1948-11-23 — Page 6

Fage 6

TRANS-ASIATIC AIRLINES, INC.

NEXT FLIGHT

HONG KONG TO MANILA

CHINA MAIL

WINDSOR CHOUSE

THE CHINA MAIL, TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1940.

24354 Editure Reporters & General Office 32312 (four lios)

THE FOURTEENTH INSTALMENT

CRUSADE IN EUROPE

23rd November, Tucaday

*

Editor-in-Chief-W. J. Kontes Asst. Editor-Im Mackenzie. Business Manager: W. H. Nolloth

Telephones:

་

TRANS-ASIATIC AIRLINES (SIAM) LTD.

NEXT FLIGHT

Subscription Rates:

HONG KONG TO BANGKOK .....

23rd November, Tuesday

FAR EAST AVIATION CO. LTD

3 months

0 months

One year

Top Floor, National City Bank of N.Y. Bldg. Tel. 27250.

(Entrance on Buddell · Street). Kowloon Tel: 57185

Air France-

(FRENCH OVERSEAS AIRWAYS)

SCHEDULED AIR SERVICES

From HONG KONG Tɔ SAIGON

every SUNDAY

Frem HONG KONG Tɑ HAHHONG & HANOI

Every MONDAY

From HONG KONG To LONDON via PARIS

FRIDAYS, NOV, AND DEC. 10.

For Particulars Apply To:--

CIE DES MESSAGERIES MARITIMES

Queen's Building.

BOAC

FLY TO JAPAN

BY

BIG B.O.A.C.

Tel. 26031 (3 lines).

HONG KONG AIRWAYS

4-ENGINED FLYING BOATS

Taking Off

Every Friday

LANDING AT YOKOHAMA

HONG KONG AIRWAYS

HONG KONG-SHANGIAJ Every Mon, Wed., & Sat. HONG KONG — CANTON Four Times Daily HONG KONG — MANILA Every Thursday

for further Information and bookings apply to the General Agents: Telephones 27765 &

27766

JARDINE, MATHESON & CO.,LTD.

AIRWAYS DEPT

6-8 CHATER RD.

MANILA

Bratun

of Demccmey~~fjangkok

BANGOON Monday

SCHEDULED

FLIGHTS Mon, Wed. & Sat.

BANGKOK, AND SINGAPORE Monday & Friday

HONG KONG

TO SYDNEY Next Flight;:

Mul, Dec.

COVERS THE

ORIENT

Luthay Pacific

WAYS

PALESTINE

|

Chapter 5 PLANNING TORCH

sometimes hostile,

Oran, Algiers, and the lone area

Son

Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower's Own Story Of The War In Europe

well as throughout

the

П

Casablanca,

tho

w.s

neutral or mixed in nuitude, All} into the the length alolatical programmes. In this Eastward through Oran, Algiers, | influenced also by the desire to

де

But

the Mediterranean. A success- ful direct landing in the Bizerte- Tun area would have yielderl great results, but that locality was far outside the rango of fighter support, and since British THE FIRST TASK WAS TO

experiences in running convo SELECT AMERICAN AND Brl-

to Malta had been unly little 'tish officers to f key positions

short of

disastrous, this parti- in the command and staff or-

culir pro

project was quickly given ganisations we would need for tian from fundamental

concepts government had ever attempted the African Invasion,

is permissible only when signifi- to carry out an overseas expeill-up as beyond the bounds of justi-

nable risic. in molern war,

cant changes in

situation tion battle arcas

Involving

of Journey

However, It was extremely fle- H.K.$16.00 frequently extend over hundreds compel if The high commander thousands of miles from its bases sirable to capture the Blærte- t-Tunis urea at the earliest possible of miles of front and, are equally must therefore be calm, clear, and and terminating in a major 11.K.$30.00

extensive in depth. Throughout

determined—and in all commands, tack,

moment so that we could surcom** such

One of our earliest and ops, especially allied organisations, his theatre are combat troops, ;

