number of passengers carried is reduced to weight by the employment of a conventional scale. On all Indian railways the figures given in the margin are used.* The plan described above presupposes that each railway uses the junction as one of its termini.\n\nWhere the junction is at an inconvenient point it is customary to give the foreign line certain running powers over the home or owning line, so as to give access to a larger station or a more important terminus. The charge for such admission and use of the road is based on tonnage moved or preferably on a vehicle-mile rate, as may be mutually agreed.\n\nTo deal directly with the contemplated joint arrangements between the British and Chinese sections of the Canton-Kowloon Railway, one of three plans is possible--\n\n1. To provide a junction station at the frontier to be used as a terminal station; 2. To place one section under the working management of the other; or 3. To give the Chinese section running powers into Kowloon.\n\nPlan (1) would of course avoid all difficulty in respect of dual control or foreign jurisdiction. But it is questionable whether it would be wise administrative policy to burden the revenues of the Colony with a recurring annual working deficit, in addition to the interest charged on the railway loan. The 20 miles of the British section, if worked as a separate undertaking would require a full complement of staff. For effective supervision the irreducible minimum, would suffice to work five times the mileage. And in actual practice it would be found that the working expenses, under this arrangement would equal if they did not exceed the traffic receipts, contributed by the mileage of the British section itself.\n\nThere may, perhaps, be political or administrative reasons why the British section should be self-contained and self-controlled, but such reasons will doubtless outweigh any considerations of mere profit or loss in railway working.\n\nIf governmental reasons do not militate against the adoption of Plan (2) it is quite possible to work the two sections as one line. In such cases no joint works whatever would be required at the frontier. Kowloon and Canton would become the two termini. The advantage of this plan would be---\n \n| Advantage |\n| --- |\n| (a.) Economy in management; |\n| (b.) Uniformity of procedure; |\n| (c.) Absence of dual control; and |\n| (d.) A larger return on the capital invested. |\n\nThe supervising staff of one section could be dispensed with. The large outlay on contingent works such as locomotive work-shops, general offices, stores, &c., need not be duplicated. Disagreement and friction begotten of dual control will not come to the birth and lastly the way will be open to secure economical working by the avoidance of all unnecessary or surplus expenditure.\n\nUnder this plan the jurisdiction and other interests of both contracting parties could be duly provided for and properly safeguarded. Offences against law and order on British or Chinese territory would be dealt with by the competent authorities of either Government, while adequate provision for watch and ward purposes could be made by the railway management.\n\nThere would then only remain the question of--\n \n| Question |\n| --- |\n| (a.) Rates and fares, and |\n| (b.) Division of working expenses. |\n\nIn regard to tariff rates and fares it is probable that a higher charge per mile would have to be levied for the short British section than on the Chinese section. It would, of course, be simpler to have a uniform charge per mile and effect a division of receipts and expenditure in mileage proportion, but the heavier cost of construction on the British section justifies a higher mileage rate and fare. What this increased charge should be is a matter for careful consideration. It is idle to assume that the respective mileage rates on the two sections will be in ratio of the construction cost per mile, or anything approaching it. The utmost that will be possible would be to make the charge for the British section as for 40 instead of 20 miles. The whole question, however, must eventually be governed by what the rail-borne trade will stand and the influence thereon of river competition.\n\n* Class 1 unit 10 tons; class 2 unit 8 tons; class 3 unit 6 tons.\n\nIt may be, of course, that the Chinese section should be prepared to surrender something for the manifest advantage of coming into direct touch with the sea in the free port of Hong Kong. But on the other hand, it has to be remembered that the original conception of Hong Kong as the future service seaport for the railway systems of South-Western China did not, admittedly, originate in the idea of a profitable business enterprise, and that, therefore, the Colony having secured a strategic advantage cannot reasonably expect to obtain in addition a full monetary return on capital it was prepared to spend as commercially infructuous expenditure.