1949-01-17 — Page 6

CHINA MAIL

WINDSOR CHIUSE

Editor-in-Chief:

Kester

Asst. Editor: --- Ian Mackenzie, Business Manager: W. H. Nolloth

Editor

Telephoner

THE CHINA MAIL, MONDAY, JANUARY 17, 1949,

THE FIFTY-NINTH INSTALMENT,

CRUSADE

In the outcome our hopes were not completely fulfilled. As the winter wore on our heed for troops bocdria sở Front and our long Unes were ad thinly manned that the now regiments arrived Army commander frequently "It Rocorsary, Instead of re-

Pored troups with Lap Flesh

Reporters & General Omce, 32812 | ones, to assign a sppéial moctor to

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TROUBLE IN

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w

IN EUROPE

Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower's

Own Story Of The War In Europe

tainment.

maximum error of five miles-ot any one point, -In die arda, which ho beloved the enemy might overrun by surprise" attack he placed very, fów supply Pistálla- - tions. We had large depots al Leige and Verdun but he was con- fident that neither of these could be reached, by the enemy.

WO

Bradley was also certain that

could

the always provent

abortive..

enemy from crossing the MeusO corps and army formations as he the USO for civilian old in the pect to this vital item of supply establishments lying to the West- and reaching the major supply. could scrape together for the matter of recreation and enterThe orders to the heavy beers ward of that river. Consequent purposo.

were to keep pounding alt sources by any such enemy attack, in the HK$10.00

of all, refineries, and distribution This altuation' was entirely un- In the late fall, as we approach-systems to the limit of their long run, would delusion was ILI.$30.00 setiafactory and a complete vied the borders of Germany, we ability. This tactic had a great

Qui general

H.K.$77.00

tion of the purpose; for which the studied the desirability of com{effect not only generally upon the that we could not affort to alt new regimento word. rushed into mucting our air force to the des entire war-making power of Gay German

| still doing nothing, while the p Gery Kite theatre ahead of their heavy truction of the Rhine bridges, on many but but also directly upon and the training

perfected his defences equipment,

of his troops, making preparations to renew the the 2 which he or mu river tupate mander had

Evory German. existence of, the German) the 420 tớ CafeMitolomeusly beenub Wadashaved, that atteck-againat the Skar, the ns- lode, nothing else, and

To and though

and though if all of them could be destroyed,

final defolt : ho Was very hopeful of decisive wherever possible, we returned 30 it was certain that with our gray plans in terms of availability fat some time before "the enemy Before Dr. Syngman Rhee' | thr lystal pian of Fustion, we air forca we could so limit the van./% fuel, and 'wan.tő our advent. Acknowledged

offensive. Bratiley's final nvolvement in a long, Inconclusive, was elected of attempt a major chunter effect, but, determined to avoid in-

croase the enemy's embarrassment.

mark was "We tried to capture in costly offanglun Brailey and Republic of South Korea, he in the manner intended. In the anerfly, would soon have to with

tha carly draw We entertained no hope of: This air campaign against ell all these Germans before they agreed that the Tairit Army repeatedly told the outside all result, however, world: "Give me the Preat found infantry unit saving these bridges for our own reserves tended to emphasise one could get Inside the Siegfried. If tack would have to show tramen-

had' a fofound and beneficial Inter use,

It was accepted that of the great advantages we had they will come out of it and fight dus gains win a work or li We knew dency for only three months. effect. In particular crises of the once the enemy, decided that he enjoyed over the eneas in all the us again in the open, it is all do would be suspended. We

of cote that if it was successful After that time, I assure you. campaign they allowed us to effect had to rotront he would destroy Bilterranean and European Cam- our advantage."

