CO885-11 — Page 332

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PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Reference:

PLENIC.O.882/11

لسلنا

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

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The Finance Committee.

The dangerous twist thus given to the Constitution is most clearly illustrated in the proceedings of the Finance Committee of the. Legislative Council. This body is composed, on a familiar Colonial model, of all the unofficial members of Council sitting under the chairmanship of the Colonial Secretary, with the Controller of Revenue and the Colonial Treasurer as the only other oflicial members. Its deliberations are con- ducted in private, and the record of its proceedings is not available to the public. Its composition and procedure thus make it equivalent to the Legislative Council sitting in camera with the official element reduced from twelve to three. This form of Committee, while doubtless appropriate to those Colonies which, less large or less politically advanced, possess a Legislative Council of small numbers, is altogether un- suited to conditions in Ceylon. Its retention under the existing Constitution proved to be a serious mistake which has contributed in no small measure to the discomfiture of the Government.

The main function of this Committee consists in the examination of the Annual Budget and Estimates, the Supplementary Estimates which are periodically required, and any measures or proposals in which financial considerations are involved. The normal procedure in dealing with the Annual Estimates is to take them Department by Department, the Head of the Department concerned being invited to attend for the purpose of giving advice or explanation and of answering any questions that may be put to him. Before the enlargement of the unofficial element in the Council, the Committee Page 23. worked smoothly and well, its relations with Heads of Departments were invariably pleasant and mutually responsive, and business was despatched in a friendly and cour- teous manner. Under the existing Constitution, however, these conditions have no longer been maintained. It has become the practice for Heads of Departments to be treated as hostile witnesses, against whom it is permissible to employ all the forensic arts of cross-examination. The conciliatory policy of the Government militates against these officers receiving adequate protection from the Chair, and the latitude allowed to the Committee places them at a further disadvantage. Questions are rarely confined to the matters at issue and the Committee are perimitted to wander at will over the whole administrative field. Under a constant fire of uninstructed criticism, subjected to grave discourtesy, if not on occasion to personal insult, and denied the protection that is their due, it is not surprising that these officers find the treatment extended to them painful and humiliating. That they have shown commendable forbearance in the face of great provocation is generally recognised, but the unhappy results of these methods have not been confined to their own number. As we shall observe later in the Report. the reaction on the Services of which they are members could not fail to be sharp and

severe.

Another aspect of the proceedings of the Finance Committee is that owing to the peculiar nature of the Constitution the methods employed have contributed to its own aggrandisement. Its three distinctive features were absence of publicity, complete control over expenditure, and a total lack of responsibility for the execution of its decisions. The only check on its power lay in the Governor and his Executive Council, which was not subordinate to the Legislature. With a Government less disinclined to bring matters to an issue some reasonable modus vivendi might have been reached; once embarked, however, on a definite policy of conciliation the Government were powerless to control the Committee. Rightly or wrongly the Government were un- willing to risk the occurence of a situation in which a decision might be taken in Executive Council and the supply necessary to carry out that decision refused by the Finance Committee. The prospect of a series of deadlocks, leading possibly to a serious crisis, could not appeal to those who had determined to explore all the possibilities of working the Constitution by a process of compromise. There was only one way to ensure that the decisions of the Finance Committee should not run counter to those of the Executive Council, namely, that before arriving at any final decision in the Executive Council the Government should consult the Finance Committee and ascertain whether This course the action contemplated would meet with the Committee's concurrence.

the Government considered it necessary to adopt. Thus not only was the Finance Committee permitted to concern itself with details of administration which were outside Page 24. its legitimate sphere, but it was definitely encouraged by the Government to do so. The inevitable result has been the diversion of all important business from the Execu- tive Council to the Committee which has gained in power and prestige in proportion as the Council has lost.

l'age 27.

Another method by which it was hoped to train unofficial members in the handling of public affairs lay in appointing them to serve on various Committees. There were already in existence certain advisory Committees on which their services

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could be utilised, such as the Railway Board, the Public Works Advisory Board, and the Local Government Board. But it was on select Committees of the Council, and on representative Commissions, appointed ad hoe to conduct some specific investigation that the Government pinned its faith. It may be noticed here that the appointment of a Committee is apt to be looked upon as a convenient and attractive method of avoiding a deadlock" and shelving awkward questions; that the Ceylon Government should show a pronounced partiality for this expedient was therefore not unnatural. But the advantage that has been taken of this partiality has resulted in the Council over- reaching itself. We were informed in evidence that in November last there were in existence no less than fifty-five ad hoc Select Committees and Commissions manned by members of the Legislative Council. It is only necessary to say that each Committee is composed of some ten to fifteen members, whereas the total strength of the Council is only forty-nine, for the absurdity of the position to become apparent. In effect each member of the Council, apart from his normal parliamentary duties, may find him- self required to serve, not on two or three but, on ten or twelve ad hoc Committees. week, only four Since the Council itself normally meets for two days a

Even if the whole of this Pag 27. days are available for Committee meetings.

time could be devoted to committee work it would be physically impossible number of committees to function simultaneously. to arrange for so When the varied interests and engagements that are the lot of every member Page 28. of Council are taken into consideration it is apparent that they are confronted The inevitable result has been stagnation and delay with a superhuman task. in public business and a sacrifice of efficiency altogether disproportionate to the advan- tages gained. Some Committees find it difficult to obtain a quorum; others have dragged on for years without presenting a report; others again have contented themselves with the issue at intervals of interim reports. The machinery of Government has been slowed down and its legitimate activities paralysed. We do not wish to convey the impression that none of these Committees has succeeded in performing a useful service; on the contrary many have done admirable work and there is no doubt that in numerous instances an interchange of views and information has been of great value to officials. and unofficials alike. If the system had been confined within reasonable limits we should have had nothing but praise for it; the point which we wish to make is that it has been extended beyond these limits, and that this extension has not only made efficient working impossible but now threatens to confine the administration to the transaction of routine business and to involve in delay and confusion all the more important matters which claim the attention of the Government.

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Page 195.

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vast a

Under the new Constitution the Treasurer, as a full Minister, will no longer suffer from the disabilities which at present attach to his position. While he is the general financial adviser of the Government there is at present no obligation on the Government to consult him on matters not placed by statute in his charge, and though in practice his advice is sought on most questions of financial importance We understand, indeed, that it is there is no guarantee that this will be the case. not uncommon for him to learn of such matters only when a decision has been taken. It is true that in all questions of major importance he is able, by virtue of his position as a member of the Executive Council, to ensure that a decision on them is not reached without full consideration of the financial point of view: bui in other questions he is dependent for an opportunity for advice on the discretion of individual officers in the Secretariat. We consider this somewhat-ħaphazard proce- dure a serious defect of the existing system which must he remedied under the new constitution.

This result, however, has been achieved largely at the expense of the personal We have shown how, as the power of the unofficial well-being of individual officers. members increased, so did it find outlet in the delivery of continual attacks on officers of the Government. The fact that the unofficial members were given no executive responsibility prevented them from realising that they formed part of the Government and drove them into the artificial position of a permanent opposition. It was natural, if not inevitable, that from this vantage-point they should make full use of every Page 125, opportunity which presented itself to embarrass the Government and therefore its officers. An impartial appraisement of the services rendered to the country by its public servants would, in their view, have only served to weaken their case for self- government, and to relax the pressure on which they counted for its ultimate realisation. They could not be expected to renounce the use of the sharpest weapons in their armoury in deference to the susceptibilities of those who, however dis interested, were placed by the working of the Constitution in the position of opponents,