1948-12-06 — Page 1

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THE CHINA MAIL,. MONDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1048.

THE TWENTY-FIFTH INSTALMENT

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The most dangerous area Was that beit by the Amerlean 11 Corps, stretching throughout a long line from Gntsu on the South

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I deported

from

ed they were over the target they

Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower's dropped their bomix on Souk-it

Own Story Of The War In Europe

Ou

| our

we were

K

Southern borders of Tunlala and active co-operation between the

-Arba, nn important town within our lines and more thari hun- dred miles from Kasserine Pass. A number of Arabs were killed and wounded, and much property destroyed. We had to act fist to who had previously allended the

avold disagreeable consequences, Casablanca meeting, I departed

We had already learned that the for that part of the front to spend,

antive population would amicab- a week

satisfying myself that several times to this superior.. aterial losses in fuel and otherly settle almost any dimeulty for H.K.$18.00 | everything was in good order to was convinced of the accuracy of supplies. Just behind Tebessa

money, and here 1 his report and 10l him I would! was the fell of Youts-les-Bains, clearly in the wrong that I quick- receive the expected attack. IL.K.$38.00 had received disappointing word take the matter up the next day and it was therefore doubly im-ly approved the expenditure of a

from General Alexander that be with the corps and army com- portant for the II Corps hokl could not arrive in the theatre mantlers,

this centre of communications. few thousand dollars to support before the sixteenth or seven-

the remainder spent

of an Farther to the North it bad to apologies; in war there fre

quently arise such contingencies. tenth of the month, and I felt i exhausting night conferring with resist a Germah penetration 11 requiring instant availability of Imperative to take personal ac- commanders and noting the mal- the direction of Thala, toward funds. The War Department, re- on in the matter even though ters that i wanted to take up Le Kel. The 34th Division was ignising this, gave to ench General Anderson And "then been with General Fredendati.

in position on the Northern finns theatre commander considerable In command of the battle line for (AN insperting party started and, in spite of its long period of

credits to be used when neegled. The Arst account of Gov- several weeks.

back before dawn, but we were inactivity dispersion.

iwo armies become possible. To ernment information services

dul- good work in the defence. delayed at Sbeitli by ars

On the evening of the twenty- However, it was the best position Algiers just In Britain has just been pub-ter inidnight on

break of sporadic Bring ahead help slop the enemy's Northward scand discussed the situation February 12

from whien to ever, from the After R as.

reconnaissance fu thrust, British artillery and personally with General Fre- #shed. The Account was and holding several conferences torce, in which my alde, Captain

South, any raid or attack against Lanks were rushed down from dendall and joki him that the

the important airfeld at Thelepte. Issued by the Stationery un the way, arrived at General Lee, undi Lieutenant Colonel the North. where the enemy enemy was no longer capable of We had a crying need for for- Office in the form of an an- teuendall's headquarters on the

afternoon of the thirteenth. Abras composed the qsault wave had somewhat thinned his lines offensive netion. I informed in ward sirfeld had the beat of all while I with n 45 formed the in order to secure the strength that he was perfectly safe in take- nual report by the Central

nie- | then was the one at Thelepte. It was my first trip us a four-star

mobile and general,

for the Kasserine offensive. The ing any reasonable risk in laun- lay in a sandy plula, and opera- remounted Ofre Information

of

tu which temporary

and mudte our way artillery of the US. 9th Division ching local counter-attacks that tions from it were never inter- was presented as White prade 1 was promoted on Febr-thes uary I was stit a lieutenant den

through the town without inel- also participated effectively in could be properly supported by rupled by rain; only the occasion- Paper to Parliament by the

dent, A short me fater την

was so certain of sandstorm this action. By the evening of his artillery.)

Impected ita usc. colonel in the Regular Army. Lord President of the Coun-

Second Corps Headquarters had tiriver fell asleep and we ended the twenty-first it was apparent this evaluation that I told the Breause of the advantages of stretched corps commander that I would this airfield, we placed on it large etl. Mr. Herbert Morrison.

stablished itself in a deep and up in shallow ditch, but with that the enemy

ng ensunities. Upon arrival at himself to the limit and hissime full responsibility for any The report contains a de-most inaccessible' ravine, a few corps headquarters I found that supply was becoming diffealt advantage that might result ir formations with comparable

I was n of the work miles East of Tebis,

qumtities of supplies and repair A better disposition ong way from the battle from the German attack had already! More than this, his line of com- from vigorous netion on his part. facilities.

