CO885-11 — Page 646

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

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TRELNIC.O.882/11

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

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said that the increase which has occurred is an indication that the which is now being worked out in Malaya, is in itself bad.

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approved plan

20. I cannot accept this view. In the first place, I may point out that (apart from the reduction in the number of retail shops) there was no pretence that, at the stage Which has been reached, there would, under the "approved plan" be any more effective check on the amount of Government opium consumed than was already in operation by virtue of the high retail price, a check which was admitted to have produced its maximum possible effect. It was recognized that, until the stage of the rationing of registered consumers is reached, there was nothing to prevent an increase in consumption consequent on the influx of great numbers of Chinese. Moreover, as I mentioned in paragraph 5 (e) above, the operation of the first stage of the approved plan (viz., the abolition of the private retailers) has itself led to an increase in the consumption of Government chandu, but the occasion for this particular increase can certainly not be cited as an indication that the plan itself is bad.

1. I repeat, I see nothing in the present situation to require any departure from the course deliberately embarked upon in 1924 after the most exhaustive examina- tion of almost every conceivable alternative, and I am reluctant in the extreme to unsettle the Malayan Governments by suggesting to them a reconsideration of the policy now being worked out. In this connexion, it seems hardly necessary for me to remind my colleagues of the demoralising effect which frequent demands for a change of policy are bound to have on a Colonial Government.

22. Before turning to a consideration of the more general aspects of the policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to opium and deleterious drugs. I wish to say a few words about the recent large purchases of Persian opium by the Straits Settle- ments Government. It was pointed out at the interdepartmental meeting in November that the British Government may be exposed to an attack at Geneva on the ground that at the very time when a League Commission (appointed with the support of the British Government, and largely financed by American funds) was in Persia conducting an inquiry into the possibility of reducing the growth of the poppy there, a boom in Persian opium was created by the large demands of a British Colony.

23. As my colleagues are aware, I have already taken the Governor to task for not making arrangements for the supply of this opium in a manner less provocative of adverse comment. But I wish to make it clear that I do not regard the action of the Straits Settlements Government in buying this opium as wrong in principle. In support of this, I would remind my colleagues that the Governor had definitely been authorized to proceed on a plan which involves no restriction on the amount of chandu to be placed on sale until it is possible to put into operation a system of rationing of registered smokers, and (after consultation with the Foreign Office and the British Representative on the League of Nations Opium Advisory Committee) he had been authorized to supplement restricted supplies from India by purchases elsewhere.

24. It seems desirable to point out here that it will continue to be necessary to purchase Persian opium; and that accordingly when questions relating to Persian opium arise at Geneva, the attitude adopted by the British Representatives should be deter- mined mainly by the consideration that it is highly desirable to avoid any line of action which may give rise to embarrassment in connexion with such purchases in the future.

25. This brings me to a consideration of the general policy of His Majesty's Government. As regards Chapter III of The Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention (as distinct from the Geneva Opium Agreement), which deals mainly with the control of the use and distribution of morphine, cocaine, &c. I have little to say. Although, I understand, this chapter was inserted in The Hague Convention with specific reference to the spread of the morphia and cocaine habit in the Far East, and the fear that the suppression of opium smoking there would lead to a still wider indul- gence in the insidious drug habit, the control of these drugs has since become a pressing European and American problem. So far, therefore, as these drugs are concerned, the centre of gravity (so to speak) has moved to London, and in the main the Colonial Office is content to follow the lead of the Home Office. My reasons for referring to this aspect of the subject are that in the first place we are asked "How can the British Government, directly or through its representative at Geneva, criticize the doings of other countries or press reforms upon them if it lays itself open to criticism in regard to the point of The Hague Convention which deals with opium smoking?" It is also the case that the British Government has been accused of hypocrisy for urging reforms in regard to drugs, while it is failing to suppress the smoking of opium in the Far Eastern Colonies.

