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CHINA MAIL

WINDSOR

HOUSI

Editor-in-Chief: —. W; J. Keates

Editor Reporters & General Office

(Zour lines)

THE CHINA, MAILA, MONDAY, JANUARY 24, 1949.

THE SIXTY-FIFTH INSTALMENT

CRUSADE IN EUROPE

The projected; attack' for Feb- Aust. Editor Ian Mackenzie.ruary 8-10 was to be merely the beginning of, a series of blows Business Manager:-W. H. Nolloth that we were planning to com- plate the destruction of the Ger- Telephones:

mans West of the Rhine. I want- 24354ed to pass to the general offen-

sive as quickly as possible be 82312 cause I was convinced that in the Battle of the Bulge the enemy hed committed all of his remain- ing reserves. I counted en a Erently weakened resistance from that moment onward, both be cause of losses suffered by the Germans and widespread discouragement that I

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BIRTH

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pital, on Sunday, January 23,

999hurshed,

Dr. N. 1 Karanjia daughter.

CHINA AND

PEACE

News of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's "tempor ary resignation" from the highest office of the land did not , come unexpectedly Rumours that he would step down to enable tottering Nanking to seek peace with the Communists have been in the air since the fatal. Zall of Mukden and the flasco at Hauchow.

because

CHAPTER 19

CROSSING THE RHINE

of the

ALL DURING THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE WE CON

Anal TINUED to plan

for the offensive blows which,

would

activities

We

Moscow to

lained. North of the Ruhr. In

Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower's that single zone of advance wo

forces.

Dur

Own Story Of The War

In Europe

In

that our

fold

A

could not logistically sustain more than thirty-five divisions.

If, however, we should first, in series of concentrated and powerful attacks, destroy the German forces West of the Rhine, the effect would be to give us all along the great front П defensivo

be-sively

proper

wor

explained our altuation and Germany,

鼻

however, there.

in my ownŁ.

miles in his rear. Their purpose had such air strength and em-line of equal strength to the is to find and destroy hostile clency, that we could afford it enemy's, We calculated that with headquarters, dumps,

depots, without material damage to our the Western bank of the Rhine in and bridges and to attack re-primary mission. The effect of our possession we could hurl serve formations. Long before our bombing effort against jet soms seventy-Ave reinforced tho two friendly armies 'them- production was at least partially divisions against the German la felt Auro would overtake 120

selves can make contact there successful because the German Germany in great converging at armies. Moreover-and this was arises a delicate problem in, eo- nover succeeded in employing a tacks. If we

allowed the enemy very im

Important-the Russians had

ordination to prevent unfortunate sufficient number of the new South of the Ruhr to remain in opened their long-awaited and accidents, and misunderstandings planes to damage us materially, the Siegried. We would bo powerful winter offensive on between allied but separated Information, concerning all limited to a single offensive by uary 25 and we had a long talk January 12. Already we had re

these things was gathered by our some thirty-five divisions, about, the situation, as wo then ports that it was making great

Recognition of friend or foe on Intelligence services, which dally A second advantage of our Hos-progress and it was obvious that the battlefield is never easy.

our saw it. presented to me their calcula plan would be the depletion of the quicker we could attack the

In Washington he had heard bo own, War Between the States dons and conclusions These be fieres larges later to be ymbling the Relish Stor

the mounting "dili") met at the crossings of the dissatisfaction with our plans and the German could not again re- blue and the other in gray, more culties of the German war ma- Rhine obstacle. Moreover, Inforce his West front in an effort than one sharp Aght took place chine and encouraged me and all effect of the converging attack is a single ground commander be not the had also heard the proposal that to avoid defeat.

between units of the same army. my associates to bellove that one multiplied when, it

is accom-up In modern war, where all unl-more great campaign, Herpanied by such air power as we outilned the exact forms are designed with the Idea sively conducted on A

broad had in Europe of blending with the country-front, would give the death blow months of 1945. Through its use He was in full agreemont.

In the early we planned the defeat by which side, where the mass formations to Hitler Germany.

We could prevent the

At enemy

that Ume of the nineteenth century are I found, among

some of the from switching forces back and was one

miscalculation In our never seen, and where the speeds higher military officials of Bri-forth at will, against either of plans, based upon faulty technical of planes and vehicles afford ob-toin, a considerable and, to me, the attacking columns and we information.