\n\nIt is customary in railway working to obtain some return on special capital expenditure such as on large works at a terminus, by the levy of a special charge, called a terminal. It would be quite reasonable to impose a terminal on all bookings in and out of Kowloon Station, the whole of which would of course be credited to the British section.\n\nThe division of working expenses could be effected in ratio of the mileage opened for traffic or more equitably on the train or vehicle mileage basis. All three methods are adopted in India with its 30,000 miles of railway open to public traffic and its scores of junction stations, many of which connect railways owned by native States with British lines proper.\n\nThe last-mentioned method of division, viz., on the basis of vehicle mileage, is the fairest, and may commend itself to the contracting parties.\n\nIn this connection it is perhaps well to mention that according to the provisions of the Loan Agreement between the British and Chinese Corporation and the Chinese Government, the Engineer-in-chief and the Chief Accountant must be British subjects, a probable guarantee that British interests would be adequately safeguarded.\n\nThe third plan, viz., that of giving the Chinese section running powers over the line from Kowloon to the frontier would be workable, but would involve either a reciprocal obligation as far as the Chinese railway was concerned or the provision of a junction station at the frontier. It would, however, call for some adjustment of staff charges at Kowloon where provision would have to be made for all traffic requirements.\n\nIt will be quite easy to determine the Chinese tonnage hauled over British metals vehicle run for purposes of calculating the haulage cost, or a toll might be levied as is sometimes done.\n\nUnder any plan the separate equipment of the two lines in respect of engines and rolling-stock is essential, and rules regarding the employment of vehicles beyond the limits of the home line would need to be laid down. In this connection the Indian Railway Conference Rules for the adjustment of through traffic operations will be found quite appropriate and useful. There is little doubt that these Conference Rules will sufficiently meet all possible contingencies arising from the joint working of the two sections of the Canton-Kowloon Railway.\n\nThe general conditions in the case under present consideration are roughly similar to those attaching to the joint Agreement entered into between the west of India Portuguese Railway and the adjoining railway system in British India. The facts are familiar to me, as I drafted the original working Agreements. The Portuguese Colony of Goa, in Western India, extends from the sea to about 50 miles inland. Fired with the ambition to possess an Indian railway of its own, the Portuguese Government raised a London loan of some £2,000,000, at 6 per cent. interest guaranteed by Lisbon. The frontiers meet on the slope of the Western Ghauts, where no station could be located, and the Portuguese railway trains had to run over the British line for a few miles to the nearest station, Castle Rock.\n\nDespite the fact that the railway did not pay, and, moreover, that the interest on capital invested exceeded the whole of the revenues of the Portuguese Colony, the Goa Government for several years persisted in working its own railway as a separate undertaking, prompted, doubtless, by the feeling that it would be undignified to submit to foreign interference or management. The insistence on high tariff rates and the friction arising from dual interests resulted in such a diversion of traffic that the Portuguese line was starved, and after several years of annual deficit, when the gross receipts did not cover working expenses, an agreement was come to by which the Goa Railway was handed to the British line, with, as proved, the happiest results.\n\nPage 721",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-360 - Public Offices - 1909.txt",
        "external_url": "",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 422265,
        "series_id": 27,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine",
        "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "CO129-361 - Public Offices - 1909",
        "page_number": 294,
        "title": "CO129-361 - Public Offices - 1909",
