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PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Reference :-

C.O. 882

6PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHIC- COPYRIGHT PHOTOGRAPH-NOT TO

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proposes the inclusion of the sum of £15,000 in the Colonial Services Estimate, 1902-3, as a grant in aid of the civil administration of Wei-hai-wei for that year.

It is suggested that a sum of $30,000 should be included in the estimates to cover any expenditure which may be recommended by the interdepartmental Committee on the administration of Liu Kung Tao, with reference to the Commissioner's proposal to build a native town on the island. On this point my Lords suggest that it would be best to await the Committee's report before providing money for this purpose. If the Secretary of State concurs, they would propose to reduce the proposed grant in aid of £15,000 for 1902-3 by $30,000, say, £3,000.

2650

No. 71.

I have, &c.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

COMMISSIONER SIR A. R. F. DORWARD to MR. CHAMBERLAIN. (Received January 21, 1902.)

(Secret.)

SIR,

Shanghai, December 12, 1901. As requested in your despatch, Wei-Hai-Wei, 'Secret, of 18th October,* I have the honour to report as follows:-

1. The total number of deserters from the Chinese Regiment since its formation in January, 1899, has been 805.

2. Rather more than one-third of that number left on the outbreak of the troubles in North China, and another third left on the return of the Regiment to Wei-Hai-Wei after active service, between December, 1900, and May, 1901.

3. Of the 805 deserters, 401 were men of less than four months' service, who had had no musketry training.

4. The men who deserted before the departure of the Regiment for Tientsin undoubtedly did so because they did not wish to fight against their own people, or because they were afraid of their families being made to suffer if they remained with the Regiment. Many threatening letters were sent to the men of the Regiment at that time, and their anxiety on account of their families was well known to the officers of the Regiment and myself, who could do little to reassure them, owing to the exaggerated ideas of the power of the Boxers then prevalent in North China.

5. Of the older soldiers who deserted after active service, I think there is no room for doubt that the cause of descrtion was the fact that the men had obtained nioney from loot, or from the purchase of loot, of which they knew the value, from soldiers of other nations, sufficient to set them up in business or to buy land with. The Chinese army is the last place where men of that class are likely to be found.

6. The chief causes for ordinary desertions are:-

(1.) The fact that a certain number of the farmer class only enlist to tide over the winter months, and return to work on their fields in the

spring.

(2.) Dislike of military service.

(3.) Obedience to the commands of their parents. (4.) Debt, principally due to gambling.

As they are very much better paid, clothed, housed, and fed in the Chinese Regiment than in the Chinese army, it is improbable that deserters of these classes, except the gamblers, afterwards enlisted in that army.

7. Of the few men who actually deserted when on active service, none'did so till after the capture of Tientsin city, although the men of the Regiment must have been well aware of the very prevalent feeling that the foreign settlements were, before that capture, in considerable danger, and there was nothing to prevent them deserting at night, with their arms and accoutrements, had they so wished. of the city, when the troops of all nations were obtaining plunder, some men deserted, After the capture probably with the object of doing so. Two men deserted on sentry duty, first, how- ever, taking off their accoutrements, and leaving them and their rifles on the ground. In all cases the men have rarely taken their arms with them on desertion. proposed serving with the Chinese army they would undoubtedly have done so, and Had they am consequently of opinion that only a small number of the deserters from the Chinese Regiment can now be serving in the Chinese army. It is probable, however, No. 59A.

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that some men who have been discharged as medically unfit, or not likely to become efficient soldiers, are now doing so. Rejected recruits, a very numerous class, may also have enlisted in the Chinese army, falsely representing themselves as deserters from the Chinese Regiment.

8. In some cases the whereabouts of deserters are known, but no intimation has ever been received that any are serving with the Chinese army, except the statement made by Major-General Creagh that an ex-soldier of the Regiment is now the Com- manding Artillery Officer with General Ma's army. It should not be difficult for General Creagh to get that man's name, which, if sent to the Officer Commanding the Regiment, would enable enquiry concerning him to be made. Some time ago I heard a rumour that a Chinese Regiment deserter was holding such an appointment, but considered it unlikely, as nothing was known of it among the men of the Regiment, and as no one could possibly have learned anything about artillery in the Regiment. I believed the rumour to have arisen from one of the two following facts:-

(1.) There was formerly serving in the Chinese Regiment an ex-Chinese soldier who had served as a gunner in the forts at Wei-Hai-Wei during the China- Japan war. He was an early recruit of the Regiment, and rose to the rank of sergeant. He was a well-known man at Wei-Hai-Wei and in the Regiment, and gained the Distinguished Service Medal at Tientsin. He was afterwards killed at Sunghow when with the Peking relief force.

(2.) There is now serving in the Regiment, as interpreter, a man who was formerly a station master at Chow-Chow, on the Lu-Hau line. His house was burned by the Boxers, and his wife was killed. He joined General Ma's army as a telegraphist and fought against us, in charge of a machine gun, in the fight at which the Tientsin Western Arsenal was captured. He offered his services to the Chinese Regiment as a civilian interpreter, in October, 1900, and was afterwards enlisted.

9. General Creagh makes two statements:-

(1.) That the requisite officers for the Chinese troops in Chili have been trained in the Chinese Regiment at Wei-Hai-Wei.

(2.) That the Chinese openly speak of the Chinese Regiment as a good school of instruction.

I feel sure that the first statement was made from untrustworthy information. The difficulty in the Regiment has always been to find men who were capable of being turned into good non-commissioned officers, and, as officers, they would certainly not be dangerous enemies. The post of officer in the Chinese army is of some value, and not likely to be freely bestowed upon the class of men who enlist in the Chinese Regiment. The second statement cannot have been made from General Creagh's own personal knowledge. There are very few, if any, British officers in North China who know the Chinese language and people sufficiently well to justify their making such a statement, and General Creagh does not know Chinese.

10. For a few months past rumours, due to most false and malicious statements regarding desertions, reckoned by the thousand, and other matters in connection with the Chinese Regiment, have been current in North China. These rumours have been a cause of much indignation in the Regiment, and the Commanding Officer has tried to trace them home. Most of them seem to have emanated from Peking. I trust, in the interests of justice, and for the sake of the good name of the Regiment, that the Foreign Office may be moved to make enquiry, through the British Legation, as to their author or authors,

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11. As regards the general trustworthiness of the Regiment, I can only say that I hope I may again have the honour of commanding it on active service. forced to trust to it when, only half-trained, in the early days of the late troubles, and at no time have we ever had the faintest reason to withdraw that trust. It was our great fortune to have such a fine body of men available whom we could trust. trained as they were, no troops did better service than the Chinese Regiment did, and none worked so hard. I often think of the service it would have done had it consisted of 1,300 well-trained soldiers, as at present, instead of about 300 recruits, and of how that service would have forced a full recognition of the value of the Regiment. The only drawback to its complete success is the prevalence of desertion, for which time and patience are the only cures.

I have, &c.,

A. R. F. DORWARD,

Major-General.

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