CO882-6 — Page 406

TIJAT

'' य 'ग

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Reference :-

CO. 882

6

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHIC- COPYRIGHT PHOTOGRAPH-NOT TO

4

The station has now been officially classed by the Admiralty as a flying Naval base. The few Naval marines, dockyard staff, and other forces happening to be there at the time will be removed by the first convenient transport to Hong-Kong in the event of war breaking out between Great Britain and any other foreign power in the North Pacific.

As the Admiralty is prepared to abandon the port forthwith on the outbreak of war, it is clear that Wei-hai-Wei cannot (as there are no means of defence) be used as a coaling station, except to a very limited extent, during the summer in times of peace.

Further, it is difficult to dispute that Wei-hai-Wei is too far distant from the seat of Government in Peking to be of much nee as a point d'appui for bringing pressure to bear on the Chinese Government when it may be necessary to do so in British interests.

Similarly, if hereafter, in pursuance of the policy of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the British Fleet is used for the purpose of Naval demonstration in Wei-hai-Wei against any foreign power threatening the integrity of the Chinese Empire, its effect is not likely, at this distance, to inspire much confidence or belief in British support in the Councils of Peking. On the contrary, in either of such cases, as a matter of fact, history shows that the presence of the British Fleet anchored off Taku, round, so to speak, the city walls of Peking, will always have prompter and better political results than the concentration of battleships in Wei-hai-Wei Harbour would lead to.

The question next arises whether, seeing that Wei-hai-Wei cannot be made a strong Military fortress or an effective Naval station, it can be converted into a commercial harbour.

The reply to this is that Wei-hai-Wei and the leased territories have absolutely no commercial resources, and that the surrounding districts are some of the poorest in China; practically there is no possibility of getting any regular exports, or of trade of any value being developed locally. The natives have no capital, and there is nothing here to attract foreign capital or Chinese enterprise from other places. A great commerce could, however, be brought to the Bay of Wei-hai-Wei (undoubtedly the finest in North China, and the only commercial asset the place owns) by means of inland railways reaching into the interior of Shantung and connecting by a branch line with Tientsin.

It should be remarked here, en passant, that any attempt to make a small local line from Wei-hai-Wei to Chefoo would be strongly opposed by the Chinese Government. Wei-hai-Wei is a free port where no Customs duties are charged. Out of export and import duties on commerce at Chefoo, the Customs collect about half a million dollars a year for the Chinese Government. The Chinese naturally would consider it unfair and unfriendly on the part of the British to divert the trade of a Treaty Port like Chefoo to a free harbour like Wei-hai-Wei.

A through inland Shantung line connecting with Tientsin, however, would greatly benefit Chefoo, if a branch line touched it, and if any difficulty arose about collecting Customs dues for the Chinese at Wei-hai-Wei, this could easily be arranged for, as at Kiao-Chow, by means of Chinese frontier barrier stations.

One may remark, however, that the fact of Wei-hai-Wei being a free port like Hong-Kong cannot help it now, as it has no commercial resources and no possible prospects in trade. On the other hand, the fact that the place is a free port prevents the local government from collecting any revenue from Customs-the only possible means of increasing the small revenue of the Bettlement.

If the British Government in prepared to support an English or Anglo- Chinese syndicate in such a large railway undertaking against any opposition that the German Government may make, and is ready to use its good offices also with the Chinese Government to obtain such a railway concession, then the commercial success of Wei-hai-Wei may be looked upon as assured.

On the other hand, if there are any reasons of State for not coming to an understanding with Germany about build.ng an English or Chinese railway line inland from Wei-hai-Wei, it is clear that Wei-hai-Wei will remain as it is now, a port of call for the British Fleet in the summer and a health resort

Ď

for foreign residents in North China during two or three months of the hot China summer.

As a summer resort, however, Wei-hai-Wei will have to compete with Japan, the old established treaty port of Chefoo, and the rising watering place of Pei Ta Ho in the north, and the loss of the British Naval and Military society will be somewhat a blow to its success as a fashionable watering place.

At the same time, as there are no possible means of increasing the local revenue, the settlement must always remain a small burden on the Imperial Treasury, costing approximately by way of grant-in-aid of the Colonial administration, about 10,000l. a year.

If, therefore, the British Government decides not to approach the German Government on the question of building railways inland from Wei-hai-Wei, it is certain that it cannot be made a commercial harbour. Since, therefore,

of

it has already been decided that it is not to be made a Naval or Military post any importance, it must perforce [remain] what it now is--a fishing village and summer watering place.

Such being the position, it appears worth consideration whether the Wei-hai-Woi Convention of 1898 should not be modified by his Majesty's Government after consultation with the Chinese Government.

Opportunity might be taken of the present friendly relations between Great Britain, China, and Japan to come to an arrangement with the Chinese Government by means of which the British authorities might retransfer the greater part of Wei-hai-Wei to China, and after making such extra payment as might be claimed, receive in exchange some more suitable Naval and Military base, such as Ting Hai, in the island of Chusan, at the entrance to the mouth of the great Yang Tsze River.

If Government decides that Wei-hai-Wei is not to be made a commercial port by railway expansion, there is really no reason to be advanced for continuing to administer the 24-mile long belt on the mainland, with an area of 280 square miles and a population of 120,000 native inhabitants. Still less necessary

is the large British sphere of influence (in which military operations may under the Convention be carried out by British troops), stretching away inland doe west for some 30 miles, and containing an area of 1,790 squaro miles, with a population of about 1,000,000 Chinese.

For the future, to make use of Wei-hai-Wei for all the purposes it serves

at present, it appears that to retain the island of Liu Kung and a small strip of land on the mainland about three miles long and about a mile deep would be all that is wanted. The rest of the territory could be retransferred to the Chinese without making any difference to the position of Wei-hal-Wei as a good sea harbour for the fleet and as a summer watering place for Europeans.

The island of Liu Kung was purchased from its Chinese inhabitants by the War Office and Admiralty for about 25,0007., and all the houses and buildings on it belong to the British Government. At present the Admiralty makes no use of the mainland at all.

The barracks of the 1st Chinese Regiment are on the mainland, and would be included in the small strip of land it is suggested should be reserved there for the use of Europeans visiting the place in the hot weather. There are no other military forces on the mainland and none on the island.

On the mainland there is no foreign business. On the island, the Eastern Extension Telegraph Company, throe British commission agencies, and several petty Chinese traders in foreign goods, are centred. There is no European merchant on the mainland.

It is clear, therefore, that if the mainland were re-ceded to China, no vested interests there would be injured.

In the event of war in North China, the island of Liu Kung and the smalt strip of mainland would always be available, as now, as a hospital base and transport centre. If the Chinese Regiment is disbanded, their barracks could be converted into a sanitarium for His Majesty's forces in China and Hong Kong.

For Naval gun practice at the ranges on the island, and for practice with small arms and cannon on the open sea outside it, Liu Kung Tao could be used as now.

E 21612.

A 3