        "content_text": "## CHINA TRADE\n**CONFIDENTIAL**\n\n[14580]\n\nNo. 1.\n\n[April 19.]\n\n292\n\n## SECTION 1.\n\nSir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 19.)\n\n(No. 142.)\n\nPeking, April 1, 1909.\n\nWITH reference to your despatch No. 9 of the 11th January transmitting copy of a letter from the China Association on the subject of currency in this country, and to my despatch No. 558 of the 11th December, 1908, regarding the unrestricted issue of Chinese banknotes, I have the honour to inclose copy of a note from the Doyen of the Diplomatic Body to Prince Ching of the 30th March in which further information is called for respecting the measures contemplated by the Board of Finance for controlling the issue of notes, and inquiry is made as to the date when the introduction of a uniform national currency may be expected.\n\nAfter this note had been drafted, a Decree appeared in the \"Gazette,\" together with the Memorial upon which it was based which expressed the views of the Chinese Government at the present time on the question of currency. I have the honour to inclose translations of these documents, which postpone indefinitely any decision upon this problem, and render ineffective the Decree of the 5th October, 1908 (inclosed in my despatch No. 461 of the 16th October), by which a uniform tael currency was ordained.\n\nThat the introduction of the tael currency was being reconsidered had been generally reported in official circles for some months past, and was indeed practically admitted by the Wai-wu Pu in their reply of the 23rd February to inquiries which I had made, on behalf of the Governor of Hong Kong, as to whether steps would be taken to withdraw the subsidiary dollar coins with which the market is now flooded, especially in South China. It will be seen from the inclosed translation of the Wai-wu Pu Memorandum that a Memorial from the Government Council was awaited before deciding upon the course of action to be pursued, and the publication of this paper now throws the whole question back to its starting point.\n\nIn a conversation with Mr. Liang Tun-yen at the Wai-wu Pu on the 30th March, I drew attention to the great lapse of time since China engaged to provide for a uniform national coinage, and expressed the opinion, which was general among foreigners, that China would never succeed in reforming her currency without expert advice from abroad. Mr. Liang did not share this view. He considered that if there was a possibility of introducing uniform coinage throughout such a vast country as China, the Chinese could do it themselves without foreign assistance. The recent Decree directed the Board of Finance to establish a special office for investigating the subject. I observed that time had not been wanting already for the study of the problem, complicated though it was, and asked if there was any one in the Board of Finance who understood it.\n\nMr. Liang mentioned the name of a subordinate official, who, I understand, has some pretensions to be considered an expert, but as it is well-known that the Board of Finance profits largely by the existing chaos in the monetary system there is no reason to expect that it will do more than report further on the difficulties of the question.\n\nMr. Liang then referred to the request of the Chinese Government that Article 8 of the \"Mackay\" Treaty should be made operative, and suggested unofficially that a Conference should be held in Peking at which this question, together with that of currency, mining regulations, &c., could be discussed. I said that His Majesty's Government were perfectly prepared to carry out their engagements respecting an increase in the tariff as soon as China had brought the other powers into line, but it would, of course, be expected that the unfulfilled Articles of the Mackay Treaty would be carried out. His suggestion appeared to me practical, provided that the Chinese Government appointed as its principal negotiator an official who was known to foreign Governments, as for example Mr. Tong Shao-yi. It was very difficult to deal adequately with a question such as currency through the medium of the Chinese language, and if the Chinese Government seriously desired to... \n\n[2236 t-1]",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-361 - Public Offices - 1909.txt",
        "external_url": "",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 435027,
        "series_id": 27,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine",
        "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "CO129-383 - Public Offices - 1911",
        "page_number": 441,
        "title": "CO129-383 - Public Offices - 1911",
        "content_text": "# Mr. H. A. Thornton, I.C.S., superintendent, Northern Shan States; Mr. W. H. L. Cabell, I.C.S., deputy commissioner, Bhamo; Mr. D. W. Rae, assistant superintendent, Sinlumkaba; Mr. D. W. Kiernander, assistant superintendent, Kutkai; Captain B. E. A. Pritchard, I.A., battalion commandant, Lashio; Mr. Smart, R.A., Bhamo Battalion; and \n\nThe consul. \n\nColonel G. Pereira, C.M.G., D.S.O.; Captain Blackwell, R.A.M.C.; and Mr. Morris, \nof the East Surrey Regiment, also visited the camp. \n\nThe Chinese representatives were: \n| Name | Position |\n| --- | --- |\n| Keng Pao-kuei | Tuotai of Tenguch |\n| Chao Kai-bsuan | Frontier deputy |\n| Hsu Chai-yu | Sub-prefect of Lungling |\n| Kuang kuei-yuan | Newly-appointed assistant frontier deputy |\n| Colonel Wang Kuei-ching |  |\n\nColonel Chung was also under orders