1941-03-11 — Page 39

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THE CHINA MAIL, MARCH 11, 1941.

CHINA MAIL

WINDSOR HOUSE

OFFENSIVE ON ALL

FRONTS

The threat that the expected Spring offen- sive may be an of- fensive on all fronts begins to take the shape of reality. The possibility that all the aggressors | might strike at once and together, not in concert but in collusion, each out to rake in his own plum-] der in a general orgy of plunder, has long loomed as the logical finale to the desperate gamble for

world dominion in which they are now so deeply in- volved. The dictators have gone too far to retreat. They mistrust one an- other too much to act separately. The failure of the Italian attack in the Mediterranean, designed to be a key move in the grand manoeuvre, is grim reminder that they rise and fall together, and a spur to the develop- ments now taking place! as they race to beat the assembly line in the American arsenal.

a

Having "arbitrated" to her own advantage the dispute between Thai- land and French Indo- China, Japan is appar- ently casting her shadow on Singapore.

RMS.

ONE

YEARS OF

PROGRESS

IN THE LIMELIGHT

THE MERRY WIDOW

We need modern

Machine

The spirit in which the common, fensive later on is the adminis- people of Britain have withstood |trative one of how to give com- the strain and danger of ruthless mand and fuller scope to men aerial attack has aroused the ad- with modern minds.

miration

By

Major Hamish Wilson

Page T

It must not, however, be thought that the Inoreased importance of technicians renders infantry ho longer necessary,

They must also be trained in the use of all the most effective müdern weapons, such as Bren guns, Thompson guns, mortars. grenades, in anti-tank tactics, and so forth, but their function will no longer be the same as before. Frontal assaults will, we hope, be lewer-or the slaughter will be ruinous.

The armoured units, with their attendant air arm will seek out the weak spot of the enemy. When the breach is made, the motorised infantry will be rushed to it in trucks, and their business will be to take possession of the captured ground and to set up a consolidat- ed defence of its flanks. They will also have to reduce, by manoeuvre and the use of their modern wea- pons, any remnants of resistance there may be.

They will keep open the tunnel through which the tanks will in- Altrate and destroy the enemy.

For such duties, weapon training is very necessary. It is, morcovér. of great importance that as many officers and non-commissioned of- ficers as possible should be entire ly proficient in the tricacies of map-reading. If it is cagy lose one's way with a marching column, it is far easier with on moving at ter times the speed.

Trade Union Role

to

Trainig in all such matters calls for bighly intelligent per- reption and leadership. Our coas Script army has within its ranks men with bigh technical expert- ence in civilian life. These men must be so placed in their units that, though they learn thoroughly the fundamentals of general sol- diering, their skill as technicians is not wasted,

There is always present the danger that they may get caught up into the ordinary routine of army life and their skill be lost.

Though their qualifications are noted on forms when they “re- gister," forms have a habit of getting lost. Some machinery should be evolved whereby pres- sure could be put upon army com- manders by a committee from the Trade Unions, if the skill of their members

being carelessly waster.

wus

It is even possible that if the sufficiently Army is as yet not supplied with the most modern equipment, many such men might still be of greater value to the war-cffort in civilian life. The -Army already bas too many "square pegs in round holes." Such a division would comprise | due in many cases to the slavish

of the world. Such A vital step in this direction 350 armoured units. 1ts man- following of the "taxl-cab" sys- civilian courage ments, in return, would seem to be the reorganisa- power would total about 3,500. Its tem of promotion by length of the highest possible efficency the armed forces.

intion of the armoured units into a hitting-power would be tremend-service.

ner?

1918- the tank.

Britain first organised 11 me- chanised force and began to ex- periment, with its use in the field.

Britain realised first the effec tiveness of supporting such me- chanised units by low-flying aw-

perience.

man of

is also a strategic ability.

罪

divisions

ing too much merely part of a

in

United Strategy

All such training involves al- limitless detail. Not only must mechanised experts, airmen and infantrymen, each know the exact part to be played by the others; they must also have as full a knowledge as possible of

the others' difficulties. Better Cooperation

There is yet

Suggestion is that the -same military oligarchy that drove the Japanese

separate Arny of our forces. Incus. In support of this armoured At the present moment,- care- into the quagmire of

Much is now said of the "culti- such an Armoured Corps it is es- force, and attached to it, there ful training, particularly thau vation of the offensive spirit." But sential that senior posts should be must be an Artillery group con- China is attempting to is the Army really preparing for held only by men with mechani- sisting

for the Armoured Corps, is of far of one Brigade of 25-greater Importance than any long- retrieve that costly fail- the Spring in an enlightened man-cal knowledge, training and ex-pounders, one light howitzer Bri- term attempt to raise the general ure by conquests in East

gade, and two AA. batteries. intellectual standards of the Britain undoubtedly has the

At least ten such That the specialist nature of

troops. Asia. hefore the British raw materials and the scientists the Royal Armoured Corps is at should be created as soon as pos- The standard of efficiency of fleet is able to divert part, and skilled workmen,

all officers, both commissioned Britain produced the one out long last being recognised in high sible. of its strength from the standing invention among

