1953-12-21 — Page 4

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THE CHINA MAIL, ̈ MONDAY, DECEMBER 21, 1953.

SIR WINSTON CHURCHILL'S WAR MEMOIRS

"TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY ” – CHAPTER 32

"

INCREASING FRICTION OVER TRIESTE

ed a draft message for our am- bossadors to deliver to Belgrade.

around Trieste sharpened. Prime

Field - Marshal Alexander

informed the Minister on May 1. 1945, that he expected the Eighth Army to reach Trieste within the next 24 hours. Tito's regular forces had, he said, occupied most of Istria and were fighting in Trieste.

If he himselff were order- ed to occupy the whole of Venezia Giulia, this would mean "a fight

the with

Yugoslav Army, which will have at least the moral

Rus backing of the

He sians."

added a warning of the feeling of British forces if asked. to fight an Ally,

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ITO'S troops had in fact entered Trieste on April 30 in the hope not only of securing the city and the surrounding area, but also of obtaining the surrender of the German garrison of 7,000 men with all its equip- ment. It was not until the afternoon of the following day that the Yugoslav forces made contact with the advance-guard of the 2nd New Zealand Division west of Monfalcone.

just

of

made

It

He suggested informing Stalin of our plans in accordance with the Yalta agreement and con- cluded as follows; "If we stand frm on this issue, as we are we can hope doing on Poland, to avoid a host of other similar encroachments.”

of

the Yugoslav businers should out around 50-50 Russian and British Influence, în fact it is at present more ike 90-10, and even in that poor 10 we have been sub- fected to violent pressure by Marshal Tito. So violent was this pressure that the United

States

be assured that when I no

Meanwhile the local situation President thought that a heavy

work At demonstration might bring Tilo longer requiro, Trieste, as a

have base for my forces in Aus-

Alexander would first

to his senses, but if hostilities trla he will be allowed to

been content it Tito had put began he doubted if they could incorporate it in his New

his fighting and administrative be treated as frontier incidents. Yugoslavia,

troops under Allied command, He accordingly sent me the The

sentence

at any rate in the areas where text of appropriate instructions we were operating, though for Alexander and Elsenhower, Alexander's message

course we would rather they but he ended his telegram with cry for me to make our

**T must a revealing sentence: political vlow clear.

withdrew completely. But Yugo Unless you can make I need not say how relieved I slay posts and sentries were re not have any avoidable inter-

this invaluable stricting our movements. Their ference n satisfactory working

with the redeployment ar- was to receive

to the with Tito

com- behaviour, both in Austria and of American rangement

forces the support from my new argument must be taken up panion.

Venezia Giulia, mode a bad im Pacific," by the Governments.

to President pression on the Allied

President troops, Prime There is

Brl- and 12 May, 45 both United States

21 May 45 Truman

I am in entire agreement every word tish.

with the message you are you say, and will work with

issuing 10 Alexander and Elsenhower.... I think thero

"

our making

110

any

with him about

Istria,

от

Prime Minister

of

Truman

I agree with

all my strength

you proposc.

any part of the

•New prewar Itay,

Ytiposiapia. That destiny of

for

and make lim

19

com-

this part of the world is re- table, the peace

should certainly

re of this.. In order to avold leading

or the Yugoslav manders into any templation, It would be wise to have solld mass of

troops in this arca, with a great superiority of modern weapons and fre- quent demonstrations of the Air Force as far as possible hurling your ad- without

in the direction of vance Vienna, which I am sure you

with all are pressing

pos- sible speed.

I suppose you have clear- ed the approaches to Triesto so that you can soon have

forces naval some strong there. Strength is safety and

picace...

on

on the line

tho

situation is handled Armly UR men were obliged to look

Is

en without power to intervene dis- before our strength

at actions which offended their persed Europe may be saved

blood-bath. sense of justice, and felt that from another

wrong- Otherwise the whole fruits of they were condoning

doing. "As

a result," cabled our victory may be cast away, Alexander, "feeling and none of the purposes of Yugoslavia is now strong, and is World Organisation to prevent getting stronger. It is now cer

Lerritorial

and aggression

at

Minister

is a very good chance that, if our deployment is formidable, a solution may be reached

Our without fighting.

