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Territory, upon which our food supplies for Vancouver Island are now dependent, a state of affairs rendering serious defence impossible.

The United States' Territory of Alaska being without a white population need not, at present, be considered as a base of hostile operations; but the Russians have lately established a fortified base of operations on their Asiatic Pacific coast, in direct commu- nication with St. Petersburgh. During the late complications, when war seemed imminent, a Russian fleet assembled in San Francisco Harbour; and while the British squadron was engaged watching a South American contest, a Russian man-of-war steamed up to Esquimalt Harbour, and could have destroyed the solitary gun-vessel lying there before she got up steam, burnt the dockyard, and shelled the town. This was previous to the construction of the present land defences, which are, however, far from complete, and should be added to, much more powerfully armed, and have telegraph signals to give notice of approaching vessels. All these, and the following considera. tions, point to the necessity of completing the defences of Esquimalt:-

1. The cession of the central channel and Island of San Juan would enable the United States to confine us to a channel in one part only 2 miles wide, by placing batteries on James and Henry Islands. There is a channel closer to the Vancouver Island shore, by which such batteries could be avoided; but that channel is intricate and unsuited to the general purposes of navigation. Still more difficult would it be for the passage of a crippled vessel seeking a graving-dock or harbour of refuge through the inland waters of the Archipelago, or Gulf of Georgia.

2. I accompanied Colonel Lovell, R.E., in his examination of various harbours- Nanaimo, Bute, and Burrard Inlet, and more particularly Barclay Sound and Alberin Canal. Í obtained detailed information from Captain Hennell, an intelligent officer of the Bombay Army, who visited the coast as far as Fort Simpson. The Senior Naval Officer commanding the station, Captain_Paget, R.N., afforded us every facility, and placed at our disposal Her Majesty's ship "Rocket," commanded by Captain Orlebar, R.N., who also gave us the benefit of his experience and knowledge, and I read carefully the Reports of Admiral de Horsey and other naval authorities, as also of the Dominion Government engineers. There appears to me no place so suitable for a naval station as Esquimalt.

3. There are other sides to this very complicated and important question, many points of which do not present themselves to those who can only form conclusions from maps, such as suitability for settlement, and capability of fresh food, water and coal supply.

4. Notwithstanding the difficulties which present themselves to the complete defence of Esquimalt, it cannot be advisable to ignore the large sums of money that have been already spent by the Imperial Government on the dockyard, on the graving dock by the Provincial Government, to which a subsidy has been promised by the Imperial Government, and, finally, the expenditure on the batteries built by the Dominion Government.

5. The abandonment of Esquimalt as an Imperial and naval station with a graving dock in favour of a more southern port not in our own territories, and where there is no natural supply of coal, on the plea of greater commercial interests south of San Francisco, would, I believe, be a mistake of a very grave character.

II and III. "The means to be adopted for placing the harbours of Esquimalt and Victoris in an efficient state of defence by permanent works, the extent to which the temporary works may be made available being reported."

"Whether these two harbours may be considered independently, or whether, on the other hand, a scheme of defence must necessarily embrace both, bearing in mind that Esquimalt, as an Imperial station, is of primary importance."

I find it is advisable to treat headings II and III together, commencing with the latter as the natural order of sequence.

Strategically it would be quite possible, and perhaps advisable, to consider the defence of the two harbours separately, breaking down the bridges from Victoria to Esquimalt, and fortifying the neck of the peninsula between the two harbours, abandoning the defence of Victoria, town and harbour, as difficult to secure and secondary in impor. tance. Not only could the town be shelled from Ross Bay, but boat landings could be effected at Cordova Bay and other places on south-east coast.

Nevertheless, morally, it would be unadvisable entirely to abandon the defence of Victoria, especially as Macaulay Point Battery assists in the defence, of the entrance to both harbours. The Dominion Government have already built the batteries, while

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the present armament is lent by the Imperial Government. The defence of Esquimalt is mainly an Imperial question, as more intimately connected with the Royal Naval station and graving-dock.