con Malta and by land, sea, and ale H.K. $72.00GH

replacement cainps, hospital cen- | success will be measured more by tinulnų problems was the deter uporate against Rommer's line tre, lines of communication, re- his ability to lead and persuadomination of exactly what ground, supply, thus assuring a victorious

adherence to Axedals, and naval forces could and end to the war in Africa. pair shops, depots, porta, and a than by his

command would be made available for the myriad of

notions of arbitrary service

organisations,

At the other end of the Hine, both nir and ground. In the practices. This truth applies with operation. Ordinarli a comman. same region dwells a civil popu- particular force during the time dee is given, along with a general Casablanca was important at that with the idea that

moment, for two reasons only. when cut off from the Eastward, friendly, ecessary to build up confidence objective, a definite allocation of First, Casablmen

WALR

the ter- would either full of its own The report of General iation,

sometimes conflence that reaches buckt fores upon

on which to

to construct Riley, Mr. Bunche's chief of someting

governments at home as

as his strategical plan, supported by minus of a long, rickety rallway weight or could be captured by

the that wound its way through columus moving back down Dhese units, individuals, and ac-adth of the commond.

organisational, the Atlas Mountains and on to the railway from detailed facilent,

Oran. I staff, may have been indis creet, but at least 1 stated the viting must be carefully con

trolled, so that everything is "en-" whenever any ineldent or prob- case the situnilon was vague, the

into Tunisia. and finally

Tivoli, the very great natural facts about the situation in

amount to

of resources unknown, ordinated toward the achievem requires the commmuter

chelty of the enllway was small hazards Involveil in landing at Palestine, In the course of

exect and animam his authority, the fun

object

Indeterminate, but it di offer a weak life in Casablanc ment of the coinmander's the complimer must be exactid and the only firm factor in to our forces if the enemy should three weeks the Jews have

gle plan. Even when all this is

We communicated this scheme whole bushes. and fully. destroyed two of the five

our instructions dechte to advance down through to the Combined Chiefs of Sint the k of the highest prumpik

We were still existing Arab armies which invaded fratquarters Is not frished. An early, happily minor, break to attack.

Spain, which was friendly to him, and found that the United States in a state of scarcity; there was the country on May 15. The Everything neered by the theater of sreuen; by Amerieun offlerr

render the Strait of Gibraltur omilling Casablanon from the victory in the Negev was foi commander comes from his sup- who had taken too much to drink no such things as plenty of and, with bumbers and artillery, Chiefs of Staff were opposed to UN for maintenance riginal attack plan. They were lowed by equally sensational station or notions, Daily brought to my attention the need thing. A diary of the tire quotes s

there are exchanget between for exercising particular care a excerpts of dozens of messages, purposes, Without the rail line, of the belief that the risks - In- success in Galilee. A crack Hi Staff and the governments to to the habits of every individual most of them transatlantic, on the bad as it was, from Casablanca volved in depending entirely upon

one subject of possible availabli 2013 messages assigned to Anglo-Saxon brigade, recruit-his renr thousands of

important post,

to Orw, all the troops sent in the Strait of Gibraðar for a line ity of United States ground, is, side the with plans,

were not estimates, Loyalty and efficiency

Mediterranean would of communications were fed exclusively from Common-¡ deating

The United in lividuals, enough-discretion, reliability, and and naval forces.

Then have been cut off; even their

spite of the American losses, requistions,

grent mid that, in wealth and

particular, was

of capacity

The Casa- shipping, and all the other things sobriety were mandatory. Where States Navy, in eitizens, annihilated the army

necessary to carry out the pur- thr

trudividuals

were relatively un-loath to commit itself firmly to cape might have been hazard-limited"

aus.

blanca-Ora rallway, we must of Fawzi, which was com

our highly an poses assigned him, by his su know or

The other factor could provide for the expedition. Casablanca important

that made quickly secure it as partial insur- periors. posed of Arab, German and

The nilitary methods eflent Secret Service organisa-

thence against possible Axis al- against the Gibraltar machinery for making and tion was called upon to conduel 11 was a Percracking state of anticipated influence of a strong tempts waging war have become su ex- a condidential investigation. All on uncertainty in which we had to landing at that point upon Spain

