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It would not means to condemn as lawful prizes-every British ship they came across. be their object to do this before our less speedy cruizers could come to the rescue, and bearing in mind the injury which the "Alabama," and two or three sister ships, were able to inflict on the United States' commerce during their civil war, it is evident that the damage that might be thus caused to our trade would be enormous, perhaps lasting and irreparable.

17. I understand that a ship of the "City of Sydney" class, dispatched from New York on the outbreak of hostilities, coming by way of Rio, where she would fill up with coal and take advantage of the prevailing westerly winds, might be expected to reach the Australian coast in forty days, still having on board coal enough for a fortnight, or even three weeks, full steaming. The ports of the Australian Colonies are spread over a line of coast about 4,000 miles in length, extending from the north of West Australia to the.north of Queensland, and from them enter or clear annually about 7,000 merchant-vessels.

18. We have no doubt some ships of war of recent type which, if dispatched from home on war being declared, might be able to reach these Colonies in the same time, and under the same circumstances, as the enemy's cruizers, but Great Britain has her home trade and the other Colonies to defend as well as Australia, and we could not expect that the pick of the fleet would be sent for our protection. I believe I am correct in saying that an ordinary corvette or sloop of war, whether sent via the Cape or Red Sea, could hardly make the passage to Western Australia in any reasonable time without expending every ton of coal she could carry. From the Cape to King George's Sound is about 4,200 miles; from Aden direct about 5,000. If she went from there to Galle she could no doubt fill up for the passage south, but it would be at the cost of still further delay in reaching her destination. From King George's Sound to Adelaide, the nearest place at which coal could be obtained, is 1,100 miles, and as the powerful steamers of the Peninsular and Oriental Company take five days to perform the distance, it is easy to see how great would be the difficulty and delay to which our cruizers would be exposed before they could go to sea in pursuit of the enemy, unless they were enabled to coal at some intermediate port.

19. It is fully recognized that King George's Sound is the most convenient site that could be selected for this purpose. The only objection that has been suggested is, that it would require protection to prevent its being made use of, or its coal destroyed by the enemy's ships, but bearing in mind the lightly armed class of vessels which they would probably employ, ample protection would be supplied by the presence of a moderate sized ship cruizing off that part of the coast. I understand that between Seal Island and the shore, at the entrance to King George's Sound, is an anchorage which would hold a squadron in perfect safety in the worst weather to which it could be possibly exposed, whilst from the high land above Peake's Head immediately adjacent the movements of everything passing could be readily observed. If further defence were deemed necessary to meet the contingency of the man-of-war being temporarily withdrawn, I believe it might easily be provided by placing a few submarine mines at the entrance to the channel opposite the inner lighthouse, and, if thought desirable, protection might be afforded to them by a small tower, mounting a single gun, placed on the height above the lighthouse. This would be ample to resist the only sort of attack to which it would be exposed, a coup de main by the boats of a cruizer,

20. I venture to think that what has been here stated will establish that the abandon- ment of King George's Sound as a coaling station is not only unnecessary but undesirable, and that whilst it may be left free for civil use in time of peace, it should, in the event of war, be at once taken charge of by the Government, and occupied as a naval coaling station. Should this last suggestion not be adopted, and the question still remain open whether or not coal should be left there for Colonial purposes in time of war, I beg to say that in such a contingency I am ready to assume the responsibility of keeping there coal supplies for Colonial purposes, and to insure that they shall not be made use of by an enemy. A few charges of gun-cotton placed in nines under the coal would, I think, be sufficient to prevent an enemy attempting its removal, whilst they would serve for its destruction if it were found necessary.

