1941-06-11 — Page 3

Of The

Premier's Defence

Fighting In Middle East

(Continued from Page 2.)

"Obviously the Army is the main factor in the business and the Fleet is preserving the secur- ity of the Army on the seas and preserving command of the seas, and the Air Force assisting the Army and Fleet in all their functions.

"But in the event of any dif- ferences they can be settled in રા few hours by reference here. These commanders have to settle it among themselves, although we

share to the full for whatever is done.

in

responsibility

an unlimited number of valuable even for the Chiefs of Staff, to they retain their confidence, they cult period, a disheartening and conquests without any fighting at scrutinise beforehand these detail-support them with loyal com- disappointing period. all? Where would you make a ed weekly statements which are radeship in failure or success. stand and engage them with re-made. solution?

Where Would We Be ?

-No Illusions

"I think the matter must cer- "A further question arises as to tainly be reconsidered (Hear, what would happen if you allow-| hear).

Only Answer To Defeat

sometimes there

those cost, some-

If Government has always to be looking over its shoulder to see "whether it is going to. ha stabbed in the back or not, it cannot possibly keep its eye on the enemy.

to

"It is impossible to go, into tạc- tical details arid I never remeni-

British Are Unique ed the enemy to advance and "AS I HAVE SAID, NOBODY ber in the last War, in overrun, without cost to himself, HAD ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE

great battles which

"Another point of some dif- the must precious and

valuable TREMENDOUS SCALE OF THE thing like forty, fifty or 70,000 culty which presents itself to strategic points.

AIR-BORNE ATTACK. THE men -

asked I am talking of battles of me whenever I am "Where would the Germans GREATEST EVER DELIVERED

in which make a statement to the House a single day - and THAT be now suppose we simply re- IN THE WORLD, AND

is whether I ought to encourage were grave signed the territory and strate. WE SHOULD RESIST IT WITH-errors made, they were

good hopes of a successful out- aften.. gic islands without a Bght? OUT ANY BUT THE MOST RES-made the subject, of an arraign come or particular operations" or Might they not at this early TRICTED AIR SUPPORT ON ment of the Government in the prepare the public for a serious Stage of the campaign of 1941 OUR SIDE.

disappointment.

a "purely already be masters of Syrja and

British standpoint there "It is only where great strategic doubt that the second of Iraq and preparing themselves

issues of policy come that it is courses is to be preferred fitting for us to endeavour to form this course I have usually follow- a final opinion.

Commons,

"Apart from the effort we made in Greece, which was very costly in aircraft, the situation in Iraq and Palestine, and potenti-

"Let us look at the anatomy, of ally in Syria, as well as the

this Battle of Crete, which -was winding up of the Abyssinian

undertaken in bleak circumstances. for an advance into Persia? story, have all made very heavy

"We hoped that the 25,000 to "The Germans in this war have demands upon our aircraft and gained many victories. They have 30,000 good troops-I am making the situation

"DEFEAT IS BITTER. THERE the Western easily overrun great countries and it a little vague--with arti lery Desert had also to be considered. beaten down strong powers with and a proportion of tanks, aided IS NO USE IN TRYING TO EX- PEOPLE, DO little resistance. It is not caly the by Greek forces, would be able to PLAIN DEFEAT.

parachute question of time gained by fight-destroy

glider NOT LIKE DEFEAT AND DO and

NOT the enemy and pre-

LIKE EXPLANATIONS, ing strongly even if at a disadvan-landings of tage

HOWEVER ELABORATE OR for important points, but vent him using the air fields there is also the vitally important harbours.

PLAUSIBLE. THE ONLY AN- principle of stubborn resistance to

SWER TO DEFEAT IS VICTORY. the will of the enemy.

Must Have Foundation

Can't Be Told

"Before any rational judgment could be formed on the dispost- tion of our Air Force and the consequent failure to supply an adequate air force for Crete, it would be necessary, as in the case of A.A. guns, to know not only what are our whole resources but also what is the situation in these other theatres, which were all intimately inter-related,

you

Naval Losses

Or

"We could only stand a cer- tain proportion of naval lorsca before the northern .sca guard of the Flant would have to bo withdrawn.

