1940-10-01 — Page 23

THE CHINA MAIL, OCTOBER 1, 1940.

CHINA MAIL

WINDSOR HOUSE --

IRRESISTIBLE?

The alliance between Tokyo and the Axis, fac- tually, changes little. What was understood is now openly professed.

It will do Britain more good than harm, however, if, as is likely, its effect is to bring home to Ameri- cans how close they are to actual conflict, how cir- cumstances are compell- ing them to a decision, or at least to a long-range defence policy which will involve stinting themsel- ves in order that Britain be maintained in the fore- front in overwhelming

strength.

If world conditions were such that a nation, could keep out of war simply by not being disposed to go to war, these argu ments would have some force. But Europe has seen. ane nation after another averrun whose deepest de- sire was to be left in peace. Even isolationists general- ly accept the thesis that the only way for America: safely to assume it will not have to go to war is to be prepared for it if it

comes.

Page

"1597-1598-1599-1600-

(Copyright in All Countries.)

Four Military Tasks

we reach it.

Invaders' Task

But

By HILAIRE BELLOC

#

Sup-

The

Four military tasks confront; mean (a) the establishment of the full nature of the problem As for the first of these ques- this country in its present situa- two or more bridgeheads and (b) will be apparent. In marine gun- tions the difficulties in the enemy's tion: (1) Repelling for, better still, On this premise, how- Imposing blockade on the enemy; communications oversea between one side you have a professional department. The great extent of destroying) effective invasion; (2) the maintenance of permanentnery alone the defence outclasses way appear on inspection to be as the offensive by sea, and on the formidable here as in any other ever, the three conten- (3) Raising the enemy's counter-those bridgeheads and the enemy's personnel formed by years of long our own coastline and the great

blockade; (4) Ultimately taking sources of supply in men tions of the die-hard iso-offensive. This last point is com- munitionment: from the continent. service conscript personnel. The with the obvious fact that the de- and training, on the other. a short-number of available ports, coupled lationists boil down to monly understated or omitted; its As to (a), it is by no means an difference is not to be neglected.. fence possesses interior lines; are strange and grim conclu- necessity will be explained when impossible task, beginning on

The maintenance of permanent the conditions adverse to a coun-. reduced scale and increasing after communications therefore is sions. Thus:.

theter-blockade of this island.by. the These four acts. are neither con- the bridgeheads were, established. kernel of the invasion business enemy. It has not as yet been To hold that one should scoutive nor indissoluble. The first More than one bridgehead and from the point of view of the really attempted. The main arm

three might come into play simul preferably widely not begin to fight until taneously or only two of them bridgeheads

separated enemy, and is by far the heaviest against it. (which is defence from Their connection is not such invasion, because an isolated er of accomplishment.

are a condition of of his tasks, perhaps beyond pow- the air) works at the shortest pos- his country is invaded is, might.

necessary: or indissoluble either bridgehead would invite imme-

sible ranges and from bases which in effect, to prefer that because one of them, invasion, is diate and overwhelming naval being now possible not only by island defence, upon interior lines. It may be argued that invasion are,-Ilko-every other form of war should be fought on a separate proposition from the and military concentration against sea but by air, such arguments as

rest, while the last one, the coun- Its small beginnings.. American soil, destroying ter-offensive takes on its full feint and diversion are necessary the contention of those who, on Therefore these are obsolete. That is indeed

The Final Decision American homes, giving value only when all the other to the invader:

the enemy side, have been most 4-Counter-offensivo. three are. accounted for. hostages, of American re-complete failure in any

hopeful of success. But the use fourth point we have called the one of Problem: Never Solved, of the air for invasion must con- most essential. It is the point of sources: rather than that these acts would mean defeat ac-

sider the excellence of the an ultimate its tide should be met and failure, while failure: in the first, conceivable enough. The military the side of the defence. This su conflict there can be but two

cording to the degree of that

counter-offensive Such bridgeheads, we say, are numerically inferior air force on against the enemy In all human turned back before it rea-vasion, would mean defeat of all might well be at: first: insufficient constantly pointed out, increasing the offensive, carried on from the repelling of the effective: in- opposition to them from within periority in quality is, as we have forms of conclusive action. One is ches United States shores the rest. Upon the carrying out and the naval threat against them Wherever the enemy has hitherto start to Anish tilla decision is Those who oppose fur- of these acts, and especially the from without would at first be struck with full' success he has reached; the other is the defen-

last, the counter-offensive, de- nishing assistance to Brit-pends the survival of this country

met with 'no adequate resistance sive, and the defensive can have in this arm; here he would meet only one object which is the gain- ain may reasonably be in the national position it has held

with high resistance. + for generations,

lug of time in which, to develop asked, "Do. you mean you

the opportunities for an offensive would rather wait until

later on. Air Blockade

A permanent: defensive is inconceivable as a. method. It the lives of American şai-1-Repelling effective Invasion.

