1941-01-21 — Page 7

Why To Build A Navy

Hitler Failed

It may seem

Hitler, who

↑

remarkable that fed by Bismarck. The Austrian war Britain and France, which brought ; fought our Grand Fleet in January prepared Germany of 1866, commonly called the vividly home to Germany the fact 1915, they would have found it.

only two dreadnought battleships for war with such intense effort Seven Wecks War, was decided on that, if her merchant fleet and co-

sea fighting that lonies were to be protected in a superior in number to their own. omitted to build an adequate Navy, land; the only and thus failed to profit by the took place was between the Ita- future war, it was essential for her Want of sea-instinct caused the German High Command to re- afforded by the lians and the Austrians, and in to have a strong Navy. But what major lesson

the risk of losing. way It should have been no

affected the Great War.

Prussian she did not appreciate, and has fuse to take

yet to learn. is that the strength ships, and so lost the best and only army, The Franco-Prussian war, similarly, was entirely a land of a Navy should be assessed not chance they ever had of winning campaign In which the French only in terms of ships, but that the the Great War.

and of the officers of Fleet had no major role to play. psychology

resultant accumulation The

The broadcast speech of Joseph P. Kennedy like his resignation from the appointment of United States Ambassador to the Court of St. James's raises two questions of great in-pparent to him, and his advisers, that the real cause of the collapse the Central Powers in 1918 terest. One is whether he

was the stringent blockade intends to help or hinder

Germany by the allied fleets; yet, the effort to send increas- in 1939. he let himself in for a ed aid to Britain. For war of titanic magnitude with a

navy absurdly smaller many months there have one which had proved inadequate been indications that the to save Ambassador was out of sympathy with much of President Roosevelt's pol- icy of helping Britain.

Great War.

than the

German defeat in the

The reasons for this are how- ever not difficult to detect if wu

bear in mind the fact that the Germans, broudly speaking, ar

German Seafaring race. ithals and war policy are found-

Fot

-By- Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon,

K.C.B.. K.C.V.O..

C.V.O., D.8.0.

of

mere

the

ma-

crews has to be reckoned with. Sea instinct is hereditary; it is also impossible to create tradi- Lions suddenly. Even in these days when ships may be looked on as

machines floating on water, differing from land chines mainly in shape and size n seaman is a seaman still.

IIIs upbringing, his outlook on strategy and tactics, dixer radically from that of those who fight ashore. The instincts of a German Naval of- Acer, both in the Great War, and in that of to-day are by no means the same as those of an officer in a Navy as old established as the British.

Undoubtedly, this want of sea- instinct also blurred the outlook of Hitler. He saw, or thought he saw, how the submarine campaign nearly won the Great War for Germany. It seemed that if num-. bers of boats could be progres- sively increased in the next war, the

chatice of mastery at would increase until it became a certainty. More small vessels, even in large numbers, were cheaper and more easy to provide.

yca

By the Treaty of Versailles Germany was denied the right tu build large ships except to re- place a few old-class battleships which she had been allowed to keep to protect her shores in the Baltic. It was useless to try to build battleships on the sly, for this could not be done without attracting attention, and probably the Incurring strong action on part of England and France. So

Since returning to then the worst of the characteris- United States in October,ties of Frederick the Great, all of this one side experience led Ger

whore campaigns were en-many, not unnaturally, to look on he has been quoted in

{LF) Navy as tirely land campaigns. Command

expensive luxury i and not a vital necessity. Hitler statements about Britain of the sea and sea-fighting never

once called battleships It is not easy to lay one's finger which left little likelihood affected him or his armies in the himself

on the many slight differences be- slightest degree. His military ef- "luxury wys of the democracies."

tween the two; one however stands that he would be going forts were largely concentrated on

In the early nineties of last cen-

out in bold relief. In the Army the humbling Austria, back to London. There robbing and