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26. Surely the proper line to take is that taken at the Geneva Conference, viz., that opium smoking in the Far East has little or no connexion with the drug problem in Europe and America, or with the problem of the control of the international trade in drugs, save m so far as the suppression of opium encourages and increases the demand of Orientals for these far more dangerous drugs.

27. If this is granted, then I have no quarrel with our continuing to take the lead at tieneva and elsewhere in pressing for reforms in the control of this trade.

25. But 1 hold very strongly the view that it is a mistake for the British Govern- ment to continue to attempt to take the lead on questions relating to the observance This policy entails of the peculiarly Oriental sections of The Hague Convention. constant demands on our Colonies to institute réforms which, by the multiplication of offences and the fostering of corruption, lead, as I have already shown, to the serious embarrassment of our Colonial Governments, and to a growing resentment on the part of the educated unofficial communities in the Colonies, while they can have little or no real effect for the purpose in view.

29 Apart from this, this policy has in the recent past led to serious embarrass- ments of a more general character, which I will illustrate by two incidents.

30. The deadlock which culminated in the American and Chinese delegations leaving the Geneva Conference in January, 1925, is, no doubt, still fresh in the minds of my colleagues. All I wish to do here is to remind my colleagues that the Conference on opium smoking was the direct outcome of a proposal by the British Representative on the League of Nations Opium Advisory Committee in 1928. Looking back it is now obvious that such a Conference was bound to be largely ineffective and was almost equally bound to for us pardalie attention on a problem which, being insoluble, is best kept in the background. I shamld say Let us love no more conferences on opium smoking." were it not for the fact that by Article XII of the Geneva Agreement (again on the initiative of the British Representative) we are committed to a series of them, the first of which is to be hell" at latest in 1929 "*!

31. I wish it to be understood that I am not attacking the British Representative personally. The proposal to convene the Conference was acquiesced in by the Colonial Office in 1923, and the action of the British Representative was strictly in accordance with the policy of His Majesty's Government. But 1 think that it is high time to change this policy,

32. Again, in 1925 the Home Office launched an attack on the excessive amount of Indian opium imported by French Indo-China; but the difficulty of discriminating against one of its customers (a Colony of a friendly Power) was one of the determining factors in leading the Government of India to consider the adoption of a progressive reduction of exports all round. In spite of the opposition of the Colonial Office. the Government of India was encouraged to proceed with this policy, which is one of the direct causes of any embarrassment which may be caused to His Majesty's Government through the purchase of Persian opium by the Straits Settlements Government.

33. In this particular case. I agree that there was some justification for the British Government to intervene, since Indian opium supplied to French Indo-China was leaking through Kwong Chow Wan into the illicit trade in the Far East (in particular into Hong Kong).

34.

I wish to urge upon my colleagues, however, that criticisms of foreign administrations should be confined to such cases. Scandals in Macao and Formosa are no concern of ours; and (apart from the ever-present possibility of unforeseen con- sequences, such as those referred to in paragraph 32) I suggest that, so long as we ourselves are subject to criticisms (however unjustifiable) through the continuance of opium smoking in our own Colonies, our wider interests will be best served by refrain- ing from provocative criticisms of others.

35. To sum up: I have indicated in paragraphs 11 to 21 my views as to the considerations on which the domestic policy of His Majesty's Government (i.e.,.vis-à- ris the Colonial Governments) should be based. I urge that in the international sphere the policy of the British Government should be to endeavour to keep the subject of opium smoking in the background. It is a subject which seems peculiarly liable to give rise to demands for reform based solely on idealistic sentiment without any regard for practical considerations. The less opportunity is given for public discussion, the

better.

36. If attacked, we should boldly take the line that we are doing our best under very difficult conditions; that we retain the idea of ultimate suppression of opium smoking as an ideal; and in particular that we stand by our undertaking embodied in the Protocal to the Geneva Agreement, but that in the meantime we will not be

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