Fredendall fell that the enemy would have been (a) send to the length of the but, considering

had "one more shot in his locker" Gnt only a reconnaissance de Ines and the paucity of roads,!

and believed that he should was probably as good a site for

tute inchment, and to keep defending the next twenty-four hours forces farther in the rest. spent heutquarters

The thoma

perfecting strengthening his holding of wallaute, When I reached the

Gnfan tended defences, rather than in the at-weaken other portions of the long hemdquarters there was a din of

tempt tti concentrate

ough front held by the Summers and drills. Upon in-

I Corps, and strength for a counterattuck in since the U. S. quiring as to the enuse, I learnedl

1st Armoured the direction of Kasserine, No Division was rat held in the un corpa that the

engineers were

or could quarrel violently with boily for úmne lng into the the ravine ellen 1

to provide thefes quarters fur the staf J

taffed account

¿

carried out by the Central

Ofer of Information during the last 12 months. It also uffords the first general des- [cription of how in peacetime Government information ser- vices are organised and of the purpose they seek to achieve both in Britain and

Overeens.

gard 23

WHS

£1

It is emphasised that the quietly asked whether the engi CO works under the general news had first assistid In pre- uidance of the various Gov-tarring front-lhe defeners but

Young

officer, apparently start emament departments for astonished at my ignorance, said, whom it provides services or Oh, the divkions have their own information material reqtdr-pagine ves for that!" It was the rd. It does, however, have only time, during the war, that I ever saw a divisional or higher responsibility | considerable

headquarters so concerned wver its own safety that it dug Badt un- derground shelters.

for the quality and effective news of State information ser- vires and for their develop- runt.

The CO1 is responsible to the Treasury in matters of finance and administration. A broad general surveillance lover its activities is exercised by the Lord President of the Council.

the excuse

that was given

אינתי

reserve. wa

HALA

FONDOUK

KÄSSERINE

STAID

ÉPTE

SIDBOU-ZIDE

SERIANA

GAFSA

MAKHASSY

THE KASSERINE COUNTERATTACK APPROXIMATE FRONT DEC. 1942 APPROXIMATE FRONT FEB. 23,1943

GERMAN ATTACK

✡ MILES

struck,

FRENCH UNITS

TABES)

harl

GULF OF GABĖS

the

be read about Lee's attack ot Fort

presented obvious risks,

Technicall

active and powerful this decision my own convictions counterathnelt, the whole situation and desires were based upon an maxiety to take Instant advantage

embarrass- of the fleeting opportunity for rent resultesi

from four prin- trouncing the enemy before he cipal causes. The Arst and vast- conlel recover from his embar- ty most important of these was Tossing position.

was to come

aud pro

the inescapable conditions resuit- By next morying it becang ap-

B: from failure in our neg-shot pureni to everybody that the able to emplare Tunis quickly. This gamble had been made on German WIS beginning his re-

[my personal orders. Afterward. The enemy moved rapidly dispersed units could not quickly treat. by night and, favoured again by brought together rlour cover during the day, suc- pand for the hostile reactions crssfully withdrew a large

a large part we were certain would follow. In company with Lieutenant

of his attacking force. However, Colonel Russell P. (Red) Akers,

Hurt I been willing, at the end the Allies all along the front nowat November, to adrait tem- ne of Fredendall's staff oflears,

kept up a constant pressure and norary failure and pass to the I promptly started on an all- night Inspection of the front lines,

the enemy was poon pusherl back defensive, no attack against us to his original positions, from could have achieved even tem- At that time the I Corps con-

which he never again attempted purary success. isted of the U. S. 1st Armoured

to launch a serious counterattack. The second major reason was alon, with the U. S. 34th Division changes in dispositions. Division, the 1st Infantry Divi-

It was too late to make, muntentions

through

work by Intelligence vulnerable Kusserine Gap wil During the final few days of faulty

agencies. Staffs were too prone assembling in the area, The 9th

the moralna troops to the West of that point buille General Alexander was to take one Isolated -pices of in- Although during Division was under orders to join frequent and, as it later turned

on the ground and in commund were becoming precariously of the actual battle line. I quickly belleved and to shut

telligence in which they implicit gut, very accurate reports were posed to attack by my forces

their The report surveys acti-when it could come up.

