1948-12-23 — Page 8

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GREETINGS

Mr. & Mrs, R. Leigh wish all their friends a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year,

BIRTH

SCHUT-At St. Theresa's Hospl- fat, on December 22, 1948, to Mimi, wife of G. Schul, daughter.

THE FOUR R'S.

a

it

st

in

were

THE CHINA MAIL, THURSDAY, DECEMBER 23, 1040. THE FUORTYTH INSTALMENT

CRUSADE IN EUROPE

To avoid stalemate and to at-

tain the position of power and mobility required to destroy the

German forces, wo planned, fol- Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower's

lowing upon any breakout, to push forward on a broad front, with priority on the left. Thus we would gain, at the earliest possible date, use of the enorm ously important ports of Belgium. This advance would also overrun the areas in which we know some mysterious "secret weapons" were being installed, and as the nd- vance continued we would direct- ly threaten the Ruhr. It was ad- ditionally planned, from the start, to advance in the direction of the Saar, so far this would be pos- sible after assuring the capture of the Belgian ports and the arrival

Ja

Own Story Of The War In Europe

large operation, even if this meant delaying the assault by a month. To this the Combined Chiefs of Staff ngreed.

Another factor that made the later date a desirable one was the degree of dependence we were placing tipon the preparatory effort of the air force. An early Ettack would provide the air force with only minimum opportunity

tablished in the Kassel region, we

From time to time during the for pinpoint bombing of critical centres in France, could easily thrust out offensively spring months staff officers from transportation on our denks. This would mean Washington arrived at my head whereas the improved weather the end of the war in Europė.

quarters to

the latest anticipated for the month of May give me

them much more All these successive moves with calculations concerning German would given

alternatives were the progrens in

the development of time and better opportunity to possible subjects of long discussions but now weapons, including as pos- impede the movement of German

demolish and

German the general pian approved as the sibilities bacteriological and ato-

critical outline of the operation we in-mic weapons. These reports were defences along the coast line. The tended to conduct was:

Land on the Normandy coast. Build up the resources needed for a decisive battle, in the Nor- mandy-Brittany region and break out of the enemy's encircling positions.

(Land operations in the first two phases were to be under the tactical

direction of Montgomery.}

Pursue on a broad front with two army groups, emphasising

to gam the left

necessary, poris and reach the boundaries of Ger- many and threaten the Ruhr. On our right we would link up with he forces that were to invade France from the South.

reserves

DI destruction points on the main roads and rall- conte leading into the selected battle area was a critical feature of the battle plus. Nevertheless, acceptance of the later date was disappointing. We wanted all the summer weather we could get for the European campaign.

Along with the general plan of operations we thoroughly const dered means of deceiving the enemy as to the point and timing scrutinised of attack.

Our Pended to

of the left at a location to threa- ten the Ruhr. The enemy would be sensitive

about the safety of the Saar Basin, while our own forces, pushing in that direction, would soon connect with the in- vasion planned to come up from Rhons the South

through the Valley. This linking up of our whole front was mandatory and would have several great and ear- ly advantages. It would liberal France. It would open up for u a great additional Tine of com

Insure inunication to

convince him that we the rapi arrival of troops from Americ und the sufficiency of their sup

Finally, tro ply.

it would cut o whatever German troops migh: remain behind the point of junc- tion and so eliminate them from the

This would allow us to war. use all our troops in facing and Bighting the

woul enemy and prevent the costliness of estab lishing long defensive flanks along which our troops could bave nothing but negative, static mis- alons.

If all these movements should prove successful, we next had to look forward to the final destruc- tion of the enemy, who would then, presumably, be defending the Siegfried Line and the Rhine River.

In May 1944 we calculated that with the ports of entry

upon which we were counting we would probably have sixty-eight strong divisions available to us, not in- cluding divisions from the Medi- terranean, when the time came make Qur decisive thrusts across the Rhine.