Moreover, they be- pain bottleneck. traordinarily complex and in-my personal staff, without their work and plan.

and the Moroccan tribes. It wo lieved that unless a strong force Any narration of the problems failed to land there it was pos- innded Instantly in Morocco the triente that high commanders knowledge, were so checked and

over a period of must have gargantuan staff for fester

weeks. that fnced us during the Intesible that the Vichy French Spanish would be much more in-

bes cilned

to enter control and direction.

the war or to Because The issues were too great to trust summer and fall of 1942 mut

Into open conflict against us, and

the Germons to of this it is sometimes assumed to chance: even chauffeurs had take them up in turn, but solo- would carry those warlike tribes

use had to evolve

permit that the influence of the indi- occasional opportunity to pick up tions

together. this circumstance would almost Spain as an avenue of advance value to Vidunt in war has become sub- Information

the Grand strategy, tactics, procure certainly give Spain greater ren-against our rear, Another objec

ment of landing craft and ships san for intervening on the Axis tion to the Bene operation was merged, that the mistakes of one enemy.

at supporting naval responsible officer are corrected In the organisation, operation, allocation

doubt as to our ability to provide In this way a settlement is or concealed in the mass detton and composition of my staff we forces, organisation of air forces, skle

cover so close in There was an unusual operational adequate air of careat number of associates, processed as though all its mem- provision of staging and training hazmat connected with the Cann- under

the Axls air forces of being reached by force

hers belonged to a single nation, areas, arrangements for early and blanca project. This is not true.

During the Inte stutlaned in Italy and Skelly. arms while the politicians in

The

and determination individual

works Nevertheless we tried to include later supply, ยอม Paris manoeuvre against each differently: Indeed, onc of the in every section individuals from of actual composition of each elc-fall and winter the North West Later losses to the hostile bomb- the other.

Dssault force-all African coast is a forbidding one era in that port and others The British Govern-most important characteristics of both nationalities, and certainment of each

from the standpoint of small-boat neighbourhood tended to support normal United these were matters that had to

The long landings.

Atlantic the validity of this doubt. Since ment. who strenuously ap the successful ofteer today is his modifications in

progressively

by the Combined posed sanctions against the ability to continue changing his States organisation were compell be handled

Dimculty in any wells break up on the beaches this decision methods, almost even his mentai ed by differences in the staff pro- simultaneously.

Impossible Arab invasion of Palestine,

processes, in

in order to keep abreast cedures of the two countries. In of these produced at once dim-n terrifying fashion and even in Chiefs of Staff made

relatively good nutumn weather to attack Bone Initially, any later now equally strenuous

of the constant change that the early days officers of the two culties in all the others.

this condition exists, on the nver-advance Eastward from Algiers The first requisite was to de- in demanding them against modern science,

of national their business in the attitude of a the Jews in order to compel the compelling urge

a naval viewpoint, the risk in- land marches, coupled with local Ад brings to the bulldog meeting n tomcul, but seral strength of the attack.

volved in this operation would seaborne attacks against the them to withdraw from the self-preservation,

battlefield. But personal charne- time went on their own discover-early as January 1942 our, Kov- Negev. The Americans show teristles are more important than les of mutual respect and friend-ernments had briefly considered, he many times greater thun in smaller ports along the coast to-

red side the Mediterranean, where ward Tunis. nside. and equal

a plan for an relatively good weather was to As for as I can recall, this was opposite ever before in warfare. The rea- ship developed a team that in lis hut loid

to American attack, labeled Gym- be expected. reaction; each partisan de- sons for this are simple. It was unity of purpose, devotion

the only instance in the war. absence of friction nast, against Casablanca alone. It

From the first it was clear that when any part of one of our nounces the other's prejudice.not a matter of great moment if duty, and

Polish volunteers. The Jews, as General Riley stressed, are now militarily capable of driving the Iranis, the Syrians and the Arab Legion across the ordan, Arab violence in seeking to undo the Assem-thi bly's decision is being mani- foldly repaid.

are.

