CO885-11 — Page 57

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

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Reference :--

C.O.882/11

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHIC- COPYRIGHT PHOTOGRAPH-NOT TO

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Strike Committee or by Russian Bolshevists in Kuang-tung, e.g. in payment of blackmail as strike pay and in reinstatement of strikers or compensation for loss of employment, then in our opinion the effect upon British interests in Shanghai would be very detrimental and there would be a direct incitement to renewed anti-British agitation at that port and in other parts of China.

to

14. The Foreign Office telegram inquires what are the real or proposed grievances of Canton, and says that, if genuine, they must be met. Generally speaking these grievances may be said unequal include everything comprised in the phrase

But the specific treaties," which is now a parrot-cry in China. grievances are set out by the Canton Commissioner of Foreign Affairs in a press communiqué, of which I enclosed a copy in my secret despatch of the 28th January.* He wrote:-"The strike was instituted by Hongkong workers, not for economic reasons, but as a protest against the British Government, primarily for the shooting which took place in Shanghai on May 30th last and sub- sequently for the shooting which took place in Canton on June 23rd." No fault of commission or omission on the part of the Government or of the people of Hongkong caused the strike or the ensuing boycott. Moreover, in the matter of legislation for the benefit of labourers, this Colony is in advance of China and the economic conditions of Hongkong workmen are better than in China.

15. The Foreign Office telegram points out that, so long as Canton receives arms and money from the Russians and nothing from us, some proportion of the Cantonese will naturally prefer the Russians. quite agree and I shall certainly use all my own influence to induce the Canton Government to accept British rather than Russian help. In this connection please see paragraph 3 (a) of my secret despatch of the 24th December,† paragraph 2 of my secret despatch of the 8th January, and paragraph 10 of my secret despatch of the 20th January.§ If the Canton Govern- ment will suppress the Strike Committee it might be possible to negotiate a satisfactory settlement on the lines suggested in my conversations with Mr. Sung Tsz-man and Mr. Sun Fo.

16. The Foreign Office telegram inquires whether it would be advisable for the Boxer Indemnity Delegation to visit Canton. We are very decidedly of opinion that it should not do so, unless and until normal relations between Canton and Great Britain are restored. It would be intolerable that Lord Willingdon's Delega- tion should be received and entertained by the present Canton Government in the native city while Sir James Jamieson in Shameen and Mr. C. C. A. Kirke at Swatow remain ringed round by strike pickets and are treated practically as enemies. We con- sider that no payment from Boxer Indemnity Funds should be made to Kuang-tung until the anti-British boycott is ended, and that the allocation of those funds should not be used as a means of bargaining with the Canton Government. It would, however, have a salutary effect if the Delegation were to visit Hongkong at an early date and make allocations (say) to the Hongkong University, while entirely ignoring Canton.

+ No. 8.

⚫C 5252/26; not printed. C 3167/26; not printed.

§ 4487,26; not printed.

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17. In Legislative Council on the 4th February I stated publicly that the Hongkong Government expects and requires the Canton Government to put an end to the illegal activities of the Strike Committee; that we hold the Canton Government to be respon- sible; but that we remain prepared to negotiate with the Canton Government an honourable and a lasting settlement. A copy of this speech is enclosed in my despatch No. 53 of the 5th Feb- ruary. The Canton Government (as you will see from the press communiqué issued by the Hongkong Government and enclosed in my secret despatch of the 23rd January†) has hitherto refused to negotiate, and I fear that it has no real desire for conciliation and does not wish to end the boycott except upon terms which would humiliate Great Britain and Hongkong and which would therefore be more permanently harmful to British interests in China than the boycott itself. No doubt the large mass of the Cantonese population would welcome an early settlement; but the masses are inarticulate and are terrorised by the Strike Com- mittee; and unfortunately, although anti-British feeling has sub- sided in central and northern China, the position in Kuang-tung has not yet improved owing to Bolshevik influence over the Canton Government. In central and northern China the policy of conciliation was fruitful owing to the suppression of the In extremist elements there by the Chinese local authorities. Kuang-tung, on the contrary, the extremists actually form the Government.

18. The 13th February is Chinese New Year's Day; and if, after it has passed, the Canton Government still persists in refusing to negotiate with the Hongkong Government, and if the action suggested under article 7 of the Washington Nine- Power Treaty proves ineffectual, then it will be necessary to con- sider very carefully whether the risks we run in allowing the anti-British boycott to continue in Kuang-tung are not greater than the risk of independent warlike action in Kuang-tung for the purpose of ending the boycott. Already the Chinese in this Colony are getting restive at the long continued inaction of the British Government. They freely ask each other the question, and they even ask of me, why does Great Britain tolerate the insults and illegalities inflicted upon British subjects by strike pickets in Kuang-tung. We are daily losing prestige, while the Bolsheviks are to all outward appearance as strong as ever in this province. Heavy losses are being inflicted upon both the British and the Chinese merchants of Hongkong. The trouble is fester- ing and threatens to become chronic. Plainly it cannot be allowed to continue indefinitely. We hope, therefore, that in any statement on the political situation in Kuang-tung made by His Majesty's Government in Parliament emphasis will be laid, as suggested by Sir R. Macleay, on the fact that British patience in dealing with the unreasonable and irreconcilable elements in Kuang-tung is not inexhaustible and that, unless a settlement is quickly reached, His Majesty's Government may be compelled to adopt a new policy towards them.

19. This despatch confirms and amplifies my telegram to you, dated 6th February.

I have, &c.,

C. CLEMENTI,

*C 5424 26; not printed. †C 4447:26; not printed.

Governor. &c.

‡ C 8026/26; not printed,

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