PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE
Reference :--
EL C.O. 885
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON
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be found greatly to contribute to the accomplishment of the other, and the two objects should, at the samne time, be kept in view.
The measures which I consider to be required are as
follows:-
1. It is very well known that a very large proportion of our whole military expenditure is that incurred for the defence of the colonies. As nearly as possible four- sevenths of the whole infantry of the line are either, at this moment, abroad or on passage, and the cost of main- taining this force is also very much greater than that of maintaining an equal force in this country, if we take into account the expense of transports, the greater cost of
rations, in many instances, and the increased number of men who die or are invalidated in regiments serving in most of the colonies, as compared to regiments at home which, of course, increases the charge both for recruiting and for pensions. The charge for transport alone is a very heavy one; and it is calculated that, upon an average, we have always from three to four battalion's on passage, the available strength of the army being, of course, to that extent reduced. Yet the sufficiency of the reliefs pro- vided has long been the subject of just complaint; nor can there be any doubt that the circumstance of our troops being subjected to such long periods of colonial service is one main cause of the prevailing disinclination to enter the army in the better class of working men. obriate these evils we should, in part, look to a reduction of colonial garrisons. The policy upon which we ought to proceed in these days of easy communication by steam between different parts of the empire, is not to scatter our force more than can possibly be avoided, but to keep a large reserve in this country (our citadel, as it is well termed by Sir J. Graham), ready to be sent at a short notice wherever danger may threaten.
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In the present state of most of our colonies they have nothing to fear from interual disturbances; during peace a sudden attack from without is not to be apprehended; and even in war, it is clear that we could not maintain, in each of our colonies, a regular force sufficient to make head against a serious attack of this sort, and that our reliance, for the safety of these dependencies, must be upon our naval power; upon the effect which our assuming the offensive would have in preventing any enemies with whom we may be engaged, from detaching any formidable force to attack our colonial possessions; upon our ability, if such a force should be sent out, to send, with equal promptitude, one capable of meeting it; and lastly, upon the efforts of the colonists themselves. A diminution of the strength of our colonial garrisons in some cases may,
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therefore, I think, be looked to as one means of increasing our reserve at home; but I must admit that this cannot be carried to any great extent; I look far more to a change in the description of force employed as effecting
a great saving in the cost of maintaining garrisons in our colonies.
In all our colonies a part of the garrison ought in my opinion to consist of colonial corps, in the constitution of which a
good deal of improvement might be effected. These corps should be of two kinds: those in which
both men and officers are of British origin; and those of which the officers only, and sometimes not even the officers, are British. We have already several colonial corps of both descriptions. The West India and Malta Regiments, the Cape and Ceylon Rifle Corps, and the Royal African Corps, are of the last kind; the Canadian
Rifle Corps, the Newfoundland Veterans, and the St. Helena Regiment, of the former. The employment of troops, of which the officers only are British, even to the extent to which it has already been practised, has been attended with the happiest effects. The West India Regiments have been found perfectly efficient for the purposes for which they are intended, and have been the means of late years of preventing a fearful sacrifice of the lives of British soldiers, by doing the duty of those stations which have proved most unhealthy to Europeans, but where black troops do not suffer. The Cape Mounted Ridle Corps and the Ceylon Rifles have also been found exceedingly economical, and at the same time much more efficient than any other troops for the particular descrip- tion of service for which they are required. I am strongly of opinion that the employment of a corps of this descrip- tion to a greater extent than has hitherto been practised, is most desirable; but I conceive that it is still more important to form also colonial corps, of which the soldiers as well as the officers are British. In forming such corps the objects should be kept in view which were originally contemplated, but unfortunately lost sight of, in forming the Canadian Rifle Corps. These objects were to make admission to such corps a reward to good soldiers of the line, and at the same time to make them the means of increasing in the colonies the population of British origin, closely connected with the mother-country by the ties of family and kindred. With this view it is proposed that the colonial corps should be recruited from the army of the line, giving the preference to men having at least one good-
conduct stripe, which under the new warrant would be to men of five years' service. It is perfectly easy, without any increase of pay or expense, to render admis- sion to these colonial corps an object of great desire to
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