CO885(1-2) — Page 6

PUBLIC

། ། ། ། །

RECORD OFFICE

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mwimmim

C.O.

Reference -

885

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHIC-

COPYRIGHT PHOTOGRAPH-NOT TO

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1834

£187,291.

1835

£163,458.

1836

£184,068.

1837 1838

£147,504. £138,180.

But it is right to state that the deficiency of the last year, arrises from the failure of the crop of currants, from which the largest portion of the revenue is biennially derived. The preceding observations will serve as an introduction to a representation which the Lord High Commissioner addressed to Lord Glenelg, in the month of June 1838, and Appendix, No. 18. of which a copy will be found in the Appendix.

Expediency of rais-

ing five if not ten

companies of black

Sir Howard Douglas commences his representation, by stating that he has reflected much upon the line of policy, which Great Britian should pursue in order to strengthen the hold which she has acquired over the Ionian Islands, as military naval and commercial stations of undoubted value and future importance.

Adverting to the prospect of a war, and to the great changes which would thereby be effected in the political condition of the States, it is clear that our policy in the meantime should be to propitiate the Ionian people by kindness and generosity to the preservation of their connection with Great Britian.

After glancing at the naval, military and political importance of the Islands to Great Britain, as enhanced by the encroachments of France upon the coast of Africa, by the growing influence of Austria as a naval Power, by the unsettled state of Greece, by the precarious existence of the Ottoman Empire, by the ambitious encroachments of Russia, by the inability of Spain to preserve the Balearic Isles from those who are evidently desirous of acquiring a naval station in the Mediterranean, Sir Howard Douglas brings into view the numerous disadvantages which result to the Islands from the anomalous character of their position as a middle state, between a colony and an independent Power.

While the States are not allowed, except through the protecting country, to enter into commercial treaties with Foreign Powers, the productions, and the shipping of the Islands are placed by us on the same footing as those of Foreign countries; the Ionian youth are not admitted into our army or navy; the policy of Russia and France, while the islands were in their possession was different, and both those Powers retain to this day the warmest partisans in the Islands.

But it is more particularly to the nature and amount of the pecuniary obligations under which the Ionian States are placed towards this country, that Sir Howard Douglas is desirous of calling attention. The revenue is falling off; the British garrisons which were maintained for a long period at six battalions, have been reduced to four, and it has now come to be contended that the military contributions of the States should undergo reduction also.

No colonial possession of this country having a legislative assembly pays any portion Gibraltar and Malta are the only crown colonies of its revenue into the military chest. which are called upon to dispose of their surplus revenue in that way.

After contrasting all the payments which other British colonies are enabled to make to the military chest, from special resources, with the Ionian contribution as detached from the general revenue of the States, Sir Howard Douglas states that in order to raise this re- venue the exportation of the natural produce of the Islands is burthened with excessive duties. Before the contribution was fixed at its present amount, the Ionian Legislature had the power of suspending the annual payments noticed in a previous part of this paper, in the event of adverse seasons, orof any other unfavourable circumstances, whereas since the contribution has been made permanent, every prospect of relief seems to be precluded. Before the con- tribution was fixed, any diminution of the garrison would have been a benefit to the Ionian treasury, whereas now such a diminution is only profitable to the British treasury. A fixed contribution is, therefore, now considered to have been an improvident arrangement for the States, and is denounced as a direct tribute.

Upon these grounds which Sir Howard Douglas develops at great length and supports by numerous considerations and arguments to which he returns in subsequent despatches, he recommends most earnestly that the charges imposed upon the states, both for their military defence, and for providing salaries for the British functionaries, which have amounted on an average to above £60,000 per annum, since the States have been placed under British protection, be modified and diminished, if not entirely remitted, or at least that the salaries should be charged upon the military contributions.

With regard to the state of the account between the Ionian Government and the military chest, it appears that some interruption took place at the commencement of the present year in the payment of the instalments of the contribution, and that of the six- teen instalments accruing since November 1834, thirteen had been made good in November 1838.

It remains to be stated in conclusion that the charge to be provided henceforward for completing the fortification of Corfu amounts to above £100,000

From Jamaica demands are made for more black troops under the following circum-

stances.