The ongincorr had or decisive action, the problem servers only flecting Instant surprising opposition to my plan, could likewise employ our entire made many studies of the Rhine is difficult to solve. These mat-the American

The relationship maintained by air power at any moment, to River, based upon statistics cover Chiefs of Staff further the advance in any area ing a long period. They had re ters would demand more and, with their commanders' in the desired.

ported to me that succèssful as started, we intended to maintain more detailed attention as our held differed markedly from that

******* ( advance progressed. But

I laboriously explained to Field saults could probably not be made In which existed between similar Marshal Brooke

about the first incessantly until defeat of Ger-

we needed GerJanuary 1945

pri-h many. Operations were planned marily to know the timing and The American doctrine has al-ducing the

that, far from over the thine until British service dispersing echelons in the

effort, I Was con of May. This opinion was so for-

campaign in three general phase, begi-direction of the next

so, that sibly.supremed

cssed that in

with a series of

Russian attacks attack

been to assign ways and to lay the ground-commander a mission, to provide the final Invasion of Germany on start cur major seastilte across the a theatre when we were ready to initiate mind I had accepted the necessary the front to destroy

delay and waa planning not to German

the work that would permit future him with armies West of the

a definite amount of the other side of the Rhine we Rhine. The next phase

battlefeld co-operation.

force, end then to interfere as could bring

a concerted and river until about that time. This Nevertheless, the actual comprise the crossing of that ri- our air offensive against the Ger- of his plans. The theory is that that his collapse would

By early 1945 the effects of little as possible in the execution tremendous

him did not, of course, affect any part against ver and catablishment of major

of our plans that were to be ex- announcement appears to bridgeheads

men economy

ecuted before were becoming the man in the field knows more follow, Thereafter

the time came to The decisive cross the river, Lator our tech- Our have caught many officials in would initiate the final advances catastrophic.

land of the tactical great

situntion Nanking

than in gaining the Rhine River along unprepared al- that we were sure would carry ed the enemy's air warning and thousand miles from the scese of cally the proportion of the Allied that it was feasible to cross the

advances had offectively disrupt- som

Bome one

on this removed by several its length was to increase drasti~/ Alcal advice

point was though the masses them- us into the heart of Germany defence system and had overrun action; and that if results obtain forces that could be used affen- river, establish bridges, and man- markedly changed and wỡ found destroy her selves have long ago given and

remaining

many Places particularly the ed power to resist.

the field commander by up showing any interest as

Westem European ports where come unsatisfactory the

tain our

ourselves long before the first to who heads the affairs of advance we would meet portions which

Somewhere during this Anal

I did not wholly convince him. of May. submarine nests were located- procedure is not to advise, ad- He said, "I wish that the Twelfth

had formerly diverted

General Marshall was so inu« the nation.

of the Red Army coming from much of our bombing effort to monith, and harass him, but to Army Group were deployed pressed by the soundness of the Chiang's "leave of ab- the East and it now became im-targets in the heart of Germany, mandor.

from replace htm by another

com- North of the Ruhr and the British whole plan that he suggested I sence," cleverly leaving the portant to arrange closer co-or-

Another advantage with the dination

forces were in the centre," im-end my chief of staff, General On the other hand, the British plying that my plans were drawn Smith, to Malta to participate in way open for a Napoleonic the Red Army. During earlier was better protection from ac- throughout the war

strategic bombers now enjoyed Chiefs in London maintained on nationalistic considerations, return should

tions, a conference that was to take place the peace campaigns we had been kept in- con

the closest Aghters. makers fail in their efforts, formed of the general intentions of fighters could be located at own commanders in the field and Americans into the thick of the iive staffs before they wont on to

companying

To this retorted: "I am cer-there beaween the President, the Groups kind

of daily contact with their tainly no more anxious to put Prime Minister, and thely respec- should be 'regarded, however, of the Soviet forces by the Com-forward

Belda near bined Chiefs of in the light of cold facts provided sufficient co-ordination and, in spite of their cumpara informed as to details of strength, I am to see the British take the course, upheld your position mere- the Rhine insisted upon being constantly battle and get them killed than Yalta. He remarked: "I can, of Staff. This the exit of a man who has between the two forces so long over almost any target in Asis plans, and situation. This habit losses. I have strengthened Mont-ly on the principle that these

tively short rango, could operate served his purpose. Riding as the two zones operations territory.

may have been based upon sound

army group by gomery

full decisions full within your sphoro into power on a wave of were widely separated.

