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(b) Ordinance No. 1 of 1870 (repealed, except as regards pensions, by Ordinance No. 6 of 1905) fixed the salaries of public servants and empowered the Governor to issue from year to year his warrant for their payment and the payment of pensions.

(c) Section 11 (8) of the Government of India Act of 1919 excludes from the proposals which have to be submitted to the Legislative Councils the salaries and pensions of persons appointed by or with the approval of His Majesty or by the Secretary of State in Council. Section 25 of the same Act makes a similar provision with regard to the Indian Legislature, and further states that the proposals of the Governor-General in Council in this matter "shall not be open to discussion by either Chamber at the time when the annual statement is under consideration, unless the Governor-General-other- wise directs.”

(d) Section 26 of the same Act gives the Governor-General power to certify that the passage of a Bill is essential for the safety, tranquillity, or interests, of British India, and thereupon the Bill becomes an Act of the Indian Legislature.

10 The Public Services recognize that political development on democratic lines requires that full control of the expenditure of the public revenue should ulti- mately be entrusted to the representatives of the people. This principle, which would fundamentally alter the position of the Public Services, is based on the belief that those representatives will not misuse their power. The recent debate, how- ever, has given a definite indication that the unofficial members in the new Council may continue to make the Public Services a pawn in the political game, and may again propose the reduction of the emoluments of public officers in direct opposition to the recently expressed decision of the Secretary of State. It is from such arbitrary interference with their prospects that the Services seek protection, and they will be perfectly satisfied if those prospects are allowed to remain, as in the past, in the hands of the Secretary of State.

(Here follow 16 signatures.)

Enclosure 5 in No. 39.

MEMORANDUM ON SECTION 52 OF THE ORDER IN COUNCIL, 1920, WHICH READS----

"52 (1) If the Governor is of opinion that the passing of any Bill, or any clause of it, or of any amendment to any such Bill, or of any resolution or vote, is of para- mount importance to the public interest, he may declare such Bill, clause, amendment, resolution, or vote to be of paramount importance.

(2) In any such case only the votes of the ex-officio Members and Nominated Official Members shall be recorded, and any such Bill, clause, amendment, resolution, or vote shall be deemed to have been passed by the Council if a majority of the votes of such ex-officio Members and Nominated Official Members are recorded in favour of any such Bill, clause, amendment, resolution, or vote."

I think that amendment of the Ceylon Order in Council in accordance with the Indian precedents quoted in Section 9 (c) and (d) of the attached memorial is most desirable. The present position is certainly precarious and it will moreover place the Governor in a very unfortunate situation in future budget debates. There are several unpleasant possibilities.

i. Normally the Chairman at meetings of Legislative Council under the pro- posed new Order in Council will be the Vice-President (not the Governor). This Vice-President will probably be an elected Ceylonese member, and he may quite possibly in the matter of salaries of public servants be opposed to the policy of Government. Under such a Chairman the budget will annually come up for con- sideration. The Unofficial majority may then try to snatch a division unexpectedly as is sometimes done with success in the House of Commons. A resolution propos- ing reduction of salaries by a percentage could be suddenly and briefly moved and seconded in. Committee of the whole Council. The Official Members would then have to keep up a debate on the Motion and prevent a vote from being taken until the Governor could come down to the Council Chamber, displace the Vice-President

• Enclosure 4.

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and declare the matter to be one of paramount importance. There would be little dignity about such procedure, and the creaking of the constitutional machine would be painfully apparent. Moreover, if by accident the Governor were not readily available on such an occasion or were suffering from indisposition, the unofficials might carry their resolution. In that case the Governor could not after the vote had been taken declare the matter to be one of paramount importance and undo what the Council had done.

ii. If the Governor were forewarned, he would no doubt take the chair during the Committee stage of the budget debate. But it would then be possible when the Schedule of the Appropriation Bill was being taken item by item, for unofficial members to move a decrease in respect of each successive head of expenditure in the Schedule with a view to reducing salaries. The Governor would then be obliged in respect of each head to declare the retention of the original figures to be a matter of paramount importance: and if such tactics were persisted in, the unofficials could compel the Governor to pass practically every head of the budget by use of the official votes alone. It is easy to see how such a procedure would be misrepresented to the public both in Ceylon and in England. It would be said that the Government had prevented the elected members from voting on the budget at all, and pressure would be brought to bear on M.P.s to ventilate the matter in the House of Commons. The creaking of the machine would be still more painfully apparent; and if tactics of this kind were adopted in successive years, the strain on the Constitution would become intolerable.

iii. Another course which obstruction might take would be to insist that the details in the volume of the estimates should be considered item by item in Com- mittee of the whole Council. This is done in other Colonies and it would be difficult to refuse such a request, if made. The elected members could then move reductions of the emoluments of individual officers and oblige the Governor to declare the salaries of quite subordinate and unimportant officers to be matters of " mount importance," thus again reducing the constitutional procedure to an absurdity.

para-

The elected members when dominant, as they will be next year, are likely to be shrewd enough to find many methods whereby the paramount power of the Governor as it exists in the present Order in Council can be shown to great disadvantage and made even to look ridiculous. Were this done it might become very difficult for the Secretary of State to support the action of the Ceylon Government in the House of Commons. Moreover, action by elected members on lines such as I have indicated above would completely unsettle the minds of the public servants in this Colony and would have a very bad effect on the administrative machine as a whole. therefore, in my opinion, be better and safer in this matter to adopt in Ceylon a It would procedure modelled on that of the Government of India.

I may add from my experience elsewhere that elected members will often vote against a measure if they are quite sure that in spite of their adverse vote it will nevertheless be passed. If, on the other hand, they believe that by voting against a measure they will insure its rejection then they will often think very seriously before they cast an adverse vote. The reason, of course, is that in the former case they have all the satisfaction of voting publicly against the Government without incurr- ing the responsibility for rejecting a measure of which they may privately approve. Such a consideration will apply with much force in the enlarged Legislative Council next year.

The sense of responsibility should have a sobering effect on the unofficial majority and it is quite possible that, if in the next Council the question of reduc- ing salaries were put to the vote, and if the members did not know beforehand whether the Governor would or would not exert paramount powers, there might be a majority in favour of leaving the matter alone. If, however, the Governor at the outset declared the matter to be one of paramount importance, I do not doubt that all the elected members would speak (although they could not vote) against the measure and would get such cheap newspaper popularity as might accrue to them thereby. If, therefore, there should be any obstacle to reserving the question of salaries, as is done in India, then I think that at the least the Governor of Ceylon should be authorized to exercise naramount powers after as well as before a vote is taken in Legislative Council. This course would have the further advantage of enabling the Governor, when desirable, to consult the Secretary of State before exercising such powers.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Reference :-

CO. 882/10

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHIC- COPYRIGHT PHOTOGRAPH-NUT TO

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