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1. PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

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Referance :-

C.O.882/11

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

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unnecessary concession and conciliation. The policy, which has been pursued, was deliberately dictated by Sir Hugh Clifford, a man whose record refutes any charge of weak administration or unwarranted yielding to pressure, and I propose to explain that policy, as I have understood it. Sir Hugh Clifford will be able to say how far I have interpreted him correctly,

This meant,

2. Sir William Manning had begun his term of oflice with an official majority in the Legislative Council, and he ended it with a Council in which the official element was out-numbered by 36 to 12, and from the chairmanship of which, save on extra- ordinary occasions, the Governor had for the first time been excluded. not only that all power of decision in the Council had been transferred from the Government to the unofficial members, but also that the Governor was precluded from the exercise of his personal influence at the Council's meetings, which influence had been, and still is, great by virtue of his ollice. The transference of power was not accompanied by a transference of responsibility, which still remained with the Governor.

3. The Commissioners have expressed their opinion, on page 18, that the Con- stitution was deliberately designed to be capable of adjustment to accord with changing condition 1 have been unable to find any evidence in support of this assumption. The correspondence deals with details concerning the concessions, viewed apparently from the standpoint of what the local politicians might reasonably be expected to accept, and there does not appear to have been any definite examination of the effects which the concessions would produce upon the actual administration. It is not clear that there was any anticipation of the fact that the transfer of the power of effective decision from the executive to the unofficial members would tend to paralyse the former, and it appears to have been assumed that the Government, which was still to retain the responsibility for the good government of the Island, would be able to discharge that responsibility as though the revolutionary changes, which the success- sive Constitutions had brought about, had not in fact taken place.

The

4. Such acquaintance as I have with the more recent political history of Ceylon makes it impossible for me to subscribe to the opinion expressed by the Commissioners on page 19, that the Constitution was calculated to produce an atmosphere of mutual The riots of 1915, with their bitter racial animosities, assistance and good-will. marked the final phase of the Government's autocratic rule, and the rapid succession of concessions, which followed, imparted to the local politicians a triumphant feeling of victory over a Government which in their eyes was definitely on the run. alterations in the Constitution represented to them a yielding to their demands, which had immensely strengthened them and had proportionately weakened the Govern- ment. Each concession was regarded, not as a gift from His Majesty's Government, but as spoils wrung from a defeated local administration. The resulting situation, so far from producing an atmosphere of mutual assistance and good-will, bred in the unofficial members a conviction that at the long last they had the whip-hand over the Colonial Government, with which they had always been in active and open opposition, and that the time had now come for them to use it. Therefore I cannot agree with acceptance of the position of co- the Commissioners' statement on page 20 that partnership faded from the picture of practical politics and the unofficials came I think that such gradually to regard themselves as a permanent opposition." acceptance was never seriously entertained by the unofficial majority. They had forced the Government into a permanent minority, but they had no notion of thereupon abandoning their consistent attitude of permanent antagonism.

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5. On page 21, the Commissioners write: In this unenviable situation the Government was faced with alternative courses of action. It could either risk a crisis by standing its ground in the face of an adverse majority, adhering to its considered proposals and throwing on the Council the responsibility for rejecting them; or it could give ground when opposed in order to secure the best compromise available. Government chose the latter course. 'There is here, in my judgment, a radical mis- apprehension of the position as Sir Hugh Clifford found it when he assumed the Government of Ceylon at the end of 1925. A Governor is bound to govern constitu- tionally, that is, in the spirit of the Constitution which he finds in existence, no matter His Majesty's Government, by what his opinions may be as to its virtues or defects. the Constitution of 1924, had of set purpose and intention transferred the power of the purse, and with it the power of decision in practically all administrative measures of importance, from the Executive to the unofficial majority. It is only reasonable to suppose that His Majesty's Government intended that this momentous change should have its logical effect, and that—with the exception always of matters which were capable of being certified to be of paramount importance-it definitely desired that the powers which it had conferred upon the unofficial members should be exercised

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by those members. What the Commissioners call standing its ground in the face of an adverse majority" was a position which the Government could only take up within the limits imposed upon it by the Constitution, and, although the Commissioners seem to imply that the Government has been weak and cowardly, I do not think that they will find themselves able to cite a single instance in which the unofficial members were allowed to have their own way in any matter which could have been certified to be of paramount importance, with any prospect whatever of its being recognised as such, either by the public at large, or more important by far--by the Secretary of State, who is the ultimate arbiter in such cases.

