1941-06-11 — Page 34

THE CHINA MAIL, JUNE 11, 1941

Ukraci

*Page 3

Premier's Defence Of The Fighting In Middle East

(Continued from Page 2.)

"Obviously the Army is the main factor in the business und the Fleet is preserving the secur- ity of the Army on the seas and preserving command of the seas, and the Air Force is assisting

the Army and Fleet in all their functions.

1

an unlimited number of valuable even for the Chiefs of Staff, to they retain their confidence, they cult period, a disheartening and conquests without any fighting at scrutinise beforehand these detail-support them with loyal com- disappointing period. all? Where would you

are radeship in, failure or success. make a ed weekly statements which stand and engage them with re- made, solution?

Where Would We Be ?

No Illusions

matter must cer- reconsidered (Hear,

"I think the

be "A further question arises as to tainly what would happen if you allow-hear).

THE

"But in the event of any dif-ed the enemy to advance and "AS I HAVE SAID, NOBODY ferences they can be settled overrun, without cost to himself, HAD ILLUSIONS ABOUT

in

the most precious and valuable TREMENDOUS SCALE OF THE strategic points.

a few hours by roference here. These commanders have to settle it among themselves, although we responsibility share to the full for whatever is done.

Only Answer

To Defeat

were

If Government has always tó

be looking over its shoulder to see whether it is going to ba 'stabbed in the back or not, it cannot possibly keep its eye on the enemy.

am

dif- to

It is impossible to go into tac- tical details and I never remem-

British Are Unique ber in the last War, in those

"Another point of some great battles which cost some- thing like forty, fifty or 70,000 ficulty which, presents itself ATTACK. THE AIR-BORNE

asked to men I am talking of battles of me, whenever I **Where would the Germans GREATEST EVER DELIVERED

a single day and in which make a statement to the House IN THE WORLD, AND THAT

sometimes there were grave is whether I ought to encourage be now ouppose we simply re-

errors made, they

ofter good..hapes. of a successful, out- signed the territory and strate-WE SHOULD RESIST IT WITH-

#ight? OUT ANY BUT THE MOST RES- made the subject of an arraign come of particular operations or "Apart from the effort we gic jstands without a

1TRICTED AIR SUPPORT ON

ment made in Greece, which was very

not at this

of the Government in the prepare the public for a serious early Might they

disappointment. From a purely costly in aircraft, the situation in

Commons. stage of the campaign of 1941 | OUR SIDE.

"Let us look at the anatomy of

British standpoint there is no Iraq and Palestine, and potenti-

already be masters of Syria and

"It is only where great strategic doubt that the second of

these was ally in Syria, as well as the

Iraq and preparing themselves this Battle of Crete, which

issues of policy come that it is undertaken in bleak circumstances.

courses is to be preferred and winding up of The Abyssinian

for an advance Into Perala?

fitting for us to endeavour to form this course I have usually follow- "We hoped that the 25,000 to story, have all made very heavy "The Germans in this war have

a final opinion.

ed. demands upon our aircraft and gained many victories. They have 30,000 good troops---I am making arti lery

"DEFEAT IS BITTER. THERE in the situation

the Western easily overrun great countries and it a little vague-with

PEOPLE DO Desert had also to be considered. beaten down strong powers with and a proportion of tanks, aided IS NO USE IN TRYING TO EX-

little resistance. It is not only the by Greek forces, would be able to PLAIN DEFEAT.

destroy parachute and glider NOT LIKE DEFEAT AND DO Can't Be Told

question of time gained by fight-

NOT the enemy and pre-

LIKE EXPLANATIONS, ing strongly even if at a disadvan-landings of

HOWEVER ELABORATE OR "Before any rational Judginent | tage for important points, but vent him using the air fields

PLAUSIBLE. THE ONLY AN- could be formed on the disposi- there is also the vitally important harbours.

SWER TO DEFEAT IS VICTORY. Gion of our Air Force and the principle of stubborn resistance to consequent failure to supply an the will of the enemy.