Allotting

ta

To the traditional three R's of education, the omniscient or at least omnipotent-- of non-elected government

Tony Kong intends to add a

In the ourth: repression. Legislative Council yesterday, Inn innocent sounding mea- sure had its first rending, a bill entitled "The Education Amendment Ordinance 1948." In the light of what has hap- pened since the end of the military administration, would seem virtually Impos- sible for any bill to be de- feated after submission by the present oligarchy, unless a great public outery should arise, one can expect this new demand for power to become law automatically. It is one of those measures which a free and enlighten-thirty-five of these to the advance ed people might accept time of emergency, as in war, provided the normal safe- guards of democracy always on guard to prevent its abuse. It requires any person not on the register who wishes to teach in a school to make application to the Director of Education to do so, The director, if he approves, may impose condi- tions as to the subjects which

He. the teacher may, take. may also refuse permission, or withdraw at any time any permission previously grant ed, or remove anyone from the register_of_teachers.

Further, if it appears to the Governor-in-Council "that it is prejudicial to the interests of the Colony or of the Com- monwealth or of the public or of the pupils," that any school should be registered or continue to be registered, or that it should be managed by an undesirable person taught by undesirable teacher, then summary action can be taken.

an

or

|

we

could we would

was

ous; at least it was far better thaa cancellation. The presence of Al- leil troeps in the Mediterranean would prevent the German from completely evacuating his troops from Southern France, while, t he gradually drained that area, our later advance from the South Con- would be much speedier. sequently we agreed upon the de-

that lay in the Southern attack with it be the recommendation made as soon after July 15 as was feasible,

virtuat highly secret and were invariably delivered to me by word of month. I was told that American scion thats

were making progress in those two important types and that as a result of their own ex- perience they were able to make shrewd guesses concerning some of the details of similar German activity. All of this information was supplemented by the periodie reports of Intelligence agencies in London. In addition, aerial photographs

Were with the greatest care in order is discover new installations that strike directly across the Channel

at its normwest point, against Our scheme for employing the would apparently be useful only

very the stronghold of Calais. In reany air force in preparation for the In some new kind of warfare.

The finest selentific brains h ways great advantages would great assault encountered both Britain and America wer have nccrued to us could we have earnest and sincere opposition, by securing poris in Belgium and called upon to help us in evalua-successfully attacked in this re- especially on the political level rail gton. Not only were the beaches To demolish the key bridges, tion and in making estimates of

main freight yards, und they best along the coast, Our only effectiv probabilities.

Arteries of France would inevit- were closest to the British ports ably result in casualtics among counteraction, during the

pre-

and to the German border.

Even paratory months of 1944, was by

population. the French bombing. We sent Intermittent enemy, fully appreciating these

facts kept strong forces in the though we planned, in the case of area and forlined that particular large cities, to disrupt communica- tions hy bombing critical points section of coast line more strongly then

Any other. The defences surrounding the locality instead of within, the highly populated were so strong that none of users, aome statisticians calcu believed that a auccessful assault!

Brittany, as Mediterranean.

Bulid up our new base along the Western border of Germany,

well as in the

up our forces While building for the final bailles, keep up an unrelenting offensive to the ex-

GENERALSTRATEGY OF OVERLORD IN CONJUNCTION WITH ANVIL-DRAGOON

ENGLISH CHANNEL 70 JURS

NANTES

BORDEAUX

NORTH SEA)

BREMEN

WBURG

BEALIN

DANE

TUCS-EL

FRANKFURT

PRAQUE

C

MUNICH

VIENNA

AUSTRIA

●MILAN

ITALY

the

The

to

from the a-n could be made ex-lated that the plan would cost at rept at such terrific cost that the least 80.000 French lives. Such a course likely whole expedition might and itself catastrophe was of

to embitter the French nation; helpless to accomplish anything the Prime Minister and many of of o positive character, after it got his subordinates insisted that some ashore. But we counted upon the way must

be found the enemy believing that we employ the air forces in support would be tempted into this opern- of the attack. The Prime Minis tion, and the wide variety of meater was genuinely shaken by the sures we took for convincing him fearful picture presented to him were given extraordinary credence by his Intelligeti Hision.