to attend, but was retained at his post owing to the northern unrest. \n\nThe meeting commenced very satisfactorily, the Chinese party calling upon us first with a large escort and considerable state. The Burmah officers, who have been responsible for the British camp during the last two years, have carried out the plans in a way which certainly did credit to their Government, and it was evident that the Chinese had been impressed, for the taotai had spared no pains this year in arranging that his staff, his retinue, and his banquet should be worthy of his post, and that he should not be eclipsed on this occasion of international meeting. \n\nAfter the unsatisfactory relations which had existed at Tengyuch during the past year, the first meeting was anticipated with some interest, and the taotai lost no time in endeavouring to establish a better understanding, for he at once offered a full and frank apology for his previous behaviour. He was unfailingly courteous throughout our stay at Namkham, meeting us practically every day either at public or private discussions or at those social functions which form part of the usual programme, and he interested himself in all that was passing, showing the greatest keenness to behave in a manner which was correct. \n\nThe different courts were constituted as usual, and the junior Chinese officers met their British colleagues on satisfactory terms, a heavy roll of cases being settled during the three weeks' conference, which involved long and unbroken sittings, and must have proved very trying for Mr. Rae and Mr. Kiernander, who were constantly in court. When it is remembered that the British and Chinese officers on the bench have not only to convince themselves and one another of the desirability of certain settlements through the medium of interpreters, but that the British officers must marshal their witnesses and sift their evidence in the dozen different languages of the frontier tribes, it will be realised that the settlement of a long case-roll in the mixed courts of the frontier is no easy matter, and calls for an endless patience and unflagging persistency of purpose. Our officers are sometimes discouraged at the fact that their Chinese colleagues have so little perception of abstract justice, and that they find difficulty in resisting a temptation to bargain over the settlements when monetary compensations are awarded by the court. Such bargaining is, I think, inevitable to the mind of the Chinese magistrate, and when it is remembered that the awards come first of all from his own pocket, and that he is dependent on the recovery of his outlay from numerous other officials and loosely-held tribal villages—a process requiring another long and enduring struggle—these shortcomings may perhaps be charitably forgotten. Judging by their results, it is evident that relations were entirely satisfactory, for their settlements were excellent, and they parted the best of friends. \n\nIn the appellate court, the taotai sat with Mr. Thornton or Mr. Cabell and myself, and we realised at an early date that he was not prepared to do business. I am inclined to think that he had tied his own hands; that he had boasted to the Viceroy that he would show a bold face to the British at the frontier; and that he found himself bound to justify his promises, but placed in consequence in a foolish and undignified position from which he would gladly have retired had it been possible for him to do so without loss of prestige with the authorities at Yunnan-fu. The fact remains that he refused to settle any case which came before him, and by so doing, he cut at the root of the joint court and compensation system which had been accepted formally by China as our basis of procedure at last year's meeting. \n\nIn the settlement of frontier cases, old-established custom, reduced to writing in the frontier agreement of 1910 (attached to my last frontier report), has decided that trans-frontier thefts, bodily injuries, and murders shall be paid for on a fixed scale of compensation by the offending country, in addition to the arrest and punishment of the offender, and that the compensation account shall be balanced and settled before the representatives of Burmah and Yunnan leave the meeting. It not infrequently happens that we have to pay more than China, but we never quibble over a case which has been proved. \n\nThis year, however, the taotai set custom and agreement at defiance. There were five murder cases before him—murders of British subjects by people whom we claimed to be Chinese. I had brought the cases to his attention again and again during the year, asking him to make some attempt to arrest the culprits; but his only replies had been either that the murdered men were Chinese subjects or that the murderers were British, and as he offered no reasons for his statements and frequently worded them in unfriendly and discourteous terms, there remained