Both Bradley and I believed in sinne dent avantages the there will be no Communiata concentration of veteran units all the bridges, and our arrival paigning. It was in the matter of

would have to спету problem. There will be no- which would otherwise have boon would and none standing, untogs Folative mobility. The American that nothing could be so expen-

concentrate | by sheer accident.... Impaialble

mer sectors to meet it, and Army has always featured mobility sive to us ad to allow the front. thing but a stable, united

In the organisation and equipment

to stagnate, going into defensive therefore Pailon's success would and independent government

of 16 forces Before the dévent of Korea.";

of the motorcar our Army was proportionately stronger in cavalry than most other armies of the time. With the coming of the motor, the American Army anger. ly seized upon 16 to gain added mobility. Our advantage in this direction was vastly increased by the mass production methods of American Industry. Tiere" was cartainly no other nation in the world that could have supplied. repaired, and supported the great Best of man armed forces used transportation That

Dr. Rhee has been Prest- dent of the Korean Republic for more than the length of time which he himself select- ed. Yet Korea is at for from being either: stable. unted or indebendent.

Since the United States Military Government relin- nuished, administrative con- trols to Dr. Rhee's govern- ment, stability has been a fast diminishing vision. :

Organised and armed Com. munist onposition in the South has become intensified. Three alleged Soviet sub- márinne, oddly unrafičed by anv of Korea's much boasted- of Const Gizard, recently DD- neared and disappeared off the cost of the Southern- most island Chelu-do with- out any interference, *

As for unity, South Korea is perhaps less unified now than before Rhee took over power. Rhee himself seems to have dissipated rather quickly the strong popular matority which he undoubt edly had when he was first elected President. Persons whom he himself selected- for ministerial positions are beginning to voice corn- plaints about ineffective government.

Independence is still a fantasy, which even DE Rhee does not deny.

Latest reports from North

HOLLAND

MAMUR

Korea, indicate that the All THE RHINE BARRIER,

Korea People's Army-el-

timated at anywhere frata 250,000 to 500,000-has taken

the American military de-

in

Many

TIDOS

in

MÜNSTER

DORTMUN

DUSEING

BELFORT

to me

MAINZ

FUAT

the tho

"And

the American

In World War II.:

Through late November and early December the badly streich ed condition of our troope criand constant concern, particularly on Bradley's front. In order to maintain the two attacks that wo then considered important we had to concéntrale: available forces the vicinity of the Roer dams on the North and bordering the Saar on the South, This weakened the static; or protective, force in the

For Ardents region.

periód We had a total of only three divi- siony on d front of some seventy- Ave milda between Triar and Manischnu and were never able

to

place more than four in that region. While my own staff kept its closest possible touch with this situation, I personally, conferred with: Bradley about it at various fimes. Our conclusion was that In the Ardennes region we were a definite risk but we be- to be a mistaken policy LED our attacks all along the front merely to make our selves ante until alt reinforce» • ments arriving from the United States could bring us up to peak

running a

In discussing the problem Bradley specifically outlined to me, the factors that, on his front, be considered favourable to con- the offensives. With all

Or 1 emphatically agree,

fous, relative gains we were rea-for

ANTWERP

ICANA

MESCENDI

ARMY

HOLLAND

(US: WINTR}

ARMY

BE

UM

ROUSSELS

Mariga

NAMUR

ARMY

MALMEDY

STAVRIOT

ST.VITH

DINANT

MARCHE

·BASTOGN

THE ARDENNES RISK RAWING OFFENSIVE CONCENTRATION:

1989 – DEFENSIVÉ DISPERSION...... INDIA AUSTRIJO LÍNÉCES

In that

ARMY

terday announced that the Sartleblarly in maintaining mor would require prolonged skrittely on the flanks of this lutely secure from attacks while December 13, bufrējātivdy Tow

that period of the year. in Europe under Fan of felt, thereford, nur ability, and it was that de- turn for the worse."

In both World Wars the infan- | Our reasons for declining to First, be pointed out the, tromen winter quarters while we waited tend to increase our safety else- up permanent "front-line" try replacement problem plagued commit the air force against the

add flandreinforcements where. On the other hand, if we positions along the 38th American commanders the bridges were bared upon con- sing to the mailers of casualties. from the homeland,