His seizure of Silesia led to the tury a truer perception of the loss of material is looked on, more or less, as a disgrace. "Saving the undoubtedly the appoint-Seven Years War in which he value of sea power was awaker- ment of an envoy whose ought no less than twenty three ed in all countries, largely owing guns has always been a rallying considerable land battles, while to the writings of Admiral Mahan, cry: Colenso and Malwand are in-

he built a few submarines, which stances. At sca

it is a cardinal she was allowed to do, and also background and opinions the only sea fighting that took U.S.N. This concided with a de- were more like the Pre-place was between England and sive on the part of Germany for axiom that, in fighting, ships must the so called, "pocket battleships"

faint expansion;

be lost if victory is to be attain- "Graf Spec" were

"Deutschland” and France, of which even a sident's would be wel-echo hardly reached the armies acquired and her sea-borne trade ed. A little thought will show how "Admiral Scheer" ships which Then in thegreatly this difference of outlockeculd only have a very limited and come. From the English fighting in mid-Europe. This ab-greatly expanded,

of naval activity applies early years of this century came most affect the fighting of a naval special use, and which were quite side, either John G. Win-applies also to the wars engineer- the rapprochement between Great ¦ action, Had the German fleetuseless for serious sea warfare. ant or William C. Bullitt, the two most prominently mentioned as successors, would promote better re-

So

colonics

lations and to that extent What Will Russia Do?

facilitate the aid-to-Brit-

ain programme.

about a meeting

countries where

sational and dramatic.

to threaten the Turkish rear, for the Turks dislike the idea of a war on two fronts just as much us the Germans did.

The speeches of Hitler and his

If the Turks surrendered to this Yes-men are filled with such sta- threat then Hitler could treat the tements which could be paralleled Greco-Italian campaign as a side- by Soviet

statements about Naine and could push his armies down through Rumania and Bul- garia and across the Dardanelles

Suez Canal. That would be triumph indeed, but there are great obstacles in the way.

By Vernon Bartlett towards the oil of Irak and

tional-Socialism. The two men who net in Berlin. therefore, met

the Berlin discussions whichment which neither will respect if

that

the

A

In fact the German Admiralty made the same mistake as that of which Italy has been guilty, namely, building special vessels which it was hoped might sneak about and sink larger warships, or prey on sea commerce instead of building ships which could openly face the fleet of its oppon- nent.

There was at this time a world- Mr. Kennedy's state- Our newspapers recen ly carried sistance of a Bolshevist state. For I fear that the moment any nation

wide, but totally unjustifiable be- ment that he resigned to large headlines

agreed to accept such assistance it

liet that aircraft were, infallibly, able to sink battleships; and, in "help the President to which we cannot pretend to like would seal its own doom.”

German naval circles, that the Hitler-Molotov meeting in

and submarine keep the United States the

magnetic mine out of war" carried the Berlin.

were capable of supplanting the implication that he could It is the technique of dictators

battleship. It seemed therefore to advisers that, if Hitler and his the

submarine new mines and help more if not acting as to publicise their journeys and

could take the place of the battic- the President's represen-meetings. It is a successful tech-

fleet, there was no reason to at- tative in London. Does nique, for in

tempt to rival Britain in battleship construction, especially when that mean that he expects, there is a free press the journey or

cheaper weapons could destroy to oppose the President's the meeting at once becomes sen-

those mammoths. Further, the! aeroplane was useful in land. developing policy of aid to

One is the Turkish knowledge | fighting as well as at sea, so it was His speech on There are certain things about to conclude an opportunist agree- Britain?

surrender would mean better to bank on machines which slavery. Another is the doubt could play the double role. Saturday revealed some should not be forgotten. On Janu-It becomes inconvenient to do so.

whether the Soviet

army would modification of his ori-ary 30, 1937, for example, Hitler

# Why, then, did they meet? They undertake campaign against

Needless to say this was not the ginal stand, perhaps the sald to the sheep-like members of

his Releshtag: "I consider Bol- met because Hitler's war against Turkey, whatever the assurances opinion of British naval officers. to Hitler thero They know well the difficulties result of the influence of shevism the most malignant poison Britain and Mussolini's war against Molotov gave

Greece have been so unsuccessful. may always be mysterious delays attending sea-work; the difficulties close

that part of of successful air attack on ships; contact with the that can be given to any people..

therefore try other and difficulties it is out of the question that Na- Hitler must

know the difficulties that great weight of American tional-Socialist Germany should me hods and Russian help is ne- the world, as those Germans have they

to protec. Bolshe-cessary if they are to succeed. Mo- learnt who expected vast supplies submarines encounter in attack- opinion. But he is still in ever be found

we or that

on our side lotov has no great desire to be an from Russia atter the signature of ing convoys; and they know how that curious half-way should ever agree to accept the as-accomplice but he has little choice the last Russb-German agreement, those, whose business is to live on because there is perhaps no coun. A third obstacle is the fact that deep waters, have the knack of house which is reluctant

try in the world to-day that an Germany

Russia circumventing such attacks. for this important to send material overseas

much wants to keep out of war as adequately

Its only

firm belief that im-service.

