CO885-(11-12) — Page 646

PECORD

OFFICE

ཟ] ། ། *[ ‚། །

Reference -

C.O.882/12

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON | ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE

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deharred from interfering in local affairs by the assurance given in Sir A. Gordon's letter of the 23rd of December, 1887 (as reported in Sir J. West Ridgway's despatch No. 382 of the 24th of September, 1901). "It is possible that in the present circum- stances the Sultan would be prepared to agree to a modification of this understanding, and it might even be practicable to induce him to enter into a new and more formal treaty which he would bind himself to accept an adviser and act on his advice. It is, however, not clear that there is any reason why such a change in relations should be desired by the Ceylon Government or by His Majesty's Government. It appears to me that there would be a clear right of intervention in the event of any dynastic dispute arising on the death of the present Sultan, and that in that event circumstances might necessitate intervention to an extent beyond the mere recognition of his successor. It might also happen that a change in the nature of the relations between Ceylon and the Maldives would be desirable if there existed any exceptional abuses or disorder, particularly if the interests of British subjects were imperilled. "I am not satisfied, however, that there is at present any immediate dynastic difficulty or any serious abuse in the administration which would justify intervention.

3. As I understand the position, the control of administration had up to 1925 been in the hands of the late Haji Ibrahim Didi, who had after a long period of political and dynastic disturbances established himself as Prime Minister shortly after the accession of the present Sultan in 1903. Upon the death of Ibrahim Didi the control of the Administration appears to have been in practice divided between his eldest son, Ahmed Didi, and his second son, Abdul Majid Didi, and it appears that the latter has lately succeeded in obtaining much the greater share of real political power, which it is alleged that he now monopolises. On general grounds it may be undesir- able that too much power should be concentrated in the hands of any one of the Sultan's advisers, and the situation is obviously open to abuse. At the same time, in the circumstances of a community of the size and character of the Maldivian state, it may be difficult to prevent any man of unusually forceful personality acquiring a prelominant influence, while the indications are that the Administration is conducted efficiently and no evidence of specific abuses has been produced.

4. The position is complicated owing to the possibility of disputed sucression in the event of the death of the present sovereign. For reasons explained in Sir Herbert Stanley's Confidential despatch of the 13th October, 1928,* the Sultan's only son, Prince Hassan Izz-ud-din, is regarded as discredited, and there may he opposition to his succeeding to the throne. Suggestions have been made that. instead, a brother of the Sultan, at present residing in India. should be invited to be his successor.

5. Sir H. Stanley's telegram of the 16th January, 1931,† reported that repre- sentations had been made to the Ceylon Government on the question of the succession, and that the Maldivian representative in Ceylon had suggested the visit of a high official to advise the Maldivians on the questions at issue. including the establishment of some form of representative institutions. Sir Bernard Bourdillon was accordingly authorized to visit the Islands, and did so in March, 1931. He proposed that the Sultan's son should visit Ceylon in the hope of some reformation; but during his visit the main emphasis was shifted from the question of succession to the position of the Prime Minister. He urged upon the Sultan that he should exercise more direct control himself, and suggested that finance and important questions of policy should become the corporate responsibility of a Council of Ministers, to be established, instead of the Prime Minister alone.

6. This suggestion was acted upon immediately to the extent of the Sultan issuing a proclamation to the effect that "the administration of the affairs of the Kingdom will hereafter be carried on under the authority of the Sultan by a Council of Nobles and Ministers." Following upon this a new draft Constitution, purporting to give effect to this intention, was transmitted by the Maldivian Agent in Ceylon to the Governor. It is not clear with whose authority this was drafted, but it seems to have been largely modelled on the Ceylon Constitution, and went very much further than merely setting up a Council of Ministers. It provided in somewhat vague terms for certain popular liberties and for a system of elected Councils and Assemblies of very democratic appearance. The Sultan has not, however, succeeded in overcoming the opposition of his Prime Minister to the inauguration of the suggested reforms, and has appealed to you for further assistance through his representative in Ceylon and Prince Hassan Izz-ud-din.

7. I do not feel satisfied that a position has yet arisen which would justify the intervention of the Ceylon Government, or which renders desirable a change

* No. 1 in Eastern No. 151.

† No. 2.

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in the relations of Ceylon with the Maldives which would give the Ceylon Government greater powers of control over (and responsibility for) the internal affairs of the Islands. If the Sultan wishes to dismiss his Prime Minister, there is no legal obstacle, and it appears that the trouble is simply that he lacks the determination and capacity to assume control of affairs. If he were to decide to dismiss Abdul Majid Didi, and the latter were to resist by force, it is possible that a situation might arise in which intervention would be necessary, but no such situation at present exists. Recent events, considered in the light of the past history of the Maldives, cannot but suggest that the present movement towards reform is activated mainly by a tlesire on the part of Abdul Majid's political rivals to displace him in the control of the administra- tion. At present the dispute seems to be a purely domestic struggle for power, which has not yet led to any serious abuses in ordinary administration, or any general dissatisfaction with the authority exercised by the present Prime Minister, and I would suggest that intervention in such a dispute would be unwise unless it were, part of a definite attempt permanently to secure greater control of Maldivian affairs.

8. I shall therefore be glad if you will reconsider in the light of these views the suggestion that a British officer should be sent to the Maldives to assist in the in- auguration of the proposed reforms, which appear to go very much further than the suggestions made by Sir Bernard Bourdillon when he visited the Islands in 1931, and if taken at their face value, to envisage a complete reform of the system of govern- ment. I shall be glad if you will consider specially the possibility that the Sultan would not be in a position, however willing he might be, to enforce the policy recom- mended by a British adviser, if one were sent, without calling on Ceylon for assistance, either financial or military. In this connexion I would suggest that it is possible that such an adviser might find that administration in the Maldives was not up to European standards and, having assumed responsibility for it, might feel compelled to recom- mend costly improvements. It should be borne in mind that the Ceylon Government could not well ignore any complaints which might be made against an administration which it had assisted to set up. I would also note that it appears from Sir Bernard Bourdillon's report that the Maldivian army supports the Prime Minister. Finally, I would remind you that in present circumstances any assistance which might be required would have to come from the Ceylon Government, and you will no doubt consider what would be the attitude of the State Council towards any such proposal. It is to be feared that debate in the Council on the constitutional position of the Maldives would prove embarrassing to you in your relations with the Sultan.

C. 93026/32 [No. 12].

SIR,

No. 11.

I have, &c.,

P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Confidential.)

(Received 20th February, 1933.)

WITH reference to my Confidential despatch of the 27th November, 1932,*

Ceylon, 31st January, 1933. regarding the new Constitution for the Maldive Islands, I have the honour to forward a translation of the new Constitution which was promulgated on the 22nd December, 1932, together with translations of His Highness the Sultan's address from the Throne and of the reply of the Ryots to that address.

I have, &c..

GRAEME THOMSON,

* C. 93026/32 [No. 11]: not printed.

Governor.

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