1940-10-01 — Page 39

THE CHINA MAIL, OCTOBER 1, 1940.

CHINA MAIL

WINDSOR HOUSE

IRRESISTIBLE?

The alliance between Tokyo and the Axis, fac- tually, changes little. What was understood is now openly professed.

It will do Britain more good than harm, however, if, as is likely, its effect is to bring home to Ameri- cans how close they are to actual conflict, how cir- cumstances are compell- ing them to a decision, or at least to a long-range defence policy which will involve stinting themsel- ves in order that Britain be maintained in the fore- front in overwhelming strength.

If world conditions were such that a nation could i keep out of war simply by not being disposed to go to war, these argu- ments would have some force. But Europe has seen one nation after another overrun whose deepest de- sire was to be left in peace, Even isolationists general- ly accept the thesis that the only way for America safely to assume it will not have to go to war is to be prepared for it if it

comes.

sions. Thus:

Page

7597-1588-1599-1600...

(Copyright in All Countries.)

Four Military Tasks

Four military tasks confront‍] mean

for generations:

Invaders Task

1-Repelling offective invasion.

(a) the establishment of the full nature of the problem As for the first of these ques-

nery alone, the defence outclasses way appear on inspection to be as

the maintenance

By HILAIRE BELLOC

be

Air Blockade

this country in its present situa- two or more bridgeheads and (b) will be, apparent. In marine, gun- tions the difficulties in the enemy' tion: (1): Repelling (or, better still, destroying); effective invasion; (2)

of permanent| the offensive by sea, and on the formidable here as in; any other On this premise, how- Imposing blockade on the enemy; communications oversea between one side you have a professional department. The great extent of ever, the three conten- (3) Raising the enemy's counter-those bridgeheads and the enemy's personnel formed by years of long our own coastline and the great blockade; (4) Ultimately taking sources of supply in men and training, on the other a short number of available ports, coupled tions of the die-hard iso-offensive. This last point is com- munitionment from the continent. service conscript personnel. The with the obvious fact that the de- lationists boil down to monly understated or omitted, Its As to (a), it is by no means an difference is not to be neglected. fence possesses interior lines, are a The maintenance of permanent the conditions adverse to a coun- strange and grim conclu-necessity will be explained when impossible taske, beginning on

we reach it.

reduced scale, and increasing after communications therefore is the ter-blockade of this island by_the These four acts are neither con- the bridgeheads were established kernel of the invasion business enemy. It has not as yet been To hold that one should secutive nor indissoluble. The first More than one bridgehead and from the point of view of the really attempted. The main arm

three might come into play simul- preferably

widely

separated enemy, and is by far the heaviest against it (which is defence from not begin to fight until taneously or only two of them bridgeheads are a condition of of his tasks, perhaps beyond pow- the air) works at the shortest pos-

Their connection is not such invasion, because an isolated er, of accomplishment.

sible ranges and from bases which his country is invaded is, might...

necessary or indissoluble either bridgehead would invite imme- It may be argued that invasion are, like every other form of. in effect, to prefer that because one of them, invasion, is dilate and overwhelming naval being now possible not only by island defence, upon interior lines, war should be fought on rest, while, the last one, the coun- its small beginnings.

a separate proposition from the and military concentration against sea but by air, such arguments as Therefore these are obsolete. That is indeed

The Final Decision American soil, destroying ter-offerisive, takes on its full feint and diversion are necessary the contention of those who, on American homes, giving three

value only when all the other to the invader.

the enemy side, have been most 4-Counter- affensive. - The are accounted for: But

hopeful of success. But the use fourth point we have called the hostages of American re- complete failure in any one of Problem Never Solved of the air for invasion must con- most essential. It is the point of sider the excellence of thean ultimate counter-offensive sources rather than that these acts would mean defeat. ac

cording to the degree of that Such bridgeheads, we say, are numerically inferior air force on against the enemy. In all human its tide should be met and failure, while failure in the first, conceivable enough. The military the side of the defence. This su conflict there can be but two turned back before it rea-vasion, would mean defeat of all might well be at first insufficient constantly pointed out, increasing.the offensive, carried on from the repelling of the effective in- opposition to them from within periority in quality is, as we have forms of conclusive action. One is ches United States shores. the rest. Upon the carrying out and the naval threat against them Wherever the enemy has hitherto start to finish till a decision is

Those who oppose fur- of these acts, and especially the from without would at first struck with full success he has reached; the other is the defen- ̈

last, the counter-offensive, de-

met with no. adequate : résistance sive, and the defensive can have nishing assistance to Brit-pends the survival of this country

in this arm here he would meet only one object which is the gain- with high resistance.