They have a command of the sea must be gain- by entering the

warmediate danger of war comes from

M. Molotov may be tempted by ed and held by surface vessels, Germany, and therefore Germany The issue, as far as Mr. frankly as

of a country the ally of must be placated.

offers of an outlet to the Persian that the commerce Gulf, less than a thousand kilo- must be carried in ships above Kennedy is concerned, de- Britain and China, to

metres in a straight line from the water, and that these ships are pends on the meaning and stop the aggressors where

Fourteen months ago the Soviet Caspian Sea. The mouth of the best attacked by surface vessels. Union signed an agreement with Baltic Sea is controlled by Ger- They look on submerged craft, and purpose of his reference they are. Many others Nazi Germany. Ever since, under many; the mouth of the Black Sea air-craft as useful auxiliaries to to keeping "out of war." the majority-believe that the cloak of that agreement. It has would be controlled by Germany surface command but as a doub Everyone who uses that money and materials been building up defensive barriers if Turkey surrendered and allowed full substitute for suxiace vessels. slogan needs to specify should be thrown into the acquired half of Poland, which Minor. Vladivostock is a long way Goering, Goebbels and the like, Everyone prefers peace to struggle but not men, protect the rich wheatfields of the

Ukraine; part of Finland, which of ports on the Persian Gulf must

vism

if it is, possibly, too late! American continent best the Soviet Union.

•

in

cannot pay

against the Nazi danger." It has Hitler's troops to cross into Asia

away. Therefore the prospect war. But that is not the Many others are thinking protects the approaches to Lenin- be an attractive one to Moscow.

question. The real ques- more in terms of building grad; Estonia, Latvia and Lithua

nin, crowded for political rea- But it is hardly possible that the

The German leaders, Hitler, had neither sea knowledge nor sca experience. Their uyes” were focussed on war as carried out on land, and they hoped that their tion is: What is the price an impregnable defence sons by German colonists; Buko-Bussians, who have so carefully sea inovations would all the of peace? Does anyone in the Western Hemis-vina and Bessarabia, which bring built up their defences against bill; moreover they were impati- ert to obtain results. Their war, the Russians to the banks of the Germany during the last year are to be successful had to be won suppose that the British

phere.

Danube and well on the way to going to open their flank by allow before Britain could re-arm; so people would not prefer

wards the Dardanelles. Germany, ing the Germans into Turkey in they did not dare to delay the peace to the nightly rain Apparently Mr. Ken-in return, has gained nothing but return for a German offer of an commencement of hostilities, in that she outlet to, the Persian Gulf which is order to attempt to rival Britain's of bombs? Our problem nedy is in this group. But the uneasy assurance has been on what terms] those who belong to it would not have to carry on war not Germany's to give. Therefore, strength in battleships. Perhaps, we would have peace or should say whether they how long

would stop aid to Britain. They should try to define That now is also Ameri- the point at which they ca's problem. There are fear such aid will lead many Americans to-day America into war. They who believe that war can should say also what they be fended off from the would do if Britain fell.

on two fronts.

whatever the communique issued starting as they perforce had to a from Berlin, some of us will con- long way in arrear, they may have A Greek surrender to Italy might tinue to doubt, whether the results seen that it was hopeless to try possibly have led to a Turkish can be important. Hitler will con- to overtake our numbers, and that surrender to Germany. Instead, the sinue to hate Bolshevism. Russia it was highly improbable that we vallant Greek defence has led to will continue to build up defences should allow them to carry out a strengthening of British positions against the Nazis. The Britishi will so ingenuous a programme. In the strategists this to a strengthening of Turkish de growing military strength and to Germin contempt of sea power is which will termination to light. Hitler's only doubt the ultimate importance of one of the fallacies hope of destroying that determina- | such obviously artificial political lead to Germany's defeat in this:*

war os in the last. tion is by persuading the Russians intrigues,

in the eastern Mediterranean, and continue to believe in their own view of British