by opponents of our iden, and his The complementary

attack appeals to me were correspond- against Shuthern France had long inely urgent and appealing. He been considered-by General Fald. "Tostwar France must be Marshall and me, at least as an our friend. It is not alone a ques- integral and necessary feature of th of humanitarianism. It is main Invasion cross thair also a question of high state pa- ly 1944, I supposed that all prin-

the

elpal commanders and the Com-

1

My own, air commanders, and I aceuroev of the

bined Chiefs of Staff were solidly challenged the We antici- together on this point Our statisticione figures.

paled losses of not more than a studies in London, however, SOON

traction of 80.000 particularly demonstrated that, even with a

because we planned to lasue.both of attack, June date

the Allies did not have enough landing craft

warnings to meneral, and morcifie

We werd overy the babitants. and other facilities to mount

possible means repeatedly to tell simultaneously both the

the French and Belgians to move Channel and the Mediterranea from critical main's in the attacks in the strength we want

cross-

on the axls, Amiens-Maubeuge- Liege-Ruhr, which, according to administrative estimates, was the maximum number that could be sustained along that channel of my Invasion, would leave Lid some thirty-three plus those introduced! through the South of France for other operations along the long

tent of our means, both to wear, ralds against every spot in Europe from Wesel on the Rhine alf Une

where scientists believed that the the way South to Switzerland, down the ecemy and to gain ad- Consequently, unless

oldvantages for the final fighting, Germans were 'attempting either

destruction elimite the Siegfried, we

Complete the

of fo manufacture new types be able to do little more than to enemy forces West of the Rhine, weapons OF where they were defend along the front South of in the meantime constantly seek building launching facilities along

the river. the coast. the advan- ing bridgeheads across the Ruhr. With all

The United States was at that Launch the final attack as a During this tages the enemy would thus en-

most double envelopment of the Ruhr, calculations of the Intelligence time committed to offensive ac- joy, he could concentrate almost

the neces- again emphasising the at will for strong counterattack.

left, and agencies were necessarily based on in the Pacifis However, this prospect would follow this up by an immediate upon be completely changed provided thrust through Germany, with the and from that .we could gain the line of the specific direction to be determined from time to time in their es- Rhino substantially throughouted at the time. its entire length. Once this was done we would enjoy a

compara-

long

ed.

period the

transport system. More than this, receding very rald we planned to warn Inhabitants, by radio and by leaflet, to evacuate temporari- the areas selected for that at-

very meagre information sary additionk) Sd not be telt. We could'nfford to give

German

abandonment of the attack on Clean out the remainder of Nevertheless, before we launched

Germany.

live degree of safety throughout This general plan, carefully the theatre that would permit the outlined at staff meetings before assignment of offensive roles to D-day,

was never abandoned, practically our entire force instead even momentarily, throughout the of only to the thirty-five divi- campaign.

The timing of the operation was sions that could be sustained along

pons.

Two considerations, опе

tions dictating the wisdom ofneralissimo Stalin that the at-important one was our Insistence | allack for a suficient time to

attack be on

the.

τη

To Be Continued

of the

the face of this, General Mont-rawledge that we had badly gomery proposed the complete pinished the strength of timates

progress.

Southern France, which then had we knew that the enemy German Air Force and because. the Invasion, Intelligence experts

the code name of Anvil. He wrote could not have anti-aircraft in were able to give us remarkably

Meient quantities to caver, on to me on February 21, 1944: “I accurate estimates of the exist-

short notice, every critical spot recommend very strongly that we ence, · characteristics, and caps- bilities of the new German wea- now throw the whole weight of in the transportation system of our opinion into the scales against Franco. The plan had to be so along arranged that. It did not, by its of Anvil." I refused to go

with this view, But it became reneral pattern, reveal the area the one route North of the Itahr. a dificult matter to decido. At them decisive in character, com-

There were other

considera Prime

dora Teheran the President and the bined to postpone the target date clear that there was no other re-selected for assault. Con quent- course except to delay the South- ty, in furtherance of o.. decep- Minister hud promised { from May to June. The first and