Must-Have Foundation adequate air force for Crete, it would be necessary, វន in the case of A.A. guns, to know not only what are our whole resources but also what is the situation in these other theatres, which were all intimately inter-related.

Absurd 'Doctrine

Naval Losses

"The action

or

་

ex-

"The British nation is unique Is thie

respect that they aro the only people who like to be told...how, had things are, who like to be told the worst, and like to be told that they are very likely going to get much worse, in the future and must préparé?. themselves for further reverses, "But when you go to other coun "Our army was to destroy air-

tries oddly enough I saw a mess borne attacks while the Navy held "If Government in wartime "These are some of the argu-off or destroyed sea-borne attacks. gives the impression that it can-age from the authorities who are most concerned with our Arab not in the long run procure # ments that deserve to be consider. But there was a time limit.

problem at present, urging wo cares for its ed before you

of the Navy in victory, who can adopt a rule

the northern sca planations? It ought to go. That should be careful not to indulge"} that you have a certainty of win-maintaining

in too many gloomy forecasts. The guard without adequate air de- is, if you are, quite sure you can "It is no use trying to judge ning at any point and that if you these

matters without full have not got it beforehand you fence was bound to be very cost-find another which can do bet Arabs do not understand, British character of meeting trouble long

1. It is known how serious were ter. knowledge. Full knowledge must clear out. The whole his-y

before it comes and I think it is "However, .no Government much better to go on putting a cannot be made public.

tory of the war shows the fatal those losses.

"We could only stand a cer- "i com.e to the next stage of absurdity of such a doctrine.

can conduct war uniese it stands bold face on things and then tain proportion of naval loraca my argument. I have shown the

10 "It has been repeatedly proved

on a solid and stable founda- meet disaster when it arrives, before the northern eca guard joundations upon which we start-that flerce and stubborn resistance

tion and knows It. and; like. a of the Fleet would have to be ed and I now go a step forward. even against heavy odds and

withdrawn. "In March we decided to go to under exceptional conditions or the help of Greece in accordance local disadvantage is in essen-succeed in biting off the head

"If, meanwhile, the Army could

"Any statements of a pessimis- with our treaty obligations. This, tial element in victory.

"Unless there is a strong im- tic character used here are calcu❤ to the of course, exposed us

"The decision to fight for Crete the whole terrific apparatus of the pression of solidarity of strength lated to discourage our friends

invasion before the danger of being attacked in the was taken with the full know-air-borne

in Government in time of war, and to spread alarm and despon- Western Desert and also to de- ledge that air support would be naval time limit, or the loss limit, Government cannot give the sup-dency over wide regions to affect was reached. then the enemy feat by overwhelming numbers at a minimum, as anyone

fighting would have to begin all over again, and their commanders in a diffi-

men nicely balanced neutrals and toi in Greece, unless Yugoslavia sec-apart from

(Continued or Page 4) the question

"Having regard to the enormous played her part or unless the whether you have adequate son- Greek Army could be extricated plies or not who measures the unprecedented scale of the opera- tion and the losses he would have to hold some narrower line. distances from our air fields

well for the to incur, he might Egypt and compares them with

air time being have at least broken it the distances from enemy

off at any rate there would have fields in Greece, and quaints himself with the radius been a long delay before he could

have mounted it again. of action of dive bombers aircraft.

Attack On Crete

who

Full Personal Responsibility

can

in

-uti

and

The Critics

of

"If Greece was overrun by the enemy it seemed probable that Crete would be the next object of attack. The enemy with his vast local superiority in air power was

"That was the basis on which able to drive our aircraft from

the decision was reached. What airfields in Greece, and, adding

would our critics have said if we this to his enormously superior

fullest "I take the anti-aircraft batteries, he was able

personal had given up Crete without aring that decision a shot? to make those airfields rapidly responsibility for

"We should have been told this available for his own use.

