CO885(3-4) — Page 379

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

│ ·│

Reference :-

C.O. 885

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHIC- COPYRIGHT PHOTOGRAPH-NOT TO

4

done. The arms, in the event of the outbreak of the then anticipated war, were necessary at any cost, and the question of who was to supply them was altogether secondary, but now that the immediate risk has passed, it will be well to consider, as a whole, the measures that should be taken for the defence, not only of the West India Islands, but of all our Colonies.

Garrisons of Her Majesty's regular army being out of the question in the event of an European war, except at important strategical points, it would be well in the first instance to determine what those points are, and how they are to be defended; to what extent naval means may be relied on, and what local means should be provided, including

1. Works of defence and submarine mines.

2. Armaments.

3. Garrisons, whether Imperial or local forces, or the two combined.

4. Auxiliary gun-boats.

5. Torpedo-boats.

6. Arms and equipment of local forces.

Having decided these points, the incidence of their cost will have to be determined, whether it is to be defrayed entirely from Imperial funds or partly from Colonial funds.

The defence of the principal strategical positions being settled, that of the other important ports in the Colonies and of the Colonies themselves against foreign attack wiil have to be considered under the same heads in each case, with reference to the means available in the Colony, to its population, and to its local institutions.

Unless under exceptional circumstances, such as now exist at the Cape of Good Hope, it is presumed that the Colonies should provide for their internal security against disorderly or disaffected populations, in which case it is not improbable that the garrisons of the regular army might be withdrawn from some stations and concentrated in the more important strategical positions, where, while providing for their defence during war, they might be available, by the aid of telegraphs and steam, as reserves in support of the civil power in the event of internal commotion during peace in any neighbouring Colony.

It is not improbable, considering the vast development of steam power for naval purposes and of artillery of late years, and the consequent revolution in the operations of war, that in determining the positions which for strategical purposes it is necessary to maintain, one or more of those now occupied may cease to be regarded as such, and others take their place, but there can be no doubt that the apprehensions caused by the supposed imminence of war previous to the signing of the Treaty of Berlin have clearly demonstrated what had been frequently urged on the late. Government as well as on the present-viz., that in the absence of such positions provided with adequate means for their defence, the operations of Her Majesty's fleets for the protection of the vast interests of Great Britain. commercial as well as political, all over the world, might possibly have been greatly embarrassed, if not crippled, even by a few cruizers handled with activity and energy, which, without any reflection upon the sagacity or efficiency of Her Majesty's navy, might have escaped from an enemy's ports or been fitted out surreptitiously by him elsewhere.

It is essential that stores of coal should be kept for the use of Her Majesty's ships in convenient and secure harbours, as also that they should have the means of filling up with coals, refitting and repairing damages in security, without which there can be no certainty that they will be able to keep the sea and afford that protection to British commerce and the Colonies which they have a right to expect from them, and it may be predicted with certainty that after everything has been done that can be done to supply their needs, their duties will even then be most arduous, and task their energies to the utmost.

Ports also in the Colonies, in which large supplies of coal are kept for commercial purposes, if undefended, may become a source of considerable danger by the possibility they might afford to an enemy of obtaining supplies of coal. The defence of such ports then is of consequence, not only directly for their own protection, but indirectly for that of other places,

If, however, the navy is kept on such a footing in war, both as regards ships and means for coaling, that the operations of large hostile squadrons may be effectually prevented, an amount of protection will thereby be afforded to the Colonies against external attack at the expense of the mother country, which will reduce their defence to such as in most instances will be within the power of the Colonies themselves, if duly organized in peace before the outbreak of war, and it will be for decision whether they should undertake such limited defence entirely at their own charges, as has been done in some of the Australian Colonies, or whether the Home Government should afford some encouragement by aiding in one or more of the following methods in the construction of

5

works, in the provision of armaments for batteries, and arms and equipment for men, and

and torpedo boats.

gun

in some exceptional cases possibly in the provision of

Before, however, the Colonies can be urged, or indeed expected, to take the necessary measures and cur the large expenditure requisite for such limited defence, they may reasonably inquire whether the Imperial Government has fulfilled its portion of the task by placing the necessary strategical positions in such a condition as to make certain the action of Her Majesty's fleets.

A strong case in illustration of the relative responsibility of the Imperial and Colonial Governments is afforded at the Cape of Good Hope.

The Colony has comparatively little direct interest in Simon's Bay, which is the coaling and refitting port for Her Majesty's ships in South Africa, but it does attach the greatest importance to the defence of the capital and its commercial port in Table Bay. The defence of the two ports, which are only about 27 miles apart the one from the other, although it may be undertaken for each separately, is intimately connected, one being as it were a hack door to the other. The defences of both had been entirely neglected since the introduction of rifled artillery, had become obsolete, and were in that condition in the early part of the present year. It was manifest that the Colony could not be called on or expected to place Table Bay in a state of defence, unless Simon's Bay were placed in a like condition. The Imperial Government would not provide the necessary funds for their port, and as a consequence the capital of the Colony and its port were undefended. Both ports, in the time of apprehended danger, were exposed to insult, and instead of being ports in which the valuable commerce which rounds the Cape every year to the extent of 95,000,0001., or about one-seventh of the whole foreign trade of Great Britain, could find a refuge, trading ships within them would have been subject to destruction by a single cruizer in the absence of any of Her Majesty's ships on other duties requiring their presence elsewhere.

An idea prevails, which has found expression in official communications from several Colonies-Tasmania, New Zealand, and Canada, for instance that Her Majesty's ships should protect the more important commercial harbours on their coasts. An example in illustration may be quoted.

In "Australia, 5, 39" it will be seen that the Government of Tasmania expressed their strong conviction that the continuous, or all but continuous, presence of one of Her Majesty's vessels of war in the port of Hobart Town during any war which might occur between England and any European Power, would be in the very highest degree advisable. In reply to a representation made on the subject to Commodore Hoskins, who commanded on the station, that officer explained the duties of the squadron under his command in the event of war as follows: to meet a hostile squadron wherever it can be found, and endeavour to stop its ravages in limine, and not by dividing and shutting up his ships in the different ports to give the enemy the command of the sea and the power of attacking them separately and in detail.

He added, moreover, that he had a right to expect that the principal ports shall be protected by land forces and batteries, either afloat or on shore, sufficiently strong to protect them against an ordinary cruizing squadron, and by beating it off or delaying it, to give him a better chance of intercepting it, and also to afford him a refuge in case of his being worsted or overpowered in a sea fight. To call on ships to protect the ports, instead of the ports the ships, is to invert the obligation and prevent their performing their proper dutics.

Should the enemy, he adds, not send a squadron to these seas, but only single cruizers acting independently against our commerce, corresponding steps would, of course, be taken, but even then, to enable detached vessels to act with vigour and success, it would be necessary for them to have fortified places to fall back upon in case of need. He can therefore enter into no engagements to give Hobart Town the preference over any other of the ports of the eight Colonies comprised within the sphere of his command, for the protection of whose interests, as well as of the commercial interests of Great Britain in those seas, he has only four ships, including his own pendant ship, under his

command.

The principle so well enunciated by Commodore Hoskins is of general application, and holds good equally with respect to the ports of the Dominion of Canada on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts (although the Dominion Government appears also, from the reports of their officers, to be of opinion that their ports should be protected by Her Majesty's ships), of Newfoundland, the West Indies, the coast of Africa, &c.

Repeated representations have been made by the Admiralty to the Secretary of State for War as to the necessity of fortifying the more important coaling stations, which has also been frequently urged by the Defence Committee, of which His Royal Highness the