no alternative but to await the results of the frontier meeting. The cases came up in due course to the appellate court, and the British evidence was produced—in each case full, satisfactory, and to us entirely convincing. The natural course would have been for the taotai to produce any counter-evidence, but he made no attempt to do this, nor did he produce the offenders or witnesses who could rebut the evidence in any way. We therefore claimed compensation on the fixed scale, which he flatly refused. The cases had been through all the stages of the frontier courts, and there seemed no hope of settlement. The object of the frontier meetings is to replace those old blood feuds, in which the Kachins settle such matters amongst themselves, by properly organised courts and by settlements which would be enforced if necessary. The result of the meetings and of this procedure has been a steady decrease of lawlessness along the frontier, to the benefit of both nations concerned; but, earnestly as we tried to persuade him to better counsels, the taotai appeared determined to set all precedent at defiance, and thus to undo the effect of many years of steady work and mutual co-operation. This was the situation in regard to case work on the last day of the meeting. \n\n## Trans-frontier Cultivations \n\nThere remained another matter of importance—the question of trans-frontier cultivations. This subject has been discussed and dealt with perfunctorily for several years past, but it was surrounded with difficulties, and it was not until the last twelve months that our information was sufficiently full to render a settlement possible. I have had the honour to address you on several occasions in regard to this question, but it may be well to recapitulate the position briefly in view of the settlement which has now been effected. \n\nIn delimiting the middle section of the Burmah-China frontier, it was found by the commissioners that the acceptance of their line, which frequently followed a zigzag course between paddy fields and irrigation dykes, would occasionally have the result of placing a village on one side of the border whilst the whole or part of the lands worked by the villagers would belong to the other side. They therefore made specific arrangements in the joint \"Description of the Boundary\" safeguarding the rights of the villagers in such cases to their original cultivation rights over the land in question. This was the commencement of the trans-frontier cultivation. As time went on, however, the original claims became considerably extended, for the farmers on the China side—mainly inhabitants of the Shan States—found that they could escape from the exactions and oppression of their own sawbwas by removing their homes to Burmah while continuing to cultivate their original fields in China. On the strength of the fact that they became subjects of Burmah by frontier custom of domicile, they now refused to pay taxes for their land to the Chinese suwbwas, and from this fact has arisen the matter in dispute. \n\nFor the past three or four years, the Yunnanese authorities have shown an active interest in the question. They have found that in the worst administered of the States—notably in Lungchuan and Mengmao—a great number of Chinese cultivators have moved their domicile to Burmah, and thus avoided payment of all taxes to China, with the result that the revenues of the Shan sawbwas in question have been considerably affected; the sawbwas themselves reported that their subjects are crossing to Burmah and \"taking their fields with them,\" thus touching the Chinese on their most sensitive spot, the possible alienation of Chinese territory. \n\nPage 436",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-383 - Public Offices - 1911.txt",
        "external_url": "",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 501841,
        "series_id": 27,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine",
        "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "CO129-491 - Public Offices - 1925",
        "page_number": 87,
        "title": "CO129-491 - Public Offices - 1925",
        "content_text": "50\n\nThe revenues from the stamp taxes shall be dealt with in the same way, and one-third thereof will be similarly distributed by the Chinese and foreign chiefs of the Stamp Tax Administration pro ratá amongst the provinces.\n\nOn the coming into force of the supplementary article of the present treaty, all internal and external debt obligations will be met as far as possible out of the customs revenues alone, leaving the excise, wine and tobacco, stamp tax and salt revenues completely or pro tanto free for the general purposes of the Chinese Government and Provincial Administrations. The Chinese Government declare that it is not their intention in the future to hypothecate for internal or external loans or monetary advances or any other purpose any portion of these, or any other national or provincial revenues, excepting only customs, railway and municipal revenues, which will, however, only be so hypothecated with the sanction and on the responsibility of the Central Government, and in the case of railway and municipal revenues only for railway and municipal purposes.