} found 11 number

ly formed of things submitted by the American troops we could bring, up, vities under two main head-that were disturbing.

nod a great respect unt admiration for his sollierly quali- They decided that the German eyes to any contrary possibility. The first to General Anderson concerning The enemy's advance. by the ties, an esteem that continued to attack ings of home services and of these was a certain complac- the strength and direction of the twenty-second, completely

was

through overseas services. The first envy, lustrated by an uneon- German

grow throughout the remainder Fondouk, and although we had attack through Faid, stalled. George Patton. who | ** scionable delay in perfecting de- these reports were discounted by always liked to bring

of the war. Certain of our battle-reconnaissance units in the Ous- of these is divided into seven

up his front weaknesses, which favoured sellia Valley, near Fondouk, who fensive positions in the phases the Army and AFIIQ Intelligence torical precedent, remarked,

Cerman categories covering all work Lack of training und experience, visions as the exaggeration, "Well, Von Arnim shoukl have early German success in the bat- insisted the

was not done by the COI within Brl-on the part of commanders was green, untried tramps,

The

the, were my responsibility. Hn concentrating. In that area, the ¡tain. It includes press and responsible. At one point where lef

In its ance of French troops into the sisted

conviction. This poster advertising, films, pub-tar fields were not yet planted that the main attnek was still Stedman." There, outside Peters-intely, upon the acoept-Intelligence section blindly per-

to come through. Fonciouk per- burg, the last desperate Con- allied

Commandl its November caused the army commander to lications. exhibitions,

Ice defending Infantry had been pre-ters and, as I later learned, in ped and driven back in bloody their battle-line subordination o

thecl

sisted, both at Army headquar- federnie counterattack was stop- 1942, insister unequivocally upon make faulty dispositions. tures, social surveys, liaison sent in the area only two days.the G-2 Division at AFHG. The rescat by strong Union reserves. General Anderson, later confu- the capabilities of the enemy and The third reason was the

to comprehend with national and regional The commander explatned, with G-2 error was serious. After the an air of pride, that he had pre-ttle I replaced the head of my

The staff, always with present-ston would have been less. There ing the gloomy side of the ple- would have been resentment and the best measures During the 12 months there and would start next day to put AFHQ. The result of this mis-movements

pared a map for his nine defence

Intelligence organisation at ture devised a plan to cover our increased dilleulty for a period, them. The altuntion-on-the-II- were about 35 press and post-out the mines. Our experience

in case the enemy but conception was thut the penetra- should pend

the over-all effect would Corps front called for the hold- to the First

Ing of mountain passes with light Morc-

157 | reconnaissance

delaying General Anderson tious,

the closer approach elements, with the strongest pos- tious, 1- rendy

that it was over, pending

Wits of Montgomery's army from the siblo reserves the COI's expenditure and strong, defensive position

Immediately in could understand counter-attack within represents 44 per cent of the two hours after his arrival on the

in swiftly and ally taking place.

substan- limited the area on aur Southern strength at any whole budget.

penetration of Newspaper spot, The

Realising by nightfall that re-tially stopped-but finally agreed dank in which the II Corps would the mountain enemy's invariable

barrier. Instruc- advertising.

no objection to be £944,000 practice upon capture of a hill or inforcements in men and equip that there was

permitted to operate in tions for the general nature of other feature was to plant his ment would be needed quickly letting

subordinates know which is only one-twentieth ines instantly, install his min and urgently, I hustened back to would have to be done should ably attempting to do too much regard but local fears, and again

what strength.