The training of such armoured † and 'non-commissioned, must be places is shown by the recent ap- the Mediterranean. Also, no weapons of land-warfare in 1914-pointment of Major-General G. Le units must, of necessity, be high- continually tested by examina- Q. Martel to its command. Not ly complex. The morale of each tion. In addition, examining staffs doubt, it gambles on

only is General Martel the gifted unit will depend to a more mark- should themselves also be, from inventor of the one-man tank; he ed degree than ever before upon time to time, changed-to prevent American <commitments

distinct them outstanding the reul efficiency (as

becoming stereotyped of aid to Britain to insure

fron leadership) of its officers. outlook. It seems certain that such a New ideas must be continually quiescence in the Pacific.

man will soon gather around him studied, practised and criticised But this has been from craft.

a really efficient band of senior both in attack and defence. technical cfficers. These men The creation of altogether new the beginning a war of Yet it was left to the German

most the personnel-to en- of crews mechanised divisions, with their should, by their enlightened at-ranks for miscalculations.

attendant dive-bombers, to win titude to modern warfare, at last courage the initiative

a bold bid to- and to prevent any feeling of be- the Battle of France. The British be able to make The crisis in the Orient technical initiative in such mat-wards a still higher status for the

machine-might be considered. ters was shelved, by old-fashioned Royal Armoured Corps. is intended to synchronise minds in high military quarters. Moreover, it would be well to

In high places, the three major with the mounting ten-We, together with our French Al- simplify the whole organisation lies, have paid a heavy price for or the Corps, and not to continue sion in Europe. Yugo-such folly.

another problem sections of the land forces-the to cling to the old cavalry group that should at once be tackled: Infantry, the Army Air Command,

and the slavia, is expected to end To prepare an army for a suc- ings. This young formation would

Armoured Corps-must resistance to joining the requires the use

cessful war in an Age of Petrol rank as the equal of any older-the vast problem of liaison.

To mamtain close cooperation each have an equal right to ex- of ideas and established groups; its senior of between units in either attack or press an opinion upon strategy.' Axis. The fate of Bulgaria technical skill of men who have ficers would hold an equivalent defence was even in 1914-1913

The role of tanks must be pro- ranking and its independence

-a complicated problem.

perly assessed. They are not a is sealed. Apparently de- grown up in such an Age.

The "Boer War" mentality would be guaranteed.

mere adjunct to the infantry-so To do so to-day is certainly no many tanks to so many infantry serted by Russia another of many senior officers handi- The war will be won not by "reluctant" little neutral of the last war,

capped us in the early years heroism, but by machines intelli-less difficult. The enemy in France units. They are the picked fight-

completely upset the British and We have already gently directed; not by masses of French liaison, system, Units being force of the future. is to be either passageway been adversely affected in this infantry, but by the breaking-up came detached and scarcely knew groups of their own, free from They must be used in massed for Hitler's war or itself a of many senior officers in the War units with aerial support.

war by the "1914-1918" outlook of such masses by mechanised

where they were or where the the demands of the infantry; small battleground.

enemy were either. This must on groupings of them will generally Office and in the regimental com-

no account be allowed to happen end munds, The control of the vigor-

to severe losses. Whether they are held in reserve as Either a many-pronged cus, imaginative ideas of the We Need More Tanks attack is planned in the ideas of men who ore senior

In the fast-moving warfare of overwhelming fire-unit in a de- younger men by the outworn, set

by The number of Armoured Divi-to-day, a matter of essential im-cisive counter-attack, or whether Balkans, the Mediter- virtue of length of service must sions, and the composition of each portance is the proper use of wire- they are carefully prepared for such division, will be a matter for less telegraphy. The enemy has offensive (as distinct from coun- ranean and the China It is wanton waste to await careful, unprejudiced decision by shown himself far ahead of us in ter-offensive) action must be de- -Sea, accompanied by an the test of action before the ad- the High Command.

his grasp of the possibilities of cided upon by the High Command justment of true merit is attempt- It is certain that we had too radio in war. This has not been | strategists.⠀ intense campaign to cut ed. A man accustomed to plan in few tanks in comparison with merely in the subtle tricks of pro.. The opinion of tank experts off American supplies to terms of infantry moving at three the enemy in France. It is also paganda, but also in this very must, however, be listened to Britain, or the world is miles per hour will find the speed certain that, to be really effective, matter of liaison between air, in- without prejudice. Just as tanic

of modern mechanised warfare a our policy must be bold,

fantry and tank units.

tactics are being improved, so is. being misled by more false serious problem.

At the outset of the war our There is no need slavishly to it reasonable to assume that anti- The solution is bound to be mobile divisions were too light follow his example, but there is tank methods are also developing alarms. Such alarms may found more easily by men brought in fire-power; there was an un- great need for Improving upon fast. be the climax to the up as youth in the modern age, due preponderance of ligh: recon-our own employment of so potent

A buld and imaginative concep- tion of the whole problem is sn strategy of terror, but the with their more mechanical turn naissance tanks. A much stronger a weapon.

̈óf mind.

Division would-be one consisting Here again is yet another op- essential of land victory. It is the very necessities of the

of about 100 heavy tanks, 150portunity for the specialist techril- | co-ordination of all such matters dictators, make it unlike-

medium tanks, and 100 light tanks, clan. The most coteful training by the High Command that must together with 10 moke tanks for of such men ought to be under-knit the modern army into an ly.

purposes of camouflage.

taken at once.

intelligent, democratle whole,

be broken,

New Partner

A key problem, then, of how best to train our army for an of:

**

agam.