"If Government in wartime

gives the impression. that it can not in the long run procure a

ed.

.

From

is

no these end

"The British nation is unique' is the respect that they are the only people who like to be told how bad things are, 'who like to be told the worst and like to be told that they are very likely going to get much worse in the future and must prepare, themselves for further reversed

most

"But when you go to other coun¬, Absurd Doctrine

"Our army was to destroy air- borne attacks while the Navy held

tries-oddly enough I saw a mess→

"These are some of the argu-

off or destroyed sea-borne attacks,

age from the authorities who are concerned with our Arab ments that deserve to be consider. But there was a, lime limit, ed before you

"The action of the Navy

problem at present, urging wes a rule can adopt

in victory, who cares for its ex- should be careful not to indulge, the that you have a certainty of win-maintaining

northern seaplanations? It ought to go. That' "It is no use trying to judge ning at any point and that if you guard without adequate air de- is, if you are quite sure you can Arabs do not understand British in too many gloomy forecasts. The

these matters without full have not got it beforehand

fence was bound to be very cost-find another which can do, bet character of meeting trouble long knowledge. Full knowledge must clear out.

It is known how serious. were | tér. The whole his-y.

before it comes and I think it is cannot be made public.

those losses. tory of the war shows the fatal

"However, no "】 come

Government much better to go on putting a to the next stage of absurdity of such a doctrine.

can conduct war unless it stands bold face on things and then my argument, I have shown the "It has been repeatedly proved

on a solid and stable founda- meet disaster when it arrives. foundations upon which we start that fierce and stubborn resistance

tlon and knows it and, like, a ed and I now go a step forward. even against heavy odds and

great, ship can win through "In March we decided to go to under exceptional conditions or

period of storms into clearer the help of Greece in accordance local disadvantage is un

weather. with our treaty obligations. This, tial element in victory. of course, exposed us to the The decision to fight for Crete danger of being attacked in the was taken with the full know- Western Desert and also to de- ledge that air support would be feat by overwhelming numbers at a

minimum, as anyone can in Greece, unless Yugoslavia see-apart from the question played her part or

the whether you have adequate sun- Greek Army could be extricated plies or not who measures the to hold some narrower line. distances from our air felds

Egypt and compares them the distances from enemy air fields in Greece, and who Ar-

unless

Attack On Crete

"If Greece was overrun by the enemy it seemed probable that Crete would be the next object of attack. The enemy with his vast local superiority in air power was able to drive

from our aircraft

airfields In Greece, and, adding this to his enormously superior

to make those airfields

available for his own use.

essen-

"If, meanwhile, the Army could succeed in biting off the head of

was reached, then the

• Seized Upon By· Enemy ̧

men nicely balanced neutrals and to

(Continued or Page 4)

"Any statements of a pessimis- "Unless there is a strong im-tle character used here are calcu the whole terrific, apparatus of the pression of solidarity of strength lated to discourage our friends air-borne invasion before the in Government in time of war, and to spread alarm and despon- naval time limit, or the loss limit, Government cannot give the sup dency over wide regions to affect

enemy port necessary to fighting would have to begin all over again. and their commanders in a diff-

"Having regard to the enormous unprecedented scale of the opera- tion and the losses he would have to incur, he might with

well for the time being have at least broken it off at any rate there would have been a long delay before he could have mounted it again.

The Critics

in

quaints himself with the radius

of action of dive bombers aircraft.

Full Personal Responsibility

and

"That was

the basis on which the decision was reached. What would our critics have said if we

that decision a shot?

anti-aircraft batteries, he was able "I take the fullest personal had given up Crete without firing

rapidly responsibility for

but the Chiefs of Staff, the De- "We should have been told this "Moreover, as the stason was fence Committee, and General had surrendered to the enemy the advancing, many more airfiolds Wavell all not only thought Crete key of the eastern Mediterranean

our communications with became available to him as the ought to be defended in circum- that weather improved and dried stances which were fully before Malta and our power to interrupt them up.

the the enemy's communications with It was evident, there them, but that in spite of fore, that the 'attack on Crete, if, fack of air support we had

a Libya were grievously endanger- it were made, would be primar- good chance of winning the ed. ily an airborne‘attack for which battle.