We were unquestion- the defence were positive in this of the total spent

on this

chine guns, and locate troops in headquarters, to hurry them for some enti

entirely unforeseen clr-l

clr with too little by the Southward) faulty Intelligence, led to a dis- medium in Britain.

nearby reserve where they could then I started back to the front, Alexander, Spuntz

dward. We scraped the barrel and cumstance İlke this occur. extension of the II Corps front; persion of the mobile reserves These campaigns aim at operate effectively against any

others to include Gatsa.

that rendered them Ineffective During the withdrawal the agreed that the immediale dan- giving the public information force that we might send against

That place, in itself, would not when the attack came. series of in- ger was over, and them. These tactical lessons had Americans fought

us become important to us until the on questions of vital public apparently been ignored by com-effective, though gallant, delaying turned our attention to punishing desert forces should approach the To Be Continued interest and urgency. Their inanders, even by those who had actions on the way back toward the enemy. effectiveness can be gauged been in the theatre for three Kasserine Pass, a spot clearly in- At that moment the weather, 1 gave orders for Im held. But there was a local lack as to prevent the effective use of strongly which had been so abominable: from the results of the cam-month paign for educating parents

air force, But by far the most serious of appreciation of exactly what our growing on the benefits of immunis defect was the fact that the assigned were neither numerous combat planes we hat were put was happening and the troops turn for the better and all the ing their babies against diph- 1st Armoured Division was still theria. This campaign cost not properly concentrated to per- enough nor skilful enough to into the fight. An embarrassing

mit its employment as a unit," At hold that strong position. The incident arose during has reduced the moment £40,000 and

General Anderson enemy armour pusher on through attacks which, while admittedly enormously the annual cost had such meagre reserves thro- the hastily constructed defence due to lack of experience on the of treating diphtheria. This ughout his long line that he felt in the pass.

part of combat crews, still illus is due to the fact that a great compelled to station half the Finally, however, Izy spite ftrates the technical dificulties of

and near Fondouk, where he surprise

relatively large which critica, fighting battles from fall in the number of diph-expected the main enemy attack: losses, our troops rallied in good the comfort of an armchair, know

newspapers.

pencirate

told

them

er campaigns. This work ac in North Tunisia had been that on gained a tremendous heal- Army's main line of communica. have been advantageous. counts for the largest part of the enemy was able to prepare away before what was actu- | useless to consider the plan fur- desert, I should have deßnitely rear to strike

cost

to resist

mediate correction,

dicated as one to be

was

ther the enemy

and

all of

took a

these air

theria cases has resulted.

to fall, and he held this force in fashion and fell back to cover nothing The COI is the largest non-army reserve by keeping in his the important centre of Tobessa A group of Fortresses was or theatrical film distributor and own hands the authority to com- and the routes leading Northward defed to bomb Kasserine Pass. Our forward alrfields at The- and spent some time searching hadl to be temporarily for the targat. Completely de- As a abandonett but the Al Force pendent upon dead reckoning for

exhibitor in the world with was scattered in small detach-

mit it to action. The remainder from Kasserine toward Le Kef, They took off in cloudy weather

an annual audience of about ments to the Southward through lepte 10,000,000. Millions of copies out the II Corps

front.

badly

of publications explaining result the 1st Armoured Division pulled out with no loss of per- navigation, they became Britain's plans, difficulties Commander, Major General Or-sonnel or machines and with im- lost. When they finally conclud-

lando Ward, had nothing left un- and achievements are pro-der his own command except duced each year. These are minor detachments of light tanks.

supplemented by meetings During the night I visited along DO YOU

of Britain.

YOUR HONG KONG?

and talks which are very Fold Pass, Near, the latter place the front between Maknassy and popular. Four special dis-t decorated m American officer KNOW plays or life in Common for gallantry only two or three wealth countries have been hours before the German attack iseen by people in all parts fell upon the positions outside

the pass at Sidi-Bou-Zld.

Brigadier General Paul McD. The work of Britain's In Robinett, an old friend of mine, formation Officers in overseas | was commaring an armoured countries, the report says, is unit in the valley, near Fondouk. largely based on the daily no attack at that point, and point- He was sure that there would be supply of Information about ed cut for me on the map the events and opinions in Bri distance to which his reconnais- tain. This service is design-sance patrols had penetrated. He ed to supplement the work of said he had reportet those facis commercid "news" agencles and not to compete with|** them.

month sea COI films about

·A·· dozen - magazines and life in Britain. -Newsreels-in weekly nowspapers are pro-"|foreign languages are also duced for overseas readors sent out by the COI to 31 while abroad millions every countries."

Can you gales whers this plature was talen? The afte awer Is In Page Seven.

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