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PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

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거리의 이익

C.O. 885

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PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

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explaining that the general policy was to run the cable as far as practicable through territory under British control. I put this entirely on the ground of commercial confidence, that the question was a financial one, and that in endeavouring to raise the necessary capital, whether from the private investor or by public vote, it was necessary to show the security of the cable from the commercial point of view; and that the natural idea of British publics would be to consider that such security was greater if the cable ran through British territory. I said that it would not be necessary for me to argue that this was a sound view, and that very possibly it might be contended that Honolulu was as safe a place as any other. Personally, I should myself be inclined to go far in the direction of agreeing with that proposition; but there was no gainsaying the fact that the British, Canadian, and Australian publics to whom it was proposed to appeal would not go into these matters but would like to know generally that the line was under British control.

This explanation was received in very good part, and we heard no more after this interview of the main cable coming to Honolulu.

I then went on to say that the question was, whether, on condition of our connecting the line with Honolulu, the Hawaiian Government could give us a suitable landing station in their archipelago with rights which would satisfy the terms of the Ottawa resolutions. Those resolutions and the general policy underlying them would no doubt, in full strictness, call for the absolute cession of some island on which the cable could be landed; but the British Government, desiring to make as moderate a request as possible and not to go beyond the absolute necessities of the case, had decided not to ask for the sovereignty of any island but only for a tenure or lease of one for the purposes of the cable and nothing more. What, therefore, we asked for was a lease of an island so that it would be private property for the cable, but without disturbing the sovereignty or jurisdiction of the Hawaiian Government. In other words, it was commercial, not political, ownership. Practically that was all; we would take a covenant for exclusive occupation, but, as the island will be uninhabited, this would be no real addition to the lease and a covenant for exemption from taxation, though it was not likely that they would establish a customs house there under any circumstances.

We were rather in a difficulty as to naming the island. The "Champion," which had surveyed Necker and possibly other islands, had gone straight on to Vancouve, and none of us knew the result. I therefore thought it as well to say that we did not desire at that stage to name any island, and, indeed, were hardly in a position to do so with any on a similar certainty, but that if, as we hoped, they were disposed to come into the project footing to the other participators in it, we should ask them for their advice and co-operation in this matter.

This at once brought up Captain King with his information. [Captain King is about the only Minister who is not the son of an American missionary. He seems to be the fighting editor"; it was he who went and annexed Necker Island in advance of Fleming.] I think he liked our appeal, and he gave a good many details, summing up in favour of Necker Island.

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When this was over, I observed that, in giving us a landing station, the Hawaiian Government would be doing no more than the other countries would do in this respect, though they would get the consideration of a special liue, costing about 80,0001, without including the office accommodation, &c.

The next question was that of the pecuniary assistance to be given by them. I explained that one main object of the scheme was to establish low rates, and went in for somne figures to show the immensity of the undertaking, the enormous cost, and the certainty of a heavy deficit for a greater or less period. I put it that every country Reminding them of their sharing the line would have to contribute towards this deficit.

offer of $25,000 for a cable to North America, contained in a Statute of theirs which had been passed and renewed without attracting any proposal, I pointed out (1) that that Statute offered an exclusive right, and (2) that it made no stipulation as to rates; and I said that we asked for no exclusive right, and that we would suggest exceedingly low ∙rates, viz., 18. a word for private messages, 9d. for Government, and 6d. for press between Honolulu and Vancouver. The Ministers smiled cheerfully, and admitted that these were very low. [We were safe in naming thein, for if the proposed 28. trans-Pacific rate were carried out the proportionate rate from Honolulu to Vancouver would be less than 1s]

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I then observed that these advantages were so much beyond what they had asked for when offering 5,000, and asked what sum they, on their part, would offer in consideration for them..Ihey did not take the ground that 5,000 was all they could offer, and noting the impression made on them by the figures quoted and the rates suggested, I put up the price to 70007. That is, I remarked that we had no authority to nune or accept

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any sum; that we could only take an offer, which would be considered in connexion with the proposals of the other countries when the authorities were determining whether the aggregate of such proposals justified them in going on with the project. Whatever offer they made would, therefore, be duly put in; but if they wished to have a definite understanding with us so far as our personal recommendations would go, we would suggest 7,000l. as, under the circumstances, a moderate amount.

Mr. Hatch observed that 5,000l. had been offered in the old days of free expenditure, and that they were more careful now. But he admitted the very favourable character of the rates, and I reminded him that the subsidy would not be payable under any circumstances for, say, two or three years.

They said that they would consider the matter, and we met again after a day's interval, Hatch then began by asking whether we would take the sovereignty of Necker Island from them and waive the subsidy. This was an unexpected proposal, and I said that all we could do was to mention the inquiry, but that we could not, ourselves, entertain the proposition, being definitely instructed not to ask for sovereignty, and that it seemed to be a departure from the policy held in view by the British Government.

[You will remember that I suggested that we might ask for sovereignty in the first instance, but that it was agreed, when we were at the Foreign Office, that this was objectionable, as it might draw in the United States with some kind of retaliation. This argument seems to hold good either in the case of a request from us or au offer from them, and we might have a difficulty with France, as, in the Treaty of 1843, we engaged not to take possession of any part of the Sandwich Islands. I suppose we might say that a lease is not a substantial infringement of this engagement.]

Hatch then mentioned that, in any case, the consent of the United States must be obtained to any arrangement by which any landing station was leased or ceded to the British Government.

He quoted Article 4 of the Reciprocity Treaty of 1876, extended in 1884, between the United States and the Hawaiian King. Neither Hawes, nor Fleming, nor I, knew of this provision, and it has not been mentioned in the printed correspondence. We were rather taken aback, but did not show it. I admitted that it was clear that the lease could not be taken by the British Government without such consent, but suggested that it might be granted to a company or person-[my idea at the time was that, if the cable were carried out as a Government enterprise, a nominal company might be incorporated to Hatch take the lease]-such company or person to be named hereafter by ourselves. urged (justly enough) that it would be necessary to consult the United States Govern- I agreed (finding ment, as substantially the lease would be to foreign Governments. them very firm about this) that it might be proper to do so, but that it would probably be easier for the United States to give their consent if the lease were not, on the face of it, an infringement of the Treaty; and I asked whether, as the consent of the United States Senate is necessary to a treaty, any modification or waiver of one would not require such consent also. Mr. Hatch said he thought so. In that case, I observed, the matter would be more protracted and difficult than if the Executive could dispose of it, and that it would make things easier if we avoided the literal infringement. I suggested that I should draw up a draft memorandum of agreement upon which all these points could be further considered, and they asked me to do so.

At the third interview, I produced the "Memorandum of Agreement," which (with certain subsequent modifications) is enclosed. This was originally drafted with a view to the lease being granted to a company or person, and I put in, for consideration, a covenant that if the Hawaiian Islands should ever be ceded to or annexed by a foreign Power, the island leased should become thereupon British territory. After some discussion, the first of these proposals was given up, the Ministers thinking that it would not seem straight- forward. They did not themselves object to the second, but thought it would be disliked at Washington. I said that it was not very material, and would be withdrawn if it occasioned any such difficulty, but the general feeling was against it, and it was accordingly excised.

The draft was gone through, line by line, at another interview and slight alterations were made. The Ministers said they could not sign it or express approval of it until the consent of the United States Government had been obtained; this they regarded as a condition precedent before which they could do nothing.

It will be readily understood that, in the very delicate relations with the United States Government, the Hawaiian Government, do not wish to compromise themselves or enter

• See No. 39.

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