but the Chiefs of Staff, the De-

and General had surrendered to the enemy the. "Moreover, as the season was fence Committee, advancing, many more airfields Wavell all not only thought Crete key of the eastern Mediterranean

our communications with became available to him as the ought to be defended in circum- that weather Improved and dried stances which were fully before Malta and our power to interrupt the the enemy's communications with them up. It was evident, there- them, but that in spite of

a Libya were grievously endanger- fore, that the attack on Crete, If lack of air support we had

of winning the ed. it were made, would be primar- good chance

"There is only too much truth lly an airborne' attack for which battle.

it "NOBODY HAD ANY ILLU-in all that, although perhaps again vastly superior hostile alr force would be available. SIONS ABOUT THE SCALE OF will not in the end turn out too

AT-badly. "The question arose whether we THE ENEMY AIRBORNE

WOULD should try to defend Crete or yield TACK. WE KNEW IT it without a fight. Nobody who BE GIGANTIC AND INTENSE.!

Greek bears responsibility for the decl- sion to defend Crete was ignorant aerodromes showed an enormous

which aircraft of the fact that conditions per-mass of mitted only the most meagre gathering there many hundreds British air support to be pro-and it turned out that the enemy mans but in each case the Ger- vided for our troops in the had prepared to pay at unlimited mans lost the battle and also the his campaign, and in the end lost the island or for the Fleet operat price for this conquest and

but can you be sure the would have been if the Allies had not. fought for Douaumont and Kem-

"Reconnaissances

over

were

"Crete was an extremely im-1 portant tallent In our line of: defence, like the Fort of Douau. mont at Verdun In 1916, and like Kommet Hill In' 1918. "These were taken, by the Ger-

ing round the island. It was not resources when concentrated up-war,

a fact that dawned upon military on any particular point may often same result and other

authorities after the be overwhelming at that point." achieved decision had been taken,

"It was the foundation of a dif-Broadcasts By Officers ficult and harsh choice whether Crete should be defended with- Referring to statements which

Air

ac-

De

mel Hill?

Relation To The Whole

"I can answer these but I do not propose to discuss tactics here because it is quite impos- able for us to fight battles in de- tail elther beforehand or after- wards, from Whitehall or from the Commans.

out effective air support or whe-had been ascribed to the spokes-

***These battles can only be judg- ther the Germans should be per- men of the War Office and

ed in their relation to the cam- mitted. to occupy it without Ministry, the Prime Minister opposition.

declared: "The cficers who give paign as a whole, a

"I have been asked why were "Some may say we should these broadcasts are not

the Cretan of

air fields not mined never fight without superior or at quainted. with the control least ample air support, and ask affairs and with what is decided beforehand or again why were commanded by long- when this lesson will be learned, or thought or felt in the Chiefs they not

range-gunfire, or why there were But suppose you cannot have it. of Staff Committee or the

not more: tanks allotted to their **“Questions to be settled are not fence Committee. always: between what is good and "I would very much have liked defences, and so on. Bad. Very often it is a choice to stop them and" in "somo' cases. between two very terrible alter I have reduced them in number. natives. If you cannot have this "It is very risky to asit a pro essential and desirable air support fessional officer to give a weekly must you, yield important key expatiation on the war when, in points one after another?

the nature of things, although he OTHERS HAVE TOLD ME may be very accomplished in his

́- "His' Majesty's Government; in YOU SHOULD DEFEND NO profession, he cannot know and PLACE THAT YOU CANNOT ought not to know the facts as their responsibility to Parliament, BE SURE YOU CAN HOLD they are understood at the secret choose the best generals they can find set before them the broad #THEN ONE MUST ASK CAN theetings.

ONE EVER BE SURE HOW AF the sarre time one it appeal-strategie objects of a campaign; ONE EVER BE SURE HOW A ed to ceaselessly to give more ask the necessary searching FORE IT HAS BEEN FOUGHT? Information to make the way more questions offer them any advice If the principle of not deferid-Interesting to the people und to or counsel that may ser fitting ing any place you cannot be sure fell them more about what is gow and then support them to the power?fritmønt and of holding were adopted, would ing on, but it is not possible for best of!

also 57long) not an enemy be able to make the head of the Government, cor s

great ship can win through a Seized Upon By Enemy

period of storme into clearer weather.

port necessary to

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