1948-12-09 — Page 6

CHINA

THE CHINA MAIL, THURSDAY, DECEMBER 9, 1948. ↑

THE TWENTY-EIGHTH INSTALMENT

MAIL CRUSADE IN EUROPE

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LESLIE At Kowloon to stay, on Dreamber 8, 1948, to Mary, wife of A. Leslie, a son,

THE IRISH BREAKAWAY

Some

son

three weeks

No one really liked the plan for schelen attack. complications,

Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower's ans, this sleemive auther

Own Story Of The War In Europe

1)

bring into the assault a Canadian corps from England, while the Eighth Army was able, some time before the end of the Tunisian part of its campaign,. 1o deinch

be

own

than simultaneous assaults were cited an

risks outweighing the chance of defeat through lack of port facilities. Montgomery, ex- pecially, always a believer in the power concept, desired to throw heavy forces Into the South Eastern portion of the island. The supply stuffs were again required to study the problem, and now they came to a more optimistic estimate than they had weeks previously.

Overvie

Some

an

Marshal

easy.

DURING THE FINAL WEEKS OF THE TUNISIAN campaign. particularly after the outcome could be definitely foreseen, mujor staffs were busy planning our next campaign. As directed by the Casablanca Conference; this was to be the capture of Sicily. At the time of the conference, alter- alive missions for the Meriter- . Subscription Rates:

ranean forces were discussed by the Combined Chieft of Staff Posti oil fields, the most impor- Brillah side it was determined to H.K.$18.00 One of these was to assnull Sleits tant single source of natural oil with the least practicable delay; available to the Axis. It was the other was to capture Sar- worked out on an academic buals group came and a special staff H.K.$72.00 dinia and Corsica.

My own opinion, given to the from Washington to explain the

This change resulted" from the conference

Because of heavy strength to prepare for the Siell In January, was that plan to us. Sicily was the proper objective if defences the distance to the target lan mult. These forces were to unforeseen availability of a con- our primary purpose remained the the fields were in Rumenia-attack Sicily in early July, and siderable number of LSTS and production of the clearing of the Mediterraneun for the nature of the terrain, and the all preparat was based upon the quantity

alleged offeney of "horizontal"

An Amphibious vehicle airborne troops, while its const use by Allied shipping,

the keeping of that target date "duck." Sicily bombing, the plan called for Because of the location of our that avec to be one of the most line

30 was

rocky that only abuts both

Africa and Italy so single surprise attack, conducted troops and embarkation points, the valuable pieces of equipment pre- through the mouth of the island's closely that it practically severs at freetup, height and with every convoys would converge upon the cured by the United States dur-one tiny harbour was it possiblo the Mediterranean, and its cap-

East, the West, | bng the war, Incidentally, fou, to land troops from assault boats. The crew briefed to attack a particu- island from the ture would greatly reduce

lar facility in the great installa- and the South.

other pieces of equipment that We would obviously have to use hazards of using that sen route,

ution.

The originators of the plan

Selection of the assaulting area

most senior officers came to re- attack of a blasting nature; On the other hand, if the real

*** had worked out mathematical was a complicated problem. From gard as among the most vital to that is, the volume of fire on the purpose of the Allies was to in-

nds linly for major operations Probabilities in great detail and the standpoint of cuse of ap- our success in Afrien and Europe point of attack would have to be

on the proach from our sentiered ports. were the bulldozer, the jeep, the so great that, in spite of the lack to defeat that country completely, then provided strength then I thought our proper initini deemed necessary. They enlculat- and the nature of the

bruis of double the bombers protection of our communtentions, 26-on truck, and the C-47 air of surprise, our assaulting troops coast line, plane, Curiously enough, none could get ushore and make good objectives were Sardinia and Cor- | slea. Estimates of hostile strength ed that the attack could achieve The South Eastern portions of the of these is designed for combat, their position.

With considerable quantities of Many of our experienced com- every newspaper in Dublin ndicated that these two islands car perfection in its destructiv island looked favourable, yet th

supply staffs were convinced that improved equipment in sight, the manders and staff officers strong- could be taken by smaller forces results.

that the ly advised

attempting One fenture to which we ob-n force of the size contemplated supply staffs agreed

uguinst carrying the news of the than would be needed in the case

Jected was the confidence placed could not be maintained birth of Princess Elizabeth's of Sicily, and therefore the opera in the efficacy of a single attack. available beaches.

catimates could be markedly re this operation, since any failures Even assum

upward, anal plans were would have a disheartening effect be mounted ut

committed was reported to have tion could

the basis of the on the troops to be Ten often we had found that facing the early capture of Syracu crystallised on "nriler date. Moreover, since been sold out.