The character of the coast forming the harbour of Esquimalt and Victoria differs essentially in its want of boldness from the coast of the mainland of British Columbia. Comparatively low ridges of rock leave funnel-shaped depressious open towards the sea, rendering impossible complete defilade from even a moderately-curved artillery trajectory. The blue lines on the accompanying plan* mark the possible lines of fire upon the dock- yards and graving-dock of Esquimalt, and on the town of Victoria, which could be taken up by hostile vessels outside the arcs of fire (red on plan) of the present

armament.

Unfortunately, the dockyard buildings appear to have been placed without any reference to protection, but being merely built of wood and exposed in position, it might be thought worth while to remove them to Indian Core. As the harbour and graving-dock cannot be removed, they must be defended by mounting artillery sufficiently powerful to keep an enemy at a distance and prevent vessels lying in Royal Roads and shelling along the lines marked blue. But these depressions would be difficult of discovery by a stranger, and could only be utilized fairly by a vessel anchored in that line of fire, or steaming along it, a dangerous manoeuvre if opposed by artillery of any power or accuracy. For the defence, therefore, of Esquimalt it would be necessary to complete the battery on Brothers Island, rendering it permanent by revetting it with masonry, placing a suitable pivot for the 8-inch gun, renewing the platforms, building an expense magazine and artillery store; it might be necessary to throw a few loads of stones to form a small breakwater across the little horseshoe bay in the centre of the island. The same applies to Macaulay Point Battery, the natural escarpment of which is being gradually washed away by the sea.

I entirely concur in the recommendation of General Sir Selby Smyth and Admiral de Horsey that a powerful battery is essential on Signal Hill, which commands not only the sea approach, but the two roads from the land side, as well as the whole interior of the harbour. A couple of 9-inch muzzle-loading rifled 12-ton guns mounted in Moncrieff pits blasted out of the rock would, think (as giving an all-round fire it would be impossible to silence), form a very valuable element of defence.

Rodd Hill presents a very favourable site, the ground forming natural embrasures and traverses, with a sheltered site for a magazine. It is easily accessible by boat from the dockyard; the fresh water supply is there. A heavy battery should be built on Rodd Point to protect the entrance to Esquimalt, and to cross 'fire with Brothers Island and Signal Hill Batteries, and Macaulay Point, 2,500 yards. The armament should not, in my opinion, be less than 9-inch 12-ton muzzle-loading rified guns. They would also bear up the Royal Roads, and a ship entering offers a favourable parallelogram of fire to them. A portion of the Rodd Hill Battery would also enfilade the tongue of land forming the shore of the salt lagoon. It would, however, be advisable to build a blockhouse on Belmont Hill, otherwise a few riflemen would render the Rodd Hill Battery untenable. Belmont Hill takes it in reverse at about 400 yards.

Fisgard Island is too small and rocky to be used advantageously as a heavy gun emplacement,

I would not propose any but heavy guns for the defence of Esquimalt, with the exception of a battery of four heavy field-guns (16-pounder rifled muzzle-loading), with harness, &c., complete, to be handed over to the Canadian militia artillery, and horsed by farm-horses, to meet boat attacks either on the several bays south-west of Victoria, from which there are good roads to the town, or to repel a landing to the eastward in Soɔke Harbour.

In this direction the rough and densely-wooded character of the country will confine, an enemy having to land supplices and ammunition to the road, which could easily be closed against him, and any counter-barricade of such road by felled trees could only be forced by artillery.

The country round Victoria, especially west of it to the sea, is comparatively open and suited for field artillery.

On the principle that it is always advisable to place batteries in advance of what they defend, it was contemplated to recommend the construction of a battery on the high land between Albert Head and Rodd Head to bear on vessels coming up the roads to the entrance of Esquimalt, with 5,000 yards extreme range to Macaulay Point, but I do not consider it advisable for the following reasons:—

⚫Ares of fire of present batteries, red; arcs of fire of proposed batteries, yellow; lines of enemy's fire, blue. Not printed.

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PUBLIC RECORD. OFFICE

Reference :-

TLC.O. 885

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

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