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PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Reference :--

TPERFIC.O. 882/11

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHIC- COPYRIGHT PHOTOGRAPH-NOT TO

C. 73230/8/30 [No. 9]. -

100

No. 56.

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT to THE SECRETARY

OF STATE.

(Received 16th June, 1930.)

[Answered by No. 57.]

(No. 444.) MY LORD,

The King's Pavilion, Kandy, 27th May, 1930. I HAVE the honour to refer to my telegram of the 23rd May, 1930, a copy of which is enclosed, and to express my regret that, by an error, the memorandum* by Sir Robert Johnson which accompanied my despatch No. 379 of the 9th May, 1930 † on the subject of the allocation of duties to Officers of State under the new Constitu- tion, was not the correct one. The correct memorandum is now annexed to be sub- stituted for enclosure 1 of that despatch.

2. Since that despatch was written, certain difficulties in connexion with the appointment of a deputy to the Attorney-General have been brought to my notice and I propose to address Your Lordship further on the whole question of the staff of the Attorney-General's Office.

I have, &c.,

F. G. TYRRELL,

Acting Colonial Secretary

for Officer Administering the Government.

Enclosure 1 in No. 56.

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

TELEGRAM.

(Dated 23rd May, 1930.)

My despatch of 9th May, No. 379, regret first enclosure incorrect. enclosure follows by next mail.

Enclosure 2 in No. 56.

THE CHIEF SECRETARY.

Correct

1. It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of the duties to be discharged by this Officer of State under the Donoughmore Scheme particularly in the early years of the working of the new Constitution. However, the most important of those duties will be those which are not defined and which it would be impolitic in the extreme to attempt to define.

The success or failure of the new Constitution will depend very largely upon the extent to which he is able to impose his personality upon his colleagues of the Board of Ministers without appearing to do so, and to secure the smooth working of a complicated and to outward appearance illogical and even unbusinesslike plan. The post will be a political one requiring special qualities (tact, power of managing men, qualities of suaviter in mode and fortiter in re, &c.,) in a high degree, which are in any case rare and certainly could not be looked for as the logical outcome of his training and experience in every Civil or Public Servant, whether in Ceylon or any. where else. In other words a man may be an admirable Civil Servant in every respect and yet completely lack the special political qualities required in the high office of Chief Secretary.

Indeed, it may be said that, difficult and responsible as the duties of the Governor under the new Constitution will be, they are at least easier than those of the Chief Secretary, in respect that the Constitution gives the Governor powers (while expressing it is true the pious hope that he will never be forced to use them) whereas the Chief Secretary has no powers, and his success, like that of the Oracle at Delphi, must there- fore depend only upon prestige. Moreover, as the first occupier of the sacred grove he has no traditions behind him. He is the first and original authentic Oracle, and must establish its position himself.

* Not printed.

+ No. 55.

101

2. The special point to which I desire to call attention in this Note is the difficulties which arise from the fact that the conditions of life in this tropical Island make it certain that of the four high Officers (the Governor and the three Officers of State) it is certain that one at least will be always absent on leave. Who is then to function as Chief Secretary when he is absent on leave? Or when in the absence of the Governor he vacates the office of Chief Secretary for that of Acting Governor? The present system under which the next senior officer automatically acts irrespective of his previous training and experience is, if my premises in 1 above are correct, clearly unsuitable to the changed situation.

There would appear to be three alternatives:—

(a) The first, which I should myself favour. would be that all three Officers of State should have a permanent deputy-specially selected irrespective of seniority-though his pay and status while remaining as deputy should be at least as high as that of any Head of Department. This deputy would be the alter ego or astral body of his Chief and would make it his business to seize himself of his whole mind, policy, and methods with a view to carrying on in exactly the same spirit and form when the Chief is absent. When his Chief is present (and he himself is not on leave) there would appear to be ample work for him to do.

In the case of the Chief Secretary he would share the heavy burthen of attendance at all Executive Committees.

In the case of the Treasurer and Financial Adviser, it is in any case essential that this Officer should be freed as far as ever possible from files and office work in order to concentrate on his new and far more important duties as Financial Adviser to the Board of Ministers and Council of State.

I am already very unfavourably impressed by the extent to which the present Acting Treasurer is overwhelmed personally with files and with the lack of delegation of duties there appears to be in his office.

The Attorney-General's office is already by common report so con- gested that there is the strongest possible case, not merely for an Assistant, but for a full and sufficient deputy of high status and attainments.

(b) An alternative would be to have an officer in general waiting to act on the Board of Ministers for either the Chief Secretary or the Financial Adviser as the case might require. I do not, however, recommend this plan---since the special qualities required in a Financial Adviser would not necessarily or even generally be found in combination with those needed for a Chief Secretary and Finance is a special study if ever there was one.

Moreover this appointment would inevitably tend by practice to be regarded as the perquisite of the senior officer of the Service-and my whole case in this note is against a disproportionate regard for seniority in the special posts under review.

(c) The third alternative would be to follow Cabinet practice at Home-and let an Officer of State hold the portfolio of the absent officer as well as his own.

This no doubt would be economical, but it is open to much of the same criticism as (b) above, and would in any case not remove the need for a highly paid and specially selected deputy to each of the three Officers of State, such deputy to be carefully chosen on merits and trans- ferred back to general duty without any implication of failure if after probation he is found after all not to possess the special political (or financial) flair needed for these exceptional duties.

C. 73230/8/30 [No. 10].

No. 57.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING

(No. 374.)

SIB,

THE GOVERNMENT. [Answered by No. 58.]

Downing Street, 18th July, 1930.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 379 of the 9th May.* regarding the allocation of duties to the three Officers of State in the

* No. 55.