Similar Sardinia and Corsica lie on the destroyed were again working at

tories listed by our experts as on the Eastern coast of the island, British forces moving against the against the Sicilian shore. How-

and the American ever, Actiniral the technical experts datly stated Eastern coast terest and sympathy in the flank of the long Italian boot, the

Cunniachom, in full output withhi a matter of that without additional ports the against the Eastern part of the particular, agreed with me that fortunes of the Royal Family seizure of those lands would

weeks or even days, We raised

ised operation would be defeated by Southern coast.

the place could be taken at slight much force a very mu were displayed after the an-

greater dis

Before leaving this point, A

conviction cost. We based our of emy strength in another question as to the advis- lack of reinforcements, ammuni nouncement of the King's person

The tion, and other supplies. The al- word upon the "hi-have-been" ability of the undertaking.

upon the assumption that most italy than would the mere ne- illness. The argument ad-cupation of Sicily, which les just target selected was a great re- ternutive was to arrange the n of the alternate plan. Same pro-Italians had had a stomachful of

of the fiery, but our information led us tack so as to gain quickly more fessionals aart others have alnce fighting and were looking for vanced by so many members of the mountainous

any to believe that the enemy had a points and ports of entry, but vigorously asserted to me that if good excuse to quit. We belley- of the Dail, that the sever- peninsul

landing craft we had correctly surplus of refining enpnelly and since strength in

evalunted the ed that if the island were sub- ance of the last link with the This discussion served to focus that his true oll shortage was in was limited, each of these attacks low combat value of the huge Jected for several days and nights Crown will bring about a re

attention once more upon the de-production and distribution faci- would

relatively weak, Italia garrista we would have to an intensive air bombardment, lationship between the two all, ultimate objectives within the we

sirability of fixing, once and for us. Our doubts and objection Expertence up to that time led stuck to the "neireling" plan and denying the garrison any chance were not, however, decisive Π us largely to discount the quality so overrun the island in ten to for sleep or rest, the assault, If countries closer than ever Mediterranean. It was complete the matter because the air units of the defence to be put up by fifteen days

rather than in the supported heavily by noval gun- before, is indeed a hopelesslyly normal that some differences in the Tunisian battle. To do this the Italian formations; in the thirty-eight eventually required. Bre, would be relatively Irish one. It is one which is conviction should obtain to be used were specially sent to coming operation they would be Moreover, it is alleged, we would The garrison might even surren

were not yet far enough along in us from the United States for the defending their possibly even accepted by a

territory, have captured the German core der beforehand.

We proceeded on this assumg- majority of Southern Irish-ocess of defeating the execution of this particular mis- which could easily make a great of the defending forces instead of

to produce crystal-clear and un-

sion.

difference.

merely driving it back into Italy. tion, since our air force had now men today. Certainly the animous conclusions AG .10 the

The attack was carried out, Our Intelligence stalls were it

possible that with grown to the point where a bom most sceptical Englishman specific netions

Gela, that would ob- with great gallantry-five Medals vitally concerned with the strength Syractise,

and Palermo

termo bardment of the kind contemplo!- will be happy to see it borne

viously produce victory. General

Honour were awarded-on of the German garrison. We felt quickly in our hands we might could be readily carried out. Marshall and I shared the belief

Chief

Tedder. proved have been able to capture Mes- Air August 1. As usual, mathematical and later experience out. Nevertheless, it is diffi- terviking done in the Medi~| calculations could not win over that our extimate was reasonable siria, the key point. before the General Spaatz, and the air forces

That cult to feel anything but dis

terranean should continue to be

conditions, but the—that if the German gorrison at Germans could have concentrated |

ated became enthusiastic supporters of of unexpected quiet at the manner in which subsidiary to and in support of effori was reasonably successful, the time of attack should be sub- suficiently is defeat any of our the project. In a period of six Mr. Costello's political man-

the main purpose

of attacking This was the second American stantially greater than two fully atine.

attacks. But not even by him- days and nights approximately oeuvre has snowballed its

across the Chunnet in early 1941.

raid against Ploesti. While 1 manned and equipped divisions. sight can it be said with certainty 5.000 tons of high explosives were In this we were supported by wha still chief of operations in then the assault as we were plan that the whole Italian garrison dropped on the eastern portion way to general acceptance.