Now,

By this Ume also the air offen- reasons of which I knew nothing, American army, since in no other of responsibility. But your plan patriotism and popularity 21 however, the time had come to sive had achieved remarkable but it was always n shock

Loway can I provide the strength for you to send General Smith to Bo sound that I think it better years ago, Chiang's apparent as to objectives and tlming.

axchange information of i plans

success in depleting the German American services, to find that essential for the rapid execution Malta so that he may explain those

me, raised in the tradition of

of the

North of the Ruhr that I deem curtain call was anything

oll reserves. For many months the the In early January 1940, with enemy's all resources had been queried their commanders in the any plan on the basis of what be convincing." I was glad at

British Chiefs but glorious,

regularly of my plans. I have not devised matters in detail. Their logic will the the approval of the Combined one of the principal objectives Picture President of China leaving Chiefs of Staff, I sent Air Chict

Marshal Tedder to

concerning tactical plans. Individual or what nation gets agree because I well know that of strategic bombing and as tho the capital minus brass

British com- the glory, for For example, the of this offensive

with General Marshall backing me make

you bands and official fanfare, this co-ordination. He was a continuous crisis

necessary arrangements reret

cumulated there developed amander were to submit in my opinion there is no glory up there could be no danger of in-

to London a daily report covering in battle worth with only the heads of the companied by Major

the blood it terference with our developing General transportation and in all phases every item of Information that in Costs"

plans. five Yuan present

Floid Marshal Brooke's argu- to wish I Harold R. Bull and Brigadier of her war effort. It, had, de/our service would only in excop={ ́ Field Marshal Brooke expressements in the matter; wore founded .:. I him bon voyage, and his General T. J. Betts, two able Bulle influence upon the ground than a local army headquarters werk

tlonal circumstances American

go highered the hope that officers from temporary absence becomes

the battles.

Germany found it in- SHAEF staff. Air Chief Mar-

I believed they in conviction. There was no potty more a flight into exile.

My own practice throughout would; but he was difficult creasingly

to transfor ahat Tedder was authorised to reserve troops and suppiles from the war was merely

basis for his great concern. This apparently The President's departure give

to submit doubtful of Allied ability to des- was proved by the fact that only Russian military au-one front to another, while her to Washington and Loudon briat troy the German armies. We or a few weeks later, when the des from office leaves the biggest thorities full information con troops in every sector were con

'situation reports called

truction of the German armles problem still ahead-that ofcerning our plans for the late stantly embarrassed by lack

Cosluatrene" (combined situas the Rhine in a series of at

situa-blows,

erful West of the Rhine had been Re-.. powerful seeking peace with the vic obtain similar information

winter and spring, and was to fuel for vehicles. The effects

tion an

and intelligence reports). Ai

complished and he stood with me torious Communists. Peace cerning Russian

con- was fell also by the Luftwaffe, When

suggested to The theness, the crossing by the delegates-have been appoint-

my friend

Ninth in which training of new pilots plan in January

catablishment ed, but that alone will not Russians were contemplating an cause of fuel shortage.

itatan-over-ali Army and the Twenty-first Army but very earnestly guarantee

They their positions around Warsaw, our Intelligence staffs begun to peace.

carly Westward attack from

directly under SHAFF. serious During the long winter fighting

I re-thank God, Ike, you ntuele by objections. directed against plus had before, was certain right glad i am sorry if my fear

pudiated must, first, locate the elusive on the Vistula. We understood bring us disturbing information persion of our forces. Ho main of

this suggestion, as I wou were

You were leaders of the Communists that the

what be

he called the plamed

dis-that our plans for the completion of dispersed and I Russians had effected that the Germany were making

effort added to your a task which does not appear concentrations for an offensive great

beat that could of fet plants. Char air gh

strength to

be devised, En-ed. It is rarely a question of mount mare tirely aside from my feeling that when he chooser to Secondly, the peace ad. cause of conditions of terrain A

because commanders were of the opinion than

full-blooded attack

quit. the proposed arrangement vocates must, if past reports on blanketuary, because that if the enemy could succeed across the Rhine. Consequently, be fullle and clumas, was dould Got you stock by your guns."" are accurate, be prepared to cloud

of fog and in putting these planes Into the

the be said, In order that interfered with air air in considerable numbers he selves of the strength to sustain with the exact and rapid execu-destruction of the German forcee The operational schedule for the to assure our mined to prevent any interference first phase of our strategio plan surrender Nationalist China operations, they were holding up would quickly begin to exact in- such an attack we should, as the tion of those plans. unconditionally. Here, the the attack until conditions should

West of the Rhine contemplated be more favourable. We learn bombers operating over Ger- defer

uld supportable biggest obstacle to

dur situation then stood, pass to the In early January, a peace ad through the Combined Chlef many.

