CO885-(18-19) — Page 524

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Reference :-

C.O.885

19 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHIC- COPYRIGHT PHOTOGRAPH-NOT TO

compare their salarios with those given to officials of great commercial and financial institutions. The Secretary of State associates himself with the views expressed by his predecessors upon the work and administration of the Crown Agents" Office, as an organisation distinct from the Colonial Office but he will be glad to consider the desirability of appointing a small inter-depart- mental Committee to report upon the best method of selecting the clerical and technical staff for the Crown Agents' Office, and particularly to consider the conditions of tenure, tire scale of payment of salaries and pensions, and how far flie arrange- ments in that Office are in accord or can be brought into harmony with the principles governing the Civil Service.

The contral of the Secretary of State vere establishment and salaries,

When the Crown Agents were informed in 1863 that they must be held responsible for the integrity of their staff, they replied :—

Cr. Ag. Tith

Such a responsibility is a very serious one, and, we believe, peculiar to this Office; and, Sept. 1863. although we do not shrink from assuming it, we submit with all deference that we have on our side a full claim to ask for complete control over those whose acts may at any moment bring

upon us the most complete ruin. So far as the p102 43. integrity of each individual is concerned it may be said that we can protect ourselves through a Guarantee Association; and, to a limited extent. this is but such Associations afford no security against losses arising out of negligence or stupidity, which, from our peculiar position, we are much exposed to.

SO,

"To illustrate our meaning more clearly we will state a case which occurred to ourselves but a fortnight ago, as follows :-- We gave directions for the shipment of goods at Liverpool valued at £7,000. The standing orders of the Office are that all such goods shall be fully insured in the

· London Marine Insurance Office,' and it is the special duty of one of the clerks in this Office to effect such insurance. On this occasion this duty was neglected, and we discovered that the vessel which had them on board had gone to sea. We then gave one of our senior clerks the most positive directions to remedy the oversight without a moment's loss of time, and had he complied with those directions all would have been right. But, unaccountable as it may he failed to do so, and before this second default was discovered the ship had

got on shore; and laden as she was with railway iron we were under very great anxiety about these goods.

seem,

"The question then arises-Had they been lost who would have made good the £7,000 ?

Under the Imperial Government, precisely analogous cases are not to be found, inasmuch as that Government does not insure; but our experi- cuce tells us that where no blame attaches to the

7

Head of a Department a pecuniary. liability is not held to exist.

"We by no means wish to be exonerated from responsibility; on the contrary we hold it to be essential to the healthy working of every Government Department that the Heads should he held responsible for their acts, both of panission and commission; but more than this is required of us. We are held responsible for the integrity and shortcomings of our whole estab- lishment. We believe we may safely say that to Head of an Imperial Department is held liable to the same extent. The Paymaster General would not be held answerable for the loss of money, nor the Storekeeper General for the loss of goods, arising out of the defaleations or negligence of their subordinates, provided they had omitted none of the usual precautions to guard against such losses. It is true that, unlike those Officers, we have the appointment of our own subordinates, but that power would afford little or no security unless we had the entire control of them, which, under the proposed arrangements, it does not appear that we should possess.

If we are to be placed under such exceptional responsibilities with regard to our staff, we think we may fairly ask for exceptional powers to protect ourselves from the possible consequences. It is simply a physical impossibility that we should personally superintend the execution of all orders involving risk of loss. We must necessarily depend to a great extent on those employed under us, just as merchants or bankers would, and as an incentive to vigilance and good service they ought on their part to feel that they are entirely dependent on us. We therefore most respectfully submit for the con- sideration of His Grace, that, having regard to the unusual responsibilities placed upon us,

we should be allowed to deal with our Office Establishment as any merchant or banker would who had similar risks to encounter, and that we should-within the limits prescribed by the Treasury--be at liberty to increase or decrease the salary of every individual according to his merits, and that we should exercise the same power in regard to dismissal as we now do in respect of appointment,

upon

Although we have always considered such power rested with us, and have acted accordingly, yet your letter of the 7th instant, on Mr. Carter's case, has given rise to some doubts in our minds as to whether it is considered that we have exceeded our powers or not, and whether our interpretation of the Treasury view of the matter is correct.

* At first sight it night appear that we were seeking to be invested with extraordinary power, but similar powers are exercised in every mercantile establishment, and if we are to be