Bhould get a considerable number The daily average of enemy losses parallel, a cartographie "Iróri | Bald. Only a smail párcentage of sidérations of priority and effect double our own. Next he ing anly four divisions" m (the ; and plów advances we not only The responsibility for maintains of divisions embroiled in edaily Curtain" splitting the Her the manpower in a way theatre lyonesa. To destroy merely a was

of the light few was of tile Uds. A total of believed that the

• bridges, it was which the chemy only place in Ardennes front and 10% running would be accomplishing little we thit Kingdom in half. And 1997 khed by the twenty-six at that time, apan serious counterattack was' ki the / to a largo German Palu / would be in no position to react

attempt a the risk Yet

portion small

reported

area was mine. quickly at any other place along tachment In the Southern

ninety per cent of no driver, some twenty of them Ardennes region. The two points At any monient from November the front Casualitas. zone is becoming smaller

of these would have to be rendered useless at which we had concentrated

"1"could have onward

In the meantime the First casualties ᏖᎵ . fit every day.

to return to or the effort would be only partial troops of the Twelfth Army, the defensive along the whole Army's attack against the Roer Meanwhile, Dr. Rhee yes-problem of great importance of flying conditions the

the front, but this crentes another ly effective. Even with the best Group for offensive action lay tront and made our lines abtor dams had got off as scheduled on

Ond

under Hodges, was. we awirited.

My divisions were engaged. Early in reinforcements. My only thing proventing him the tr

hodvy bombing effort But, at just to the Northward; the other, basic plecision was to continue the the month the weather, which had from establishing a "stable

Just to the offensive to the extremo limit of hear intermittently bad, look a Replacements, whether newly there rarely occurs a day of suff- South

Tog vand Korean Republic was the arrived from the homeland orrd clonfly good weather to allow pin that we were in the best possiblà cision, that was responsible for clouds practically prohibited lack of a rate of foreign ex-cently discharged from hospital, point bombing from great heights, position to concentrate against the the startling succosses of the Orst herial reconnaissance and now change.

to the Processed Are not replacement depote.zo strong and amicient that law dennes arët that might be at attack"

December began to appear in the upland, and enemy apti-aircraft was still flanks of any attack in the Ar week of the German Tronf

together with Incres

Increasing. obvious complaint directed

This statement-a T2 Thus thers in great inter Sying bombing waar too expen-tempted by the Germans. He in early December Genert

mingling ut the Big Powers--can only

of veterans from num elvé. ----Consequently -

To Bo Continued. estimated that; if ..the only

the Patton, with his Third Army, waji be called picayune. It comes divisions and of others who method we could employ against enemy should deliver a qurprise

Κάνο

When the che bridges was blind bombing, not seen action.

attack in the Ardennes he would advisable that Dr. Rhee ap- need for replacementa la acuto, through the clouds. The Air Star have great, diffeulty in supply prcolate the fact that foreign efficiency domands that all mon caloudied that destruction of the libitxied to

as far as the support of any kind should promoly to the place where most vall, more imb and Goms ton enemy could overrun our largu

Avaliable in depots be dispatched bulle of the bridges would require Find of the

Unless the be regarded solely as an aid eded individuni arsignment ac- nage than we could afford to divert supply dumps he would soon find to be made effective use ofcording to personal preference is from other vitally important pur. Hirrisolf in trouble particularly in He, and other leaders in well-nigh impossible.

aby period when our air forces. similar situations, should not

ebuild operate emciently, Brad- Howovery veterans always in One of the greatest of theasley tracoll out on the mat the rogard foreign aid as a boonsist on returning to their own other purposes was to toplate Gur. This he estimated the German which will be inevitably divisions, and when this cannot be any's Tosorros of dud of. By upearhearts could possibly reach forthcoming every time he dono a definite morale omergency this time the enemy was relting with his delimates later proved to erles "Wolf.” ·

We teled, within the limits.

noods, to return voterans to

to their own units, but in emergency the rule had to be visiated. In the fall of 1944 ap

KOREAN DELEGATE TO UNITED NATIONS

Sooul, January 1ồi The governinent announced to || day- the appointment Chough Hyoung ok as chief dolagaten vor the Korsan

mission in Parik foulgy, tra

Mr. Óhough, who as Pres Byngnian Rhoo's "pociál tatizo at Járga, tegy AKA

Europp And months, will take over loff vacant by De John

WAN

sador to

Gener

Mr. Chough

by plane on scheduled to GREEVE

|Bunday traded

I ponds.

hitő" précariotis qidnition "with" rés-| Be""-roniarkably accurate, with “ja

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