learned three defensive on all

major assaults. The first be encountered, may

all other parts of that the President, the Primisnup at the Northern flank, of would be by the Twenty-first Army al-nt Staff, however, that even i jet planes was progressing in the

of the line. development of

Minister, and their stiffs, Dispersion is one though it is highly possible these conditions failed to show United States and in Great Bri-crimes in warfare, but us with Stalin, this time at Yalta, General group in the centre and the third,

were of the greatest again to meet with Generalisimo our lines; the second, by Bradley's that the Chinese method of improvement the Russian attack tain but we were not put for all the generalities the proper Marshall proceeded

would be launched no later than

separately a converging attack by Bradley count application of the

on

truth is far from the rest of the Amorfean and Devers to eliminate the enemy may yet save the day.

The Communists have no progress.

equadrons of them during the more important than mere know-group into Europe, and ary 12 and made remarkable spring campaign.

Tedge of its existence. 1. 25

I [garrison in the Sear Basin.. Our only possible recourse was

ranged to meet him secretly at thing to lose by rejecting Air Chief Marshal Tedder and to attempt by our bombing effort January, the German enjoyed the

In the situation facing us in Marseilles. I went there on Jan- anything but unconditional his associates arrived in Moscow to delay German production of great. advantage.. of the Siegfried surrender, since their armies just after this attack began. The this new weapon.

air defences in 'the "aren“. Northward are in a position to fight for Generalissimo and the Russian forces

milltary authorities

knew that

the Saar, fnclusive. As long extra-long from what is not handed to them them with the utmost carefully runways were required for the as we allowed him to remain in on a platter. Nevertheless, and there was a full and ac whenever they found a German ability

employment of the jet plane and those elaborate fortifications his exchange of information field with

was stubborness on the part of9ng future plans.

enhanced to hold of his long line Mao Tse-tung in insisting on Generalissimo informed our mis-repeated bombardment. In addi-while he concentrated for DOLL

The kept it under, intermittent but unconditional surrender

weak forces, to sion that even if the attacks then tion they sought out every area ing attacks the point of carrying on the in progress should fall to reach where they believed these planes This meant that a large propor

at selected points. war for another few months their designated objectives the could cost him the future Russians would keep up a series caused some diversion from our be Immobilised in

were under construction. This tion of the Allied Force would loyalty of a large part of the continuous

operations

that]

a protective people who at present wish would, at the very least, objective of depleting oll re-role, with only that portion on for nothing more than an end. Western front

the German from reinforcing the serves but by January 1945 we the offensive that could be main- to fighting.

by withdrawing forces from the Russian zoRO The Chinese are known As a further result of this for their ability to take of Staff authorised me to cont- initial effort the Combined Chicis punishment in their stride as municate directly with Moscow Dart

of their existence; on matters that were exclusively floods, famines and exploita- milltary. In character. Later in KNOW tion by ruthless warlords the campaign my interpretation testify to that. At the mo- of this authorisation was sharp ment, however, they are the difficulty arising out of the tired of war. Inflation and age-old truth that politics and HONG Insecurity. They may not military activities are nover

dive the

ac-

in German"

out, as

must tell

things

would

I completed · my final] the-same, time there was on the banks of the river to with?

We already Project the had to be sharply curtailed "be. / Flold Marshal Sir Alan Brooke "round, cominander" to operate Group, he turned to ind and unid;

very simple at the moment, by the first of the year, but be- mentre in the develop/tained that we would never have the German defeat were the burdens, The German k.now lick

and, more

losses

Our

own

give-and-take bargaining | January 15. It began on Janu-Chough along.

received

ly challenged by Mr. Churchill,

be certain whether life under compictaly separable.

such

DO YOU

YOUR

In modern war, the needs für KONG?

fwo

the Communists will be bet-co-ordination between ter than under the Kuomin-friendly forces that are attack tang. They believe it could ing toward a common: centre la be worse and fervently hope far more scute than it was in It will be better.

the days when fighting was con- fined to the ground, along a har row band of territory defined by the range of small arms and fold guns Today the lighter bombar supporting attacking › urmy constantly: range over the enemy lines, sometimes hundreds of

The

Athens, Jantiary $23) *Creak Cabinet tonight decided to Ampose press censor ship on military news.-Reuter,

Can you res cognise where. this ploture (WRO) taken? Tha

war-lac Baven.

to

from

ong..

runway they portions

relatively

Thank

To Be Continued

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