&

tion plans, we invariably chose gaining the whole length of the uck would start in May but we that the

some-jargets in the Caïals, aren Rhine before launching a

a larger Permit ships and craft first to final tack

tor heavy bombing simultaneous- assult on interior Germany. Our were given to understand that scale than that originally plannet operate in Overlord and then to objective was the destruction of any date selected in that period by the staff assembled in London proceed to the Mediterranean for ly with every critical raid, the German armed forces. If we of the year would fulfil the com-

om- under Lieutenant Generally participation in that battle. We could overwhelmingly defeat the mitments made by our two poli- Frederick Morgan, He was a concluded that this arrangement

tical leaders.

was not especially disadvantage- The persons concerned will enemy West of the river it was

extraordinarily fine

officer and be required to show cause

certain that the means available In order to obtain the maximumn had, long before my arrival, won to him for later defence of the length of good campaigning weathe high admiration and respect why they should not be re-.

Rhine would be meagre indeed; ther, the earlier the attack could of General Marshall. I soon came fused permission to teach` or Soviet forces had already entered be faunched the better. Another to place an equal value upon his manage, or why the school

Poland and much of

and much of the German

man factor in favour of an early at qualifications. He had in should not be struck off the strength wre russian offensives on frantic efforts of the German to complished a mass

would

be tied down to tack was the continuing and months preceding my arrival ac meet future register. The now-familiar

of detailed the Eastern front. Finally, if we strengthen his constal defences. planning, accumulation reversal of the democratic

could not

the German Because of weather conditions in and gathering of supply that principle that a person is in- armles

West of the Rhine, ob- the Channel, May was the earliest made D-day possible. My Idons nocent until proved guilty, stucte, where our own supply

ply date that a landing attempt could were supported by General Mar- lines would be as short as pos- be successfully undertaken and gan personally but he had been Here one has to disprove sible, how could we expect to do the first favourable combination compelled to develop his plan on nebulous charges against one, it East of the Rhino, where this of Udes and sumrise occurred ear- the basis of a fixed number of | although no concrete evidence advantage would not be ourat ly in the month. Thus early May ships, landing craft, and other ro

can be produced. True, any Generals Bradley and Patton, was the original and tentatively sources. Consequently he had no

selected target date.

tecourse except to work out an accused person may go before along with my entire staff, always

in

along Alarming Intelligence reports attack the Governor-in-Council to

three-division views for advances both through concerning the progress of the front, whereas I insisted upon listen to the grounds on the Metz gap and North of the Germans in developing new long five and informed the Combined which it is proposed to take Ardennes.

rangé weapons of great destruc-| Chiefs of Staff that we had to Proceeding to nction, but if the authorities

the next step tive capacity also indicated the have the additional landing craft

and other from this one, we reasoned that advisability of attacking early.

gear essential to the are "satisfied" about their

the Ruhr, which we expected to own decision, "such order | be

defended by the strongest shall be final." No right of forces the enemy could provida, appeal whatsoever is allowed would be best reduced by a double To achieve it wa envelopment. Shades of planned to make the Northern at-

DO YOU tack as strong as the lines of communication would sustain, and

and KNOW the Frankfurt attack as strong as remaining resources would por. mit.

for in the Bill. Hitler and. Stalin!

concurred

destroy

these planning

We believed further that

To be fair to the powers that be, one must believe that in a chaotic age, in on area riddled with Commun. ist propaganda and the ac- tuality of war, a centre like Hong Kong should safeguard itself against the weakening event we belloved that, once es- seepage foreign fifth- column idea into the minds

YOUR HONG

once these two attacks had join- ed in the vicinity of Kassel, East) of the Ruhr, there would be no hope, in the military sense, ro- maining to Germany. In any KONG?

Can you re-

taken? The ans

Nins..

of its children. Cleverly-guards are guaranteed. In cognies where placed Moscow trained teach- the ordinance which passed this ploture was ers could play havoc with the ita first reading yesterday swer is in Page - future of this Colony. No there is no such safeguard, no Briton of 1948 who has right of appeal beyond the thought about the matter can persons who pray the "son- object to such measures, tence in the first place. It which may be the difference is far from being a measure. between liberty, and licence which should be accepted in -provided **** effectiv "safe"! its-present. form.

♫

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