\n\nARTICLE 7.\n\nThe Chinese Government declare their intention of reorganising immediately the Railway Administrations and the collection of railway revenues and the operation and policing of the railways with increased foreign assistance, including the employment of foreign chief accountants and traffic managers and inspectors on those lines where they are not already employed; and they further declare their intention of adhering strictly in the future to the principle that railway revenues shall be expended solely for railway purposes, that is to say, for meeting railway obligations, including loan services and debts, and for maintaining and developing the present lines and for new construction.\n\n(Note. The above article is inserted for the purpose of noting the desirability of dealing in some way with the railway problem. Doubtless opportunity will be afforded when the conference meets of ascertaining how far it is possible to go in the way of railway reform and of exploring the possibilities of a railway reconstruction and consolidation loan, and of reorganising the railways under one effective administration with foreign assistance. Under existing conditions in China, however, it is improbable that it will be found possible to go far in this direction, and failing anything else the declaration sketched above would be better than nothing.)\n\nARTICLE 8.\n\nThe Chinese Government undertake to enter immediately into separate negotiations with the Governments of the Powers concerned for a settlement of outstanding claims of those Governments against the Chinese Government, and of the claims of their nationals arising out of the civil wars and disturbances of recent years, or out of the actions of Chinese civil or military officials, or out of business contracts concluded with or obligations otherwise incurred by Chinese Government Departments or officials. The Chinese Government further undertake that payment of all admitted claims which cannot be settled out of other revenues will be made out of customs revenues as increased by the surtaxes as soon as a surplus is available after meeting all indemnity and loan obligations due, and that, failing such a surplus being available, payment will be made out of the first loan contracted by China for administrative or other purposes, It is understood that the principles governing the negotiations for a settlement of foreign claims will be based inter alia on the recognition by the Chinese Government of claims for losses suffered by foreign nationals directly arising out of civil warfare, or the actions of Chinese soldiers or disbanded soldiers or civil or military officials, or directly arising out of acts of brigandage or piracy, for which the Chinese Government can properly be held responsible on account of such brigandage or piracy being due to civil war conditions, or on account of the neglect on the part of local officials to afford proper protection: that a reasonable rate of interest will be allowed; that claims of which the validity has already been recognised by the Chinese Government will not require further discussion; and that disputed cases on which agreement cannot be reached shall be referred to arbitration. It is further understood that claims for losses of goods and cash while in the hands of Chinese agents in the interior will be cancelled, and that in return the Chinese Government will in future throw no obstacles in the way of the agency trade in the interior as at present conducted, will afford all possible protection to such agents of foreign firms, and foreign property, whether goods or\n\n51\n\ncash, in their hands, and will give such Chinese agents the same measure of compensation for any losses suffered in time of civil warfare or disturbance in respect of the foreign goods they hold as may be granted to other Chinese merchants of the locality.\n\n(Note. It is not proposed to burden this paper with an exposition of the native agency claims question, which has been fully reported on in separate correspondence. It seems most improbable that the Chinese Government will ever be induced again to recognise the validity of foreign claims for goods lost or looted while in the hands of native agents in the interior, and a settlement of this question on the lines indicated above is long overdue.)\n\nARTICLE 9.