CO885-6 — Page 405

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Reference :-

C.O. 882

6

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHIC-

COPYRIGHT PHOTOGRAPH-NOT TO

<

6

In future the Commissioner would then occupy, as it were, the position of a British Consul at a Chinese Treaty Port as far as the mainland was concerned, but would remain British Commissioner with jurisdiction over all nationalities on the island.

All the Chinese on the leased mainland would naturally be placed under Chinese jurisdiction.

In the strip of land reserved for the use of visitors, the Commissioner would exercise municipal authority in conjunction with a Chinese Magistrate, and sit with him to hear any international cases arising there in a mixed court-jurisdiction in Chinese natters between Chinese in the reserved strip of land should be left to the Chinese magistrate.

Such a recession of territory and rearrangement of administration would reduce the civil expenditure by about 5,0007. a year.

The expenses on the mainland would be very small, for no staff would be required there, and if the rents of the buildings and lands on the island now collected by the War Office and Admiralty were paid to the Colonial Office as revenue, the island revenue with the other municipal taxes would in time almost balance expenditure.

It should be borne in mind that the island of Liu Kung has been purchased outright by the British Government, and that Government is now, in the eye of Chinese law, its tenant in perpetuity; accordingly if the Anglo-Chinese Convention of Wei-hai-Wei is revised, as suggested here, care should be taken to make it clear that the island has become by purchase the property of His Majesty's Government, and that, apart from the Convention of 1898, its tenure does not rest solely on the length of the occupation of Port Arthur by the Russian Government, as laid down in the Convention of Wei-hai-Wei, 1898.

Of the strategical expediency of securing another British Naval base in the China Sea nearer than Hong Kong and botter than Wei-hai-Wei, the Admiralty is, of course, the best judge. Presuming, therefore, first, that one is desirable, if not actually necessary, it is doubtful whether a better opportunity than the present time will ever occur of arranging with the Chinese Government for the cession of such a Naval and Military base, partly by way of exchange and partly by purchase.

It should be universally admitted that in this matter Great Britain can go to China with clean hands. Great Britain can point out that after spending a quarter of a million pounds on experiments, it is found that Wei-hai-Wei cannot be adequately fortified, and that the original object for which the station was obtained (to redress the balance of power between Russia and Great Britain in the north), cannot now be carried out in its entirety by these means, and that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance must make it clear to China that it is to her private interests to assist Great Britain in preserving the balance of power in the Far East. To attain her original aims, therefore, Great Britain may ask China to modify the Convention of Wei-hai-Wei on the linos suggested above, and to give, by way of exchunge in part, or by sale or lease, such other Naval or Military base as his Majesty's Government may dloom suitable.

It should be impressed on the Chinese that it is Great Britain's command of the sea in the Far East that empowers her to undertake the far-reaching responsibility of assisting in maintaining China's independence, and that Great Britain may fairly claim to expect China to meet her halfway in providing the fleet with a better base in the interests of the preservation of her own integrity. Moreover, the Chinese Government is well aware that England seeks no territorial expansion in China, and that the presence of a British Fleet in China waters is practically, at the present moment, her best safeguard against aggression at the hands of other foreign Powers.

Under the Convention of Wei-hai-Wei the Chinese Government is privileged to make use of the Bay of Woi-hai-Woi for the Chinese Fleet. China is now about to reorganise her Northern Fleet, and it would be a not inopportune moment to rctransfer most of the mainland to China. This would enable the Chinese to make complete arrangements for their fleet and sailors on the mainland, and on the harbour on that side of it ut Wei-hai-Wei, instead of at Chefco, where it is at present proposed to station the future Chinese Fleet.

7

Of the strategical value or desirability of a second British Naval base on the Yang Taze, besides and in addition to the harbour of Hong Kong, the Admiralty, as stated above, is of course the best judge.

In support of the greater advantage, however, to British commerce in Central and Southern China, of the base of Ting Hai, in the island of Chusan, as compared with Wei-hai-Wei, and of the greater political importance of this position to Great Britain, there is very much to be urged.

To show this fact as strikingly as possible a brief comparison is made below of the commercial and political advantages of a British station at Chusan over Wei-hai-Wei.

In the first place, the exchange proposed would enable Great Britain to emphasize and if necessary enforce her claims to any special mining and railway concessions in the Yang Taze Valley. At the same time it would place the political predominance of Great Britain in Central and Southern China beyond dispute. As is well known, at present the very existence of the British sphere of influence and interest depends on no concession or convention, but solely on the written assurance of the Chinese Government, given in 1898, that the valley of the Yang Taze will not be "mortgaged, "leased, or ceded to another Power."

"

By the Anglo-German Convention, and by the International “

open door agreement made by the foreign Powers in 1900, at the initiation of the United States, England's claim to this sphere of interest and influence has been indirectly recognised by Europe.

As far as China is concerned, Great Britain's claim to a sphere of "interest and influence" in the eight provinces comprising the Yang Taze Valley is not resented as any assertion of English Sovereignty over Chinese territory, or as aggressive. China is well aware that Great Britain has by far the greatest stake in the commerce and shipping of Central and Southern China, and recognises that this gives her prior claims to special mining and railway enterprises there. The occupation of Chusan therefore would, as far as the other foreign Powers are concerned, be but an effective substantiation of what Europe has already admitted theoretically and indirectly by International agreements, and, as far as China is concerned, would prove that Great Britain is prepared to assist China to maintain her integrity in her most vital quarters, and prevent any other foreign Power from interfering with the freedom of trade, or from obtaining special advantages unfairly over the British in their sphere of influence.

It should also not be lost sight of, that although the proposed exchange of part of Wei-hai-Wei contained per se no nenace to any foreign Power, the leasing of Chusan would be a bold and determined stroke of foreign policy on Great Britain's part. It would undoubtedly raise Great Britain's prestige and credit in the East, and be a convincing proof that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is not meant to be a hollow agreement.

It should be a popular measure with the British public, who would see in it the fulfilment of the pledge given by Parliament, that Shanghai and British interests in the Yang Taze Valley are to be defended at all costs.

During the last five years the British public has made a bitter cry that the agreement of the Chinese Government as to the non-alienation of the Yang Taze is no better than so much waste paper. These complaints have grown exceedingly loud since the Boxer disturbances, because Germany and France have seized upon that imbroglio as an excuse for permanently quartering German and French troops upon Shanghai. The occupation of Chusan, therefore, would be calculated to satisfy the British public that its trade interests are not being_neglected on the Yang Taze Valley, and that the Government is prepared now to substantiate and, if necessary, assert its claims to special political predominance and special privileges within this sphere of influence and interest.

The establishment of a Naval and Military station at the door of the China Nile would also be an eloquent intimation to the French and German troops at Shanghai that Great Britain is not, in view of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, prepared to always look quietly on a permanent settlement of foreign soldiers in her particular sphere of influence.

In the second place, time and events now clearly demand that Great Britain should pay more attention to British commercial interests at

A 4