Arm attitude in this matter will, I

our

belleve, be of value in against

discussions with Stalin, It seems to me that the need for at the Triple Meeting curliest moment is very great.

On May 19 I replied to the President.

future wars will be attained. tain that any solution by which I trust that a standstill we shared an area with Yugo- order can be given on the slay troops or Partisans or per- mitted Yugoslav administration of the American to function would not work." movements armies and Air Forces from Europe to the Fur East], at raic for a few weeks.

not mind I hope you will We will also conform in our

with you, if demobilisation. Even

my putting to this

for the need great respect, standstill order should be-

it would como known

some further consideration of do

the words "a war with the nothing but good,

Yugoslava,"

any

and

a

"altack us." I do

A war

answer

our

Gen. Morgan, Alexander's Chief of Staff, eventually agreed with the Yugoslav upon a Hoe of demarcation around Trieste.

ter

TT was not until a month had passed of increasing friction that It seems probable

Recondly

with the Soviets and with Tilo not envisage somewhat violent internal reac

at Washington followed

war with tre Yugoslavs, and that Stalin himself addressed me

on the Yugoslav problem. tion the new President's bold tele

short of war, I do not con- Marshal Stalin to Prime Minis-

should be sider Ambasadors

21 June .45 to me. The argument gram

withdrawn. It is at critical "Don't let us get tied up in

fact Notwithstanding the that Ambassadors junctures for- Europe had always been

That the Yugoslav Government -WEEK-later,

May 12, midable.

should be on the spot, Undoubtedly It had

Meanwhile, Tito's

accepted the proposal of the after the great events had led to the Second World War

American and British Govern- has arrived, and is completely

the On May 2 Gen. Freyberg happened in the

Western through the ruin of the League

mants with regard to and his New Zealand troops theatre,

negative. We clearly cannot- arrived thero

from of Nations by the withdrawal

this state,

Istria-Trieste region, the con- It

leave matters wis

will entered Trieste, took the President Truman a most wel- of the United States.

and immediate action

versations in Trieste stem to have He now to play almost as deadly a

Teached deadlock. come and strong message. surrender of the German said he was becoming increas- part at a moment when the

This Is principally 10 .be garrison, and occupied the ingly concerned at Tito's actions future hung in the balance.

explained by the fact that the

the representatives of Allied Command in the Medi- terranean are unwilling to take account oven of the minimam wishes of the Yugo-

slavs

dock areas.

Alexander

THERE was also at this time

the desire to finish off Japan by concentrating bil valable and suitable forces in the Far East. This was supported by the which had powerful school East before Europe, sugges- from the beginning set the Far

tion of a "Blonde Of B

In Venezia Giulia. Tiio seem- ed to have no Intention of abandoning the territory or lot- ting this ancient problem await 5 ON May

a general postwar settlement, telegraphed:

We must now decide, said the to uphold now, finds him- President, whet

whether Tito self In. # much

stronger the fundamental principles of military

than position

he territorial settlement by orderly foresaw when I was in Bel- process against force, intimida- If Tito grade, and wants to cash in tion, or blackmail,

he would probably standfast" order seems to have on it. Then he hopes to step succeeded

I claim parts of South Austri, raised this issuo-abruptly in the Trieste when finally inlo stepped out.

Now ho wants Hungary and Greece.

Although the stability of Italy President's circle. At any rate, be installed there.

and

and her relations with Russia his replies seemed couched in only allow me user's rights.

"We must bear In

mind might be at stake, the present somewhat different mood to that since our meeting he issue was not a question of tak- that expressed in his telegram,

about Trieste,

On May 14 he said he prc- has been to Moscow. I be ing sides in a dispute between lieve he will hold to our Italy-und-Yugoslavia-or-bacon--ferred to see what happened original agreement if he can involved in Balkan politics, before considering a continued, "but of deciding whether Britain though temporary, occupation

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and America were going to of the Soviet Zone in Germany allow their Allies to engage in by the Western Allles. As for uncontrolled land-grabbing tactics which were all too re- miniscent of Hillier and Japan.