On the 1st of December last the force stationed in the Jamaica command (which tro for the Ju- comprises Bahamas and Honduras) amounted to 3,200 men, viz.—Royal Artillery, 198 ;

five European battalions; and the 2nd West India Regiment.

command.

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That force was distributed in the manner following:-

IN JAMAICA.

Rank and file.

8th Foot

412

37th ditto

422

56th ditto

399

64th ditto

414

68th ditto

423

Artillery

198

2,268

IN BAHAMAS.

6 Companies of 2nd West India Regiments

558

IN HONDURAS.

4 Companies of ditto ditto

374

3,200

In conformity with the arrangements made by the Government for reinforcing the troops in Canada, the Governor of Jamaica had already been instructed on the 1st of De- cember last, to detach one of the battalions under his command, the 37th, to Novia Scotia, thus reducing his infantry force to 4 battalions of 2,070 effective men, but with the intention that the 4 remaining batallions should be increased to 559 men, in all 2,236 rank and file.

On the 6th of December, however, the Governor was further instructed that it was the wish of the Government that he should detach another battalion to Halifax, if he felt that he could dispense with it, without apprehension for the security and tranquillity of Jamaica. In acknowledging the receipt of this instruction, Sir Lionel Smith has stated, that no discretion being left to him, he should send the 37th regiment to Halifax so soon as the means of conveyance could be provided, and it has already, in fact, arrived there; but that as regarded the further proposed diminution of his force, he felt that under the circum- stances in which the island was placed, such a measure would be extremely imprudent. He had, it was true, previously consented to his force being reduced to three white regi- ments, but conditionally upon a black regiment being allotted to him. If, however, the ad- miral to whom Sir Lionel was about to apply, (he writes on the 21st of January) could find conveyance for bringing over three companies of the 2nd West India Regiment from Baha- mas, and two companies from Honduras, he would in that case part with another white regi- ment. This arrangement will not, however, provide the requisite number of 700 rank and file of black troops to replace white troops in those unhealthy and objectionable quarters which cannot be abandoned; and it is stated by the General Commanding-in-chief, that Appendix, No. 21. Sir Lionel Smith will require a black regiment of not less than 1,000 rank and file.

Supposing then that the garrisons of Bahamas and Honduras are left reduced to three companies of the 2nd West India Regiment for the former, and two companies for the latter, it will still be necessary to make an immediate increase of five companies of 100 rank and file each to that corps, in order to fulfil the condition upon which Sir Lionel Smith has acquiesced in the reduction of his white troops. But if those garrisons are to be restored to the amount at which they stood on the 1st of December last, the 2nd West India Re- giment will require an increase of ten companies of 100 rank and file each, a measure which would seem to involve the propriety of creating a 3rd West India Regiment. The considerations to which the General Commanding-in-chief has adverted, as seeming to show the inexpediency of reducing the garrisons of Bahamas below the amount of the five companies of the 2nd West India Regiment, are grounded on the view which was taken by Lord Glenelg of the subject, in June, 1837, and which is recapitulated in No. 21, of the Appendix.

BRITISH NORTH AMERICA.

CANADA.

From North America no immediate demands are made for reinforcements, beyond a Expediency of rais. detachment of artillery for Nova Scotia, which the Board of Ordnance have no means ing an additional

force for defence of of furnishing.

North America. But the statements which will be found in the Appendix, are of a nature to merit the most serious attention of the Government, as showing the absolute necessity of en- deavouring to devise some means of checking the enormous expences of the temporary levies, as well as the evils resulting from the numerous desertions from the regular troops. It seems evident that so long as occasion can arise for alarm whether of regular invasion, or of predatory incursions from the United States, it would be useless to attempt to restrain authorities in the Canadian Provinces from taking such measures as they could not with- out imprudence leave untried, either for quieting the apprehensions of the population, or for defending them against actual aggression.

But it will also be seen from the Appendix, that even since the American authorities Appendix, No. 27.

have appeared desirous of repressing the border outrages, the regular force in Canada has

not been considered sufficient for the ordinary purposes of defence.

Under these circumstances, it appears to be deserving of consideration whether it would not be preferable to incur a defined amount of fixed expense for the maintenance of an ad- D

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