6. Sir William Manning had left the Colony shortly after the inauguration of the 1924 Constitution, and during the long interregnum which ensued the Government was carried on as far as might be on the old lines, questions as to any radical change of policy being rightly held over for the new Governor's decision. The policy which Sir Hugh Clifford deliberately adopted has, in my opinion, been completely misunder- stood and consequently misrepresented by the Commissioners,

7. Regarding the Constitution of 1924 as the machine which His Majesty's Government had of set purpose devised for the Government of Ceylon, Sir Hugh Clifford from the day of his arrival administered the affairs of the Colony in strict accordance with that Constitution. It was open to him to attempt to neutralise the consequences of the political revolution by a policy of divide et impera, by balancing caste, race, and creed one against another-a matter of no great difficulty in a com- munity made up of such heterogeneous parts. Ile rejected such a course, both as un- worthy, and as inconsistent with the furtherance of the political and national develop- ment of the people. He refused to conceal from the unofficial members any acts or decisions of the Government, and he insisted that they should be afforded the fullest information, and that nothing, of which they might reasonably claim cognisance, should be withheld from them. He was further at pains to impress upon them that the acceptance of the power of decision entailed upon them the responsibility for decision. Self-government had been set before the people as their ultimate goal, and on their journey thither they must find many pitfalls. Dependence upon the Govern- ment is bred in the bone of every Ceylonese, and their first attempts to stand alone were bound to be accompanied by blunders and mistakes. But a beginning had to be made, experience was the best teacher, and the Governor's reserve powers were a sufficient safeguard against serious damage.

8. The opportunity of the unofficial motion, which forms so prominent a feature in the local Legislature. was taken by Sir Hugh Clifford as a means of inducing the unofficial member to change his role of destructive critic for that of constructive counsellor. In cases where a motion embodied a proposal involving no important question of principle, Sir Hugh Clifford withdrew the Government bloe, and, while tendering to the Council the opinion which his experience of affairs caused him to hold, - and warning the members of the possible consequences, he invited them to make up their own minds, the officials being left free to register their votes as might seem good to them, or to refrain from voting. Sir Hugh Clifford hoped thereby to bring home to each member a sense of personal responsibility, and in my opinion his policy has already had a highly educative and steadying effect.

In

9. It so happened that the initiation of this new policy coincided with an event which was destined to have a remarkable reaction upon the political world. May, 1926, an unofficial member proposed in Finance Committee that the Ceylon University should be situated elsewhere than in Colombo, whereby he fired the first shot in a campaign which was to be fought with incredible bitterness throughout the Colombo length and breadth of Ceylon. The country split at once into two camps, pro and pro Kandy. The Colombo party took it for granted that the Government would support their cause, seeing that a site had some time previously been selected in Colombo and the Government was busy with the preparation of plans and estimates for building upon it, but Sir Hugh Clifford declared that the question was one which all members of the Council must decide for themselves, and he refused to direct the official vote. This action on his part greatly disappointed the Colombo party, and their disappointment was changed to open and active hostility, when Sir Hugh Clifford, and later I also, when administering the Government, declared a personal preference for Kandy.

10. This declaration was the signal for a definite attack upon the Government by the Colombo party, who proceeded to advertise to the country the hopeless weak- ness of the Administration. Useful capital was made out of the fact that the mischief had started in the Finance Committee. The Government was made out to be the subservient tool of the Committee, which it must conciliate at all costs, while the