with Lieutenant-Colonel Strange, R.A., to report upon the defences necessary to place the important harbours of Esquimalt and Victoria in an efficient state of permanent defence.
2. Your Ministers will no doubt concur with the Secretary of State for War that it would be desirable that the Port of Nanaimo should at the same time be examined by Colonel Loveli in company with Lieutenant-Colonel Strange.
I have, &c.
(Signed)
No. 41.
M. E. HICKS BEACH.
31
capabilities for defence of the peninsula between Esquimalt and Victoria Harbours, surrounded as it is by water except the narrow gorge at Portage Inlet. The dockyard itself, with its commanding outpost, Signal Hill, is capable of being defended by a handful of men, whilst at any time it be decided (as, in my opinion, it is most desirable) more thoroughly to fortify, this peninsula can be made practically impregnable by placing redoubts on, and occupying, the heights with a proper garrison.
6. Captain Bedford has clearly shown how inadequate the proposed batteries would be for the defence of Esquimalt, and has suggested valuable alterations in the disposition of the guns, but retains the three 7-inch guns at Macaulay Point. I think one should
be at Rodd Point instead of a 64-pounder, and one at Holland Point.
7. The following is the disposition that I recommend the guns now available :—
30
-
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE
Reference :-
6
CO.885
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON
ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHIC- COPYRIGHT PHOTOGRAPH-NOT TO |
(Secret and Confidential.) Sir,
Colonial Office to War Office.
Downing Street, July 3, 1879.
I AM direeted by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to request that you will inform Secretary Colonel Stanley that he has transmitted by to-day's mail to the Governor- General of Canada, for the information of his Government, a copy of your Secret and Confidential letter of the 30th ultimo, stating that Colonel Lovell, C.B., commanding Royal Engineers at Halifax, has been directed to proceed to Vancouver Island, and after placing himself in communication with Lieutenant-Colonel Strauge, R.A., to report upon the defences necessary to place the important harbours of Esquimault and Victoria in an efficient state of permanent defence.
2. In transmitting the letter, Sir Michael Hicks Beach observed that he had no doubt that Lord Lorne's Ministers would concur with the Secretary of State for War, that it would be desirable that the Port of Nanaimo should at the same time be examined by Colonel Lovell in company with Lieutenant-Colonel Strange.
APPENDIX.
I am, &c. (Signed)
R. H. MEADE.
Rear-Admiral de Horsey to Admiralty.
[This was inclosed in a letter from the Admiralty, dated September 6, 1878.]
(Confidential.) Sir,
**
Shah," at Esquimall, June 28, 1878.
I REQUEST you will acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that on arrival at Esquimalt on the 18th instant, I lost no time in complying with their Lordships' directions as contained in the latter part of your Confidential Circular letter of the 24th April last, in accordance with which I have the honour herein to report my views on the subject of the defences of Esquimalt and its vinicity.
2. In order to carry out their Lordships' instructions, I directed (Appendix No. !) Captain Bedford to take to his assistance Gunnery Lieutenant Lindsay and Captain Burrows, R.M.A., and to report fully to me on the subject of defending this port.
3. The inclosed able and lucid Report (Appendix No. 2) made by Captain Bedford, with the assistance of the officers named in the last paragraph, has much facilitated my duty in reporting on the subject under consideration, for although after personal examination of the various sites, I differ from that Report in some minor details respecting the disposition of the available guns, as hereafter shown, I fully concur with the report in the main, and especially with paragraph 6, wherein is set forth the inadequacy of the proposed arrangements for the defence of Esquimalt and its dockyard.
4. Appendix No. 3 and 4 being tracings from Admiralty Charts, are furnished to make my views clearer, but in considering the question I request their Lordships will be pleased to place before them the excellent Chart No. 576"Esquimault and Victoria Harbours," which will elucidate my remarks far better than a tracing.
5. On examining the chart last mentioned, the eye will be immediately struck with the
No. 38.
Holland Point Macaulay Point Rodd Point.. Brothers' Island Signal Hill ..
:::::
:::::
9-in.
8-in.
7-in
64-pr. Total.
2
3
1
1
3
B
8. 'The above leaves five 64-pounders on truck carriages unapporpriated; I consider
the defence complete without them, but if it be desired to employ them, I should place two at Finlayson Point, and one at each of the following positions:-the point inside Scrogy Rocks, the Dockyard Summit, and Duntze Point, at the positions respectively marked A, B, C, and D on Appendix No. 3.
9. The emplacement of guns on rock in such positions as Rodd Point, Signal Hill, and the Dockyard Summit would entail a slight expense for blasting to assist the natural facilities afforded by the sites, but none of moment.
any
10. In suggesting the above positions for guns, I have not overlooked the rule that guns should not generally be situated so as to draw the enemy's fire on the places they Fire aimed at are intended to protect. But this rule scarcely applies to the present case. Signal Hill could scarcely be bad enough to strike the dockyard 700 yards at right angles to its line. The situation of the dockyard is, moreover, so obvious and well known, that an enemy desiring to shell it would require no assistance to denote its position.
11. The suggested positions of the 9-inch and 8-inch guns may require explanation. The former I would appropriate to Brothers' Island, on the principle of placing the best gun in the best place to keep an enemy at a distance (the most advanced site; and, nevertheless, one not easily surprised, nor tenable whilst commanded by Signal Hill. The latter (the 8-inch) would be valuable on Signal Hill for the same purpose as the 9-inch, and also on account of its singularly commanding position. An enemy with local knowledge might enter the harbour at night without excessive risk from the guns in position, but with an 8-inch gun on Signal Hill he would find himself in a trap unable to remain.
12. Although Victoria Harbour, from its shallowness, could not be attempted by an enemy's ship of any size, its defence, as well as that of Victoria City, has not been over- looked in the above suggestions. But I submit that, in the absence of defensive works of an extent not now contemplated, that city is not defensible except by sufficient land forces to meet an enemy in the field. On reference to Appendix No. 4 it will be seen how easily it can be taken in the rear by an enemy landing in Cadboro Bay, Cormorant Bay, or indeed anywhere along a coast line of some 13 miles or more extent, and yet with a march of only 3 to 5 miles to the city.
13. Finally, I would, with all deference for entering upon the subject, draw their Lordships' especial attention to the necessity of Esquimalt being defended by Imperial resources and under naval control. The dockyard is Imperial property, and bears the same relative position to our squadron in the Pacific as Halifax does to the squadron in the North Atlantic, but with three-fold force, as there is no Bernuda or Jamaica in these waters, no British Possession within possible reach for supplies and repairs. It is lamentable to think that, in the present defenceless condition of this harbour, and viewing the trifling number of volunteer militia, any fairly organized enemy's expedition should suffice to destroy the dockyard and be masters of the position until again ejected by hard fighting. This is assuming the absence of Her Majesty's ships, which, in case of war, must be counted upon. They could not remain here as mere floating batteries, and, even
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