\n\nIt is agreed that the customs duties levied on the frontiers, land and maritime, of China shall be uniform, and that the preferential duty treatment now applicable to goods imported into and exported from China by land shall be abolished from the date of the enforcement of the surtaxes provided for in article 2 of the present treaty. It is understood that the equitable adjustments (referred to in article 6 of the Chinese Customs Tariff Treaty signed at Washington on the 6th February, 1922), in cases in which this preferential duty treatment was granted in return for some local economic advantage have been made outside the conference by the Governments of the Powers concerned.\n\n(Note. The above is drafted on the assumption that the French and any other Governments concerned come to terms with the Chinese Government outside the conference.\n\nThe Special Conference has also to arrange for —\n\nThe formulation of rules for future tariff revision-as provided for in article 4 of the Washington Chinese Tariff Treaty; and\n\nThe framing of a detailed scheme for the constitution of the Board of Reference contemplated in the relevant Washington Conference resolution- but this scheme, having to be submitted for the approval of the Powers concerned, would hardly fall within the scope of the present treaty.)\n\nARTICLE 10.\n\nThe Chinese Government declare that all the provinces, as represented by the Provincial Administrations and the Provincial Assemblies, have formally accepted the present treaty, and have undertaken to abide by and carry out its provisions so far as they concern the affairs of the provinces.\n\n(Note. This article is inserted for the purpose of noting the desirability of securing the formal acceptance of the treaty by the provinces in some way or other.\n\nThere are of course various alternative methods of procedure, including that of securing the seals of the Provincial Administrations and\n\nProvincial Assemblies to a separate protocol.)\n\nPART II.\n\nSupplementary Article.\n\nIt is agreed that the provisions of this supplementary article shall be carried into effect as soon as the opinion of a two-thirds majority of the Governments of the contracting Powers the provisions of the preceding articles of the present treaty shall have been satisfactorily and completely carried into effect, and a sufficient measure of unification and stability of Government shall have been attained to render practicable the complete abolition of internal taxation of commodities as hereinafter provided for.\n\nThe Governments of the contracting Powers, recognising that the conditions laid down in article 8 of the treaty of the 5th September, 1902, between Great Britain and China, and in article 4 of the treaty of the 8th October, 1903, between the United States and China, and in article 1 of the Supplementary Treaty of the 8th October, 1903, between Japan and China, are no longer entirely in accord with the circumstances of the present day, have agreed upon the following arrangements to be substituted therefor.\n\nThe Chinese Government, recognising that the system of levying li-kin and other dues on goods at the place of production, in transit, and at destination, impedes the free circulation of commodities and injures the interests of trade, hereby undertake\n\n883",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-491 - Public Offices - 1925.txt",
        "external_url": "",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 523805,
        "series_id": 27,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-co129-engine",
        "series_title": "CO129 Colonial Office Hong Kong Records 理藩院香港檔案",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "CO129-523-12 Currency situation 17-2-1930 - 9-7-1930",
        "page_number": 59,
        "title": "CO129-523-12 Currency situation 17-2-1930 - 9-7-1930",
        "content_text": "61\n\n6\n\nwould have to be disposed of in some way and both British dollars and Mexican dollars subsequently barred from local circulation. The discount on these latter would probably increase and the consequent separation from South China's monetary system would tend to encourage the settlement of South China's commercial business direct instead of through the intermediary of Hong Kong. Fluctuations in exchange with other currencies, silver dollars, and Chinese subsidiary currency would increase and the principal object of the issue be frustrated.\n\n3. The suggestion that Government take over the note issue has been revived. The forces which bring it about now would still operate and merely transfer it to the new Government issue. Moreover, it would be a formidable undertaking as was established in 1910 involving the Treasury in the provision of a large silver reserve, a gold securities depreciation fund, and inevitable exchange operations in order to obviate an accumulation of silver dollars. Whether it could be worked at a profit at any rate for a number of years is open to grave doubt.