PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE
Reference :-
EPELTICO.
885
(Confidential.) Sir,
190
Inclosure 4 in No. 203.
Head-Quarter House, Hong Kong, March 3, 1880. WITH reference to your letter of the 19th ultimo, Secret and Confidential, I have the honour to return the Appendices, together with my remarks on the Report therewith transmitted, as requested.
I much regret that the approaching inspections, reports, and other military business, together with the quantity of matter that was forwarded with your Excellency's letter for perusal, prevented my returning the documents with my reply at an earlier date.
I have, &c. (Signed)
G. W. DONOVAN,
Commanding Forces, China and Straits Settlements. To His Excellency J. Pope Hennessy, C.M.G., &c.,
Governor of Hong Kong.
Inclosure 5 in No. 208.
Observations of Major-General Donovan on the Report, &c., of the Committee on raising a Local Force in Hong Kong.
I CONCUR in the opinion of the Committee that the standing force of Hong Kong should be increased, and that in war time the force should be capable of further augmen- tation; but when the Committee goes on to propose the raising of a company of Chinese by way of an experiment, I cannot go with it. No experiment whatever should be admitted into a deliberately-planned scheme for the defence of a military station, and Hong Kong is for all intents and purposes as much a military station as Gibraltar, Malta, and Bermuda. It guards the docks, naval yard, and the stores required for Her Majesty's navy, and affords protection to a few British merchants and banks. It also gives a certain amount of protection to the different banks and the British mercbants at the Treaty ports. It is true some foreign merchants avail themselves of our protection and laws, and many Chinese make it an asylum when they either have made a little money and prefer to keep it under our rule, or find it convenient for their own interests to live at a safe distance from their own country. But though Hong Kong is styled a Colony it has no colonists, and from its peculiar formation it is never likely to be colonized by Her Majesty's subjects. But on account of its important position its defence must be made as safe and secure from an enemy's attack as foresight, forethought, and engineering skill can make it. scheme for the defence of Hong Kong it appears to me desirable to consider the defence of the rest of this command, for one station ought to be able to help the other in time of need, and what I would submit for the consideration of the home authorities is :-
In a
1. That another battery of Royal Artillery may be sent to the command. A half- battery to be stationed at Hong Kong, and a half-battery at the Straits. That the gun lascars may be Sikhs, and that the same numbers be allowed for the Straits as are now allowed for Hong Kong.
2. That a company of Royal Engineers may be sent to the command, half for Hong Kong and half for the Straits.
3. That a regiment of 600 rank and file, officered by Europeans as in India, may be enrolled for service in the command. This regiment I would also divide, stationing the head-quarters at Hong Kong, with a wing at the Straits.
4. That a troop of Indian cavalry may form part of the, Straits command (the horses would do better there than at Hong Kong). In war time a portion of the troop could be detached for service in Hong Kong to act as mounted orderlies, and to carry on communication between the different posts. In a climate like this telegraphs, either wire or signal, cannot always be depended upon.
5. In war time I apprehend there would be no difficulty in finding suitable men on the spot to work torpedo-launches, and to assist the Royal Engineers in submarine mining. These might be either Europeans or natives; but the actual placing of mines should be entrusted to Europeans only.
I
6. In the event of war a complete division should always be held in readiness at Madras to embark for service at Hong Kong or the Straits at the shortest notice. do not think it would be advisable to keep more trops at Hong Kong than are actually required, on account of the limited space, and the difficulty there would be in subsisting them.
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7. A coolie corps of 100 Chinese might be found useful, but except as labourers or pioneers I should not like to recommend the employment of Chinese.
With regard to the regiment I propose for service in the command, I would recommend that it should be raised from natives in our North-west Provinces of India and in Madras. The Malays are not fitted for soldiers, and there are no other natives available excepting the Chinese, and I am so thoroughly convinced that the employment of Chinese as a local force would be such a great mistake that I am totally opposed to arming them or to allowing them to form any portion of Her Majesty's combatant forces. They have no loyalty towards their own country, and cannot be expected to have any towards ours. Some of those who know the Chinese are of opinion that, even if enrolled as soldiers, they would from being well paid only remain in our service as long as matters went smoothly, but that with orders from China, or under a strict discipline, they would desert to a man.
One of our best authorities states they are not to be trusted with the charge of stores or magazines. Now we know from experience that Indian troops are to be trusted, and are trusted, as guards to magazines, stores, and treasure. From my own observation I consider the Chinese would not make as good soldiers as the Indians, and are not as fit to cope with Europeans as the Sikhs are; but for a coolie corps or a pioneer corps they would suit admirably. Even if the Chinese were more fit for soldiers than they appear to me to be, I should still be averse to their employment as a local force; there are already too many on the island, and in the event of a rupture with Russia, China might consider it too good an opportunity to lose for striking a blow at our power in these parts, and then the Chinese on the island would, from their numbers, be a source of trouble and inconvenience, unless all were sent back to China who could not give such security as would satisfy us that their lot was cast in with our own. Those allowed to remain should be kept well away from the defending force, for from their habits and style of life no commander directing the defence of Hong Kong would be justified in glowing them to reside in the neighbourhood of the troops.
In the proceedings of the Committee it would have been more satisfactory if all the representatives of the different British commercial firms and bankers had had an opportunity of stating their views as to the formation of a local force. In the Appendices I find that out of forty answers to the queries of the Committee, three only, the Honourable W. Keswick, the Honourable P. Ryrie, and Mr. Jackson, can be said to have a real stake and interest in the Island of Hong Kong. As a matter of course, I attach more importance to their views than I can to those of the rest, who, with much the same experience of the Chinese as I have myself, and with no stake in the Colony to risk, with the exception of perhaps a few trifling investments in houses and land, have no interest in Hong Kong beyond what I trust is common to us all, a desire to see such an important out-station of Her Majesty's Empire thoroughly impregnable.
(Signed) G. W. DONOVAN, Major-General,
Commanding China, Hong Kong, and Straits Settlements.
Hong Kong, March 3, 1880.
No. 204.
The Right Hon. Sir Michael Hicks Beach, Bart., to Governor of South Australia.
(Telegraphic.)
Downing Street, April 17, 1880. YOUR evidence not at present considered necessary by Royal Defence Commission, but Ministerial representative desired,
Please inform the other Colonies that Delegates should reach England not later than the commencement of June next.
T
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