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BLI

RECORD

OFFICE

Reference -

bulimi C.O.882/12

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE. LONDON

ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHIC-

COPYRIGHT PHOTOGRAPH-NOT TO

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upon its provisions, adding that you propose to await my observations before pro- claiming the new Constitution. I readily accept that invitation and I trust that the observations which I am able to offer will be of assistance to Your Highness in your endeavours to promote the welfare and good Government of your people.

2. I observe that Articles 29 (b) and 30 (c) of the draft refer to Bills affecting the Treaty between Great Britain and the Maldives and Article 32 seems to imply that if such Bills are passed by a two-thirds majority of the Legislative Council or of the Peoples Assembly they will become law. I am given to understand, however, that it is not your desire nor that of your Ministers to take power to legislate in any manner affecting that Treaty and that it would be entirely in accordance with the object in view if the Constitution were definitely to state that no legislation could be enacted which affects the Treaty.

3. With further reference to Article 29 I notice that power is given to refer back only two classes of Bills. The first relates to a subject for which special provision is made in Article 95 and the second to a subject upon which, I understand, it is not desired to legislate at all-wide paragraph 2 above. I suggest that the value of Article 29 would be greatly increased if the power of sending back Bills for further consideration were made to extend to Bills of every kind, and if no specific classes were mentioned.

4. Article 30 states that the Sultan will not give his assent to Bills relating to the subjects mentioned in that Article and would appear therefore to mean that there is to be no power of legislation upon those subjects. It will, I think, be necessary that there should be a power of legislation upon all the subjects mentioned except that described in Sub-clause (c), though special safeguards upon its exercise would be proper The amendment of the Constitution Sub-clause (b) is already provided for by Article 95 and the reference to this subject might, be omitted from Article 30. With regard to the other subjects mentioned I suggest that it would fulfil the object of the draft if some safeguard such as the passage of a Bill by a two-thirds majority of the Legislative Council or of the Peoples Assembly were made a condition of assent to Bills of the classes mentioned in Article 30, deleting Sub-clauses (c) and (b) for the reasons already given.

5. Article 31. Your Highness will no doubt agree that this Article should clearly refer only to Bills other than those mentioned in Article 30, and I would suggest that it be amended accordingly.

6. Article 57. I understand that it is the intention that the procedure for the dethronement of the Sultan shall be the same as that for his election, but I observe that this Article differs from Article 25 in that the people are merely summoned by special meeting to hear the decision of the earlier special meeting and are not required to approve that decision. It would seem desirable therefore that Article 57 should be amended to accord with Article 25.

7. Article 58. This Article provides for the election of the 21 members of the Legislative Council by the tax-paying atols and the four wards of Malé and is in conflict with Article 62, which provides that the members of the Council shall be elected by the members of the Peoples Assembly. I would accordingly suggest that to give effect to Your Highness's intentions the provisions for the election of the Peoples Assembly should precede those for the election of the Legislative Council, and that the portion of Article 58 which conflicts with Article 62 should be omitted.

8. In conclusion

may I assure Your Highness of the keen interest with which 1 have learned of the proposed reforms. I trust that the introduction of these reforms will mark the beginning of a new era of increased prosperity and happiness in your dominions.

Assuring Your Highness of my best wishes for your health and prosperity:

I have, &c.,

His Highness

Muhammed Shamsuddin Iskandar, C.M.G.,

Sultan of the Maldives.

GRAEME THOMSON,

Governor of Ceylon.

C. 83266/81 [No. 18].

25

No. 8.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE to THE GOVERNOR.

(Confidential.)

SIR,

[Answered by No. 9.]

Downing Street, 21st November, 1931. I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Confidential despatch of the 12th of October,* transmitting, for my information, a copy of a translation of a draft constitutional document making provision for a new Constitution for the Maldive Islands.

2. I have read this document with interest, and I should be glad if furnish me with a copy of the Constitution in the form in which it is finally issued.

would you

I have, &c.,

P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER

C. 93026/32 (No. 1].

No. 9.

THE GOVERNOR to THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Confidential.)

SIR,

(Received 7th March, 1932.)

[Answered by No. 10.]

Ceylon, 15th February, 1932.

I HAVE the honour to invite a reference to the correspondence ending with your Confidential despatch of the 21st November, 1931,† on the subject of constitu- tional changes in the Maldive Islands.

2. From information which I have received from time to time from the Maldivian representative at Colombo, and from letters to myself from the Sultan, it is quite clear that the opposition by the Maldivian Prime Minister to any constitutional change, the probability of which was referred to in Sir Bernard Bourdillon's despatch of 14th March, 1931, has materialized, and has so far been entirely successful. Prince Hassan Izzuddin arrived in Colombo last November, and visited me on 7th December, accom panied by the Maldivian representative. He handed ine a private letter from the Sultan, of which I enclose a translation. In the course of the interview the Prince and Mr. Didi made it clear that in their opinion the only hope of remedying the existing state of affairs lay in the temporary removal of the Prime Minister. The Sultan was too weak, or as they expressed it, too kind-hearted, to take the initiative in this matter, and they felt that the only solution was for a British officer to visit Malé for a few months, to advise the Maldivian Government as to the reform of its administration. They felt that the presence of a British officer would enormously strengthen the hands of the Sultan and the reform party generally. I accordingly addressed to the Sultan a letter, to which I have just received a reply. Copies of both these documents are enclosed. 3. It is quite clear that the Prime Minister has now become a virtual dictator and that although his assumption of power and his mismanagement of affairs is generally resented, the docility and laziness which are characteristic of the Maldivians prevent his opponents from taking active steps to put an end to a state of affairs which is inimical to the progress and prosperity of the Islands. It is clear to me that nothing whatever can be effected by further correspondence with the Sultan, and the suggestion that a British officer should visit Malé and attempt to stimulate the reform party into activity and to assist them to set their house in order seems to offer the only possible hope of effecting any reform.

4. The initiation of the new Constitution in Ceylon has unfortunately made heavy demands

upon the personnel of the Ceylon Civil Service, and I should find it exceedingly difficult to spare a suitable officer to undertake a. mission of this nature. I should be glad to learn however whether, in the event of my finding it possible to do so, you would approve of the despatch of a British officer to Malé for the purpose indicated in this despatch. I should further be glad if you would ascertain from the Lords Commis- sioners of the Admiralty whether they are prepared to agree in principle to the con- veyance of such an officer to Malé and back again at the end of his stay, in one of His

* No. 7.

+ No. 8.

# No. 5