21. In conclusion, reverting to the suggestion of Sir W. Jervoise that the Peninsular and Oriental steamers should, during hostilities, cease to call at King George's Sound, ia consequence of their liability to capture when having on board valuable freights and gold, I submit that, if there be any truth in the picture I have drawn of the probable operations of an enemy on the outbreak of war, there is no reason to apprehend that valuable freights, still less gold, would be placed on board the Pensinsular and Oriental steamers under such circumstances. The knowledge that the "City of Sydney" had been seen off the coast in the neighbourhood of either Adelaide, Melbourne, or Sydney would, I suspect, at once put

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a stop to all movements of shipping with valuable freights or gold from any of their ports. I imagine that mail steamers, knowing that their published time-tables could furnish an enemy with full information as to their exact positions almost hourly, and that they would be quite as easily intercepted coming out of Melbourne, or Glenelg, as King George's Sound, would confine themselves exclusively to the carrying of mails and passengers, and trust to their speed and their empty holds for exemption from capture. It may, I think, be taken for granted that, so long as there was any risk of its being captured, merchants would send valuable freights only under convoy, and gold in men-of-war.

22. In considering the defence of Western Australia, my attention has been directed to the measures proposed with the same object for the other Australian Colonies, and I trust I shall be pardoned if 1 venture to offer some observations respecting them which occur to me, though they are not in accord with the views expressed by the high authorities from whom these measures emanate.

23. It appears, from the Committee's Report, that a system of permanent defences has been undertaken for the protection of their principal towns and harbours, supported by a body of troops, not only sufficient to secure the works from attack by land, but also Granted the to take the field, and cope with any force likely to be brought against it. probability of these ports being attacked either for the purpose of levying contributions or for the destruction of the shipping they shelter, some defence is clearly required for their protection; but the question suggests itself, whether this could not be much better pro- vided by a naval force than by any system of land defences, to be manned and garrisoned by volunteers or Colonial troops? It is, of course, a great point to secure the immunity from attack of those towns and ports, but it is clear that this arrangement affords no security whatever to the trade of these Colonies, and that whilst they might easily and cheaply be protected from the attack of any small naval force that might reach these shores unobserved by our cruizers, no amount of defences or land forces will protect their shipping, for which they must, after all, be dependent on our men-of-war. It seems to me, therefore, open to question whether, after making such provision as might be necessary to guard against surprise, these Colonies would not have done better to have appropriated, in a different manner, the very large sums of money which the construction of the defences in question must have entailed, to say nothing of the outlay for their up-keep, and the maintenance of an armed force fit to take the field.

24. There are no doubt political reasons why the Australian Colonies should have been urged to adopt the present course; it has imparted a feeling of security, which will probably last until we are actually at war; it has gratified a natural and laudable spirit of independence, by allowing them to feel that they possess their own defences and military forces, the control of which cannot fail to be very acceptable to a Colonial Ministry. To the Imperial Government it is, of course, very satisfactory to be relieved from all claim or responsibility for the security of such wealthy and important Colonies in time of peace. But I submit, with due respect to the high authority by which this arrangement has been sanctioned, that if ever we are at war with the United States, or an European Power possessed of any naval force, the mother-country will find her responsibility for the protection of her Colonies is in as full force as ever, and that she will be called upon to provide means for it when she is perhaps the least prepared to do so.

25. I am aware that what is now being attempted in these Colonies is analogous to what has been successfully carried out in Canada, but I would point out that the circum- stances of the two countries differ materially. Canada's vulnerable point is on land, and her only enemy is not superior to her in military capacity; she lacks numbers, but this can be readily supplied from Imperial sources; it was therefore clearly right to encourage her to take measures for her internal defence. Such protection as her trade requires would be easily afforded by our Navy whilst engaged in harassing the enemy. But with Australia the case is different; it is most unlikely that one of the Great Powers would dispatch a land force for the attack of its fortifications, or that its land forces would be afforded the opportunity of showing their fitness to cope with it. Their real danger lies in the injury which would be inflicted by the presence on these coasts of an enemy's ships of war, an injury which, I submit, would be inflicted as much by their being shut up in their barbours as by their being exposed to capture at sca.

26. The question of the defence of Colonics is one which it has been my duty to consider during the greater part of my official career, and the conclusion at which I have arrived is, that, as it is a duty which must in the large majority of cases devolve upon the Imperial Government, it would be far better that such Colonies should contribute their proportion of the cost of the security they enjoy in the form of a money contribution, which would be, in fact, in the nature of an insurance, entitling them, in the event of war, to complete protection from aggression by sea and land at Imperial cost. Such an

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