sarme, but others held that, in

we would quit 1 still believe that of the Island and such The present policy is not one war, opportunity should be ex- the spring of 1942 a small dening it was too weak and

turkment of big planes hati taken would be wisc to defer the we were wisa

to concentrate to achieved were greater than limited area that the concentra- which anyone had expected plotted as it arises, and that if off from Near

East bases on 8 operation until we could effect much as possible, and to proceed unsurprise attack, but nothing was a greater concentration of our methodical to the conquest of any we had previously attempted. to see proposed by the Fine things went well in the "saft un- Gael Party. The latter bail merely because we had made up mainly lost. Same were interner!

tierbelly" we should not

In the actual outcome the cap- an Istond in which the defending paure accomplished and the planes were own forces. at the last election given a

Because of the estimated in-strength was approximately 350,- ture of Pantelleria was so easy- our minds to conduct the cross-1 when they had to come down innbilitity to supply severol assau amaltaneous, attack became the 11, just as our troops were get- 000. In any event the simple, the garrison surrendered on June specific pledge that Channel operation. The doctrine Turkey. The early attempt, call-divisions and their reinforcements change was contemplated in of opportunism, so often applic-ed the Halverso):

ting into their assault bouts from Project over the Southern and Eastern

Eastern adopted plam, the relationship of Eire to able in tactics, is dangerous on (HALPRO), because of the name beaches, we studied and tentative- To conduct the British portion the larger ships-that few people the doubts the Crown. It was recognis- changes in the field of strategy

pursue in strategy. Significant at its commander, did somethingly adopted a plan that contom of the attack General Alexander had any inkling of

to dispel ed, of course, that the coali- have repercussions all the way

the illusion that a few plates assault by echelon, be- designated the Eighth Army under and fears that had to be ever- big planes could win a war. ginning in the South East, follow- General Montgamery, while on come in launching the operation. had been 60 tion was not an easy one to

back to the factory and the train-

Development of the Siciliani by a second one in the South, the American side General Pat- Indees, objection

resolved to hold together. And it had ing centre. They must be care-

plan assigned the name and a third in the vicinity at ton, who had been brought out of pronounced that 1 fully scrutinised. Moreover, in Husky, began in February. The Palermo on the North coast. The the Tunisian battie in the middle make a

reconnaissanca personal been put about that Mr. Mac- the specific case, all the origins major points to be decided were Idea was that each would pro- of April, was placed in communi, į immediately prior to the doult Bride had played a role in reasons for adopting the

cross- the strength of the attack, its vide air cover for the following General Alexander was to be in date in order to the present proposal not dis-Channel operation as

timing. and is exact location.

one and the result would be to immediate charge of the ground myself that the defences similar from that attributed strategic aim were still valid. Manifestly we could not depend give us a number of beaches and assault; his headquarters was de- suffelently softened to assure suc- to Mr. Aneurin Bevan over faithfully to this purpose tons, would force us to deter decisions

even while adhering entirely upon the employment of ports at the earliest possible date, signated Fifteenth Army Group. Cess. This reconnaissance

naval and air bom- the Steel Bill. But Mr. Mac-still remained important questions,

that were then engaged in thus facilitating supply.

While

hile these plans were still in the form of a Bride has categorically denied then and later, as to the best me~} respecting timing until after the tion was that failure in any pace desirability of first seizing the is-prior to the attack, conducted

indicated the bardment of the inland two days it was Mr. Costello who first South for supporting the dial battle in Africa, and since ticular assault would cancel sui fant of Fantellerin, roughly bans to appear to the defenders to the great this date could not be accurate the following ones, and even if tween Sicily and the North be a real assault and to simulate suggested repeal.

This as nearly as possible the actual predetermined, all other planning initial landings were successful, Eastern coast of Tunisia. It is sad projected attack of 1844.