дп

les.

untested

estimate of

the vessels

11

Wils

tan

working under nationalities were apt to conductermine the areas and the gen-8C, four days out of five. From could be accomplished!' only by

the chance

all as long as his tactical skill be preserved as long as possible: the Axis submarine bases by are the fanks of the assault, probable

met

u

were not

tire

the

of

secure any greater

that having

鉛

The plain fact is that, owing a Wellington happened to be coukl not have been excellent if had as its object the mere dental Orun and Algiers must be nitack- proposed operational plans was Ito the divisions between its crusty. unapproachable individual alt its members had come from of West Africa to the Axis as ed under any plan of operation, eitanged by intervention of high-

same submarine base. Later the scope of Both were who found

one of his chief de-the same nation and the

important ports and mr authority. We cheerfully ac- the initial plan for Gymnast was members, the Security Coun- lights in penning sarcastic quips service.

He was the

an attack the airfields near Oran were es- cepted the decision because War Office. cit is incapable of imposing to the

Because of

that enlarged to include

sential for later operations, par- Love

Koverning considerations were anything on Palestine-least single head, who saw the whole through accident something might within the Mediterranean by the ticularly for stoging short-range ( political more than tactical, and

particularly in battlefield and directed operations incapacitate me,

British. Parenthetically, I should of all a solution. The Berna through a small administralive the carty stages of the operation, here remark that in all our later fighter aircraft from Gibraltar to political estimates are the func datte Plan, which could have

dlers. However, we did point happen to be. Algiers, of course, West Africa, been the basis for an agreedles. As long

any evidence that was the centre of political, econo- out that the us he had the deputy also an American, so that

carly capturo of xelu- the ports on, that coast had ever stamina and the courage to make the fiction of a practically exclu-

mic, and settlement if action had been

this decision, re- activity in the Tunis was, by military

moved from the_realm of the taken quickly, is dead and decisions and to stand by them, sively American operation would been used

Fixing

the remotely possible. buried. The only course

In fixing

upon requirements of his par- To this post was named General

the lunding then, was what we Had to deelde. the

The next major decision con- now is to order, not an exten-

ticular time und eonditions, he Clark, who had come to England areas for our expedition a prir in the one case we could attack cernet the timing of the attack. sion of the truce, but all was a great commander. But the

was a great

of the If Corps mary consideration was the proc Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers; in Meteorological reports indicated as' commander armistice for the purnose of

Oran, teams and staffs through which fle was a relatively young man ticability of providing adequate the other

Algiers, and that a steady deterioration the modern commander absorbs but an extremely able profession air cover for our convoys, from Bone. direct negotiations between

whether was to be anticipated, be- should come they his al, with a faculty for picking fine the moment and exercises

Over this question we studied ginning in the early fa

y fall, Naturally, the belligerents. Since Trans- information

within authority must be a beautifully assistants and for developing a

range of the hostile bomb-

I came in therefore, time became of the Dom long and earnestly. jordan, the only Arab State interlocked, smooth-working me high morale within his staff, Dur- ers until landings, were success favour, personally, taking the casuence. Everything was done to

ful. The danger ranke

nge Included with any military power left chan

chanism. Ideally, the whole ing the planning stages of Torch.

tire force inside the Mediterran-launch the attack at the earliest the

Mediterranean up to ean. Western is a British dependency, this should be practically a single General Clark acted as deputy

I believed that Tunis was possible date, even to the point and extended even for Gibraltar, means in effect a settlement mind; consequently misfits defeat and, until the September, at West of that for the enemy's long-land initially as for cast as Bone, sea, air, and ground formations so great o prize that we should of sacrificing desired strength in in curly between Britain and Israel. the purpose of the command or Smith

rangu bombers. Allied More than any

carriers ganisation essential to the supply chief of staff.