"There is only too much truth, again vart y superior hostile air "NOBODY HAD ANY ILLU-in all that, although perhaps force would be available.

SIONS ABOUT THE SCALE OF will not in the end turn out too "The question arose whether we THE ENEMY AIRBORNE AT-badly.

"Crete was an extremely im- should try to defend Crete or yield TACK. WE KNEW IT WOULD it without a fight. Nobody who BE GIGANTIC AND INTENSE. portant sallont In our fine of

"Reconnaissances bears responsibility for the deci-

defence, Ilke the fort of Douau. Greek sion to defend Crete was ignorant aerodromes showed an enormous

.mont at Verdun · · In 1916, and of the fact that conditions per-1 mass of aircraft which

like Kemmel- Hill in 1918. "These were taken by the Ger- most meagre gathering there many hundreds British air support to be pro-and it turned out that the enemy mans but in each case the Ger- in the had prepared to pay at unlimited mans lost the battle and also the island or for the Fleet operat-price for this conquest and his campaign, and in the end lost the

but can ing round the island. It was not resources when concentrated up-war,

you, be sure the a fact that dawned upon milltary on any particular point may often same result would have been and other authorities after the be overwhelming at that point."achieved if the Allies had not decision had been taken,

fought for Douaumont and Kem-

mitted only the

vided for our troops

ficult and harsh choice whether

over

were

"It was the foundation of a dif-Broadcasts By Officers mel Hill? Crete, "should be defended with- Referring to statements which Relation To The Whole

Air

- ,

out effective air support or whe-had been ascribed to the spokes- ther the Germans should be per-men of the War Office and

These battles can only be judg- mitted to occupy it without Ministry, the Prime Minister ed in their relation to the cam-

declared: "The cfficers who give paign as a whole.

opposition,

have been asked why were "Some may say we should these broadcasts are not ጆር never fight without superior or at quainted with the control of the Cretan air fields not mined least ample air support, and ask affairs and with what is decided beforehand or again why were when this lesson will be learned. or thought or felt in the Chiefs they not commanded by long- But suppose you cannot have it. of Staff Committee or the De-range gunfire, or why there were not more túnks allotted to their

"Questions to be settled are not fence Committee.

always between what is good and "I would very much have liked defences, and so on.

"I can answer these but I do bad. Very often it is a choice to stop them and in some cases

tactics between two very terrible alter-I have reduced them in number. not propose to discuss natives." If you cannot have this]. "It is very risky to ask pro- here because it is quite impos- essential and desirable air support fessional officer to give a weekly sible for us to fight battles in de- must you yield important key expatiation on the war when, in tall either beforehand or after- points one after another?

the nature of things, although he wards from Whitehall or from MOTHERS HAVE TOLD ME may be very accomplished in his the Commons, YOU SHOULD DEFEND NO profession, he cannot know and His Majesty's Government, in PLACE THAT YOU CANNOT ought not to know; the facts as their responsibility to Parliament, BEE SURE A YOU CAN THOLD: they are understood at the secret choose the best generals they can "?THEN ONE ~"MUST"ASK" CAN meetings.addres

fhd, set Before them the broad ONE EVER BE SURE HOW At the same time one ta appeal-strategic objects of a cam ONE, EVER BE SURE HOW A ed to censelessly to give more sak the necessary searching US FOREST HAS BEEN FOUGHT? Information to make the wat more | qu WF4If the principle of not defend- interesting to the people uhd to}}

*ing any place you cannot be surg® tell them more about what is go- ört holding, were adopted, would, ing on, but Its is not possible, for not an enemy. be able to make the head of the Government, vor | m

asioffer them→ counsel that;

then suppor

their powe tions and also,

Ladies Attention!

(LATEST BEACH HAT);

Make the most of yourself this Summer with a figure control bathing suit.

*

An exclusive range of JANTZEN and other brands are fully represented.

Inspection Cordially Invited

China Emporium Ja