We should insist, he urged, on Field-Marshal Alexander

or the Yugoslavs, Mr Truman de-

ob-

to

clared that we should awolt reports about our messages Belgrade before deciding what forces to use if our troops were Unless Tito did attack

atineked.

now be necessary. Otherwise we shall merely appear to have been bluging, And will

in fact be bluffed out.

I think we should prevent the rough handling of our front-line troops; or Infiltra- tions ostensibly peaceful, but contrary to the directions of and the Allied commanders,

the on a scale to endanger position of our forces where they now stand.

tions I should In these conditions not consider action

by Alexander to ensure the pro- functioning of his Mill- tazy Government as constitut- ing "a war with the Yugo- slavs," But I certainly thunk that pressure should be put upon them to quit Trieste and Pola and return-to-the-lines- marked

out, and that this pressure should be regarded 03 the nature

of trontier incidents rather than as prin- cipal diplomatic decisions....

per

Laining complete and exclusive control of Trieste and Polo, the it was impossible to involve the N May 21 Mr Truman said he

Yet the Yugoslave earned the merit of liberating this territory from the German invaders, and in that territory moreover the Yugoslav populs- tion is in a majority. This position cannot be regarded as satisfactory from the point of view of the Allies,

In my desire not to make matters worse, I have hitherto

not

ta

drawn attention in our correspondence to the be- _haviour. of Field Marshal Alexander; but now it is time emphasise that cannot accept the supercilious tone with regard to the Yugoslavs which Field-Marshal Alexan- dor has occasionally adopted in these conversations.

It is absolutely unaccept- able that Field Marshal and Alexander in an official public message allowed him- self lo compare Marshal Tito with Hitler and Mussolini. Such a comparison is unjusti fed and offensive to Yugo-. slavia.... I replied:

and His Majesty's Government had to put motion many hundreds of thousands of troops in order from to prevent themselves being attacked by Marshal Tito,

have been Great cruelties inflicted by the Yugoslavs on

of the Italians in this part

In the world, particularly Tylesta and Fiume, and gen-. erally they have shown' a disposition to grasp all the which their territory Into light forces have penetrated.

The movement of thesa

not light forces could

havo been made unless you for your part had made immenso from and welcome advances the cast and in the north, and unless Field-Marshal Alexan- der had held 27 enemy divisions on his front in Italy to and finally reduced them aurrender.

I do not considèr that it can be said that Marshal Tito has conquered all this territory.

It has been conquered by the movements of for

greater forces, both in the west and

in the cast, which compelled of the the strategic retreat Germans from the Balkana.

AT any rate, we have reached

an agreement which it is proposed to enforce. We think that any permanent territorial changes should be soitled, of

the peace table, and Marshal Tito is in no way prejudiced by accepting the present: Line which we demand until that meeting takes place. In the interval we can talk all these matters over together at Ber- iin.

Tho nctual Field - Marshal

wording of Alexander's

President's

telegram has been largely taken from the draft We do not see why wo should be pushed about

people where, especially by we have helped, and helped before you were able to make any contact with them. There. fore I do not see any reason

to make excuses for-Field- Marshai Alexander, although I was not aware that he was going to draft his telegram · exaclly in this way,

It seems to mo that Russianised frontier running from Lubeck through Elsen- ach to Trieste and down to Albania is a matter which requires a very great deal of argument conducted between good friends.

(Continued Tomorrow)

agreed we could not leave line of communication through United States in another wor matters as they were. We should Gorizia, and Monfalcone, and Two days later he declared he reject Tito's answer and rein of a big enough

to the was unable Arca

and unwilling to force our troops at once so that cast to ensure proper adminls involve his country in a war the Yugoslavs should have no tration. Mr Truman said wo with the Yugoslavs unless they doubts about our Intentions. He should be prepared to consider attacked us, in which caso we proposed that Eisenhower and

steps any necessary

Minister to Marshal to effect would be justifled in using Alexander should make a show Prime Tito's withdrawal. He also add- Allled troops

und to throw them of force by land and air,

Stalin

Re. 23 June 45 World Copyright reserved. back far enough to stop any time it to coincide with our re-

Our Joint Iden at the production, even partially, in any further aggression,

Jestion of Tito's demands. The Kremlin in October was that language, strictly

• Author's subsequent italics.

prohibited.

+

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