At Casablanca the Sicily opera- would have been indecisive and later concentration would be dif- island that the political heirs of tion was decided

was popularly known option contemplated for D-day upon for two commanders and staffs could not ficult, and we can the risk of de-as the "Gibraltar

and H-hour. Admiral Cunning- thend- of Michael Collins should have reasons, the Brst of which was its have proceeded with confidence

ham and 1 boarded # British feat in detall. This last possi Central Mediterranean" assumed

in responsibility for great immediate advantage Considering the strength of the billty we did not consider serious assumed by many.

un-cruiser at Bone one evening, and the final break with Britain; opening up the Mediterranean sea enemy garrison, we felt that unless before the attack could assailable. It possessed an air during that night steamed cast. and in the circumstances Mr. routes. The second was that be some five or six divisions should begin the German strength de- field from which Axis planes were ward at full speed to join the

cause of the relatively Churchill's

small size be deployed in the initial landing. fending the garrison should reach able to operate against us but, squadron assembly near Pantel- strong feelings of the island is occupation after An invasion on this scale requir-

namely, loria. Cunningham told me that point, may be partioned.

of a very substantially over two divinely more than this, we bally needed the whole nrea was mined except It is, enpture would not absorb unfore-ed the concentration

We for for a narrow channel of landing But the plan was however, evident that Mr.seen amounts of Ailled strength considerable number

supply additional air support for following, which had been swept. complicated! in the

Руся! Churchill's attachment to the should any large-scale sels of the Navy.

that the enemy craft and additional fighting ves ond that always a dis- the Sicilian attacks. Except for formalities of the Constitu- counteraction.

advantage. At first, however, small numbers of P-385, we were This prompted me to ask, "Are This renson During the spring months of it appeared to be the only pos- still using the short-range British answer was, "Oh yes, but at there no floating mines about?" tion and to the maintenance weighed heavily with General 1943 we kept in constant com- eíble solution to the problem. Spitices and American P-40, of British predominance, in Marshall-moreover, this decision, munication with the Combined As time

went on it was evident and to bring their bases closer to TRANS-ASIATIC AIRLINES (SIAMI LTD. name at least, is fully match in January 1943, avalded a com- Chiefs of Staff to determine the that the German was moving to their intended target would be of

ed by an equivalent Irish dis-offensives in the area. Successful which we could

indefinite strategic amount of the resources uper stiffen up the garrison in Sicily, tremendous advantage.

count and the but our information led us to be- Topographically Pantelleria pre- taste for both. But recogni altack would advance our bomb-time at which they

could tion of this fact cannot in- er

lieve that he had not yet attained, sented almost dismaying obstacles: bases still farther, but we made available. The

Its terrain United or at least passed, what we con- to an assault, validate his other objections. would not necessarily be drawn States staff found that it could sidered be the critical level. entirely unsuited to the use of Events have moved with into a campaign that would con- send us splendidly trained

tinuously devour voluable speed since Mr. Attlee sum- sources. The Combined Chiefs of on convoys for the assault. In ad- re- division, the 45th, properly loaded moned the Chequers Confer- Staff ordered that, Alexander, in dition we had the 3rd, which we ence. Despite the assurances addition to serving as my deputy, did not plan to use in the Tuni given by him during the de- should also be the ground com-sian battle. Moreover, our plans bate on the King's Speech, mander of the Sicilian operation called for the release of the U.S there is very little evidence can

from the Tunisian The Importance of Mediterran- 1st Division

bases for furthering, our battle arcu as quickly as success to show that the inevitable bombing campaign against con was sure. These three divisions. consequences of the breachtrat Germany was always a fac-reinforced by the 2nd Armoured were sufficiently stressed by During the spring of 1943 o pro- troop elements of the 82nd Air- tor in the development of plans. Division, still In Morocco, para- H.M. Government in the ject was developed in Washing- borne Division, and Rangers were course of those talks or at

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However,

| this allegation by saying that thods of

mitment to

our basic

code

ton for a special bombing effort to make up the American portion the latter discussions in Paris. | from an African base against the of the assaulting forces. On the Mr. de Valera's "polite fc.

tion" of a Republic was a

better bargain altogether. DO YOU

As it is, it seems likely that

Eire's increasing participation KNOW

In the affairs of Western Europe, will now receive a

setback

as a result of the

YOUR

difficulties, particularly in HONG

KONG?

the realm of Defence, which the sharpening of the Parti- tion problem will, tend to perpetuate.. It is tragic to observe the continuance of Can you such sectarian feeling, fed on cognias where sentiments, and passions this plature was quite out of tune with the taken? The an times, causing this useless awer la in Page. irritation so near the heart of the Commonwealth and Inevitably suggesting dangor- ous precedents to some-of Its more distant members.

Nine.

The danger in such an opern- preparation, study

Buonar LEMONETTE

XHEMIDEGA CORS

and

was

be

WIN

in

il

determine for were

took

were

this speed the bow wave will throw them away from the ship. It would be just bad luck if we should strike one."

To Be Continued.

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