Admittedly, to

to pass inside the when But, unfortunately, in the last and control of vast that must be ponsible for the effective co- numbers; indeed, during our an- ing a base at Casablanca involy.fighting chance for success would

available in significant land, air, sea, other one person, Clark was res

Mediterranean without establish-strength than

•hree weeks Anglo-Jewish and logistical forces

achieved tension has noticeably in brought to bear as a unit against ordination of detail

experience in the Meditered additional hazard, but I felt have meant delay. for raneon we never had available that as long as we were risking creased. Both sides have given the enemy. The personalities of this, the first Allied plats

more than two or three carriers so much we might as well put attack in Europe. conumanders plenty of provocation. The senior

stall amphidering our problem officers are of

in at any time.

all our chips special importance. Tows

one number']

To Be Continued have strengthened

Land-based military Professional

aircraft had to in early August 1942, and London in on Ability

take almost the entire load of themselves militarily in de strength of character, always re- was obvious that if we were to take air protection, and the fiance of the truce terms, and quired in high military position, launch a serious attack during providing annulled the Bernadotte

moment only available spot from which are often marred by unfortunate that year there was not

Sum- this could be done was Gibraltar. Plan by their actions in the characteristics, the two most fre- to waste in preparation.

Gibraltar the focal Negev. Britain. has shown quently encountered and hurtful mer was already fading and good This made

our air umbrella and: ones being too obvious avidity campaigning weather would soon point of her blas by taking the lead for public acclaim and the dalu- be gone. The need for haste was this in turn fixed the distance to in the demand for sanctions. sion that strength of purpose de- so great as to admit of ho op. which we could safely proceed in- Moreover, the R.A.F. at Ammands arrogant and cyen ingut portunity for planning for the to the Mediterranean with surface

A soldier surest or the best-the

Availability of shipping satis-ships. man has

been ferable deportment. apparently

once remarked that a man sure of factory had to become the ideal limited the size of the force that reinforced, and Jewish ac-

his footing doca not need to A thousand intricacles had to could be carried, while shortages cusations that British arrns

mount a horse!

be solved in close co-ordination in naval escorting and support are being shipped to Trans-

British Ministry Staffs develop plans from basic with the

vessels limited our attack to three iordan probably refer to sun decisions made by responsible Transport, the Director of Mave- major points; during early plan- niles to our own forces there. commanders.

planning ments, the War Office, the Ad-ning weeks it appeared that we If the Jews and the Legion of vast triphibious undertaking. Director of Shipping, and the

'sometimes, as in the case miralty, the. Air Ministry, the would be limited to two.

Four important ports or port were to start fighting, Britain takes weeks and months. As a Prime Minister. In the United areas, within the extreme limits might very soon be embroil-consequence these plans must be States

processes were of our capabilities, were indicated

The fact and intelligent equally involved.

venture as desirable objectives. ed. There are fanatics both in founded in London and among officials conclusion, and once made they was now-it was almost new in ware, from West to East, Casa- In the Middle East who have must be fixed and clear. Devia-conception. Up to that moment no blanco on the Altantle coast, and learnt nothing by their.

failures in the last two years

1

The

and

these

and would welcome such a well be that the three oil DO YOU}

development.

gushers in its sandy wastes

KNOW

YOUR

HONG KONG?

All that is needed is an give promise of an extensive ounce of statesmanship on ilfield which would better both sides. The Jews need be nominally under the con- a firm understanding with trol of Abdullah. These are Aritain as much today as genuine British interests. We when the British were the sought to ensure them by Mandatory Power. Neither frustrating the decision of the American dollars nor Russiart Assembly giving the Negev ermoments can provide them to the Jows. Wo lost because: with an effective substitute we backed the losing side. for an alliance with Britain The Jews are dizzy with suc- based on a peace treaty with cess, and those in Britain con- cagnise whore Transjordan. But Britain cerned with stage-managing kent. The 40s this pletura. was too, needs their friendship. It the show are dizzy with swer is in Page may well be that the Negev fallure. If both sides' could seven.. would provide a useful mill-overcome their vertigo and tary base, and Britain is not look dispassionately to their keen to write off the five Interests, a settlement might million pounds invested in be achieved without difficulty the Gaza barracks. It may or delay.

Can you

11

These

on

BREWED & BOTTLED IN GREAT BRITAIN

ALLSOPPS

MARK

THE BEST DRINK UNDER THE SUN

CALDBECKS

TELEPHONE JUDOJ