\n\n4. The banks concerned might be compelled to issue notes on demand against silver dollars once the bullion point was passed. This would in turn compel the public and the other banks to accept payment similarly in dollars. It would also compel the banks of issue to yield control of their note issue by having to increase them indefinitely (on demand against silver dollars which they could not utilise) at a time when slackness of trade requires that currency be contracted rather than expanded.\n\nMy conclusions are that at the moment the premium is so great that any legislative attempt to bridge it forcibly and abruptly might have serious consequences. The import trade, the revival of which would remedy the situation, would on the contrary be paralysed by a drop of 3d. in exchange (the present excess over parity) and in other directions the results might be disastrous.\n\nI am, however, inclined to the opinion that if the existing abnormal situation took a turn for the better (either because of a revival of imports or of an upward movement of silver for any reason) so that the effects of inward remittances were offset and the premium once lowered to bullion point, advantage should be taken of it and an attempt then made to obviate a recurrence. It might be successful and the premium pegged if all the banks combined to resist an upward movement and to let it be known that their influence would be used for that purpose. It might also help if the Government (disregarding for the moment the revenue point of view) made the conditions attaching to excess note issues less onerous either by some remission of the stamp duty or by accepting as deposit against the issue a proportion of first-class securities or commercial paper. The cumulative effect of such co-operation might restrain the speculation, at any rate which now aggravates the evil, and keep the movement within narrower limits.\n\nI should suggest, therefore, a conference of local bank managers with a view to devising a method of procuring co-operation and that the Secretary of State be asked to seek technical advice in London as to the form the aid of the Government should take.\n\nIf no means of control can be devised and if exchange, as far as its higher level is concerned, gets entirely divorced from silver, the resulting feeling of instability will be such that it would be better to adopt a gold basis than to remain on the present intangible system.\n\n27th July, 1929.\n\n(Sd.) M. J. BREEN, Acting Colonial Treasurer.\n\n7\n\nI-B.\n\nMemorandum of a meeting held at the Colonial Secretary's Office, Hong Kong on 19th August, 1929.\n\nA meeting was held this evening, attended by The Hon. Mr. A. C. Hynes, Chief Manager, the Hong Kong & Shanghai Bank, Mr. A. H. Ferguson, Manager, The Chartered Bank, Mr. C. L. Sandes, Manager, The Mercantile Bank, The Hon. Colonial Treasurer and presided over by the Hon. the Colonial Secretary to discuss the position of the Hong Kong currency and in particular the fact that notes are at a premium of about 15% above silver. The meeting had before it the Treasurer's memorandum entitled \"The Premium on Bank Notes,\" dated the 27th of July, 1929.\n\nThe following is the unanimous opinion of the Bankers on the three questions appearing on page 3 of the memorandum:\n\nQuestion.\n\n(a) To what extent is the premium beneficial or detrimental to the general trade interests of the Colony?\n\nThe premium is not beneficial and it would be to the interest of the Colony if the premium could be reduced to something not exceeding 4%, which would be the cost of laying down silver dollars in Hong Kong.\n\nGenerally speaking, the premium is beneficial to imports and detrimental to exports.\n\nQuestion.\n\n(b) What causes bring it about and what measure of responsibility, if any, attaches to the banks of issue?\n\nThe premium is caused by an excess of exports (particularly invisible exports) over imports, and the Banks are not responsible for the premium and have no power to prevent it.\n\nQuestion.\n\n(c) What measures could the Government take to remove it?\n\nTo remove the premium suddenly would so upset the trade of the Colony as to be highly detrimental and no particular measure can be suggested for removing the premium which would not likely do more harm than good. The only possible course is to wait for natural causes (for example, a rise in the price of silver or an increase in imports) to reduce the premium to a more manageable limit.\n\nThere appear to be three possible methods of reducing the premium:-\n\n1. To adopt a Gold Basis.\n\n2. To adopt a Silver Basis.\n\n3. For Government to take over the issue of notes.\n\nAt the present time, any of these three remedies would appear to be worse than the disease. The premium is not due to shortage of notes, but to the shortage of cover, and it cannot be cured by a further issue of notes even if the 1% stamp tax on issue were removed or if the issue of notes were otherwise made less onerous to the Banks.\n\n62",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/2diw2n4r2/CO129-523-12 Currency situation 17-2-1930 - 9-7-1930.txt",
        "external_url": "",
        "rank": 0
    }
]