ing of time in which to develop ain may reasonably be in the national position it has held

the opportunities for an offensive asked, "Do you mean you

later on. A permanent defensive would rather wait until

is inconceivable as a method. It the lives of American sai-

2.-Imposing blockade. Sup- is a contradiction in terms. The lors instead of British sai- Only effective invasion is to be scattered, awaiting concentration posing invasion on sufficient scale most powerful defensive systems considered, ie, massive invasion It is rather the second condition, be not attempted, the defensive in history (of which perhaps the lors shall be risked in on a scale permitting full and the maintenance of permanent would rely upon the traditional crusading Syrian-castles were for the power of blockade and the offen- their period the best examples) operating destroyers, and permanent occupation and com- communications between

pelling the destruction or capitu-bridgeheads and the continent, sive (that is the enemy action have never served for defence do you prefer that the lation of the defence. If such in- which presents the most formid against us) upon the novel ex- only, but always for ultimate Lacking the American Army and Navy vasion succeeds it succeeds alto- able difficulties, No doubt the periment of counter-blockade, the counter-offensive.

success of this last, a defensive gether. No partial success la pos-enemy has built and concentrated closing of our ports. by

system has always failed and should have to fight-possible that is no partial success transport and has added also by action from the air. sibly Japan and Germany could be one hatever sum er by sen. No doubt along com-upon the much greater difficulty Now, what are the opportunities

could of final service to the new building to his striking pow- The enemy has rightly insisted must fail. at once without an ally clent body of resistance remained paratively short and narrow lanes which out effort at blockading him for the counter-offensive, on our in the world rather than would in the nature of things, be great superiority in the air might will suffer from the extension of side in the present struggle? The increasingly reinforced by the guarantee transport temporarily. the approaches to be watched. moral factors are numerous, the with one?"

defence with its much greater re- But temporary transport would Until lately it sufficed to watch chief among them being the gen- Finally, those who plead sources and world-wide comes have to be permanent and on the Channel. It is now necessary and the growing reaction of those

connec-|

worthless. Transport would the issues of the North Sea and eral opinion of the civilised world to save American youth communication by sea were not very large scale indeed. This is to consider all the French Atlan- whom the enemy has oppressed, from conscription and interrupted). If effective invasion true oven of the supplies required the coast and of course, the entries otcupled and massacred. But

this Imponderable,. on a large scale and occupying for the personnel, and when we to the Mediterranean, which in neglecting training in peacetime for the invaded territory fully is suc- add to this the very great dificul- cluded the entry of the Red Sea which cannot be measured or de- defence are advocating a cessful nothing could oust it. or ties of conveying, and landing the Nor can blockado be imposed, sively discussed, there is one, ma- destroy it, save a fully equipped heavy material, tanks and artil-éven with a wholly superior naval jor opportunity for counter-offen- complacent course that and fully organised army on the lery and munitionment, which the power on supplies across the sive from our side. That oppor may result in these young same scale at least as the invad- effort would require, it should be Near East and the Black Sea. tunity not only remains Intact so manifest that the establishment On all these accounts the chemy long as invasion is repelled but men being sent into bat- Now the conditions of effective of permanent communications by has affirmed the impossibility of continually increases in value. It tle as the most helpless invasion on such a scale are sim- the enemy between his bases and the old-fashioned blockade is the use of the air arm,

The knowledge of this makes kind of "cannon fodder".

ple and known to everybody they his invading forces would present against him being established un-

a problem never yet solved and der present conditions...It is to be the enemy subject to the condi- perhaps insoluble. untrained troops instead

remarked that neutrál opinion, so tions of a comparatively short fat as it can be gauged by the war. He may, for purposes of of skilled in how to pro- ing to think in humane The Kernel

neutral Press, inclines to the ruse, talk otherwise, but he knows enemy's thesis here; but only ex-well enough that unless, he con tect themselves.

and sympathetic terms.

When we consider that the main perience can decide,

occupy the base from which ne The people who take Yet is this true solicitude obstacle to any such action is still 3-Raising the counter-block-will be attacked, which base is these positions are for the for American youth and ren feet which in mere numbers adp. Can the chemy establish a this island, the ultimate fuerens- remains overwhelmingly superior counter-blockade and, if so, could ing'superiority of the air arm, not 'most part keenly con- civilised behaviour in the to anything the enemy can have the defence raise it when it was only in quality but in quantity, provided,, and in trained personnel established or in course of estab- will involve a decision against scientious. They are try-world?

is still more strikingly superior, [ lishment?

him.

er's own forces.

enemy