2-imposing blockade.

is a contradiction in 'terms. The lors instead of British sai- Only effective invasion is to be scattered, awaiting concentration. posing invasion on sufficient scale in history (of which perhaps the most powerful defensive systems considered, i... massive, invasion It is rather, the second condition, be not attempted, the defensive lors shall be risked in on a scale permitting full, and the maintenance of permanent, would rely upon the traditional crusading Syrian castles were for operating destroyers, and permanent occupation and com- communications between the power of blockade and the often have never served for

their period the best examples) defence do you prefer that the lation of the defence. If such in- which presents the most formid against us) upon the novel ex- polling the destruction or capitu- bridgeheads and the continent, sive (that is the enemy action

only but always. for ultimate counter-offensive. American Army and Navy vasion succeeds it succeeds alto-able difficulties, No doubt the periment of counter-blockade, the

Lacking the gether. No partial, success is pos-enemy has built and concentrated closing of our ports by enemy system has always failed and | success of this last; a. defensive should have to fight-possible, that is, no partial success transport and has added also by action from the air. sibly Japan and Germany could be of final service to the new building, to his striking. pow- The enemy has rightly insisted, must fail. at once without an ally cient body of resistance remained paratively short and narrow, lanes which our effort at blockading him for the counter-offensive on our Now, what are the opportunities enemy because whatever suffer.by sea. No doubt along com- upon the much greater difficulty in the world rather than would in the nature of things. He great superiority in the air might will suffer from the extension of side in the present struggle? The with one?"

Increasingly reinforced by the guarantee transport temporarily the approaches to be watched. moral factors are numerous, the defenop with its much greater rez But temporary transport would Until lately it sufficed to watch chief among them being the gen Finally, those who plead sources and world-wide connec-be worthless. Transport would the issues of the North Sea and eral opinion of the civilised world to save American youth communication by sea were not very large scale indeed. This is to consider all the French Atlan-whom the enemy has oppressed tions (supposing, of course, that have to be permanent and on the Channel. It is now necessary and the growing reaction of those from conscription and interrupted). If effective invasion true even of the supplies required He canst and, of course, the entcles accupied, and massacred But on, a large scale and occupying for the personnel, and when we to the Mediterranean, which in- neglecting this imponderable, training in peacetime for the invaded, territory, fully is su odd to this the very great dimcul- cluded the entry of the Red Sea. which cannot be measured or de- defence are advocating a cessful nothing, could oust it or lies of conveying, and landing the Nor can blockade be imposed, sively discussed, there is one ma- complacent course that and fully organised army, on the lery and munitionment, which the power on supplies across the sive from our side. That oppor

destroy it, save a fully equipped heavy material, tanks and artil- even with a wholly superior naval jer opportunity for counter-offen- may result in these young same scale at least as the invad- effort would require, it should be Near East and the Black Sen. tanity not only remains intact so- manifest that the establishment On all these accounts, the enemy long as invasion is repelled but men being sent into hater's own forces.

Now the conditions of effective of permanent, communications by has affirmed the impossibility of continually increases in value. It tle as the most helpless invasion on such a scale are sim- the enemy between his bases and the 'old-fashioned ... blockade, 15. the use of the air arm, .....

· kind of “cannon fodder":

"ple and known to everybody; they his invading forces would present against him being established un- The knowledge of this mokes a problem never yet solved and der present conditions. It is to be the enemy subject to the condi- untrained troops instead

perhaps insoluble.

remarked that neutral opinion, so tions of a comparatively short of

skilled in how to pro- ing to think in humane

far as it can be gauged by the war. He may, for purposes of Tho, Kornel:

neutral Press, inclines to the ruse, talk otherwise; but he knows tect themselves.

and sympathetic terms,

enemy's thesis hore, but only ox-well enough that unless he can When we consider that the main perience can decide.. The people who take Yet is this true solicitude obstacle to any such action, is still

occupy the base from which he 3-Raising, the counter-blooky will be attacked, which baso is these positions are for the for American youth and remains overwhelmingly, superior counter-blockade and, if so, could ing superiority of the air arm, not the feet, which in mere numbers ade. Can the enemy establish a this island, the ultimate increas- most part keenly, con- civilised behaviour in the to mything the enemy can have the defence raise it when it was only in quality but in quantity scientious. They are try-world?

provided, and in trained personnel established or in course of estab-|-ill involve a decision against- is still more strikingly superio,,lishment?

him,

...